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ABSTRACT
THE TACIT DIMENSION OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING
Thomas Reeder Robinson 
Old Dominion University, 1996 
Director: Dr. Laurence D. Richards
This research was conducted to observe the self-reflections of an organizational 
participant group to further understand the organizational learning phenomenon. The 
participant group consisted of the 15 managers, spanning three levels of management, of a 
large engineering group in the southeastern United States.
The intent of the research was to generate theory, rather than to test theory. To 
accomplish this objective, a qualitative research methodology in a participatory action 
framework was modeled from Keating's (1993) Organizational Learning Process (OLP) to 
co-construct participants' organizational reflections. The methodology included individual 
interviews designed to elicit spontaneity that co-generated organizational perspectives. 
These perspectives were then combined and anonymously assessed by the participants as to 
their personal beliefs, and their perceptions of the organization's rhetoric and actions. The 
assessed perspectives were finally used to facilitate group dialogues. The assessed 
perspectives revealed what the participant group believed, and what they perceived 
themselves to say and do. It was discovered that there were many perspectives that 
revealed large incongruities between the participant group's beliefs, rhetoric, and actions. 
Analysis of these incongruities and the group dialogues: (1) demonstrated Argyris and 
Schon's (1978) theoretical constructs for barriers to organizational learning; (2) indicated 
that the expectations generated by their "quality" program were incongruent with more 
traditional expectations that pre-dated their "quality" program; and (3) suggested the 
existence of a body of largely tacit and experiential organizational perspectives that 
established a strong context for decision and action. The existence of these influential, yet 
tacit, perspectives implied a new essential process for the development of an advanced 
organizational learning system (Argyris and Schon, 1978), Le., the co-construction of tacit 
knowledge. The processes through which such co-constructions appeared to occur 
naturally within the participant group were detailed as a proposed explanatory model for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
organizational learning. Implications of the research for the management of organizations, 
for organizational learning theory, and for future research were also developed.
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This research is conducted to observe organizational self-reflections on issues of 
importance to an organization in a participatory action research setting to further understand 
the organizational learning phenomenon. Motivating this research is that there is no theory 
or model of organizational learning that is widely accepted (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Keating, 
1993), even though there exists a well recognized literature (Bateson, 1979; Argyris and 
Schon, 1978; Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Levitt and March, 1988; Huber 1991; Dixon, 1992; 
Dodgson, 1993), which makes numerous useful distinctions on types of learning (e.g., 
lower-level versus higher-level, behavioral versus cognitive, and individual versus shared), 
while addressing the goals and processes of organizational learning and ways in which 
organizational learning may be facilitated or impeded. Fiol and Lyles (1985) point out that 
the lack of acceptance for a model of organizational learning goes back over two decades, 
when Simon (1969) defined organizational learning as the growing insights and successful 
restructuring of organizational problems by individuals reflected in the structural elements 
and outcomes of the organization itself. In this definition, learning consists of the 
development of insights on one hand, and structural and other action outcomes on the 
other. As Fiol and Lyles (1985) note, one is a change in knowledge, sometimes not clearly 
perceptible, while the other shows itself in the more easily visible organizational outcome. 
Fiol and Lyles (1985) observed that the problem in distinguishing between these two 
aspects of organizational learning is further complicated in that a change in states of 
knowledge and structural changes often does not occur simultaneously. Consequently, 
Fiol and Lyles (1985) show in their review of the organizational learning literature that, as a 
result of this confusion, theorists have referred to learning as (1) new insights or 
knowledge (Argyris and Schon, 1978; Hedberg, 1981); or (2) new structures (Chandler, 
1962); or (3) new systems (Jelinek, 1979: Miles, 1982); or (4) mere actions (Cyert and 
March, 1963; Miller and Friesen, 1980); or (5) some combination of the above (Bartunek, 
1984; Shrivastava and Mitroff, 1982). These phenomena are referred to as learning (Cyert 
and March, 1963; Jelinek, 1979); adaptation (Chakravarthy, 1982; Meyer, 1982); change 
(Dutton and Duncan, 1983; Mintzberg and Waters, 1982); or unlearning (Starbuck, Greve, 
and Hedberg, 1978). Fiol and Lyles (1985) observe that in all instances organizational 
learning authors assume that learning will improve future performance, but that a problem 
emerges around a clear definition of learning and the measurement of it Accordingly, Fiol
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and Lyles (1985) present an "initial definition" of organizational learning so that "a better 
theory can be built".
Organizational learning means the process of improving actions through
better knowledge and understanding. (Fiol and Lyles, 1985, 1)
The above framework provides the initial motivation to further understand the 
organizational learning phenomenon. Accordingly, a participatory action research approach 
is adopted to facilitate the observation of organizational self-reflections in an organization. 
First, it is assumed that individual self-reflections on the members' organization will 
contain what individuals in the organization believe and perceive, and that joint self­
reflections will contain what individuals in the organization jointly believe and perceive. 
Therefore, it is assumed that this is a way of observing the "knowledge" or 
"understandings" in a particular organization. Secondly, although this research involves a 
unique case study of a specific organization, it is assumed that there will exist general 
findings that can be applied to many other organizations. Finally, it is believed that an 
action research design is necessary to match the complexity of the organizational learning 
phenomenon with that of the requisite observations. Support for this belief is found in 
authors such as Lewin (1947), who pointed out that action research avoids many of the 
deficiencies of positivist science for generating knowledge for application to organizational 
problems, and Susman & Evered (1978), who argued that the positivist science model is an 
inadequate basis for generating knowledge about organizations.
In the course of enacting action research designed to facilitate organizational self­
reflections, what stood out in this particular case study was the number of unwritten norms 
and assumptions: i.e., the individual reasons why the participant perceived himself or 
herself, or others in the organization to decide, choose, and act as they did. Equally 
remarkable was not only the extent that such unwritten norms and assumptions were 
shared, but also that the participants themselves were largely not fully aware of such 
unwritten norms and shared assumptions. Questions naturally arose out of such 
observations as: how were such unwritten norms and shared assumptions generated, how 
did they become shared, and why were they largely not explicitly articulated prior to this 
research facilitation? If these unwritten norms and shared assumptions are taken as 
evidence of values and generalizations that are generally known, understood, and believed 
by the organization's members, and they are seen to affect the organization's outcomes, 
then such knowing, understanding, and believing could be seen to fit Fiol and Lyles'
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(1985) above definition for organizational learning, especially if the understandings and 
actions are not required to be judged as "improved" or "better".
I should note at this point the ways in which I differ with Fiol and Lyles' (1985) 
definition for organizational learning. First, I contend that it is a matter of interpretation as 
to whether or not the learning observed in this specific case study fits the "improvement" or 
"better" specification. Accordingly, I contend "improvement" or "better" is in the eye of 
the beholder. Further, I view the assumption by most authors that learning will improve 
future performance, to be a limited viewpoint of organizational learning. I believe that a 
broader viewpoint is simply a recognition of new understandings, beliefs, or perspectives 
as learning, without the judgement of what is improved or better. Second, as Fiol and 
Lyles (1985) pointed out, the problem with taking new knowledge as evidence of learning 
is that sometimes it is not clearly perceptible. I offer that this is especially the case with 
experiential knowledge, because such knowledge is constructed in a non-verbal domain, 
and is often tacit until an explicit articulation of the knowledge is made. However, 
although such knowledge may be difficult to recognize, articulate, or measure, it is no less 
real. Indeed, I contend that it should be the work of a learning organization to continually 
strive to articulate their learning, as I contend such work is necessary for an organization to 
make their own learning a subject of their learning. Third, I contend the generation of new 
organizational knowledge creates the potential for organizational action. Therefore, I 
contend that organizational actions are effects of shared organizational knowledge, and 
should not be mistaken for knowledge generation or the learning itself. However, I do 
contend that actions have a dynamic relationship with knowledge: it became apparent in 
this particular case study that actions flowed from current perspectives, and that these 
actions in turn affected how individuals experienced and perceived their organization. Most 
often the flow of organizational actions seemed to re-enforce current perspectives and 
beliefs, but were also observed in some cases to modify perspectives and beliefs. Because 
of this dynamic relationship, I contend that organizational actions should be taken at a point 
in time as effects of shared organizational knowledge, and not be mistaken for knowledge 
generation or the learning itself. In summary, the creation of new shared 
knowledge in an organization, without judgem ent as to its goodness, is 
taken as evidence of an organization having undergone learning. It is 
acknowledged that this learning may be hard to perceive, especially when it is not 
evidenced by actions. However, it is contended that the work of a learning organization is 
to continually strive to articulate its own learning. When an organization has created new 
shared knowledge, a potential for action is created, and therefore such knowledge
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4
generation may be evidenced by the actions of the organization. Such actions then become 
the effects of learning, but only at a point in time, since knowledge and action are taken as 
having a dynamic relation, where one affects the other. In the course of developing this 
perspective during the conduct of this research, my focus for this case study became the 
evidence supporting what was known, understood, or believed, especially in some shared 
way, in my search to observe and better understand the phenomenon of organizational 
learning.
Because of the above observations, the question arose as to how did the shared 
perspectives, understandings, and beliefs come to be held by the individuals of the 
organization? If such shared perspectives, understandings, and beliefs in this specific case 
study are taken as "organizational knowledge” and their generation is taken as "learning", 
then some of the relevant questions for "organizational learning" would concern the 
perspectives, understandings, and beliefs that come to be shared in an organization. 
Accordingly, I offer a perspective for organizational knowledge as the shared 
perspectives, understandings, and beliefs held by the members of an 
organization, and I offer a perspective of organizational learning as simply the 
generation of organizational knowledge. I contend that such learning creates the 
potential for action and therefore such learning may be evidenced through the 
organization's decisions, choices, and actions, which in turn can further affect learning,
i.e., the generation of new knowledge. The actions which do ensue from such knowledge 
produce the organization, while knowledge that does not produce actions, at a minimum, 
produces context for interpretation of actions. It is the evolution of this perspective during 
the course of this research that has led to the examination of organizational knowledge in 
search of a more acceptable theory for organizational learning. Relevant questions became 
the following: (1) How is knowledge created in an organization? (2) How does
knowledge become shared in an organization? (3) Why is at least some organizational 
knowledge, especially that which is influential in an organization's decisions and actions, 
not explicitly articulated? (4) What distinctions can be drawn for organizational 
knowledge? And, (5) what are the implications for organizational learning to the 
distinctions that might arise out of the above questions?
In asking these questions it became evident that, while the organizational learning 
literature implies knowledge is the result of learning, it lacks an explicit treatment as to how 
knowledge is produced and the ways in which it comes to be shared. Attention to this 
deficiency is made explicit by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995):
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First, as seen in Senge (1990), organizational learning theories basically 
lack "the view that knowledge development constitutes learning" (Weick,
1991, p. 122). Most of them are trapped in a behavioral concept of 
"stimulus-response." Second, most of them still use the metaphor of 
individual learning (Weick, 1991; Dodgson, 1993). In the accumulation of 
over 20 years of studies, they have not developed a comprehensive view on 
what constitutes "organizational" learning. Third, there is widespread 
agreement that organizational learning is an adaptive change process that is 
influenced by past experience, focused on developing or modifying 
routines, and supported by organizational memory. As a result, the theories 
fail to conceive an idea of knowledge creation. (Nonaka and Takeuchi,
1995, 45)
It is for these reasons the focus of this dissertation is on knowledge, how it is 
generated, how it is shared, and how it affects learning in an organization.
Purpose of the Research
The primary purpose of this research is to further understanding of the 
organizational learning phenomenon by application of an Organizational Learning Process 
(OLP) developed by Keating (1993). This process also includes a methodology designed 
to make explicit and to observe the existence of gaps between organizational "espoused 
theory" and "theory in-use", i.e., rhetoric and action, as Argyris and Schon (1978) 
contended exists in nearly all organizations. With this purpose in mind, five objectives 
guided the effort
The first objective is to incorporate changes in Keating's (1993) 
intervention strategy that were suggested by his research to determine if 
these changes would indeed inform and enhance the strategy. The changes 
made in Keating's strategy were: (1) an emphasis in facilitating expressions of 
experiential, and hence largely tacit organizational knowledge; (2) individual validation of 
perspectives; and (3) participant assessment of the resulting perspectives on three scales 
versus two.
An implication that emerged during this research is that experiential organizational 
knowledge is not only largely tacit but also has a significant influence on an individual's 
organizational perceptions, decisions, and actions. Given the role that this tacit 
organizational knowledge seems to play, an implication of this research is that such
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knowledge has a significant influence on an organization's ability to collectively learn. In 
particular, Keating (1993) noted in his research:
...individuals of an organization have differing perspectives... These 
differences remain organizationally tacit until some form of representation 
makes them explicit (Keating 1993,5)
This research is in agreement with this statement and advocates that there exist in all 
complex organizations a body of organizational knowledge that is largely tacit in the sense 
of Polanyi's (1966) "tacit knowing", a theory of mind for an essential process of thinking, 
which occurs largely outside of our explicit awareness. This tacit knowing exists from the 
ways in which members of an organization experience their organization and translate such 
experiences into generalized assumptions and beliefs. Much of this knowledge is largely 
tacit since a large portion of a member's organizational experience occurs in a non-verbal 
domain. Until such experience is translated into an explicit articulation or representation, 
this non-verbal knowledge remains tacit
Due to this assumption of the ubiquitous nature of tacit knowledge, there was a 
deliberate attempt in the elicitation of individual perspectives, to bring out this "tacit 
knowing" in an attempt to observe how such tacit knowledge might contribute to 
understanding the organizational learning phenomena. This was done by turning questions 
and insights raised by participants in interviews back to them in the form of reflective 
questions. Through this interview technique it was discovered that "spontaneous" 
conversations were achieved. This spontaneity would evidence itself through spontaneous 
behaviors, such as, laughter, anger, and other emotional expressions, banging on desks, 
waving or wringing of hands, and other bodily gestures, and/or copious use of metaphors, 
stories, and other figurative language expressions, while often expressing a "here and 
now", and their feelings in relation to this "here and now". Through such spontaneous 
conversations a portion of the participant's previously non-articulated organizational 
experience would often be expressed. These expressions would frequently contain 
generalizations of the participant's organizational beliefs, and would also often imply how 
such beliefs were formed from such experiences.
It was discovered early in the research process that spontaneous conversations 
seemed to facilitate making tacit knowledge explicit Consequently, such spontaneity was 
purposely sought in the interviews following this insight It was observed that reflective 
questioning, which was initially used with the intention of eliciting tacit organizational
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knowledge, could sometimes produce spontaneity, but not always. In these instances, the 
participant often expressed concern about the interview and its confidentiality, or a 
perception of compulsion for the research by upper management Intuitively, it was sensed 
that trust was an essential component to achieving spontaneity. As trust built through the 
course of the research process, spontaneity in interviews, conversations, and group 
meetings occurred with greater frequency. Chapter V, "Methodology Enactment", tells the 
story of framing the research in a manner acceptable to the participants, and the building of 
confidence with the participants to achieve the trust that seemed essential in achieving the 
desired spontaneity. Links between trust, spontaneity, experiential and tacit knowledge are 
drawn. Finally, the implications of these links for the management of organizations, for 
constructing advanced organizational learning systems, and for action research are drawn in 
chapter Vm, "Research Implications".
The participants' conversational representations of their organizational experiences, 
especially in conversations that achieved a degree of spontaneity, were interpreted by the 
researcher in the form of explicit perspectives, short statements that attempted to generalize 
the participant's thoughts, beliefs, values, and/or feelings regarding specific organizational 
issues or relations. These short statements, served as the researcher's hypotheses of how 
the participant translated his or her organizational experiences into his or her organizational 
values, beliefs, decisions, and/or actions. These hypotheses were tested through a process 
of participant validation of the perspectives, which also served to frame the research in a 
manner acceptable to the participants and to build trust Chapter IV, "Research Design", 
details this modified Organizational Learning Process (OLP).
In his research, Keating (1993) also formulated individual "perspectives" in the 
form of a series of short statements from individual interviews. However, Keating's 
(1993) formulation of perspectives differs from this research in two aspects. First, Keating 
(1993) did not individually validate the perspectives he formulated from his interviews, and 
therefore such perspectives were not taken as a hypothesis of the individual participant's 
meaning. Rather, they were taken as a representation intended to stimulate further 
reflection and dialogue within his OLP design. Second, in conducting his interviews, 
Keating (1993) principally followed a predetermined questionnaire, as opposed to a semi­
structured interview, i.e., questions built upon previous answers delivered with the intent 
to facilitate a deep reflection. As such, there was no deliberate attempt to elicit tacit 
knowledge or to achieve spontaneity in Keating's (1993) research, although both did occur 
to a limited extent (see chapter IV, "Research Design"). This difference in spontaneity 
appears to make a difference in the participants expressing more of what they explicitly
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knew, i.e., their verbal knowledge, versus what they tacitly knew from their experiences,
i.e., their non-verbal, experiential, and largely tacit knowledge. This is evidenced by the 
difference in the extent and size of the gaps between rhetoric and action found between the 
perspectives generated in Keating's (1993) research and this research. When the 
perspectives are evaluated by the participants on scales designed to observe their 
organizational "espoused theory" versus "theory in-use" (Argyris and Schon, 1978), i.e. 
rhetoric versus action, as was done in Keating's (1993) research and is done in this 
research, Keating (1993) found significantly fewer perspectives with high empirical gaps, 
as measured by a seven point Likert-type scale, between rhetoric and action than did this 
research (see chapter VII, "Local Findings"). From this evidence it appears that 
spontaneity is a key factor in getting participants to articulate their organizational actions, as 
opposed to their organizational rhetoric, although it is acknowledged that there may have 
been other factors, which this research was not designed to measure. However, in this 
particular case study there are many perspectives in which the participants are in good 
agreement that the perspectives represent the actions in the organization, and are in poor 
agreement that they represent the rhetoric in the organization, and vice versa (see chapter 
VI, "Perspective Analysis"). Since actions are experienced, and experiences often remain 
tacit until some explicit representation is formed, it appears there is likely to always be 
some gap between existing rhetoric and current action in organizations, which is also 
advocated by Argyris and Schon (1978), although not from a tacit knowledge perspective. 
Consequently, the perspectives which exhibit a gap between rhetoric and action in this 
particular case study are seen to provide a window into the sought after experiential and 
largely tacit organizational knowledge (see chapter VII, "Local Findings"). This research 
also implies that these perspectives provide a unique window into understanding learning 
and the unique barriers to learning in an organization. Finally, this research advocates that 
the tacit knowledge, which these perspectives reveal, points toward a process that is 
essential to advanced organizational learning systems, i.e., a process where a context is 
created for the spontaneous articulation of tacit experiential knowledge (see chapter VUI, 
"Research Implications"). There are also many perspectives in which the participants are in 
good agreement that they represent both the rhetoric and actions in the organization. For 
these perspectives, this research advocates that they provide a window into understanding 
what is explicit in the organization (see chapter VI, "Perspective Analysis").
Keating's (1993) research finally differs from this research in how the perspectives 
for the entire participant group were assessed by the participants. Keating combined the 
individual perspectives into a larger set of statements for the entire group of participants.
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This larger set of statements was assessed by the entire participant group, just as is done in 
this research. However, the set of perspectives formed from Keating's research were 
assessed by the participants on only two scales. These two scales were labeled as the 
"expressed axis" and the "current axis", and were defined to correspond to Argyris and 
Schon's (1978) "espoused theory” and "theory-in-use”, respectively. Keating noted in his 
research that individuals sought to distinguish themselves from the larger organization:
...individuals suggested that they wanted to respond to an organizational 
profile statement differently than their response for the organizational 
perspective. Instead, they insisted their perspective was different than that 
which they perceived the organization to hold. The participants pointed out 
that the strategy did not permit this distinction, of individual perspective in 
contrast to the organizational perspective, to be expressed. (Keating 1993, 
162-163)
Consequently, a third scale is provided in this research for individuals to express their 
personal position or belief toward the perspective that is being assessed, in addition to the 
two scales modeled after Argyris and Schon's (1978) "espoused theory" and "theory-in- 
use". The addition of this third scale results in revealing gaps between how the participant 
group personally views a perspective versus how they perceive the organization's rhetoric 
and/or actions to be disposed toward a perspective. These gaps between individuals' 
personal positions * and perceptions of what the organization says and does serve to 
provide insight into understanding learning and the barriers to learning in an organization, 
as well as providing a window into the participant organization's shared tacit knowledge. 
Chapter VI, "Perspective Analysis", details the belief, rhetoric, and action gaps that were 
found in the participant organization. Chapter VII, "Local Findings", presents these gaps 
as evidence supporting specific insights into the participant organization.
In summary, the intervention strategy for this research differed from Keating's 
(1993) in that it first explicitly attempts to elicit the participants' tacit, experiential 
organizational knowledge in the form of spontaneous conversations regarding the 
participant's organizational experiences. Secondly, it includes the extra step of individual 
perspective validation, whereby the initial researcher perspective formulation is taken only
1 Individuals' personal position assessments are also referred to as personal belief, since it is how the 
individual is personally disposed toward the perspective, e.g., a respondent may say regarding the 
perspective, "I personally believe this statement to be true, while I perceive most in the organization say 
it's not true, but act as though it were true."
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as a hypothesis of the individual participant’s interview meaning. This step affords the 
participant an opportunity to individually reflect on his or her own perspectives. Finally, a 
third scale is provided for the individual assessments of the participant group's set of 
perspectives to provide the individual participants an explicit opportunity to distinguish 
themselves from the larger organization. All of these differences serve to reveal to a greater 
degree gaps between personal organizational beliefs, and perceptions of the organization's 
rhetoric and actions. Identification of these gaps serve to provide insight in understanding 
the participant organization's learning system and barriers to learning, while providing a 
window into the participant organization's shared tacit knowledge (chapter VII, "Local 
Findings").
The second objective is to implement Keating's (1993) intervention 
strategy as modified as a participatory action research project in an 
organizational setting different from that of Keating's research to observe 
similarities and differences. The research question accompanying this objective is: 
"Will a similar reflective inquiry in a completely different organization produce similar 
results?" This question is addressed in chapter VII, "Local Findings".
The third objective is to bring out organizational self-reflections on 
traditional change technologies and other organizational issues deemed 
important by the participants themselves in order that: 1) the participants 
are provided with an opportunity for benefit through the discovery of 
organization specific knowledge; and 2) an opportunity is created for 
observing evidence of learning as a result of such change technologies and 
issues. It was understood that if the research is not beneficial to the participants, it will 
likely not hold their attention and support. So the issue of how the research can or will be 
beneficial to the participants is of specific importance and continuous reflection throughout 
the research. These reflections are detailed in chapter V, "Methodology Enactment".
Specifically, the organization, which is the subject of this research, was in their 
fifth year of a Total Quality Management (TQM) 2 implementation. Aside from the larger 
questions of "What is learning in an organization, and what constitutes evidence for such 
learning?", there are secondary questions which ask, "Can such learning be enhanced by an 
organizational improvement technology or philosophy, such as TQM?", and "How might
2 Italics in this dissertation is reserved to indicate that a more generic term has been substituted for the 
specific term used by the participant organization in order to better protect the identity of the participant 
organization.
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such a technology be evaluated in terms of organizational learning? These questions are 
addressed in chapter VIE, "Research Implications".
The fourth objective is to observe differences in the participants' 
organizational "espoused theory" versus "theory in-use" (Argyris and Schon, 
1978), i.e., rhetoric versus action. Argyris and Schon (1978), in their model for 
Organizational Learning, contend gaps between rhetoric and action are ubiquitous in 
organizations, and are further accompanied by "camouflage", i.e., routines that turn such 
gaps into "undiscussibles”. Argyris and Schon (1978) contend that these routines hide or 
disguise such gaps, which prevent their explicit articulation and create barriers to learning, 
especially to double-loop learning, i.e., breaking the paradigm, and to deutero-leaming,
i.e., learning to learn. There are several problems with their assertion for action and 
rhetoric gaps, "camouflage", and "undiscussibles". First, Argyris and Schon (1978) cite 
only anecdotal evidence for the existence of rhetoric and action gaps, "camouflage", and 
"undiscussibles". Second, the existence of these gaps, "camouflage", and 
"undiscussibles" appear to be constructed from their observations of various organizations. 
Third, other than Keating (1993), there appears to be no studies in the literature for 
organizational theory or organizational learning that explicitly explore the existence or 
nature of action and rhetoric gaps in organizations. Finally, Keating's (1993) methodology 
and case study results only yielded a few perspectives with significant rhetoric and action 
gaps. Keating's (1993) methodology was not specifically intended to observe rhetoric and 
action gaps, so consequently it was not ideally suited for this purpose. One weakness was 
that Keating (1993) assessed perceptions of organizational rhetoric and actions against 
perspectives that were not validated by the individual interviewees as being truly 
representative of their organizational beliefs. A second weakness was that Keating's 
interviews did not seek spontaneity, and therefore probably did not reveal some of the 
deeper underlying issues in the organization. As a result, most of the perspectives 
generated in Keating's research were probably more representative of the rhetoric in the 
organization and less representative of much of their tacit and unspoken actions, if such 
tacit and unspoken actions did in fact exist. In any case, most of the perspectives in 
Keating's (1993) study demonstrated only minor differences in rhetoric and action. 
Therefore, in order to close this gap in the literature, an objective of this research 
is to observe differences in the participants' organizational rhetoric and 
action through a research methodology that will co-construct such rhetoric 
and action gaps with the participants should they exist (see chapters III and IV, 
"Methodological Framework" and "Research Design"). The research questions that
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accompany this objective are: (1) Will the modified OLP design co-construct with the 
participants rhetoric and action gaps, if they exist? (2) If rhetoric and action gaps are 
revealed to a significant extent in this research, what are the differences between this 
research and Keating's (1993) research that have caused these gaps to be to be more 
prominent in this research? (3) If rhetoric and action gaps exist, do they provide evidence 
for "camouflage" and "undiscussibles", and if so, what is the nature of such "camouflage" 
and "undiscussibles"? And, (4) if rhetoric and action gaps are revealed, what are their 
relation to the organization's knowledge and learning? The results answering the first 
question are addressed in chapter V, "Methodology Enactment", chapter VI, "Perspective 
Analysis”, and chapter VII, "Local Findings". The differences between Keating's (1993) 
research and this research are address in this chapter, chapter HI, "Methodological 
Framework", chapter IV, "Research Design", and chapter V, "Methodology Enactment". 
Chapter VII "Local Findings" also addresses the second question, as well as the third and 
fourth questions.
The fifth objective is to observe evidence of learning which occurs as 
a result of the modified OLP intervention to better understand such 
learning, and to propose an explanatory model of the processes through 
which learning is generated in an organization. The particular questions of 
interest for this objective include: (1) What is learning in an organization? (2) What 
constitutes evidence for such learning? (3) How does learning occur? (4) How can 
barriers to learning be identified and overcome? (5) What are the processes and 
organizational skills that contribute to organizational learning? (6) Can these processes and 
skills be discovered and learned? (7) Can making the subject of learning in an organization 
explicit serve to improve and sustain organizational learning? These questions and a 
proposal for an explanatory model of the processes through which learning is generated in 
an organization are addressed in chapter Vm, "Research Implications".
Assumptions of the Research
Keating (1993) detailed four assumptions regarding his research. First,
...that individuals of an organization have differing perspectives... These 
differences remain organizationally tacit until some form of representation 
makes them explicit., that these differences can be... made explicit through 
representation of organizational assessments based on Schein's (1985) 
organizational culture perspective of internal integration. (Keating 1993,5)
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Second,
...that the participants are capable, through the application, of making 
distinctions between what Argyris and Schon (1978) refer to as theory-in- 
use and espoused theory... (Keating 1993,5-6)
Third,
...that the strategy could be executed within the domain of organizational 
defenses and barriers to organizational learning present in an
organization to the extent necessary to allow the process of inquiry to
develop. (Keating 1993,6)
Fourth,
...that the application of the strategy within a single organization could 
provide implications beyond the local organizational context (Keating 
1993, 6)
This research, because of its similarity, makes the same assumptions as Keating's 
(1993) research, but also contains three corollaries to the above assumptions, as well as 
two additional assumptions. These corollaries to the above assumptions and additional 
assumptions are elaborated in the following to better establish the context for this research.
As a corollary to Keating's second assumption, this research 
assumes that individuals will be able to distinguish themselves from the 
organization through the use of a scale designed for this purpose. This 
research further assumes that this inquiry creates the need for individuals to be able to 
distinguish themselves from the organization, based upon Keating's observations as 
detailed in "Purpose of the Research" above. Given this assumption that individuals need 
to distinguish themselves from the organization, it is the design of this research to be able 
to identify gaps between how the participant group is personally disposed toward an 
organizational issue or perspective, versus how individuals generally perceive others within 
the organization to be disposed toward the organizational issue or perspective in their 
rhetoric and their actions. It was anticipated that identification of these gaps would be
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instructive to the participants, and contribute to the proposal of an explanatory model of the 
processes through which learning is generated in an organization.
As a corollary to Keating's third assumption, this research assumes 
that a process of organizational reflection will be sufficiently self- 
motivating and valuable in its resulting discoveries by its organizational 
participants to elicit and sustain the participants' support throughout the 
research. It is the intent of this research to observe the validity of this assumption 
through a process of continuous feedback from the participants regarding their feelings 
toward the research and its conduct It is assumed that detailing such observations will 
assist future participatory action organizational research. Such participant feedback on the 
research is detailed in chapter V, "Methodology Enactment".
As a corollary to Keating's fourth assumption, this research assumes 
that observation of a process o f individual and collective organizational 
reflection should yield sufficient insights into the phenomena of 
organizational learning to propose an explanatory model of the processes 
through which learning is generated in an organization. Such a model should: 
(1) facilitate the practical application of enhancing the phenomena of organizational learning 
in organizations; and (2) inform future studies on the phenomena of organizational 
learning, whereby the model may be either refined or replaced. Chapter VUI, "Research 
Implications", proposes this model.
The first additional assumption that this research makes is imbedded in the 
objective to modify the OLP interview process to achieve expressions of experiential, and 
hence largely tacit, organizational knowledge. This objective assumes the technique 
of reflective questioning will result in verbalizations of an individual's 
experiential, and hence largely tacit, organizational knowledge. Berry 
(1988), an author concerned with the subject of implicit knowledge as it relates to 
construction of expert systems, notes that a growing number of experiments in the 
psychological literature support the notion of implicit knowledge gained as the result of an 
implicit learning process (Reber, 1967, 1976; Berry and Broadbent, 1984, 1987; 
Broadbent, FitzGerald and Broadbent, 1986), and quotes Reber who has suggested that 
"complex structures such as those underlying language, socialization, perception and 
sophisticated games are acquired implicitly and unconsciously." Berry (1988) explains 
that human experts have difficulty describing what they do, because some aspects of their 
knowledge have never been represented explicitly, especially where they have learned 
through experience. From this, Berry (1988) asks how such implicit knowledge can be
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elicited from experts. Berry (1988) cites that one problem is knowing the right question to 
ask, and even if the right question were asked, experts might still give answers that were 
fundamentally incorrect. However, Berry (1988) notes that experts are very good at what 
Johnson (1983) calls "reconstructing", i.e„ rules for how a task might be done that seem 
plausible to a practitioner in some domain of reasoning. Berry (1988) notes that one 
approach to the problem of experts not being able to provide reliable answers to questions 
has been to systematically observe experts performing real world tasks, while asking them 
to provide running commentaries while they carry out the task. Berry (1988) notes that 
Gammack and Young (1985) suggest that analysis of such commentary goes beyond what 
experts can explicitly tell you in a problem solving situation to permit inference of what 
knowledge they must be using but either cannot verbalize or of which they are unaware. 
By reconstructing the solution, the experts' knowledge can be modeled.
These lessons in elicitation of expert knowledge are used in this research in an 
attempt to elicit individual experiential organizational knowledge. Just as experts are able to 
provide knowledge of which they are unaware in the context of performing their expert task 
through their reflective commentaries, it is hoped that reflective questions will mentally 
transfer organizational participants into the context of their organization such that their 
commentaries will provide organizational knowledge of which they are unaware. This 
research therefore makes the assumption that conversations facilitated through such 
reflective questioning will contain imbedded, experiential, and hence largely tacit 
organizational knowledge, and that such imbedded knowledge can be elicited, made 
explicit, and shared through analysis and a process of individual validation, participant 
group assessment, and dialogue.
As mentioned above it was discovered through the process of enacting this 
assumption that an essential factor to participants expressing their experiential, tacit 
knowledge was spontaneity, and an essential factor to achieving spontaneity is not just 
reflective questioning, but also trust and a context acceptable to the participant
The second add itiona l assum ption  this research makes is th a t 
organizations can learn. In stating this assumption, an understanding is needed as to 
what is meant by "organizations can learn". This research takes the perspective that an 
organization's learning is defined by a change in its knowledge. Accordingly, for an 
organization to be able to learn, it would imply that there exists a unique form of 
knowledge characteristic to the entire organization, as opposed to knowledge that resides 
with just its individual members. Although it is recognized that knowledge does reside 
with the members of an organization, this research contends that organizations produce
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discoveries and actions that would not otherwise be possible through individual knowledge 
or action. Therefore, it is postulated that these discoveries and actions are evidence of a 
knowledge unique to the whole organization, as opposed to the knowledge that resides just 
with its individual members. This "relational" knowledge is postulated to arise out of the 
interactions between individual members' knowledge, and is contended to be the 
knowledge that causes the organization's total knowledge to be greater than the sum of its 
parts. It is through the generation of such relational knowledge that it is assumed that an 
organization can learn, as opposed to just its members learning.
In the case of the participant organization, this research intends to provide an 
experiential sense of the relational knowledge postulated above. It will be shown that the 
participant group's knowledge was constructed through a cyclic process of individuals (1) 
experiencing their organization, (2) interpreting their experience into individual 
perspectives, (3) acting according to these perspectives, and (4) from these actions, 
creating new actions and articulations for others to experience. It will be shown that this 
cyclic process of joint knowledge generation created interrelated perspectives and a 
potential for action that otherwise would not have been possible solely through individual 
perspective or action. It will also be shown that a context for what was viewed as possible 
or not possible arose from this interaction of individual perspectives, which thereby 
constrained some of the participant group's decisions and actions (see chapter VII, "Local 
Findings").
It is from this experience of this case study that it is contended that the observed 
interaction of individual perspectives gives rise to the postulated relational knowledge of an 
organization, and that this creates a potential for discovery and action that otherwise would 
not be possible from individual perspective and action. Finally, while this relational 
knowledge is viewed as creating a separate potential for discovery and action, it is also 
viewed as generating constraints for the organization's behavior by generating a context 
through which members jointly perceive what is possible or not possible (see chapter VUI, 
"Research Implications").
Research Questions
The research questions posed in the original proposal for this research were four 
questions specific to the participant organization and three cross-organizational questions. 
As mentioned above, the participant organization was in their fifth year of a Total Quality 
Management (TQM) implementation. Also, as mentioned above, the research process was 
fashioned after Keating's (1993) Organizational Learning Process (OLP) design.
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Accordingly, the questions specific to the participant organization, which are addressed in 
chapter VII, "Local Findings", are as follows:
1. What affect has TQM had on the participant organization's culture and ability "to learn 
as an organization"?
2. What is TQM's future potential to affect the participant organization's culture and ability 
to learn?
3. What effect will this research have in its attempt to assist the participant organization to 
assess its TQM effort, its culture, and its ability "to learn as an organization''.
4. Will a process similar to Keating's (1993) OLP enacted in a completely different 
organization by a different researcher produce similar results?"
The original cross-organizational questions, which are addressed in chapter VIII, 
"Research Implications", are as follows:
1. Can organizational learning be enhanced by an organizational improvement technology 
or philosophy, such as TQM?
2. How may the enactment of such a technology be evaluated in terms of organizational 
learning?
3. How may the potential of such a technology to facilitate organizational learning be 
evaluated?
It was also acknowledged in the original proposal for this research that, "as it is the 
design of action research, that other research questions may emerge that may be seen even 
as more important..." (p.2, addendum 1, dated January 1993 to dissertation proposal dated 
December 1992). As mentioned in the introduction above, what emerged and stood out in 
this particular case study, was the number of unwritten norms and shared assumptions, i.e. 
the reasons why the participant perceived himself or herself or others in the organization to 
act and decide as they did, which seemed to affect decision, choice, and action within the 
organization. As also noted above, it seemed that the participants, themselves, were often 
not fully aware of these unwritten norms and shared assumptions on which they were 
basing their thought processes, and resulting decisions and actions. These observations 
during the conduct of this research led to the evolution of this dissertation toward questions 
regarding the generation and unfolding of knowledge in the participant organization, and, 
through the generalization of the participant organization's results, toward a proposal of an 
explanatory model for the generation and unfolding of knowledge in organizations in 
general. Accordingly, the questions that emerged for the participant organization, which 
are addressed in chapter VH, "Local Findings", are as follows:
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1. What are the unwritten norms and shared assumptions influencing decision, choice, and 
action in the participant organization that might be indicated by evidence?
2. What were the mechanisms that generated such norms and shared assumptions?
3. If such norms and shared assumptions were not explicitly articulated prior to this 
research, how were they known and shared?
4. Why did these norms and shared assumptions so influence decision, choices, and 
action?
If these unwritten norms and shared assumptions for the specific participant 
organization are taken as a form of knowledge, then these questions would imply parallel 
questions for organizations in general, which are addressed in chapter VIII, "Research 
Implications", as follows:
1. How is knowledge that is largely un-articulated generated in an organization?
2. How does such un-articulated knowledge become shared in an organization?
3. Why would shared knowledge that is not explicitly articulated be influential in an 
organization's decisions and actions?
This research intends to present evidence from the interviews, perspectives, 
participant assessments of perspectives, comments, and group meetings that, first, there 
existed many unwritten norms and shared assumptions, which affected individual decision 
and action in the participant organization; and, second, that these unwritten norms and 
shared assumptions affected decisions and actions (see chapter VII, "Local Findings"). If 
behavior is taken to be an effect of learning, then this evidence would make the questions 
regarding knowledge germane to organizational learning. Then, it is this logic that 
supports the premise of this research that organizational knowledge is knowledge that is 
shared and held relative to other knowledge, and that organizational learning is the 
generation of organizational knowledge. From this premise the last two emergent research 
questions with respect to organizational knowledge are generated, which are addressed in 
chapter VIE, "Research Implications", as follows:
1. What are the distinctions this research suggests for organizational knowledge?
2. What are the implications of these distinctions for organizational learning theory?
The fourth objective of this research is to observe differences in the participants' 
rhetoric and action, through a methodology designed to co-construct such differences with 
the participants, if they exist The questions of interest for this objective include:
1. Will the modified OLP design co-construct with the participants rhetoric and action 
gaps, if they exist?
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2. If rhetoric and action gaps are revealed to a significant extent in this research, what are 
the differences between this research and Keating's (1993) research that have caused 
these gaps to be more prominent in this research?
3. If rhetoric and action gaps exist, do they provide evidence for "camouflage" and 
"undiscussibles", and if so, what is the nature of such "camouflage" and 
"undiscussibles"?
4. If rhetoric and action gaps are revealed, what are their relation to the organization's 
knowledge and learning?
All of the above questions are addressed in chapter VH, "Local Findings". The data 
relative to the first question is presented in chapter VI, "Perspective Analysis". The 
differences between Keating's (1993) research and this research are also addressed in this 
chapter, and in chapter m , "Methodological Framework", chapter IV, "Research Design", 
and chapter V, "Methodology Enactment".
The fifth objective of this research is to propose an explanatory model of the 
processes through which learning is generated in an organization. The questions of interest 
for this objective build upon the first emergent research question with respect to 
organizational knowledge presented above, and include:
1. What is learning in an organization?
2. What constitutes evidence for learning in an organization?
3. How does learning in an organization occur?
These questions are addressed in chapter VDI, "Research Implications", where a 
proposal for an explanatory model of organizational learning processes is framed in terms 
of the processes through which the knowledge of individual organizational members is 
constructed in the context of the continuous knowledge construction of other organizational 
members.
It will be seen that this research facilitates in-depth organizational reflections and 
inquiry by its participant members, and that from this, a wealth of largely un-articulated 
norms and shared assumptions, which affect decisions and actions, emerge. It will be 
shown that these un-articulated norms and shared assumptions appear to emerge as a result 
of how the participants experience their organization. As a result, the above questions, 
regarding the generation of experiential knowledge and its relationship to shared learning, 
emerged and became primary to this research. On the other hand, the original dissertation 
proposal questions became secondary, as the design of action research acknowledges and 
anticipates.
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Finally, it is desired to project the implications of this research for the management 
of organizations. Several research questions, which are addressed in chapter VUI, 
"Research Implications", are introduced to serve as a guide to these projections, as follows:
1. How can barriers to learning in an organization be identified and overcome?
2. What are the processes and organizational skills that contribute to organizational 
learning?
3. How may an organization discover and leam the processes and skills which contribute 
to organizational learning?
4. Will making the subject of learning in an organization explicit serve to improve and 
sustain organizational learning?
Scope and Limitations of the Research
Since this research adopted the Organizational Learning Process (OLP) developed 
by Keating (1993) to generate and observe organizational self-reflections to further 
understand the organizational learning phenomenon, the scope and limitations of this 
research are similar to the scope and limitations of Keating's (1993) research. As seen in 
Keating (1993):
Argyris and Schon (1978) categorize interventions, with respect to 
organizational learning, as "comprehensive" and "limited". Comprehensive 
intervention involves transformation of individual theories-in-use en route to 
the transformation of the organizational learning system. In the limited 
intervention,... (1) the process of organizational inquiry is facilitated by the 
interventionist, (2) conditions of error are engaged by the organization, and 
(3) the interventionist seeks to allow a forum for the organization to break 
out of the restrictive perspective which may be limiting to the organization. 
(Keating 1993, 10)
Just as in Keating (1993), Argyris and Schon (1978) serves as a starting point for 
discussing the scope of this research effort. Like Keating (1993), the research scope is not 
a comprehensive endeavor to transform the organizational learning system of the participant 
organization. Instead, the scope is limited. Like Keating (1993), the scope is limited to 
understanding the implications of the local application of a modified OLP for the larger 
domain of organizational learning. Unlike Keating (1993), the scope also includes 
understanding the implications of the resulting content of the local application of the
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modified OLP for the larger domain of organizational learning.^ Accordingly, the research 
strategy is in the terms of Argyris and Schon's (1978) limited intervention: i.e., the 
researcher through the modified OLP facilitates an organizational inquiry; conditions of 
error are discovered and engaged by the participant organization; and, the researcher, 
through the modified OLP, seeks to allow forums for the participant organization to break 
out of their restrictive perspectives that may be limiting to the participant organization. This 
process is observed and the resulting content is analyzed to understand its implications for 
organizational learning.
As in Keating (1993), the research design of the inquiry strategy, instruments, and 
procedures by the researcher narrows the research to specific activities. This aids the 
research in achieving "transparency" to the participants, as also discussed in chapters EH 
and IV, "Research Methodology" and "Research Design", respectively. First, the research 
design places the researcher (interventionist) as facilitator of the research process, and as 
such, the research activity closely parallels the design and suggestions of the modified 
OLP. The organization does participate in the determination of local application 
parameters, such as participation, scheduling, and the dissemination and local interpretation 
of results, as well as some design features of the modified OLP structure, but these are 
only minor variations, whereby the researcher acts as the conduit for suggestions and 
implementations for such variations. Second, the research design causes the researcher to 
be focused primarily on process, and the participant organization to be focused primarily on 
content The researcher focus is on process as a means to generate content for 
understanding the implications of local observations to the larger domain of organizational 
learning. The organization's focus, on the other hand, is on understanding the specific 
organizational content being generated through the application. The organization's focus 
on content comes as a result of the process, since content and "sense making" is generated 
through the process. In conclusion, the result of the research design narrowing the 
research to specific activities causes the research design to be transparent to the participant 
organization, i.e., the research design creates the experience of organizational inquiry and 
dialogue without the participants having to focus on how to create such inquiry and 
dialogue.
Like Keating (1993), the modified OLP strategy provides the opportunity for 
differences in assessments of the organization to emerge and to be confronted, through a
3 The content of the local application of the modified OLP is used in this research as evidence within the 
participant organization for the ways in which knowledge was generated, expanded, captured, and propagated, 
as evidence for the tacit experiential nature of a significant portion of the shared organizational knowledge, 
and for structuring an explanatory model for shared learning in organizations.
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process of directed inquiry, at both the individual and organizational levels. However, in 
the context of an organizational learning system, the depth of this effort is limited to the 
narrow focus of the modified OLP strategy, and not intended as a "comprehensive 
intervention" to generate the "transformation of individual theories-in-use en route to the 
transformation of the organizational learning system." (Argyris and Schon, 1978) The 
modified OLP strategy is limited in its design through: (1) the development and 
application of the process outside routine organizational activities, structures, and 
processes; (2) the implementation of the process as a "research project" without the 
implication of being permanent or sustainable beyond the facilitated research efforts; and
(3) the facilitation of the process by a single researcher through a participatory design. Like 
Keating (1993), it is this distinction of limited scope with respect to the learning system of 
the organization that is essential to understand the design, implementation, and implications 
of this research effort.
Importance of the Research
Keating's (1993) OLP strategy applied organizational learning concepts generated 
from organizational learning theory in an organizational setting through a participatory 
action strategy. A key significance of Keating's research was its attempt to simultaneously 
contribute to both organizational learning theory and practice through the design of strategy 
and the supporting mechanics to facilitate an advanced organizational learning system; 
further, Keating's (1993) research advocated advancement of the theoretical underpinnings 
for designs and re-designs of other advanced organizational learning systems through the 
practice of the designed strategy and its supporting mechanics. Therefore, Keating’s 
research attempted to simultaneously contribute to both theory and practice for 
organizations, where his research advocated an inseparable circularity between theory and 
practice through the application of a strategy formed from theory and enacted with the 
intention to advance theory.
Like Keating (1993), the significance of this research also lies in its attempt to 
simultaneously contribute to both theory and practice for organizations. The modified OLP 
strategy for this research is designed with the benefit of Keating’s research, and the 
literatures on organizational theory, organizational learning, participatory action research, 
expert systems, and tacit knowledge. Like Keating (1993), this research advocates an 
"inseparable bridge" between theory and practice, where one informs the other. Indeed, 
since the perspective of tacit knowledge in relation to organizational learning emerged 
through the enactment of a modified OLP, and since the modified OLP strategy was
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suggested by Keating's (1993) research,4 and other applicable literature,5 this research, 
just as Keating (1993) advocated, enacts the bridging of theory and practice for 
organization, where each informs the other.
Keating's (1993) OLP strategy was designed through his recognition from the 
organizational learning literature of the importance of generating organizational processes of 
inquiry. As Keating (1993) noted:
These processes are recognized as essential to development of advanced 
organizational learning systems. Several predominant descriptions of these 
processes include: organizational dialectic (Argyris and Schon 1978), 
surfacing and testing mental models (Senge 1990a, 1990b), and 
interpretation systems (Daft and Weick 1984). (Keating 1993,13)
Keating's (1993) research attempted to integrate these processes within the context of 
organizational learning, and in this aspect his OLP design incorporated perspectives from 
each of the above processes that have been advocated by their respective authors as 
essential to the development of advanced organizational learning systems. This research 
attempts to make its unique contribution through yet another process, 
heretofore explicitly unrecognized in the literature.^ This process involves 
the establishment of contexts to enhance organizational learning systems 
through co-constructing the tacit experiential knowledge of its members. 
This author sees this process as most essential to the development of an advanced 
organizational learning system. Indeed, an attempt to enact an advanced organizational 
learning system process from any of the above authors' perspectives or combination of 
their perspectives may generate a context in which the tacit experiential knowledge of the 
members of an organization is explicitly articulated, expanded, captured, and propagated, 
but not necessarily so. Furthermore, the "how to" for creating an organizational dialectic 
(Argyris and Schon 1978), for surfacing and testing mental models (Senge 1990a, 1990b),
4 Keating's (1993) study contained the original OLP architecture, and implied several important 
modifications, including, (a) the need of many individuals to distinguish themselves Grom the organization, 
and (b) the need for organizational members to distinguish the implications of their tacit perspectives to 
their organizational learning system.
5 Keating's (1993) initial acknowledgement of the tacit nature of many perspectives, in itself, suggested the 
possibility that literature on the tacit aspects of knowledge might be relevant to organizational learning 
systems.
6 An exception is Nonaka and Takeuchi (199S), which was published at the time this study was being 
written, and notably, after Keating, Robinson, and Clemson (1994), which contains the essence of the 
perspective for this process.
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and/or for interpreting organizational systems (Daft and Weick 1984), is largely missing 
from the above authors. On the other hand, designing contexts for facilitating the 
articulation, expansion, capture, and propagation of the tacit experiential knowledge that 
exists in all organizations greatly informs the "how to" for creating organizational dialectic, 
for surfacing and testing mental models, and/or for interpreting organizational systems. 
Finally, the design of contexts for facilitating tacit knowledge creates the opportunity for 
enhancing organizational learning systems in desired ways. For example designing a 
context for learning provides a specific focus for learning, whereas without the designed 
context, foci for learning may self-organize in unpredictable, inefficient, ineffective, and/or 
potentially undesirable ways.
This research makes several other contributions beyond enacting a bridge between 
theory and practice, as Keating (1993) advocated, and advocating another essential process 
for the development of an advanced organizational learning system. First, this research 
observes differences in the participants' organizational rhetoric and action through a 
research methodology that co-constructs such rhetoric and action gaps with the participants. 
As a result, it closes the deficiency of the absence of such research in the literatures of 
organizational theory and learning. Second, this research contributes to understanding 
organizational learning in terms of tacit knowledge. An understanding of organizational 
learning from this perspective should significantly add to organizational learning theory and 
practice, especially through the design of instruments and processes that facilitate 
organizational learning from this perspective, and through the discovery of the skills and 
processes necessary to tap the reservoir of tacit experiential knowledge in all organizations. 
Finally, this research contributes to the participant organization in their local organizational 
discoveries and interpretations that arise from their enactment of the modified OLP.
Organization of the Dissertation
The chapters of this dissertation are organized according to the sequence of the 
processes that were necessary to its production (see figure 1). These processes include:
(1) developing the research context; (2) designing the research; (3) enacting the research;
(4) developing the research findings; and (5) projecting the implications of the research. 
The objectives of the first process are addressed in chapters I and H. Chapter I provides an 
introduction to organizational learning theory as the motivation for observing facilitated 
organizational self-reflections, and explains how these observations in this particular case 
study further motivated an examination of knowledge, especially experiential and tacit 
knowledge. It poses the initial research questions, which were based upon the participant
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organization's interest and an organizational learning context, and explains the emergence 
of research questions, which were discovered through enacting the research. Finally, 
chapter I provides an introduction to Keating's (1993) perspective of connecting 
organizational theory and practice, while distinguishing the unique contributions of this 
research, especially the perspective that an explicit facilitation of an organization's tacit 
knowledge is an essential process for an advanced organizational learning system. Chapter 
II, "Literature Review”, reviews the literature and research supporting this research, 
including the literatures on organizational theory, organizational learning, participatory 
action research, knowledge and tacit knowledge. An example from Michael Polanyi's 
(1966) perspective for "tacit knowing" is examined to metaphorically construct a 
perspective for "tacit knowing" in organizations. Literature relating to the elicitation of 
expert implicit knowledge for expert systems is reviewed in relation to the design of this 
research. Finally, elements of the theory of action perspective of organizational learning 
(Argyris and Schon 1978), mental models (Senge 1990), and the concepts of 
organizational inquiry, which are recognized as fundamental to organizational learning, are 
reviewed. These first two chapters, which develop the research context for observing an 
organization with respect to its learning and knowledge, are concluded by discussing the 
implications of the research project with respect to the literature.
The second process produces the supporting methodology and research design. 
Chapter m , "Methodological Framework", develops the supporting methodology within 
the framework of participatory action research. Distinctions between action research and 
positivist science, quantitative and qualitative research are drawn. The appropriateness of 
each are examined in terms of the intent of this research. Tenets for good science including 
researcher influence, generalizability of findings, reproducibility, and validity are 
addressed. Elements essential to characterizing the participatory action research in terms 
that are meaningful in the experience of the participants, including focus, participation, 
context, structure, and expectations of the research, are considered. The considerations 
and constraints of chapter III define the methodological framework employed to establish 
the research design as developed in chapter IV, "Research Design". Chapter IV explicidy 
articulates the specifications for the research design necessary to satisfy the methodological 
framework established by chapter m . It discusses the elicitation of expert implicit 
knowledge, and describes each phase of the five phase strategy for the modified 
Organizational Learning Process (OLP) design, while noting how each phase serves the 
specifications for the research design.
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Figure 1. Organization of the dissertation report
The third process is the enactment of the research. Chapter V, "Methodology 
Enactment", develops the contextual setting for the research by describing the experience of 
enacting the research design developed in chapter IV. Obstacles to gaining individual and 
organizational support for the research are chronicled. Organizational changes the 
researcher believes to have occurred as a result of the conduct of the research are detailed. 
Anecdotal evidence for attribution of changes to the research is offered. How data were 
collected, how long data collection lasted, what were the organizational and physical 
settings for data collection, what was the local inclusiveness of the data, how data were 
transformed and weighted for participant feedback, how participants interpreted and reacted 
to the data, what truth value and applicability was ascribed to the data through the 
participants' interpretations and reactions to the data, what were the participants' feedback 
on the research, what impact the research had on the participants, and what impact the
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researcher and participants had on each other are experienced in this accounting. The 
principle tools of the researcher, i.e., participant observation and the semi-structured, 
spontaneous interview are demonstrated through the descriptions of the methodology 
enactment Spontaneity in semi-structured interviews will be seen as a key for eliciting tacit 
knowledge and motivating participation. Finally, the organizational changes that the 
researcher believes to have occurred as a result of the conduct of the research, and the 
anecdotal evidence for attribution of these changes to the research, are explained.
The fourth process develops the results of the research. Chapter VI, "Perspective 
Analysis", describes the analysis method that was used to interpret the data generated by 
the modified OLP, which consisted of examining the semantic meaning of perspectives 
corresponding to their categorization and ranking according to the participants' 
assessments. This type of analysis was employed, since the focus of the research process 
for the participants had been their construction of meaning relative to their assessments. 
Additionally, a form of analysis was needed to reduce the complexity of the perspectives 
and their assessments, while preserving the participants' constructed meaning, so that the 
perspectives would be more comprehensible, and therefore more readily stimulate the 
participants' group discussions. This semantic analysis by perspective category and rank is 
also used to point toward evidence for the local findings of chapter VII. Chapter VII, 
"Local Findings", discusses the organizational specific insights that the perspectives and 
their assessments indicate. It addresses for the participant organization the research 
questions initially posed, and those that emerged during the conduct of the research. 
Evidence supporting these local findings is drawn from the interviews, perspectives and 
their assessments, and the group meetings.
The fifth and last process in producing this dissertation is projecting the 
implications of the results of this research beyond the participant organization. 
Accordingly, the dissertation is concluded with chapter Vm, "Research Implications", 
which develops: (1) the response to the original cross-organizational questions, (2) the 
response to the cross-organization research questions that emerged during the research 
regarding organizational knowledge and learning, (3) a proposal for an explanatory model 
of the processes through which learning is generated in an organization, (4) implications 
for the management of organizations, (5) implications for organizational learning theory; 
(6) directions for future research, (7) a summary of results and conclusions.




The literatures on both organizational theory and organizational learning are 
prodigious. There exist many different perspectives and viewpoints for interpreting 
organizations and their learning. This chapter begins with an overview of organizational 
theory literature that has preceded and supported the organizational learning perspective. 
The next section presents an overview of the organizational learning literature that has 
preceded, supported, and formed the perspectives of this research. Finally, specific 
literatures are reviewed to further establish the context and perspective for this research, 
including Argyris and Schon's (1978) theory of action perspective of organizational 
learning, Senge's (1990) mental models, Keating's (1993) perspective of distinguishing 
the individual from the organization, and Michael Polanyi's (1966) perspective for "tacit 
knowing". These first two chapters develop the research context for observing an 
organization with respect to its learning and knowledge, and are concluded by discussing 
the implications of the literature for this research.
Organizational Theory Literature
This overview of the literature on organizational theory will show that there is no 
single theory of organizations, but rather many theories that attempt to explain and/or 
predict organizations and the behavior of the people in them. It will be seen that each 
theory of organization offers important and useful insights according to the context in 
which one is attempting to understand or explain an organization. Accordingly, this 
overview serves to establish the context for organizational learning and the perspectives of 
this research. Indeed, the overview will show organizational learning as a logical extension 
of the organizational theory literatures.
Just as there are many perspectives for the theory of organizations, there are many 
perspectives about the best way to group organizational theories. However, the most 
common approach is to group organizational theories according to schools, i.e., according 
to their basic assumptions about humans, organizations, and organizational behavior. 
Usually this grouping also groups theories according to a period of time in which the most 
important contributions were written, since normally one set of perspectives was dominant 
at a point of time, only to be challenged and replaced by another set of perspectives. This 
ascendancy, dominance, challenge by other schools, and decline of prevailing theories can
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be seen as characteristic of Thomas Kuhn's (1970) postulation of the dialectic process 
common to all sciences.
The primary purpose of grouping organizational theories according to schools is 
that it organizes the knowledge about theories of organizations. There are many traditional 
groupings of organizational theory according to schools, such as Scott (1961), Koontz 
(1961), Hutchinson (1967), Scott and Mitchell (1972), George (1972), Perrow (1973), 
and Bolman and Deal (1984), to name a few. However, Shafritz and Ott (1992) provide a 
modem day historical perspective to organizational theory according to some of the most 
common groupings of schools. These organization theory groupings are (1) "classical", 
(2) "neoclassical", (3) "organizational behavior" or "human resource", (4) "'modem' 
structural", (5) "systems, contingency, and population ecology", (6) "multiple 
constituencies and market", (7) "power and politics", and (8) "organizational culture and 
symbolic management". While the work of any single author or set of authors may cross 
several schools, most can be located predominantly within one of these schools. Also, 
most of the major works in each of these schools will often be found to be bounded within 
a certain historical time frame, although each school can be seen as continuing to influence 
other schools. Many of the assumptions relevant to this research will be found in the 
"organizational culture and symbolic management" school, although other relevant 
assumptions will be found in the "organizational behavior" and "systems" schools.
Shafritz and Ott (1992) contend that most analysts view the beginnings of the 
factory system in Great Britain as the birth point of complex economic organizations and, 
consequently, of the field of organization theory. Classical organization theory, as its name 
implies, was the first theory of organizations, and dominated organization theory into the 
1930s. Shafritz and Ott (1992) cite its fundamental tenets as:
1. Organizations exist to accomplish production-related and economic 
goals.
2. There is one best way to organize for production, and that way can be 
found through systematic, scientific inquiry.
3. Production is maximized through specialization and division of labor.
4. People and organizations act in accordance with rational economic 
principles. (Shafritz and Ott, 1992,27)
The assumptions of the "classical" school were most popularized in the twentieth century 
by Taylor (1911) in his espousal of "scientific management".
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Shafritz and Ott (1992) explain that most of the major writers of the "classical" 
school did their most significant work before World War n, while the "neoclassical" 
writers gained their prominence from the end of World War II through the 1950s by 
attacking the "classical" writers. The intellectually derived theories of the "classical” school 
left them vulnerable to attack. Consequently, the "neoclassical" writers were more of an 
"anti-school", and, as a result, could not adequately replace the "classical" school. Instead, 
they attempted to save "classical" theory by introducing modifications based upon research 
findings in the behavioral sciences. This, however, initiated a theoretical movement away 
from the mechanistic views of the "classical" school, which became central to the 
foundations of most of the other schools that have followed. Simon (1946) is cited as one 
of the most influential of the "neoclassical" theorists, who criticized the classical approach 
as inapplicable to many of the situations facing managers. One of the major themes was 
that organizations did not and could not exist separately from their environment Selznick 
(1948) asserted that while it is possible to describe and design organizations in a purely 
rational manner, such efforts can never hope to cope with the non-rational aspects of 
organizational behavior. Shafritz and Ott (1992) explain that one of the most 
comprehensive "neoclassical" critiques came from March and Simon (1957) in a summary 
of the knowledge about organization theory and behavior that had been generated primarily 
by the behavioral science movement This summary demonstrated that sociologists found 
that efforts to achieve bureaucratic objectives resulted in unforeseen and dysfunctional 
consequences, because individuals responded in personal ways to organizational stimuli. 1 
Shafritz and Ott (1992) explain that the fundamental assumptions about the behavior 
of people at work did not change dramatically from the beginnings of organizations until 
just a few decades ago. These traditional assumptions that "the boss knew best" was 
characterized by the classical work of Munsterberg (1913), where he sought to match the 
abilities of new hires with a company's work demands, to positively influence employee 
attitudes toward their work and their company, and to understand the impact of 
psychological conditions on employee productivity. In contrast, the modem 
"organizational behavior" or "human resource" applied behavioral scientists of the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s focused their attention on how organizations could and should allow 
and encourage their people to grow and develop. From this perspective, it is assumed that 
organizational creativity, flexibility, and prosperity would flow naturally from employee
^Note that this research attempts to elicit such personal response by eliciting participants' distinction of 
their personal organizational perspectives as opposed to their perceptions of how other members view their 
organization.
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growth and development The essence of the relationship between organization and people 
is redefined from dependence to co-dependence. The organization is no longer viewed as 
the independent variable to be manipulated in order to change behavior. Instead it is both 
an independent and dependent variable. The organization influences human behavior just 
as behavior shapes the organization. Several of the major works under this school are: 
McGregor (1957), where he contends that managerial assumptions about employees can 
become self-fulfilling prophesies; Janis (1971), where he explains social conformity by 
"groupthink", the mode of thinking that persons engage in when concurrence seeking 
becomes dominant; Argyris (1970), where he contends that employees should have 
maximum amounts of accurate information so they can make informed decisions with free 
will; and, Bolman and Deal (1991), where they contend that organizations exist to serve 
human needs (rather than the reverse).
Shafritz and Ott (1992) explain that the '"modem1 structural" school is concerned 
with vertical differentiations, i.e., hierarchical levels of organizational authority and 
coordination, and horizontal differentiations between organizational units. They are 
concerned with many of the same issues as "classical" theorists, but have benefited from 
advancements in organization theory since World War n. Bolman and Deal (1984) 
identify the basic assumptions:
1. Organizations are rational institutions whose primary purpose is to accomplish 
established objectives; rational organizational behavior is achieved best through systems 
of defined rules and formal authority.
2. There is a "best" structure for any organization in light of its given objectives, 
environment, products and services, and technology.
3. Specialization increases quality and quantity of production.
4. Most problems in organizations result from structural flaws and can be solved by 
changing the structure.
Several of the major authors of the "'modem' structural" school include: Bums and 
Stalker (1961), who are widely acknowledged to have founded the "socio-technical 
approach", and who found that while stable conditions may suggest the use of a 
mechanistic form of organization, more dynamic conditions require an organic form of 
organization that calls for participatory management and reliance on workers; Davis and 
Lawrence (1977), who define a "matrix organization", which is suggested in an 
organization that has extraordinary and conflicting needs for freedom (for innovation) and 
order (for regulation and control); and, Blau and Scott (1962), who assert that all 
organizations include both a formal and informal element. Shafritz and Ott (1992) note that
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Blau and Scott's (1962) thinking appears to have been influenced by Barnard (1938), who 
contrasts the informal organization as those processes of society that are unconscious with 
those of the formal organization, which are conscious. Barnard (1938) contended that 
these unconscious processes have important effects of establishing certain attitudes, 
understandings, and customs that create the conditions under which the formal organization 
may arise. 2
Shafritz and Ott (1992) explain "systems" theories of organization as having two 
major conceptual themes: (1) Bertalanffy's (1951) general systems theory, and (2) use of 
quantitative tools and techniques to understand complex relationships. A system is an 
organized collection of parts united by prescribed interactions and designed for the 
accomplishment of specific goals or general purposes (Boulding, 1956). Systems theory 
views an organization as a complex set of dynamically intertwined and interconnected 
elements. Wiener (1948) epitomized these basic theoretical perspectives of the systems 
perspective.
Shafritz and Ott (1992) explain "contingency" theory as a "close cousin" of systems 
theories in which the effectiveness of an organizational action is viewed as dependent upon 
the relationship between the element in question and all other aspects of the system, at the 
particular moment. Consequently, everything is situational and there are no absolutes or 
universals.
Shafritz and Ott (1992) explain "population ecology" theory as assuming that 
natural selection processes operate among organizations. Organizations do not adapt to 
their changing environments by making decisions; instead, the environment selects among 
organizational forms. The focus is on the reasons for organizational diversity, formation, 
survival, and death, where theorists seek to understand why there are so many kinds and 
sizes of organizations, and how social conditions affect the rates at which organizations and 
organizational forms arise, change, and die out Populations of organizations, rather than 
individual organizations, are the appropriate units of analysis.
Shafritz and Ott (1992) explain "multiple constituencies and market" theories as a 
major departure from the "systems" and "structural" theorists, who assume the existence of 
cause-and-effect (logical-positivist) relationships among variables. In contrast, the 
"multiple constituencies and market" theories disputes the claim that organizations exist for 
the accomplishment of some shared utilitarian purposes; instead, an organization is only an 
extension of and a means for satisfying the interests of the individuals and groups that
% ote that this contention is very similar to the contention of this research that the tacit knowledge of the 
organization sets a context for the explicit knowledge and for the decisions and actions of the organization.
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affect and are affected by i t  Organizations do not have goals and objectives; rather, 
constituencies have goals and objectives that they wish to accomplish through involvement 
with an organization. Organizations remain viable only as long as the diverse interests of 
their constituencies are satisfied.
Shafritz and Ott (1992) explain "power and politics" perspective as a specific 
application and an expansion of "multiple constituencies" theory. It focuses on the tactics 
and strategies that constituencies or coalitions use to gain and maintain power in and around 
organizations. Organizations are viewed as complex systems of individuals and coalitions, 
each having its own interests, beliefs, values, preferences, perspectives, and perceptions. 
The coalitions continuously compete with each other for scarce organizational resources. 
Conflict is inevitable.
Finally, Shafritz and Ott (1992) explain that the newest and most controversial 
perspective of organization theory is the "organizational culture" or "symbolic 
management" perspective. Its theories are based on assumptions about organizations and 
people that depart radically from those of the "mainline" schools of organization theory. 
This perspective does not believe that quantitative, quasi-experimental, logical-positivist 
research designs and methods are especially useful for studying organizations (Ott, 1989). 
It assumes a culture exists in an organization that is comprised of many intangible things 
such as values, beliefs, assumptions, perceptions, behavioral norms, artifacts, and patterns 
of behavior. It assumes that many organizational behaviors and decisions are almost 
predetermined by the patterns of basic assumptions that are held by members of an 
organization. Those patterns of assumptions continue to exist and to influence behaviors 
because they repeatedly lead people to make decisions that "worked in the past" for the 
organization. With repeated use, the assumptions slowly drop out of peoples' 
consciousness but continue to influence organizational decisions and behaviors, even when 
the organization's environment changes. These unconscious assumptions become the 
underlying, unquestioned, but virtually forgotten reasons for "the way we do things here", 
even when the ways are no longer appropriate. Thus, a strong organizational culture 
literally controls organizational behavior. Every organizational culture is assumed to be 
different because every organization has a unique history and set of contextual factors.
It is seen that a number of assumptions from the "organizational learning" school 
can be found in the "organizational culture" or "symbolic management" school. However, 
this research departs from the above assumptions in several ways: First, this research 
assumes that culture is not necessarily intangible. This research agrees that values, beliefs, 
assumptions, perceptions, behavioral norms, artifacts, and patterns of behavior are
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normally largely tacit, but assumes that these aspects of organizational culture can be 
discovered and made explicit It agrees that many organizational behaviors and decisions 
are often predetermined by the patterns of basic assumptions that are held by members of 
an organization, but assumes that such behaviors and decisions can be chosen, as opposed 
to predetermined. For members of an organization to discover their "intangible" aspects of 
their culture and to explicitly choose, this research advocates that there must exist an 
explicit commitment to inquiry, dialogue, and learning. Lacking such a commitment, this 
research is in agreement that patterns of assumptions are likely to continue to exist and to 
influence behaviors, because "they repeatedly lead people to make decisions that 'worked 
in the past' for the organization". This research agrees with Shafritz and Ott's (1992) 
explanation for how assumptions become "underlying, unquestioned, but virtually 
forgotten". However, this research also assumes that tacit assumptions may also form 
directly from experience, and remain tacit because they are never explicitly articulated. 
Accordingly, the main departure of this research from the "organizational culture" literature 
is that this research advocates that organizations can, through enacting an explicit 
commitment to inquiry, dialogue, and learning, make explicit their tacit aspects of their 
culture and explicitly choose their behavior. Finally, the organizational learning literature 
departs from the "organizational culture" literature by introducing the possibility of learning 
in organizations.
Organizational Learning Literature
There have been five major reviews of the literature on organizational learning 
conducted over the last ten years (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Levitt and March, 1988, Huber, 
1991; Dixon, 1992; and Dodgson, 1993), each from different perspectives, e.g. 
management, sociology, communication, human resource development, goals and 
processes. An overview of these literature reviews is presented to demonstrate both the 
diversity of organizational learning literature and areas of convergence that specifically 
support the perspectives of this research.
Fiol and Lyles (1985) assesses the strategic management literature in which they 
find that there is no widely accepted model of organizational learning. They note that 
theorists have referred to learning as (1) new insights or knowledge (Argyris and Schon, 
1978; Hedberg, 1981); or (2) new structures (Chandler, 1962); or (3) new systems 
(Jelinek, 1979: Miles, 1982); or (4) mere actions (Cyert and March, 1963; Miller and 
Friesen, 1980); or (5) some combination of the above (Bartunek, 1984; Shrivastava and 
Mitroff, 1982), while these phenomena are referred to as learning (Cyert and March, 1963;
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Jelinek, 1979); adaptation (Chakravarthy, 1982; Meyer, 1982); change (Dutton and 
Duncan, 1983; Mintzberg and Waters, 1982); or unlearning (Starbuck, Greve, and 
Hedberg, 1978).
Fiol and Lyles (1985) observe in all instances organizational learning authors 
assume that learning will improve future performance, but that a problem emerges around a 
clear definition of learning and the measurement of i t  However, they note several areas of 
consensus regarding a theory for organizational learning as follows:
1. Environmental alignment. Organizations, in order to survive and remain competitive, 
must be able to align with their environments, and alignment implies that organizations 
must have the potential to learn, unlearn, or relearn based on their past behaviors.
2. Individual versus organizational learning. Agreement exists that distinctions must be 
made between individual and organizational learning. However, there is also 
agreement that organizational learning is not simply the sum of each member's learning. 
Instead, organizations are viewed as being able to develop and maintain learning 
systems and memories through their patterns of behavior, prevailing perspectives, 
norms, and values that enables organizations to influence both their immediate and 
future members in ways of understanding and interpretation. 3
3. Contextual factions. Contextual factors affect the probability that learning will occur. 
Four contextual factors are cited: corporate culture conducive to learning, strategy that 
allows flexibility, an organizational structure that allows innovation, and the 
environment Wide agreement exists that an organization's culture, consisting of their 
shared beliefs, norms, and broad beliefs systems, highly influence perception of 
constraints, strategy employment, and direction of change. Strategy is seen as 
providing boundaries to decision making and a context for the perception and 
interpretation of the environment Centralized and mechanistic structures are viewed as 
reinforcing past behaviors, whereas an organic, more decentralized structure allows 
shifts of beliefs and actions. Learning is seen as requiring both change and stability 
between the learners and their environments. If the internal or external environment is 
too complex and dynamic, overload is likely to occur, whereas too much stability 
reduces the inducement to learn and change.
4. Content of learning. Three basic types of learning are cited: adaptation, cognitive 
development, and behavioral development. Adaptation is most commonly seen as 
defensive adjustment Cognitive development is seen as adjustment of process that
% ote that this research makes the distinction of relational knowledge as representing the learning which 
occurs at an organizational level, as opposed to an individual level.
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affects the organization's interpretation of events, the development of shared 
understandings, and/or conceptual schemes among members. Behavioral development 
is seen as new responses or actions that are based on the interpretations.^
5. Levels of learning. Lower-level learning occurs within a given structure and/or set of 
rules. The focus of this learning is on the immediate effect on a particular activity or 
facet of the organization. Argyris and Schon's (1978) refer to this as "single-loop 
learning, where the organization's set of rules restricts itself to detecting and correcting 
errors within that given system of rules. Higher-level learning, on the other hand, aims 
at adjusting overall rules and norms rather than specific activities or behaviors. Argyris 
and Schon's (1978) refer to this as double-loop learning, which occurs when 
mismatches are corrected by examining and altering first the governing variables and 
then the actions. Evidence indicates that such learning often requires some type of 
crisis, such as a new leader or a dramatically altered environment
Fiol and Lyles (1985) note two primary deficiencies in the literature. First is a 
clear distinction as to what is learning and how to distinguish it from unreflective change. 
Their survey of 15 major works noted that researchers often failed to clearly distinguish 
between adaptation, behavioral development and cognitive development In order to aid in 
resolving what is meant by the words learning and adaptation, Fiol and Lyles (1985) 
propose the following definitions:
Learning: The development of insights, knowledge, and associations 
between past actions, the effectiveness of those actions, and future actions. 
Adaptation: The ability to make incremental adjustments as a result of 
environmental changes, goal structure changes, or other changes. (Fiol and 
Lyles, 1985, 811)
Second, Fiol and Lyles (1985) noted that few instances of higher-level learning have been 
observed, and that it was unclear if this is because it is rare, or because theorists have not 
developed ways of describing and measuring i t  They call for developing methods for 
measuring learning that are more than mere observations of changes taking place. In this 
distinction between organizational learning and change, they contend it is important to be 
able to distinguish whether adjustment decisions demonstrate unreflective action-taking or 
in-depth understanding of past actions. Accordingly, they call for a methodology that takes
^Note that this research contends learning has occurred with what Fiol and Lyles (1985) refer to as cognitive 
development, and that the subsequent behavioral development is viewed as an artifact of the learning.
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more of an in-depth look at the functioning of the organization, and one that is able to 
distinguish between behavioral adaptation and learning through understanding if 
association development has occurred.
This research begins to answer some of Fiol and Lyles (1985) challenges. It views 
learning as cognitive development, and its methodology is designed to observe cognitive 
development through the in-depth elicitation of organizational perspectives and then- 
subsequent rigorous reflection (see chapter IV, "Research Design"). However, a flaw of 
the enactment of this research is that it only elicits and assesses perspectives over a 
relatively brief period of the participant organization's history. It is contended that a more 
accurate picture of an organization's learning would emerge, and a more effective 
facilitation of its learning could occur through a permanent structure for an advanced 
learning system.
Levitt and March's (1988) review of organizational learning literature is particularly 
interesting to this research, as they take a view of organizational learning as routine-based, 
history-dependent, and target-oriented, which results on a focus of how organizations learn 
and interpret their experience and the experience of others. First, they view behavior as 
based on routines. "Routines" include the rules, procedures, conventions, strategies, and 
technologies of an organization, as well as its beliefs, frameworks, paradigms, culture, and 
knowledge. They contend from their review of multiple authors and researchers: (1) that 
routines are independent of the individual actors, and are capable of surviving considerable 
turnover; (2) that the experiential lessons of history are captured by routines in a way that 
makes the lessons, but not the history, accessible; (3) that routines are transmitted through 
socialization, education, imitation, “professionalization”, personnel movement, mergers, 
and acquisitions; (4) that action stems more from a logic of appropriateness or legitimacy 
than from a logic of consequentiality or intention; (5) that it involves matching procedures 
to situations more than it does calculating choices; (6) that routines are based more on 
interpretations of the past than anticipation of the future; and (7) that routines adapt 
incrementally according to feedback about outcomes. They view organizational actions to 
flow from such routines, and therefore to be history-dependent. Finally, they view 
behavior to be target-oriented, since they view behavior as also dependent on the relation 
between the outcomes organizational members observe and the aspirations that they have 
for these outcomes.
It is notable how Levitt and March's (1988) perspective agrees with this research. 
It is seen that the model this research proposes for the generation and transmission of tacit 
and explicit knowledge implies the above thesis (See chapter VIII, "Research
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Implications"). This model holds that knowledge is generated in concert with others 
through a cyclic process in which members experience the actions and articulations of 
others, and then interpret these actions and articulations according to their current 
knowledge. Completing this cycle generates new knowledge or reinforces current 
knowledge. This new knowledge or reinforced current knowledge in turn influences new 
actions or repeats former actions, respectively. Similar to Levitt and March's (1988) 
contentions, this model implies: (1) such knowledge generation would be more dependent 
on contextual factors than specific individuals, since it is generated in concert with others;
(2) knowledge would be shared largely through socialization processes, since it is 
transmitted through everyday actions and articulations; (3) social representations of 
experiential knowledge would be available to others without the actual experience, since the 
actions and articulations flowing from members' experiential knowledge would be 
representative of their direct experience; (4) the knowledge would be more dependent on 
the history of experiences than anticipation of future experiences, because of its cyclic 
generation; (5) actions flowing from such knowledge would be history dependent, because 
of their cyclic generation; (6) actions would be more dependent upon context than intention, 
because of their ensuing from largely tacit perspectives and assumptions formed from 
experiencing the actions and articulations of other members; and (7) such knowledge would 
change only incrementally as future experiences are created from the actions that flowed 
from current knowledge.
Huber (1991) provides an extremely broad and comprehensive view of 
organizational learning literature centered upon the four constructs or processes of 
knowledge acquisition, information distribution, information interpretation, and 
organizational memory.
First, it is most interesting to this research that as a result of this review, Huber 
(1991) challenges the notion of intentional learning in organizations:
Intentional learning is the focal process in the lives of scientists and 
educators. Small wonder that when organizational scientists think about 
organizational learning, they often think of it as an intentional process 
directed at improving effectiveness. (Huber, 1991,88)
Huber (1991) advocates that "it is important to challenge such narrow concepts of 
organizational learning... as narrow conceptions decrease the chances of encountering 
useful findings". Instead, Huber (1991) proposes that "learning need not be conscious or
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intentional", that "learning does not always increase the learner's effectiveness, or even 
potential effectiveness", that "learning need not result in observable changes in behavior", 
and that in organizations "these process (of learning) are frequently interpersonal or social." 
(Huber, 1991, 89). It is noteworthy that these perspectives and contentions may be seen as 
nearly identical to the perspectives and contentions that were developed and introduced in 
chapter 1 as a result of this researcher's experience of this case study.
Huber (1991) defines knowledge acquisition as the process by which knowledge is 
obtained. He categorizes this process into five sub-processes: (1) congenital learning, (2) 
experiential learning, (3) vicarious learning, (4) grafting, and (5) searching. Of specific 
interest to this research are portions of his literature review on experiential learning, which 
is further subdivided into: (1) organizational experiments; (2) organizational self-appraisal;
(3) experimenting organizations; (4) unintentional or unsystematic learning; and (5) 
experience-based learning curves. First, in his review of organizational experiments, he 
finds consensus that experiential learning is enhanced by the availability and analysis of 
feedback, which is part of the methodology of this research (see chapter IV, "Research 
Design"). Second, in his review of organizational self-appraisal, he notes a number of 
overlapping approaches that tend to focus on member interaction and participation as critical 
to learning, including action research. It should be noted that core to the methodology of 
this research is an action research, self-appraisal approach (see chapter IV, "Research 
Design"). Finally, Huber (1991) notes that unintentional or unsystematic learning has been 
studied experimentally, analytically, and through interpretation of archival data. He noted 
that experimental studies in the 1950's and 1960's have lead to observations that 
organizational learning is often haphazard and multi-faceted, but that such experimental 
studies of learning has essentially ceased. It should be noted that this research design 
partially fills this gap through its experiment of eliciting organizational knowledge for 
feedback through assessments and facilitated dialogue.
Huber (1991) defines information distribution as the process by which information 
from different sources is shared and thereby leads to new information or understanding. 
Thus, information distribution is seen as a determinant of both the occurrence and breadth 
of organizational learning. He advocates that organizations often do not know what they 
know. Consequently, he contends when information is widely distributed, that it will lead 
to a higher probability of retrieval by individuals and sub-units, and an increased 
probability for learning. Consequently, Huber (1991) calls for research on how the 
distribution of potentially synergistic information may be facilitated. It should be noted that 
this research found a large body of shared perspectives among the participant group that
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were highly influential in establishing contexts for decisions and actions (see chapter VII, 
"Local Findings"). These perspectives appeared to be largely shared through the 
participants commonly experiencing the articulations and actions of other members. 
Consequently, this research advocates the enhancement of naturally occurring social 
processes as a mechanism for facilitating the broad distribution of potentially synergistic 
information. This is specifically recognized under the sub-section in chapter Vm, 
"Research Implications", titled "Implications for the Management of Organizations", where 
it advocated that "there should be a fundamental recognition that the work of an 
organization is social, and that which may facilitate such social work should be discovered 
and employed." Also, when Huber (1991) advocates that "organizations often do not 
know what they know", he appears to be referring to a knowledge distribution problem, as 
opposed to knowledge that is tacit. This research would advocate the same, but sees the 
problem as not just how knowledge is shared, but also the extent to which knowledge may 
be implicit Consequently, this research advocates that not only does the sharing of 
knowledge needs to be facilitated through encouraging social processes, but also that the 
surfacing of implicit knowledge should be facilitated, again through encouraging naturally 
occurring social processes, especially dialogue.
Huber (1991) defines information interpretation as the process by which distributed 
information is given one or more commonly understood interpretations. He questions 
whether more learning has occurred if organizational units develop a common 
interpretation, or if all units interpret the information differently. He concludes that more 
learning occurs when more and more varied interpretations have developed, and also when 
more of the organization's units understand the nature of the various interpretations, 
because such development changes the range of the organization's potential behaviors. It 
should be noted that the design of this research facilitates understanding of various 
interpretations through assessment of perspectives and facilitated group dialogues. In fact 
many participants commented that although they did not agree with specific perspectives, 
they now understood reasons for the perspectives. (See chapter IV, "Research Design", 
and chapter V, "Methodology Enactment").
Finally, Huber (1991) defines organizational memory as the means by which 
knowledge is stored for future use. This research, because of its design to elicit and assess 
organizational perspectives, and to use these assessed perspectives as a basis for facilitating 
dialogue, is concerned more with the unintentional storing of "soft" information in the form 
of norms and routines. Huber's (1991) literature review, on the other hand, is concerned 
with mechanisms for the storing and retrieving of explicit information.
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Dodgson’s (1993) review of organizational literature is focused through 
considering (1) the goals of organizational learning, (2) learning processes, and (3) ways in 
which learning may be facilitated or impeded. Much of this review repeats the perspectives 
and insights expressed in the earlier reviews above. Several areas in which Dodgson's 
(1993) review converges with the above reviews and this research is that although he 
agrees that learning is based on individuals, organizations can learn "in toto". He contends 
learning is socially constructed and quotes Simon (1991), who argues that although all 
learning takes place inside individual human heads...
What an individual learns in an organization is very much dependent on 
what is already known to (or believed by) other members of the 
organization and what kinds of information are present in the organizational 
environment. (Simon, 1991,125)
He cites March et al. (1991) as contending that the learning process is generally 
conservative and sustains existing structures of belief, which he points out to parallel 
Kuhn's (1970) "normal science". He concludes that the emphasis in much of the 
management, innovation, and economics literature is that "history matters", and what a firm 
can do in the future is strongly influenced by its past and collective learning. 
Organizational learning as more than the sum of the individual learning of its members, as 
socially constructed, as conservative and sustaining of existing structures of belief, and as 
history dependent are all themes that are strongly substantiated by the evidence and 
experience of this research.
Dixon (1992) reviews the organizational learning literature from the viewpoint of an 
HRD (Human Resource Development) professional. She notes that HRD professionals 
have a substantial technology for increasing competence in individuals, but that they lack an 
equivalent technology for addressing organizational learning. Consequently, her review is 
centered on a viewpoint of what HRD professionals can do to facilitate learning at the 
organizational level. She repeats many of the concepts reviewed above, and reviews the 
literature according to five constructs that are very similar to Huber's (1991) constructs, 
i.e.: (1) information acquisition, (2) information distribution and interpretation, (3) making 
meaning, (4) organization memory, and (5) retrieval of information.
There are several areas in which Dixon's (1992) review specifically reinforces the 
perspectives of this research. She too agrees with the concept that learning in organizations 
occurs beyond the individual level.
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There is a know-how in the collective that can be credited only to the group.
This know-how is embedded in the shared understanding of the group...
The distinctive feature or organizational level information activity is sharing.
(Dixon, 1992, 31)
She sees critical reflection in the form of dialogue, action science, and questioning 
assumptions as a means of internal information acquisition. Her interpretive perspective of 
organizational learning emphasizes the equivocality of information, and holds that meaning 
is created, not interpreted. She quotes, "The essence of organizational learning is reduction 
of equivocality, not data gathering" (Daft and Huber, 1987, 9). She contends that 
organizational ambiguity precipitates an exchange of views rather than the collection of 
additional data. Accordingly, she advocates that HRD professionals should take 
responsibility for creating forums where conflicting issues are discussed and equivocality 
reduced. These viewpoints are again seen to be congruent with this research and its 
advocations that contexts for dialogue should be created and facilitated to transform that 
which is known individually and implicitly to a domain where it is shared and known 
explicitly (see chapter Vm, "Research Implications").
Specific Authors
Several authors have specifically influenced the perspectives for this research. In 
particular are Argyris and Schon's (1978) theory of action perspective of organizational 
learning, Senge's (1990) mental models, Keating's (1993) perspective of distinguishing 
the individual from the organization, and Michael Polanyi's (1966) perspective for "tacit 
knowing".
Argyris and Schon's (1978) theory of action perspective of organizational learning 
is a perspective that attempts to explain learning as a behavior in organizations. They 
describe learning as occurring on three levels, i.e., single-loop, double-loop, and deutero 
learning. They contend that organizational learning involves the detection and correction of 
error. Accordingly, single-loop learning is when the nature of the error that is detected and 
corrected allows the organization to carry on its present policies or achieve its present 
objectives, and double-loop learning is when the nature of the error that is detected and 
corrected involves the modification of an organization's underlying norms, policies, and 
objectives. Deutero-leaming is when an organization's members learn about previous 
contexts for learning. This requires that they reflect on and inquire into previous episodes 
of organizational learning, or failure to learn, and in so doing, discover what they did that
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facilitated or inhibited learning, and then invent and produce new strategies for learning, 
which in turn are evaluated and generalized as to what they have produced. Argyris and 
Schon's (1978) study found that most organizations do well in single-loop learning, but 
have difficulties in double-loop learning. They could find no example of organizations 
which learned in a deutero fashion.
Argyris and Schon (1978) distinguish that often there are differences between 
actors' rationalized statements of what they do (espoused theory) and the actions that 
actually occur, which are said to be governed by their "theory-in-use". Organizational 
members are able to articulate and disseminate espoused theories, but cannot readily 
articulate their theories-in-use. Both espoused theories and theories-in-use are collectively 
held, but theories-in-use are held tacitly rather than consciously. This makes theories-in- 
use unavailable for examination and challenge, although they may be inferred from the 
actions of the organization's members.
Theories-in-use are similar to Senge's (1990) "mental models", which he 
acknowledges is based on Argyris and Schon's (1978) organizational theories of action. 
Mental models are generalizations that have been inferred from past experience. They are 
reflected in the interpretation of current experience, and through that interpretation they 
influence the choice of actions. Where mental models have become entrenched in an 
organization, they may prevent new learning and hinder constructive change. Janis's 
(1983) concept of "groupthink", mentioned earlier in this chapter, may also be interpreted 
as entrenched mental models.
Keating (1993) also provided an additional "individual theory" distinction beyond 
Argyris and Schon's (1978) distinction for individuals' espoused theory as opposed to 
their theory-in-use. He provided instances in his study that indicated organizational 
members may also, as individuals, hold beliefs that differ from what they perceive others’ 
espoused theories to be, and also from what they perceive others' theories-in-use to be, as 
inferred by their perceived actions. This distinction serves to distinguish the individual's 
personal theory from his or her perception of the theory espoused and the theory-in-use by 
others.
As a result of these concepts, Argyris and Schon (1978) contend that organizations 
tend to create learning systems that inhibit double-loop learning. They label such learning 
systems as a "Model O-I limited learning system”, which is characterized by primary 
inhibiting loops, which act as barriers to effective organizational learning by contributing to 
dysfunctional group dynamics and by reinforcing conditions of error that initially 
established these loops. In this limited learning system single-loop learning may occur,
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i.e., error can be detected and corrected provided correction does not challenge existing 
norms, objectives, or strategies. However, if errors are detected that would require 
challenging the legitimacy of existing norms, objectives, or strategies, the source of error is 
not addressed, and dysfunctions in the organization develop: for example, the source of 
error may become an "undiscussible", while "camouflage" is invented to hide or disguise 
the "undiscussible". As a result, the probability of double-loop learning is decreased. In 
contrast to Model O-I, Argyris and Schon (1978) present Model O-II as an advanced 
organizational learning system. In this model issues are surfaced and subjected to public 
testing. This permits inquiry directed at engaging conditions of error that result from 
contradictions in espoused theory and theory-in-use. The result is increased probability for 
double-loop learning. The primary difference in Model O-I and Model O-II theory is that 
the inquiry and public testing of issues eliminates the inhibitory loops characteristic to 
Model O-I.
In that both Argyris and Schon (1978) and Senge (1990) contend that theories-in- 
use and mental models, respectively, are largely tacit (and largely formed from experience), 
this review turns toward Michael Polanyi, a distinguished scientist-philosopher, and his 
landmark work, The Tacit Dimension (1966), where he developed a theory for an essential 
process of thinking, which he called "tacit knowing", in order to develop a perspective for 
tacit knowledge. He starts by saying:
"I shall reconsider human knowledge by starting from the fact that we can
know more than we can tell." (Polanyi, 1966,4)
In Polanyi's model for tacit knowing he demonstrates through classical 
psychological experiments, examples, and reasoning that we often develop knowledge of, 
what I shall call, causes, as a result of our direct experience of, what I shall call, their 
effects. He calls what I call the cause "the second term", and what I call the effect "the first 
term".
"We know the first term only by relying on our awareness of it for attending
to the second." (Polanyi, 1966, 10)
Polanyi further explained that in many ways the first term of this relation will prove 
to be nearer to us, while the second term will prove to be further away from us. Using the 
language of anatomy, he refers to the first term as proximal, and the second term as distal.
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"It is the proximal term, then, of which we have a knowledge that we may
not be able to tell." (Polanyi, 1966,10)
One example Polanyi provides of such proximal or tacit knowing is the way a blind 
man feels his way by tapping with a stick. The blind man feels the impact of the stick 
against his fingers and palm, but since he has learned to use the stick for feeling his way, 
his awareness of the stick's impact on his hand is transformed into a sense of its point 
touching the objects he is exploring. Through the blind man directing his awareness to the 
distal, i.e., the objects the point of his stick touches, he is able through an interpretative 
effort to transpose the proximal feelings the stick causes in his hand. Polanyi calls this 
interpretative effort the semantic aspect of tacit knowing.
The blind man's tacit knowledge in Polanyi's example consists of the blind man's 
interpretative abilities to transpose the otherwise meaningless feelings of the stick in his 
hand into the meaningful feelings of his stick touching objects. In the same way, mental 
models and theories-in-use are the perspectives formed from attending to our perceptions 
of the causes of the effects that we directly experience. The effects we directly experience 
in our respective organizations are the proximal of which we have a knowledge that we 
may not be able to tell, and would have little meaning to us without the interpretative 
abilities we have learned over time through our direct experience of these effects of our 
respective organizations, just as the feelings from the stick would have little meaning to the 
blind man were it not for his accumulated experience of finding his way with a stick. Such 
interpretative abilities remain largely tacit to us as we focus our attention on the distal, i.e., 
the causes of the effects that we directly experience. It is important to note at this point that 
the causes, which are the focus of our attention, are in fact interpretations of the causes, 
just as are the causes that the blind man imagines for the feelings of the stick in his hand. 
Our ability to make such interpretations comprises our tacit knowing learned through our 
past experiences of effects, and just like the blind man, I contend that this knowing is 
usually outside of our awareness. As I present evidence in chapter VII, "Local Findings", 
I contend that such tacit knowing is usually bom out of the socialized organizational 
experiences of its members, and that it affects decision and action much more than is 
normally realized. Such tacit knowledge not only appears to strongly affect decision and 
action, but also appears to strongly affect organizational members' future interpretive 
abilities: a member's tacit knowledge creates decisions and actions, which create new 
effects, which are then experienced and interpreted by other members based on their 
current tacit knowledge. These other members in turn create new decisions, actions, and
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resulting effects. This cycle of existing tacit knowledge affecting decision, action, and 
subsequent interpretations appears to often create vicious cycles that lock organizations into 
specific modes of behavior. The organization behaves as it does because of its history, 
which is consistently and constantly repeated because of its history. This conclusion is 
similar to Dodgson's (1993) conclusion in which he found that the emphasis in much of 
the management, innovation, and economics literature is that "history matters", and what a 
firm can do in the future is strongly influenced by its past and its collective learning.
Finally, since the perspective is taken that tacit theories-in-use and mental models 
not only strongly affect our learning through affecting our ability to interpret, but also 
represents a history of learning, a perspective is taken that such implicit theories-in-use and 
mental models represents evidence of learning. Accordingly, a perspective is taken that it 
is important to elicit such implicit knowledge, not only for the sake of this research, but for 
the sake of facilitating learning in an organization. For this a perspective of eliciting tacit 
knowledge through facilitating spontaneous, contextual articulations of members' 
experience is gained from Berry's (1988) perspective for eliciting tacit expert knowledge 
for expert systems, which was reviewed in Chapter I.
Implications of Literature for the Research
There are two primary implications for this research that follow from the 
organizational theory and organizational learning literatures. First, it has been seen that 
there is a multiplicity of organizational theories and organizational learning perspectives. 
Accordingly, one implication of the literature for this research is that it is necessary to 
articulate the perspective that has been formed which guides this research. Second, it is 
important to note recognized deficiencies in the literature in which this research should 
contribute to filling.
The primary perspectives from the literature that serve to guide this research are the 
following four constructions:
1. From Argyris and Schon's (1978) theory of action perspective, organizational learning 
is viewed as a natural behavior in organizations. Such learning "need not be conscious 
or intentional" (Huber, 1991, 89). This natural behavior is viewed as being greatly 
influenced by theories-in-use or mental models, which are largely tacit and often may 
not be congruent with espoused theory. This is congruent with the "organizational 
culture" or "symbolic management" perspective, according to which, for any complex 
organization, it is assumed there exists an implicit culture which influences 
organizational behaviors and decisions through patterns of basic assumptions, and
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where these patterns of basic assumptions repeatedly lead people to make decisions that 
"worked in the past" for the organization. This is also similar to Levitt and March's 
(1988) view of organizational behavior as based on routines, and to Dodgson's (1993) 
contention that organizational learning processes are generally conservative and often 
sustain existing structures of belief. Further, "these process (of learning) are frequently 
interpersonal or social" (Huber, 1991, 89). Accordingly, normative learning in an 
organization is viewed as a naturally occurring, incremental, contextual, and social 
process.
2. From a wide consensus of the organizational learning literature, learning is viewed as 
occurring through individuals, but such individual learning is viewed synergistically,
i.e., it is viewed as being affected by the learning of others, and as affecting the 
learning of others, thereby resulting in a formation, validation, and sharing of 
perspectives that would not otherwise be possible individually. This is similar to 
Dodgson's (1993) contention that organizations can learn "in toto", and Dixon's (1992) 
collective "know-how.
3. From Fiol and Lyles (1985), the perspective is taken that learning may be evidenced by 
change in actions, norms, practices, policies, strategies, and/or procedures, but that 
such evidence may be difficult to observe or detect. "Learning does not always 
increase the learner's effectiveness, or even potential effectiveness", and "learning need 
not result in observable changes in behavior" (Huber, 1991, 89). Accordingly, from 
Argyris and Schon's (1978) concept of theories-in-use, and Senge's (1990) mental 
models a cognitive perspective of organizational learning is adopted for both evidencing 
and facilitating such learning. Therefore in evidencing learning and in facilitating 
learning, learning is seen as new knowledge or a change in knowledge. Such new 
knowledge or change in knowledge may increase the organization's potential for action, 
but not necessarily so. Where it does not increase the organization's potential for new 
action, it is considered no less as learning, since it still will at least affect the 
organization's interpretive abilities. In Polanyi's (1966) terms, it is the semantic aspect 
of knowing. This cognitive perspective is effected in this case study through 
attempting to elicit and make explicit the tacit mental models, or theories-in-use, of the 
participants. Accordingly, Berry's (1988) perspective for eliciting tacit expert 
knowledge for expert systems, which was reviewed in Chapter I, is adopted by this 
research in attempting to elicit participants' tacit organizational knowledge. Finally, 
Polanyi's (1966) perspective for "tacit knowing" is adopted in forming a perspective
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
for the nature of tacit knowledge, and the experiential way in which such knowledge is 
principally acquired and interpreted.
4. From Argyris and Schon's (1978) perspective for levels of learning and organizational 
defenses, a perspective for distinguishing levels of learning and organizational defenses 
is adopted as a way to recognize levels of learning that may be evidenced in this case 
study, and as a way to recognize barriers to learning, when such learning does not 
occur.
The second implication of the literature for this research is that it is important to note 
the recognized deficiencies in the literature in which this research should contribute to 
filling.
1. Fiol and Lyles (1985) noted that there was not a clear distinction as to what learning is 
and how to distinguish it from unreflective change. The perspective formed from this 
research holds that learning is new knowledge or change in new knowledge. Such new 
knowledge or change in knowledge may be distinguished from unreflective change 
through the methodology of this research, which elicits in-depth representations of the 
organization's knowledge.
2. Fiol and Lyles (1985) noted that few instances of higher-level learning have been 
observed, and that it was unclear if this is because it is rare, or because theorists have 
not developed ways of describing and measuring i t  They call for developing methods 
for measuring learning that are more than mere observations of changes taking place, 
and call for a methodology that takes more of an in-depth look at the functioning of the 
organization. The methodology of this research takes such an in-depth look at the 
organization. If there were instances of higher-level learning in the participant 
organization, the methodology would have certainly revealed such learning, and 
distinguished it from unreflective action-taking. In that instances of higher-level 
learning were not observed in this in-depth case study of a complex organization, this 
research provides another data point on the rarity of such higher-level learning.
3. Huber (1991) notes that unintentional or unsystematic learning has been studied 
experimentally, analytically, and through interpretation of archival data. He noted that 
experimental studies in the 1950's and 1960's have led to observations that 
organizational learning is often haphazard and multi-faceted, but that such experimental 
studies of learning have essentially ceased. It should be noted that this research design 
partially fills this gap through its experiment of eliciting organizational knowledge for 
feedback through assessments and facilitated dialogue.
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4. Keating (1993) provided an additional individual distinction beyond Argyris and 
Schon’s (1978) distinction for individuals' espoused theory as opposed to their theory- 
in-use. He provided instances in his study that indicated organizational members may 
also individually hold beliefs that may differ from what they perceive the espoused 
theories of others to be, and what they perceive others' theories-in-use to be as inferred 
from their perceived actions. This distinction serves to distinguish the individual's 
personal theory from his or her perception of the theory espoused and the theory-in-use 
by others. Since this is a new distinction, however, there is a question as to how 
useful this distinction actually may be. The design of this research serves to address 
this question through the participants' explicit assessments of their perspectives 
according to this distinction.
5. Although there is wide recognition of tacit organizational cultures, theories-in-use,
mental models, assumptions, norms, and routines, there has been no methodology 
designed to systematically elicit or assess such tacit knowledge in order to gain a more 
measurable understanding as to the role such knowledge plays in the naturally 
occurring learning processes of organizations. The design of this research to 
specifically recognize, elicit, and assess such tacit knowledge is considered to be a 
major contribution of this research in filling this gap.
6. Finally, there is a paucity of research that applies specific concepts of organizational 
learning to facilitating organizational learning processes of inquiry. Accordingly, the 
details of the methodology and the enactment of this research should provide insight as 
to the form that specific tools, procedures, methods, and conditions would take in 
facilitating an effective organizational learning process of inquiry.




The purpose of this chapter is to establish the methodological framework necessary 
to construct the research design. The methodological framework for this research is 
principally drawn from participatory action research. There are a variety of descriptions of 
participatory action research (Whyte, Greenwood, and Lazes 1989, Whyte 1989, 
McTaggart 1991, Elden and Taylor 1983, Elden 1983, and Elden 1981). Among these 
descriptions the features which are relevant for this research are a collaborative research 
effort, the co-generation of substantial local knowledge, and the advancement of theory 
from the inference of local discoveries.
The establishment of a methodological framework introduces rigor into the 
participatory action research. It does so first by a consistent application of a research 
design built upon theory. This introduces theoretical validity into the research, which is 
discussed later in this chapter. Secondly, the development of a methodological framework 
forces the consideration of other criteria for good science, e.g., researcher influence and the 
generalizability, reproducibility, and validity of research data and findings. Finally, it 
forces consideration of specific issues unique to the research, such as how to elicit 
voluntary participation, and what are the focus, context, structure, and expectations of the 
research.
The intention of the methodological framework is to facilitate organizational self­
reflections by the participants on issues they deem important in order to facilitate 
observations on the guiding questions and objectives stated in chapter I. In review, the 
primary objective that the methodological framework should serve is to facilitate 
organizational self-reflections and dialogue that aid observing and understanding the 
phenomena of organizational learning. This objective is served by the supporting 
objectives stated in chapter I, which include: (1) observing if the changes suggested by 
Keating's (1993) Organizational Learning Process (OLP) strategy enhance the OLP 
strategy; (2) noting similarities and differences in Keating's (1993) case study versus this 
case study; (3) making explicit the organizational reflections deemed important by the 
participants to facilitate local discovery, especially with regard to TQM; (4) observing 
differences in (a) the participants' organizational rhetoric and action, i.e., "espoused 
theory" and "theory in-use", (Argyris and Schon, 1978), and (b) the participants' own 
positions with respect to their perceptions of the rest of the organization's rhetoric and
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action, as suggested by Keating's (1993) strategy; and (5) observing evidence of 
organizational learning occurring as a result of the modified OLP participatory action 
intervention.
In stating that the primary purpose of this research is to observe with an 
organization the generation of organizational self-reflections to further understand the 
organizational learning phenomenon, this research positions itself as theory-generating or 
building, versus theory-testing (Whyte, Greenwood, and Lazes 1989, Whyte 1989). The 
purpose of theory-generating research is to develop theory based on a set of data, whereas 
the purpose of theory-testing research is to test some specific pre-existing theoretical 
hypothesis. Theory-generating research does not have the same type of rigor as theory- 
testing research. In theory-testing research, a specific variable might be designed to test a 
specific hypothesis by measuring it under a set of constraints that assures not only the 
reproducibility and validity of the measurements, but also the generalizability of the 
inferences through statistical sampling conventions. Instead, theory-generating research 
typically is based on a set of data developed through observation. Unlike theory-testing 
research, it is normally qualitative rather than quantitative. However, a different kind of 
rigor can be introduced into theory-generating research in several ways. First, a consistent 
framework can be introduced through which data are generated and theory is inferred. A 
consistent framework adds rigor by pre-determining the conditions under which data are 
generated. Although multiple interpretations of the data may still occur, a consistently 
applied framework constrains what are counted as data. Second, the framework can be 
designed to make explicit the individual biases of the researcher and the participants. 
Third, the framework can be designed with feedback loops that minimize implicit biases the 
researcher might otherwise introduce into the research. Fourth, criteria for good science 
can be considered in the articulation of a framework , such as the generalizability, 
reproducibility, and validity of the research findings. Finally, it forces consideration of 
specific issues unique to the research, such as how to elicit voluntary participation, and 
what are the focus, context, and expectations of the research.
In establishing the methodological framework necessary to construct the research 
design, this chapter first articulates the distinctions between action research and positivist 
science. Second, the chapter explores the appropriateness of qualitative versus quantitative 
research. Third, the chapter discusses issues of generalizability, reproducibility, and 
validity of research findings for qualitative research. Finally, the chapter considers specific 
issues unique to this research involving the focus, participation, context, structure, and the
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expectations of the research in terms of the participants and their relationship to the 
researcher.
The Origins of Action Research
Action research was first proposed by Lewin (1947), where he combined action 
and research by arguing that a social situation can best be understood if a change is 
introduced into it, and its effects are observed. Lewin gave a clear picture of what he meant 
by action research and how it differed from traditional positivist science, a set of ideas 
influenced by the empirical tradition that attempts to systematize knowledge with the aid of 
logic and mathematics (Hew, 1979). Susman and Evered (1978) describe Lewin's letters 
between 1944 and 1946 as expressing profound concern for finding methods to deal with 
critical social problems, where traditional science was not progressing toward resolutions. 
Lewin's laboratory was the change experiment on the social system in which practitioners 
and social scientists collaborated to find ways to bring about needed changes. From these 
roots, action research emerged with the twin aims of providing practical guidance to people 
faced with immediate problems and contributing to the goals of social science (Rapoport, 
1970). As a social science, action research does not aim to formulate universally true laws, 
but situation-specific insights (Susman and Evered, 1978). The action researcher 
intervenes in the problem situation in order to improve the self-help and action-taking 
competencies of the individual (Susman and Evered, 1978), as well as to facilitate learning 
at the level of the organization (Argyris and Schon, 1978). The purpose of action research 
is to advance theories about organizations and about change processes that produces 
organizations (Walton and Gaffney, 1989). Therefore, the knowledge that is produced can 
help to empower organizational members to take actions toward the new organizational 
forms that they determine as desirable as a result of the process.
Action research has used different techniques for data collection such as 
questionnaires, direct observation and/or in-depth interviewing, as well as retrieval of data 
from records, memos, and reports that the client system routinely produces. Susman and 
Evered (1978) view the action research process as a five phase cyclical process of 
diagnosing, action planning, action taking, evaluation, and specifying learning. They 
consider all five phases to be necessary for a comprehensive definition of action research, 
but note the following distinctions made by Chein, Cook, and Harding (1948) for when 
the researcher is involved in less than all five phases:
1. "Diagnostic action research" - when the researcher is involved only in collecting data for 
diagnosis and feeding the data back to the client system.
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2. "Participant action research" - when diagnosing and action planning are carried out in 
collaboration between researcher and client system.
3. "Experimental action research" - when the researcher and client system collaborate in all 
or nearly all phases to set up an experiment for taking an action and evaluating its 
consequences.
If this research was labeled according to the above distinctions, it would lie 
somewhere in between diagnostic action research and participant action research: although, 
the inquiry is carried out in collaboration between the researcher and the participants, the 
responsibility for generating actions as a result of discoveries rested with the organization's 
participants.
Appropriateness of Action Research and Qualitative Methods
Action research avoids many of the deficiencies of positivist science for generating 
knowledge for application to organizational problems. A positivist model of science has 
been the model which has largely served the physical, biological, and much of the social 
sciences, and according to Pepper (1942) "appears to amount to the proposition that ideally 
knowledge should consist of beliefs founded on data.... Knowledge, then, would be 
identified with science, and science would be conceived ideally as a mathematical or logical 
system in which postulates and propositions referred to empirical data and in which the 
connections among the propositions and their empirical references would be exhibited by 
logical data" (Pepper, 1942,60). According to this world picture:
1. Methods are value-neutral.
2. Observations are based on the present.
3. The researcher is detached from the objects of research, which exist independently of 
human beings.
4. Knowledge advances either by induction or deduction, and is confirmed by logical 
consistency, prediction and control.
5. Laws are broad, universal, free of context, and hierarchically organized.
Susman & Evered (1978) argue from the following perspectives that this world 
view is an inadequate basis for generating knowledge about organizations. Several of their 
arguments include the following:
1. Organizations are artifacts created by human beings to serve their ends and do not exist 
independently of human beings.
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2. Positivist science treats persons as objects of inquiry. Humans differ from objects in 
their capacity for self-reflection and their ability to collaborate in the diagnosis of their 
own problems and in the generation of knowledge.
3. Positivist science assumes value-neutral methods. However, organizations are systems 
of human action in which the means and ends are guided by values.
4. Positivist science is itself a product of the human mind, thus knowledge of the inquirer 
cannot be excluded from an understanding of how knowledge is generated.
5. The primary criteria of confirmation for positivist science are prediction and control of 
its objects of research. In organizations, where the objects of research are human, 
prediction and control presents the temptation for manipulation, and possible exclusion 
of other ends such as improved understanding among persons and the release of human 
potential.
6. Positivist science eliminates the role of history in the generation of knowledge, since its 
observations are based on the present. However, organizations are not bom in an 
instant; present patterns of behavior often can only be understood as a product of 
shared definitions evolved from a unique history.
7. Empirical observation and logical reconstruction of organizational activities are not 
sufficient for a science of organization because:
a) organizations are planned according to their members conception of the future, and 
statements about the future have no truth value according to positivist science; and
b) organizations can be understood experientially by researchers so that the truth of 
many propositions about organizations need not be supported empirically or 
validated logically.
8. Organizations can be legitimate objects of scientific inquiry only as single cases without 
considering whether such cases are includable under general laws.
9. Positivist science assumes that a system is defined only to the extent that an explicit 
language exists to describe i t  Where positivist science acknowledges that intuition and 
interpretation can be precursors to scientific knowledge, it does not consider them by 
themselves to be legitimate scientific methods. However, any representational system 
is always less than the actual system, and rather than poor substitutes for articulation, 
such methods encourage a deeper understanding of organizational values and 
consideration of new organizational forms.
Susman and Evered (1978) point out six characteristics representative of the
methods and objectives of key developers and practitioners of action research that provide a
corrective to the deficiencies of positivist science:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
55
1. Action research is future oriented. Human beings are recognized as purposeful systems 
(Ackoff and Emery, 1972), and in dealing with the practical concerns of people, it is 
oriented toward creating a more desirable future for them.
2. Action research is collaborative. It "challenges the position of the social scientist as 
privileged observer, analyst, and critic” (Chems, Clark, Jenkins (1976,33). As such, 
the research process will be a function of the needs and competencies of both the 
researcher and the client, while preventing the researcher from taking the role of 
disinterested observer and obliging him to clarify his own ethics and values.
3. Action research implies system development. The research process encourages the 
development of the capacity of a system to facilitate competencies with the client to 
diagnose, plan, take action, and to evaluate and specify learning.
4. Action research generates theory grounded in action. Theory provides a guide for what 
should be considered in the diagnosis of an organization, while contributing to the 
development of theory by taking actions guided by theory and evaluating their 
consequences. Theory may then be supported or revised on the basis of the evaluation.
5. Action research is not dogmatic. The action researcher recognizes that his or her 
theories and prescriptions for action are themselves the product of previously taken 
action and, therefore, are subject to reexamination and reformulation. The action 
researcher also recognizes that the objectives, the problem, and the method of the 
research must be generated from the process itself, and that the consequences of 
selected actions cannot be fully known ahead of time.
6. Action research is situational. The action researcher knows that many of the 
relationships between people, events, and things are a function of the situation as 
relevant actors currently define it  Appropriate action is not based entirely, or possibly 
even primarily, on knowledge of previously observed relationships, but instead 
includes how particular actors define their present situations.
Keating (1993) also distinguishes the appropriateness of qualitative methods in
understanding complex organizations and the processes which generate them.
In light of Poplin's (1987) description of the basis for quantitative inquiry, a 
cogent argument for selection of the qualitative methods for the research can 
be made. Poplin (1987) suggests that quantitative analysis is grounded in:
(1) logico-mathematical reduction, or the idea that data must be submitted to 
mathematical analyses, requiring reduction of problems into variables which 
can be quantified, (2) separation between the researcher and the subject of
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research as well as a separation of the phenomenon investigated from the 
larger context from which it is generated, (3) value-free objectivity, or an 
unbiased position assumed by the researcher, (4) reliance on generation of 
hypotheses for testing and deductive analysis, and (5) demands that 
research be replicable to be considered valid. (Keating 1993,96-97)
Keating (1993) went on to explain that the intent of his research did not meet 
Poplin's (1987) description of the basis for quantitative inquiry. Just as the intent of 
Keating's (1993) research did not fit Poplin's description of the basis for quantitative 
inquiry, neither does the primary intent of this research. The primary intent of this research 
is to observe organizational self-reflections on issues of importance to an organization to 
further understand the organizational learning phenomenon. More specifically, these 
observations are desired to be co-observations generated through the researcher and 
organizational members co-constructing organizational reflections on issues co-deemed as 
important The intent is to create discovery regarding the organizational perspectives, 
understandings, and beliefs specific to the participant organization. Through this process, 
it is hoped that a better understanding of the organization's learning can be generated, and a 
better understanding of the organizational learning phenomenon can be attained. Such an 
inquiry should not and probably cannot be reduced to Poplin's formula for quantitative 
inquiry, for many of the same reasons presented above by Susman & Evered (1978). A 
counter argument to each of Poplin's five part formula for quantitative inquiry is presented 
in the following five paragraphs.
First quantifiable variables would constrain organizational observations to what 
such variables were intended to observe or measure. Such constraint would be appropriate 
in testing some accepted theory, but would prove to be too restrictive in the case where a 
broad understanding of an organization and the processes that produces its learning is 
desired.
Second, there is no intention to separate the researcher from the organization under 
research. Instead, the intention is to generate inquiry and observation through co­
construction of perspectives and co-observation of this process of inquiry. Therefore, 
instead of minimizing or denying the influence of the researcher, an attempt is made to 
account for the researcher as an influencer of the research. First, there is an explicit 
acknowledgement of the researcher assumptions (see chapter I). Second, there is constant 
feedback of the researcher's interpretations to the participants as a means of correcting 
misinterpretations (see chapter IV, "Research Design"). Third, the methodology provides
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an explicit record of validated perspectives and open-ended comments, assessed by all 
participants as to their position with respect to their perceptions of the rest of the 
organization's rhetoric and action (see chapter IV, "Research Design", and chapter VI, 
"Perspective Analysis"). Fourth, a set of field notes is maintained to record interactions 
with participants as they occur. Fifth, all of the perspective development interviews are 
tape recorded and transcribed (see chapter IV, "Research Design", and chapter V, 
"Methodology Enactment"). Finally, all group meetings are tape recorded (see chapter IV, 
"Research Design", and chapter V, "Methodology Enactment").
The third counter argument to Poplin's five part formula for quantitative inquiry is 
that the researcher and co-researchers are recognized as not free of value commitments. 
Instead, the researcher and organizational participants are understood as bringing their 
perspectives, biases, and assumptions into the research arena. Indeed, it is the essence of 
this research to articulate such perspectives, biases, and assumptions in its attempt to co- 
observe with an organization their self-reflections in order to better understand the 
participant organization and the phenomena of organizational learning.
The fourth counter argument is that the research does not formulate hypotheses for 
testing, but rather poses questions for observation. From these questions and 
observations, hypotheses for future research may be developed, but these hypotheses are 
not the subject of this research.
The final counter argument is that the research is understood to be context- 
dependent, and therefore not replicable outside of the specific context created by the 
specific participant organization operating in the context of this specific inquiry at the 
specific time it is conducted. This, however, does not mean that the research cannot be 
generalized beyond its local context, as addressed in the following section.
In conclusion, quantitative research in organizations is appropriate and has its place 
when the research purpose involves generation of hypotheses for testing and deductive 
analysis. This research in its design treats some of the data quantitatively to aid observing 
for differences in perceptions of organizational rhetoric and action, and for differences in 
the individual participant's position with respect to his or her perceptions of the rest of the 
organization’s rhetoric and action. However, more importantly, the research design serves 
as a window, metaphorically speaking, in observing the participant organization. 
Consequently, this research employs a qualitative perspective through the observation of 
the participant organization's process of reflection and dialogue generated through the 
modified OLP. These observations are guided by a number of objectives and research 
questions, as addressed in chapter I, which are intended to co-generate local knowledge
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with the participant organization, and to generate cross-organizational knowledge regarding 
TQM and organizational knowledge and learning.
The appropriateness of each method, quantitative or qualitative, then, is dependent 
upon the intent of the research. The arguments regarding the merits of each should not 
diminish the value of either. Qualitative design serves to generate new knowledge about 
the phenomenon in question and prepares new avenues for inquiry. Qualitative design can 
yield discovery that might not be possible through the more rigid and inflexible nature of a 
quantitative research design. Therefore, challenges to the qualitative perspective are 
answered in terms of the intent of the research, and the due consideration of other criteria 
for good science, as addressed in the following section.
Generalizability, Reproducibility, and Validity of Research Findings
Keating (1993) aptly addresses generalizability, reproducibility, and validity in 
establishing the framework for his qualitative research. This section applies his 
considerations of these criteria to this research.
Generalizability of Research Findings
Keating (1993) cites qualitative research literature perspectives, which hold that any 
research is not totally unique, and that on some level the research can be projected beyond 
the narrow bounds of the specific research application (Borman, LeCompte, and Goetz, 
1986). Keating (1993) goes on to say:
In quantitative research, generalizability is enhanced through statistical 
sampling conventions to assure representativeness and the ability to make 
inference based on results. However qualitative sampling is based on 
purposive, or non-probability samples, that are selected for their suspected 
ability to illuminate the phenomena of interest (Sykes, 1991; Sandelowski,
1986). (Keating 1993, 102).
Keating (1993) suggests that a criterion of fitness be used for the generalizability of 
qualitative research findings, and quotes Sandelowski (1986) as follows:
A research meets the criterion of fitness when its findings can "fit" into 
contexts outside the research situation and when its audience views its 
findings as meaningful and applicable in terms of their own experiences. 
(Sandelowski 1986,32)
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Keating (1993) therefore concludes, as does this research, that even with a limited 
and purposely selected organizational sample, the arguments for appropriate translation to 
other populations, or organizations, becomes reasonable. The concept of fitness is applied 
in the generalization of this research in two ways. First, this concept is used in the conduct 
of the research. Here, the audience is the participants. Through the validation and 
assessment of perspectives developed from individual interviews, the participants find the 
perspectives meaningful and applicable in terms of their own experiences, or the 
perspectives are changed or rejected. From this concept of fitness, the content of individual 
interviews are generalized on the local level, which become the local findings of the 
research. Second, the concept of fitness inevitably applies in the presentation of this 
research. The readers will find the general findings of this research as meaningful and 
applicable in terms of their own experiences, or they will reject them, just as the 
participants of this research would have rejected this research if it had not been meaningful 
and applicable to them on their local level. If, however, readers can see the general 
findings as meaningful and applicable in terms of their own experiences, then it can be said 
that the findings of this research were appropriately generalizable according to the criteria of 
fitness.
Reproducibility of Research Findings
Keating (1993) cites perspectives which view reproducibility as forcing a 
simplification through separating phenomena from their complex context. While 
reproducibility, the characteristic to produce results repeatability, is considered to be an 
essential element for rigor in scientific inquiry, Keating (1993, 103) notes that such 
separation of phenomena from context, "risks the exclusion of relevant complex contextual 
factors", which "may not be known, suspected, or initially designed in the research." 
Keating (1993) notes that reproducibility is closely linked to the researcher in data 
collection, interpretation, and development of research findings, and points to perspectives 
that support researcher influence as appropriate even in quantitative research.
The researcher examines the data, attaches meaning to them, and draws 
inferences and conclusions, all quantitative researchers start with marked 
differences in orientation, the researchers may be 'driven' to different 
interpretations, not only of the problem as a whole, but even of identical 
data sets. (Collins 1989, 3)
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Keating (1993), therefore asks if the concept of reproducibility is appropriate to qualitative 
research designs.
Given the dynamic and inductive way (qualitative research) operates, it is 
true that replicability is impossible to prove theoretically. Indeed, I 
wouldn't want to, since regarding the researcher as a valuable bias in the 
whole process, I prefer to believe that while the base data may be replicable 
from one research to another, the interpretation (and consequent action) may 
differ. (Robson 1989, 8)
Keating (1993) notes that other authors have developed alternative ways of thinking about 
reproducibility, such as, or similar to, the concept of auditability, as summarized by 
Sandelowski:
A research and its findings are auditable when another researcher can clearly 
follow the 'decision trail' used by the investigator in the research. In 
addition, another researcher could arrive at the same or comparable but not 
contradictory conclusions given the researcher's data, perspective, and 
situation (Sandelowski 1986,33).
In that exact replicability is not possible in qualitative research, it should nonetheless strive 
to achieve the concept of reliability in the qualitative sense. Keating (1993) notes that 
Sykes (1990, 1991) suggests this is accomplished by making the research "transparent" so 
that the readers of the research can precisely follow the research. Keating (1993) notes that 
Sandelowski (1986) goes beyond this through offering guidelines as to how auditability 
might be accomplished for qualitative research:
Auditability is specifically achieved by a description, explanation, or 
justification of 1) how the researcher became interested in the subject matter 
of the research, 2) how the researcher views the thing studied, 3) the 
specific purpose(s) of the research, 4) how subjects or pieces of evidence 
come to be included in the research and how they were approached, 5) the 
impact the subjects or evidence and the researcher(s) had on each other, 6) 
how the data were collected, 7) how long data collection lasted, 8) the 
nature of the setting(s) in which data were collected, 9) how the data were
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reduced or transformed for analysis, interpretation, and presentation, 10) 
how various elements of the data were weighted, 11) the inclusiveness and 
exclusiveness of the categories developed to contain the data, and 12) the 
specific techniques used to determine the truth value and applicability of the 
data. (Sandelowski 1986,34-35)
It is this formula for auditability proposed by Sandelowski (1986) that this research 
follows in answering the issue of reproducibility. Chapter I, "Introduction", addresses 
items 1 thru 3 from the above Sandelowski (1986) quote. Chapter IV, "Research Design", 
addresses item 4. Chapter V, "Methodology Enactment", addresses items 5 thru 8. And, 
chapter VI, "Perspective Analysis", addresses items 9 thru 12.
Validity of Research Findings
Keating (1993) cites qualitative research literature perspectives, which hold that 
validity focuses on the meaning and meaningfulness of data (Patton 1986), and is used to 
establish inferences made from the qualitative data (Sykes 1991). Keating (1993) quotes 
Sykes (1991) as identifying 5 forms of validity that are generally recognized in the 
literature:
Apparent validity or face validity holds when a research method produces 
the kind of information that is wanted or expected.... In ternal 
validity...refers to internal coherence of the findings - to the snugness of fit 
between the data and the conclusions.... Instrumental validity looks at the 
match between the data provided by a research method and those generated 
by some alternative procedure itself accepted as valid.... Theoretical 
validity..stitts to the justifiability of research procedures in terms of 
established theory.... Consultative validity refers to the validation of data 
or interpretations through consultation with those involved in the research 
process. (Sykes 1991, 10)
As Keating (1993) points out, apparent validity is applicable to qualitative inquiry, but may 
be misleading: "Conclusions of apparent validity can be illusionary" (Kirk and Miller 
1986,22). This research strives to produce apparent validity through production of data 
which supports the focus of this research, i.e. the co-generation of shared knowledge in the 
participant organization. Internal validity is appropriate to qualitative inquiry, since the 
findings emerge from the data. Internal validity can be enhanced in qualitative inquiry
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through a design that continually cross examines the data with respect to the conclusions 
that emerge. This can also serve to enforce the apparent validity through successive 
amplifications of the data (Sykes 1990). This research strives to produce internal validity 
through repeated participant reflection in first generating organizational perspectives, then 
evaluating organizational perspectives, and finally creating dialogue on organizational 
perspectives. Keating (1993) proposes that instrumental validity in qualitative research can 
be enhanced through multiple perspectives. This research design facilitates multiple 
organizational perspectives, and facilitates their assessments from multiple perspectives, 
i.e., the multiple perspectives of the body of participants, and the multiple perspectives 
generated by the participants viewing the data from the varying aspects of personal belief, 
perceptions of organizational rhetoric and action, open-ended comments, and the social 
dynamics of group meetings. As Keating (1993) points out, qualitative methods of data 
collection that are based upon established theory have (by definition) theoretical validity, 
but that it is the appropriateness and relation of methods to theory that is subject to debate. 
This is answered in this research by relating the design and its assumptions to established 
organizational learning theory (see chapters I thru IV). Finally, as Keating (1993) notes, 
qualitative research methods, which invite feedback from participants, make a strong case 
for consultative validity. This research design consults with those involved in the research 
process.
A key point for enhancing research validity, in either qualitative or quantitative, "is 
a disciplined design and transparency in the methods used to arrive at, and address, the 
issues of validity." (Keating 1993, 108) This research strives to achieve a "disciplined 
design" through building a system of observations on a body of theory, through probing 
and cross examination of data, through seeking multiple perspectives, through inviting and 
facilitating feedback from the participants, and finally through relating the data of the 
research to existing theory, which in turn may also serve to modify existing theory or build 
new theory. Finally, this research strives to achieve "transparency" for both the 
participants and readers of this research. For the participants, transparency is achieved 
through creating the experience of enacting the research. Accordingly, the research validity 
is enhanced with the participant through the unique meaning the participant attributes to his 
or her experience of enacting the research. For the reader, transparency is achieved 
through using Sandelowski’s (1986) guidelines for auditability (cited above) to re-construct 
for the reader, as much as possible, the experience of enacting the research. Accordingly, 
the research validity is enhanced with the reader through the unique meaning the reader 
attributes to his or her experience of the research re-construction.
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Focus, Participation, Context, Structure, and Expectations of the Research
In organizations, where the objects of research are human, research must be 
characterized in terms that are meaningful in the experience of the participants. 
Consequently, in establishing the framework for the research methodology, issues, 
involving the focus, participation, context, structure, and the expectations of the research in 
terms of the participants and their relationship to the researcher and the research, must be 
considered.
Focus of the Research
As stated, the primary purpose of this research is to observe with an organization 
the generation of organizational self-reflections to further understand the organizational 
learning phenomenon. However, this goal would probably have little meaning to most 
organizations. Therefore, a local focus which contains issues relevant to the participant 
organization is essential to the interest of the participants and, indeed, to the very existence 
of the research. As stated in chapter I, this research takes the perspective that 
organizational learning is the process through which perspectives, understandings, and 
beliefs come to be shared by members of an organization. Accordingly, a focus which is 
congruent with both the primary purpose of this research and the local goals of any 
participant organization is recognized to be a process that strives to articulate the specific 
perspectives, understandings, and beliefs that are prevalent and unique to the participant 
organization. On one hand, such an articulation is relevant to understanding the 
phenomena of organizational learning in the specific participant organization, as well as in 
other organizations where the generalization of the research findings are seen to be 
appropriate. On the other hand, such an articulation is relevant to a participant organization 
since the focus becomes the issues which arise because they are seen to be important by the 
participants.
In this particular case study an opportunity was also afforded to observe the effects 
of a TQM implementation, which became a sub-focus of the research. TQM naturally arose 
as a local issue of interest, since the participant organization for this research happened to 
have been in their fifth year of a TQM implementation. This presented the opportunity to 
draw inferences regarding TQM for the participant organization, and also for beyond the 
participant organization, where such inferences are seen as appropriate.
Level of Participation in the Research
As Keating (1993) notes, the perspective that organizations generally participate in 
the design of a participatory action research effort is prevalent in participatory action
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research literature (Whyte 1989; McTaggart 1991; Elden 1981). However, the framework 
and design for this research was primarily established prior to the conduct of the research, 
i.e., an initial design was presented to the prospective participant organization, which was 
carefully scrutinized by its members with regard to time commitment, level of participation, 
and expected benefit Several changes resulted from these conversations, but the design 
retained its prior architecture (See chapter IV, "Research Design", and chapter V, 
"Methodology Enactment"). Consequently, the participants were primarily participatory in 
engaging the research design, as opposed to participatory in the design of the research. 
However, this level of participation allowed the local direction and results of the research to 
be co-constructed by both researcher and participants. First, participation was voluntary, 
and therefore determined by both the participant organization and the individual members 
who chose to participate. Second, the design was a facilitation for local inquiry and 
discovery. Therefore, the local focus of the research, i.e., the articulation, interpretation, 
and implications of the local issues and discoveries, was determined by the participants. 
Finally, the design includes a self-referential process, which continually tested the 
assumptions, fit, and acceptance of the research in relation to the participant organization. 
As a result, the research design contains the requisite flexibility to allow the research to be 
co-constructed by both researcher and participants, although the design was primarily 
predetermined. It is through the power of this design and the participation required to 
engage this design that the co-construction of local assumptions, issues, discoveries, and 
implications becomes possible. It is through this co-construction that the research retains a 
participatory action research label.
Construction of Context for the Research
For the research to occur and continue, a context for the researcher, participants, 
and organization must exist The researcher entered the participant organization deficient in 
knowledge of the organization’s industry, products and services, strategies, technologies, 
formal and informal structures, and culture. The organization entered into a research 
domain deficient in the knowledge of research design, methods, and strategies, concepts 
for inquiry, and expectations for results. It was essential that an initial context be 
developed with the prospective participant organization through a proposal to form a 
commitment for the research. Beyond the initial context and commitment for doing the 
research, the context for the research had to evolve and mature throughout the research 
process for the research to remain viable. This evolution of context involved the continual 
co-construction of the multiple relationships between the researcher, the organization, the
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participants, and the research. The aspects of these contextual co-constructions are detailed 
in the following paragraphs.
As Keating (1993) recognized from Whyte (1989), participatory research must 
recognize the limitations of both researcher and the practitioner participant with respect to 
the knowledge brought by each to the research. Like Keating (1993, 88), the 
"organizational members were regarded as the 'knowledge experts' with respect to the 
operation and contextual factors of the organization." The researcher, on the other hand, 
brings expertise in matters of research design, methods, and strategies. Recognition of 
these differences of expertise, knowledge, and perspective between researcher and 
practitioners challenges the research design in three ways. First, the research design is 
challenged to combine the expertise of the researcher with the knowledge of the 
organizational members to set a context for the research which satisfies the expectations of 
the organization, the participants, and the research alike. Again, the primary purpose of the 
research is to observe with an organization the generation of organizational self-reflections 
to further understand the organizational learning phenomenon. The primary purpose of the 
participant organization is to conduct an inquiry to discover organizational perspectives, 
especially with regard to their five year TQM implementation effort. Therefore, these 
challenges are translated into eliciting a local organizational inquiry into the perspectives, 
understandings, and beliefs that have come to be shared by the members of the 
organization, especially with regard to their TQM effort. A second challenge to the design 
is to familiarize the researcher in the expertise of the practitioners, and to familiarize the 
practitioners in the expertise of the researcher in the process of the research. An 
understanding of each domain of expertise is necessary for the research to meaningfully co­
construct local discovery. Therefore, the challenge is a design that facilitates both 
researcher and practitioners to learn through the experience of the research process each 
other's respective domain of experience. A third challenge to the research design is to 
account for the different interpretations for the research and its context. As Keating (1993, 
88) points out, "the existence of different 'researcher' and 'researched' interpretations, 
and the need to address these differences, is recognized and suggested by Brown (1983)." 
This requires the design to facilitate a forum which allows these differences to be addressed 
and recognized by the participants and the organization, as well as the researcher. The 
forum, then, is required to have the characteristics of allowing each perspective to be heard 
and tested equally, in a manner that is sufficiently low in confrontation so that the inquiry 
can exist and continue.
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Structure of the Research
As Keating (1993,94) points out, "the nature of participatory research suggests that 
the methodology is problem directed, and has as a major research product a resolution to an 
organizational problem." However, like Keating's (1993) research, this research is not 
directed toward resolution of a problem. Instead this research is directed toward a process 
for co-observation and co-inquiry into organizational self-reflections. Accordingly, the 
establishment of new process is advocated as a product of this research, a product that is 
necessary to generate the co-generation of local organizational knowledge that is desired by 
this research in order to understand organizational learning as the generation of shared 
organizational perspectives, understandings, and beliefs. Since this research is process 
oriented, the research design is required to introduce a temporary structure which permits 
equal participation, issue identification, surfacing and testing of assumptions, and 
development of implications at both individual and organizational levels.
On one hand, a temporary structure facilitating a research process can provide 
several benefits from both a research and an organizational perspective. First, local and 
general knowledge advancement can obtain a broader scope through considering multiple 
issues, contexts, interpretations, and expectations, as opposed to research that simply 
focuses on a specific issue. Second, individual benefit has potential to be more significant, 
since each individual can find their own unique insights and corresponding personal 
benefits. Finally, actions that challenge the status quo are more likely, as individuals 
translate their specific insights into coalitions for action (please see chapter V, 
"Methodology Enactment", and chapter VII, "Local Findings").
On the other hand, a temporary structure facilitating a research process does not 
provide a "successful" outcome in terms of predetermined desired results. Its success must 
be determined through the perceptions of value and utility of the participants. When the 
research is over, it does not end in some action toward some problem, but it can lend itself 
to continued existence as a result of changes of perspectives and/or culture as a result of the 
research, and transition of the temporary structure into permanent organizational structures 
and action.
Expectations of the Research
Like Keating's (1993) research, the development of expectations is problematic for 
the methodological framework supporting the research. The research does not have a 
specific problem for a focus, or a predetermined desired outcome. Instead the focus is 
oriented toward co-observation and co-discovery. Accordingly, expectations for the 
research are continually co-constructed during the course of the research, and are varied for
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the organization, participants, and the researcher. Therefore, the research framework has 
to accommodate coexistence of multiple expectations. As Keating (1993,93) notes, "this 
expands the concept of PAR beyond the narrow focus of problem resolution as the 
expectation of the research outcome 'shared' by all participants." The implications for such 
a research design are addressed in chapter VUI, "Research Implications".
Summary
This chapter develops the supporting methodological framework for the research, 
which forms the basis for the research design. The methodological framework is based 
upon various descriptions for Participatory Action Research (Keating 1993, McTaggart 
1991, Whyte, Greenwood, and Lazes 1989, Whyte 1989, Elden and Taylor 1983, Elden 
1983, and Elden 1981).
Distinctions between action research and positivist science, and between 
quantitative and qualitative research were drawn. The appropriateness of each were 
examined in terms of the intent of the research. Tenets for good science including 
researcher influence, generalizability of findings, reproducibility, and validity were 
addressed. Elements essential to defining the participatory action research in terms that are 
meaningful in the experience of the participants, including focus, participation, context, 
structure, and expectations of the research, were considered. These considerations and 
constraints define the methodological framework for the design of the research, which is 
addressed in chapter IV, "Research Design".




This chapter develops the research design from the supporting methodological 
framework developed in chapter HI. This framework is principally drawn from 
participatory action research. The primary intent of the research is to observe 
organizational self-reflections on issues of importance to an organization to further 
understand the organizational learning phenomenon. More specifically, these observations 
are desired to be co-observations generated through the researcher and organizational 
members co-constructing organizational reflections on issues co-deemed as important to co- 
generate local discovery. Through this process, which strives to articulate the specific 
perspectives, understandings, and beliefs that are prevalent and unique to the participant 
organization, it is hoped that a better understanding of the organization's learning can be 
generated, and a better understanding of the organizational learning phenomenon can be 
reasoned.
The primary features of this framework are a collaborative research effort, the co­
generation of substantial local knowledge, and research based on theory that advances 
theory through the inference and implications of local discoveries. The research builds a 
system of observations through seeking multiple perspectives, through the probing and 
cross examination of data, through inviting and facilitating feedback from the participants, 
and through relating the data to existing theory. Through this system of observations into 
the local discovery of the participant organization, the research strives to better understand 
the phenomena of organizational learning. Accordingly, the specifications for the 
research design imposed by the research framework developed in chapter DI include a 
research design that: (1) facilitates continual co-constructions which permit the coexistence 
of multiple contexts and expectations; (2) facilitates mutual learning of the researcher’s and 
practitioners' respective domains of experience; (3) creates transparency of the research 
design through detailing the experience of the research process; (4) feeds researcher and 
participant interpretations back to the participants as a means of reflection and of correcting 
misinterpretations; (5) tests the assumptions, fit, and acceptance of the research in relation 
to the participant organization; (6) facilitates the individual and collective articulation of 
multiple organizational perspectives in an equal and low conflict context; (7) aids 
participants' local discovery into their organizational specific perspectives, understandings, 
and beliefs, especially with regard to TQM; (8) places an emphasis on facilitating 
expressions of experiential, and hence largely tacit, organizational knowledge; (9)
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constructs and validates perspectives through an individual interview and validation 
process; (10) assesses organizational perspectives from multiple perspectives, i.e., through 
open-ended comments, through participant perceptions of organizational rhetoric and 
action, and through the participant's own position with respect to his or her perception of 
the rest of the organization's rhetoric and action; and (11) makes an explicit record of 
validated perspectives, assessments, and open-ended comments.
The Organizational Learning Process
The research design is comprised of a five phase reflective process modeled after 
the intervention strategy developed by Keating (1993), which he termed as the 
Organizational Learning Process (OLP). Keating's (1993) OLP was designed to facilitate 
organizational dialog using processes based on some of the more prevalent theories and 
ideas of the literature for organizational learning. These processes include Argyris and 
Schon's (1978) "organizational dialectic", Senge's (Senge 1990a, 1990b) surfacing and 
testing mental models, and Daft and Weick's (1984) interpretation systems. The design for 
the modified OLP differs from Keating's (1993) OLP in several ways. The purpose of the 
modified OLP for this research is to facilitate local discovery as a means to observe the 
specific perspectives, understandings, and beliefs, and hence learning, prevalent in the 
participant organization, whereas the primary purpose of Keating's (1993) OLP was to 
stimulate reflection and dialog as a means of enhancing organizational learning through 
"good dialectic". The modified OLP also (1) places an emphasis on facilitating expressions 
of experiential, and hence largely tacit, organizational knowledge, (2) individually validates 
perspectives, and (3) assesses perspectives on an additional third scale designed to facilitate 
expression of the participant's own position or belief with respect to his or her perception 
of the rest of the organization's rhetoric and action, whereas Keating's (1993) OLP does 
not.
The five phase modified OLP consists of (1) focus development and orientation, (2) 
elicitation of individual organizational perspectives, (3) individual assessments of 
composite perspectives, (4) individual exploration of assessments, and (5) joint exploration 
of assessment results. This process of inquiry provides opportunities for both the 
individual and the participant organizational group as a whole to explicitly articulate their 
organizational specific knowledge, beliefs, and understandings, and to deeply reflect on 
these articulations from several perspectives: first, the participant is exposed to the 
perspectives of all the other participants; second, the participant reflects on these multiple 
perspectives from multiple perspectives, i.e, from the perspective of the participant's
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perception of organizational rhetoric and action, and from the perspective of the 
participant's personal belief with respect to his or her perception of the rest of the 
organization's rhetoric and action; finally, the participant reflects on his or her and other's 
articulations from the perspective of the social dynamics of the participant group. Phases 
2,3, and 4 allow the individual to privately articulate his or her perspectives, discover the 
perspectives of others, and establish his or her own position relative to the positions 
established by others, respectively. Since this is done individually and anonymously, the 
process is low in conflict It allows the individual to broaden his or her personal 
perspective by the perspectives of the others in the participant group, and to change his or 
her perspective, if desired, without risk of conflict or potential embarrassment of having to 
reverse a previous publicly taken or defended position. It prepares the individual 
participant for the last phase where he or she enters into a social arena jointly with the other 
participants for reflecting upon the participant group's unique perspectives, 
understandings, and beliefs. Each of the five phases of the modified OLP are described in 
the sections that follow. The enactment of these phases with the participant organization as 
it occurred is detailed in chapter V, "Methodology Enactment".
Phase 1; Focus Development and Orientation
This phase begins after a preliminary commitment by the prospective organization 
to perform the research. It consists of forming a focus group of several organizational 
representatives to explore the focus for the research and to begin the dual orientation of the 
researcher and practitioner to each other's respective domain of experience. The focus 
group is representative of the larger proposed participant group, and explores with the 
researcher the focus for the research, the likely participants, framing the research, rules of 
engagement, and the logistics associated with conducting the research.
The focus for the research is explored with the focus group through a circular 
process of conversations, observations, co-constructions, and re-formulations. First, a 
"local theory of organization" is co-constructed by both the researcher and participants. 
The focus group assists in directing the researcher's attention to relevant organizational 
documents, programs, surveys, and typical organizational meetings. The researcher 
reviews or observes these documents and meetings, and co-constructs with the focus group 
a "local theory of organization", i.e., hypotheses for the primary concerns for the 
prospective participant organization. This "local theory of organization" is used to form 
preliminary in-depth interview questions, which are used in the second phase of the OLP to 
elicit individual organizational perspectives from the individual participants. This 
preliminary interview schedule is tested on the focus group members for relevancy and
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effectiveness in generating organizational reflection. Relevancy and effectiveness of the 
questions are co-determined with the focus group through the results of the trial interviews 
and through the comments of the focus group on the interview schedule. Relevancy and 
effectiveness depend on both the content and the language of the proposed Phase 2 
interview questions. The content of the questions should center on the major concerns of 
the prospective organization, and the language should be in a form that the participants 
themselves are likely to use.
Another major orientation for the research is framing the research in terms that the 
proposed participants can accept and understand. Prospective participants from any 
organization are concerned foremost with the products and services of their business. 
Their time and energy is a limited and precious resource essential to the operation of their 
business. Consequently, in order to elicit voluntary participation, the research must be 
framed in terms of its costs and benefits to the prospective participants, and explained in 
language relevant to the organization's culture. The research purpose, expectation, and 
process must be relevant to the participants' organizational concerns and goals. Issues 
regarding confidentiality, time requirements, and rules of engagement must be acceptable. 
Since it would be impossible for a researcher to successfully frame and explain a proposal 
for action research in local terms independently, an appropriate framing must be co­
constructed with the focus group before the proposed research is presented to the 
prospective participants.
The focus group also assists the researcher in co-constructing proposed rules of 
engagement, i.e., issues regarding confidentiality, voluntary participation, dissemination of 
the information generated from the research within the participant organization, and use of 
the research results for academic purposes. These are also the issues of concern for 
research which involves human subjects. The proposal for such research must be reviewed 
and approved by Old Dominion University's College of Engineering Human Subjects 
Review Committee. Finally, the focus group assists the researcher in arranging logistic 
support for the research, i.e., office space, document reproduction support, and assistance 
in making appointments and scheduling meetings.
Once the research focus, the prospective participants, suitable framing, acceptable 
rules of engagement, and logistics have been co-constructed for the research, the research 
protocol is presented to the proposed participant group. Also a summary of the research 
protocol and how the issues regarding confidentiality will be addressed is submitted to Old 
Dominion University's College of Engineering Human Subjects Review Committee for 
approval. It is critical that the participants engage the research voluntarily, even
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enthusiastically, for such action research to have value in their eyes and for the research 
observations to not be skewed. Therefore, the initial presentation of the research protocol 
to the prospective participants is critical. It must be presented in a form that constructs the 
prospective participants as co-researchers. Although the details for the research protocol 
are now somewhat mature from the co-constructions with the focus group, the presentation 
must seek further co-constructions to convey and practice co-ownership of the research 
beginning with the initial presentation. Accordingly, the presentation should take the form 
of conversation as much as possible. The researcher emphasizes the voluntariness of the 
research and is attentive to questions and concerns. The local relevancy of the research, as 
co-constructed with the focus group, must be adequately explained and even modified if 
new viable co-constructions emerge. After the initial presentation, and after winning initial 
support from the proposed participants to proceed with the research process, the researcher 
meets with the prospective participants in small groups determined by organizational 
boundaries for a second presentation. This second presentation allows participants to 
express questions and concerns in a more intimate group, facilitates deeper conversations 
and co-constructions, serves to orient the researcher to the various sub-organizations, and 
conversely serves to individually orient the various sub-organizations to the research.
Through this process of focus development and orientation, the first five 
specifications for the research design, as listed in this chapter's introduction, begin to be 
effected, i.e., (1) co-constructions which permit the coexistence of multiple contexts and 
expectations, (2) mutual learning of the researcher's and practitioners' respective domains 
of experience, (3) creating transparency of the research design through detailing the 
experience of enacting the research process, (4) feeding interpretations back to the 
participants as a means of reflection and of correcting misinterpretations, (5) and testing 
the assumptions, fit, and acceptance of the research in relation to the participant 
organization. Finally, the interview questions used in the second phase are co-constructed, 
which are used in the next phase to effect the sixth specification for the research design, 
i.e., to facilitate the articulation of organizational perspectives.
Phase 2: Elicitation of Individual Organizational Perspectives
The second phase involves generation of organizational perspectives by the 
participants. This is accomplished through a process that begins with an in-depth interview 
with each participant The interview questions generated in the first phase are used in these 
interviews to stimulate, as much as possible, spontaneous conversations. Accordingly, the 
interview schedule, unlike Keating (1993), is not faithfully followed from one interviewee 
to the next Instead it is used as a guide to relevant subjects for the interview. The desired
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result is to stimulate spontaneous reflection and articulation of the interviewee's 
organizational experiences and his or her resulting generalizations, beliefs, and 
assumptions.
The theoretical basis for desiring spontaneity in the phase 2 interviews is explained 
under "Assumptions of the Research" in chapter L In summary, Berry (1988) suggests, 
complex structures (as may be acquired by practitioners) such as those underlying 
language, socialization, and perception are acquired implicitly and unconsciously, and that 
"experts" have difficulty describing what they do, because some aspects of their knowledge 
have never been represented explicitly, especially where they have learned through 
experience. Berry (1988) asks the question, "How can such implicit knowledge be elicited 
from experts?" Berry (1988) suggests that a running commentary be elicited while the 
expert carries out his or her task, and therefore implicitly suggests a form of spontaneous 
performance.
Enacting a form of interviewing designed to facilitate spontaneity as a key in 
eliciting experiential knowledge, like conversation, becomes an art form. As a 
consequence, the questioning is not constant between interviews, nor would it be constant 
between interviewers were there other interviewers. This raises a "reproducibility" 
question, as discussed in chapter III. This is answered with the assumption that the desired 
result of such interviewing should be reproducible, since the result desired is simply to 
stimulate the interviewee to spontaneously reflect and articulate significant organizational 
experiences and his or her resulting generalizations, beliefs, and assumptions. To assure 
that the interview takes the direction that the interviewee chooses, it is important that the 
interviewer provides only the initial structure of the questions that were designed to start 
and maintain the interview, i.e., the questions co-generated with the focus group in the first 
phase. The rest of the interview structure should be provided through the interviewee's 
own spontaneity. Specifically, in the conduct of such an interview, if an interviewee 
relates to a question with enthusiasm, emotion, or elaboration, the interviewer attempts to 
construct other related questions to sustain the spontaneity, and to let this spontaneity lead 
to where the interviewee chooses to take i t  Therefore, metaphorically speaking, different 
interviewers may follow different paths, but once spontaneity is achieved, the destination 
should always be the same, i.e., the destination that the interviewee chooses. In this 
metaphor, it is recognized and acknowledged that there may be a number of different paths 
that the interviewee may choose, but if the choice of direction is given to the interviewee, 
some of his or her top organizational concerns will typically emerge. And, when this form 
of interviewing is applied over the entire participant group, it is assumed that most of the
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primary organizational concerns contained within the entire participant group will emerge. 
This assumption becomes a matter for observation in the in-process interviews conducted 
after each assessment of the composite perspectives in phases 3 and 4 (see chapter V, 
"Methodology Enactment").
The interview from this phase is taped and transcribed verbatim in its entirety. 
Such transcription serves two purposes. First, the transcription assists the researcher in 
"combing out" the recorded interview data into short statements that are fed back to the 
interviewees as hypotheses for their organizational perspectives. In particular, attention to 
the participant's language, especially metaphors, assist in constructing perspectives 
reflective of the participant's "mental models” (Senge, 1990), and in constructing them in 
the local language of the participant's organizational culture. Instructive to this process is 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980), who demonstrate that metaphors are an integral part of 
everyday speech and affect the ways in which we perceive, think, and act. Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980) provide convincing evidence that even reality itself is defined by metaphor, 
and as metaphors vary from culture to culture, so do the realities they define. Accordingly, 
the metaphors that the participant uses serves as an aid to understanding and explicitly 
articulating the reality of the participant organization as the interviewee perceives i t  The 
participant is then able to reflect validate, and/or modify these hypothesized perspectives as 
appropriate. The second purpose the transcribed interview serves is as a means for the 
interviewee to reflect on his or her original words as he or she validate, and/or modify their 
hypothesized perspectives. It provides the participant a means to discover that he or she 
really did say what the hypothesized perspectives say, or to understand their origin in the 
event that a hypothesized perspective misinterprets the participants true "mental model".
After the participant has validated the hypothesized perspectives, a short in-process 
interview is conducted to reflect on the research process and to answer questions regarding 
the remaining phases. This specifically serves the fifth specification for the research 
design, i.e., the testing of the assumptions, fit, and acceptance of the research in relation to 
the participant organization. It is seen from the above that this phase also reinforces the 
second thru the fourth specifications served by the first phase, and additionally serves the 
other specifications for the research design as follows and as numbered in the introduction 
to this chapter: (6) facilitates the individual participant's articulation of organizational 
perspectives in a low conflict context; (7) aids the individual participant's local discovery 
into his or her organizational specific perspectives, understandings, and beliefs; (8) 
facilitates an emphasis on expressions of experiential, and hence largely tacit, 
organizational knowledge; (9) constructs and validates perspectives; and (11) makes an
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explicit record of validated perspectives. Finally, this phase serves in preparation for the 
next phase, the individual assessments of composite perspectives, which specifically meets 
the tenth specification for the research design, i.e., the assessment of organizational 
perspectives from multiple perspectives.
Phase 3: Individual Assessments of Composite Perspectives
The validated perspectives from the individual participants are synthesized into a 
composite set of perspectives and grouped by topic. They are then individually and 
confidentially assessed in four different ways: through open-ended comments, through 
participant perceptions of organizational rhetoric and action, and through the participant's 
own position with respect to his or her perception of the rest of the organization's rhetoric 
and action. The latter three assessments are accomplished through the participant marking a 
seven point Likert scale, which varies from strongly agree to strongly disagree.
These individual assessments expose each participant to the multiple organizational 
perspectives elicited in the second phase, and asks each participant to reflect on these 
perspectives from the multi-perspective of organizational rhetoric, action, and personal 
belief. Accordingly, this leads the participants to reflect both individually and jointly on 
their organizational beliefs, assumptions, and understandings. As explained in the 
introduction of chapter I, it is "assumed that individual self-reflections on the members' 
organization will contain what individuals in the organization believe and perceive, and that 
joint self-reflections will contain what individuals in the organization jointly believe and 
perceive.” Further that "it is assumed that this is a way of observing the knowledge' or 
'understandings' in a particular organization." Phase 2, as described above, constitutes the 
individual self-reflections, and this phase and subsequent phases constitute joint 
reflections, as well as some individual reflection, since now the participant will be 
considering the perspectives of others as he or she reflects on his or her own perspective.
The composite perspectives constitute a participant construction of a "local theory of 
organization", assist in framing the research in an acceptable manner, and build trust among 
the participant group. First, the composite perspectives are a participant construction of a 
"local theory of organization”, since the participants' organizational beliefs, assumptions, 
and knowledge are ingrained in such a set of individually validated perspectives. Second, 
the composite perspectives and their assessments assist in framing the research in a manner 
acceptable to the participants, since they are recognized as a construction by their own 
participant group, as opposed to a construction by an outsider. Finally, the participant 
assessments serve to test, modify (through the open-ended comments), and validate this 
construction.
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After the participant completes their assessment, another short in process interview 
is conducted to reflect on the research process, to answer questions, and to continue testing 
the assumptions, fit, and acceptance of the research in relation to the participant 
organization.
In summary, this phase reinforces the other specifications served by the first two 
phases, and additionally serves the other specifications for the research design as follows 
and as numbered in the introduction to this chapter in the following ways: (8) facilitates 
expressions of experiential, and hence largely tacit, organizational knowledge (this time 
through the elicitation of possible rhetoric, action, and personal belief gaps); (9) validates 
perspectives (this time through the participants' assessments); (10) assesses organizational 
perspectives from multiple perspectives; and (11) makes an explicit record of assessments, 
and open-ended comments, in addition to the explicit record of validated perspectives.
Phase 4: Individual Exploration of Assessments
In the fourth phase, after all participants have responded to the survey, each 
participant assesses the composite perspectives a second time. This time, for each 
perspective, for all three scales, the survey shows the respondent the distribution of all of 
the individual assessments and all open-ended comments, while the individual's own 
responses and comments are highlighted. Thus, the respondent sees, in confidence, how 
his or her responses and comments compare to everyone else's. The respondent may 
change their response on any of the three scales, if desired, as well as add any additional 
comments. This process allows the individual to reflect on his or her position with respect 
to the positions taken by the other members of the participant group.
As a means for preparing for the next phase, each participant is also able to cast two 
votes regarding each perspective. The votes assist in identifying perspectives that are of the 
most concern to the participant group. The first vote indicates whether the participant 
desires to have the perspective called out as a topic in the group discussions of the next 
phase. The second vote indicates whether the participant desires to have the perspective 
referred to higher management in the event that the participant group decides to refer some 
but not all perspectives to higher management
After the participant completes this second assessment yet another short in-process 
interview is conducted to reflect on the research process, to answer questions, and to 
continue testing the assumptions, fit, and acceptance of the research in relation to the 
participant organization.
In summary, this phase reinforces all of the research specifications for the research
design.
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Phase 5; Joint Exploration of Assessment Results
The fifth phase involves group discussion of the assessment results from the prior 
phases. The first objective for these meetings is to create a significant participant group 
dialogue into the local discoveries of the participant group, as represented by the composite 
perspectives and their assessments. Each participant is provided a copy of the composite 
perspectives, the assessment results, and the history of their two assessments for reference. 
Additionally, to facilitate the group's dialogue, the composite perspectives are organized 
and presented in the group discussions in terms of the rhetoric, action, and personal belief 
gaps evidenced by the assessments. Perspectives are arranged by the type of gap and the 
magnitude of the gap (see chapter VI, "Perspective Analysis"). This orders what otherwise 
can be, at this point, an overwhelming volume of data. It also aids the participant group's 
awareness and acknowledgement for the existence of such gaps, while facilitating a clear 
perspective for the organizational rhetoric, action, and personal belief perception 
differences that exist in the participant group. The theoretical basis for facilitating the 
participant group's discussions with such gaps is Argyris and SchSn's (1978) contention 
that rhetoric and action gaps are ubiquitous in organizations, are often "undiscussibles", are 
frequently actively hidden by "camouflage", and often present formidable barriers to 
organizational learning.
The second objective of the group meetings is to yield local discovery beyond that 
represented by the perspectives and their assessments. The experience of the perspective 
generating interviews revealed that spontaneity could facilitate the expression of previously 
unarticulated individual knowledge (see chapter V, "Methodology Enactment"). 
Accordingly, spontaneity in a group dialogue is hypothesized as having the potential for 
expressing previously unarticulated shared knowledge. Trust seemed to be an essential 
element for achieving spontaneity in the individual interviews (see chapter V, 
"Methodology Enactment"). Accordingly, an element of trust among the members of the 
participant group is hypothesized as essential to achieving spontaneity in the group 
meetings. The modified OLP to this point has been designed to build trust through a 
context that facilitated the co-construction and coexistence of multiple perspectives. The 
participants, consequendy, bring their experience of these co-constructions and knowledge 
of their fellow participants' perspectives to the group discussion meetings. The knowledge 
of each other's perspectives and especially the experience of co-constructing a body of 
organizational perspectives appears to be conducive to building trust (see chapter V, 
"Methodology Enactment"). Finally, for spontaneity to occur it must foremost be given an 
opportunity to occur, i.e., the group meetings must necessarily be conducted in a manner
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that encourages spontaneity (see chapter V, "Methodology Enactment"). Therefore, 
through both trust and proper conduct of the meetings, an attempt is made to achieve 
spontaneity in the participant group's dialogue to facilitate expression of their shared 
experiential knowledge and to aid their joint local discovery.
The final objective of the group meetings is to achieve closure, which in this case 
will be a closure that self-organizes from the dynamics of the participant group. As 
previously stated in chapter HI, although this inquiry is carried out in collaboration between 
the researcher and the participants, the responsibility for generating actions as a result of 
discoveries rests with the organization's participants. Therefore, it is acknowledged that 
closure in terms of a set of actions or adoption of new processes may not be achieved, and 
indeed is not attempted. However, the local findings that are co-constructed through the 
process of the group dialogue can be summarized, and attention can be called to areas that 
imply some form of organizational action. Closure for this research, then, consists of 
providing such reflection and feedback until the participant group itself decides on a form 
of closure. Accordingly, it is acknowledged, given the limited charter of this research, that 
before the occurrence of the group meetings, how the group meetings will end or the 
resulting state of the participant group cannot be predicted, but instead is a matter for 
observation as part of this case study. The question how to transition a facilitated 
Organizational Learning Process into an organization's structure and processes remains a 
subject for future research (see chapter VIII, "Research Implications").
To assist in the observation of the group meetings of this final phase, the group 
meetings are tape recorded. Accordingly, the observations for these group meetings are 
constructed from these tape recordings (see chapter V, "Methodology Enactment").
In summary, this phase reinforces all the specifications for the research design, and 
especially serves specifications as numbered in the introduction to this chapter as follows: 
(4) feeds researcher and participant interpretations back to the participants as a means of 
reflection and of correcting misinterpretations (this time through the final results and 
analysis of the composite perspectives; (5) tests the assumptions, fit, and acceptance of the 
research in relation to the participant organization (through the conduct of the group 
discussions); (6) facilitates the individual and collective articulation of multiple 
organizational perspectives (but this time, aoi in an equal and low conflict context); (8) 
facilitates expressions of experiential, and hence largely tacit, organizational knowledge 
(this time through the spontaneous dialogue of the participant group); (9) validates 
perspectives (this time through the participant group's dialogue); and (10) assesses 
organizational perspectives from multiple perspectives (this time from the perspective of
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type of rhetoric, action, and belief gap, and the perspective of the social dynamics of the 
participant group).
Summary
This chapter developed the research design from the supporting methodological 
framework developed in chapter HI, which constitutes a system of observations into the 
local discovery of the participant organization to better understand the phenomena of 
organizational learning. This system of observations includes seeking multiple 
perspectives, probing and cross examining the data, inviting and facilitating feedback from 
the participants, and relating the data to existing local theory. From this system of 
observations the requirements for the research design were summarized as the 
specifications for the research design. From the specifications for the research 
design a five phase reflective process, referred to as a modified Organizational Learning 
Process (OLP), was modeled after the intervention strategy developed by Keating (1993). 
The differences in purpose and method of the modified OLP and Keating's (1993) OLP 
were described and explained, especially in its purpose to serve as a means to facilitate and 
observe local discovery in a participating organization, and its method to purposely elicit 
experiential organizational knowledge. The process for each of the five phases was 
described and related to the specifications for the research design.




The purpose of this chapter is to to describe the experience of enacting, with the 
participant organization, the research design developed in chapter IV, and thereby develop 
the contextual setting for the research. It is hoped that detailing this experience will assist 
future participatory action research.
The contextual setting for the research is developed through an experiential 
accounting of the research enactment Obstacles to gaining individual and organizational 
support for the research are chronicled. Organizational changes the researcher believes to 
have occurred as a result of the conduct of the research are detailed. Anecdotal evidence for 
attribution of changes to the research is offered. How data were collected, how long data 
collection lasted, what were the organizational and physical settings for data collection, 
what was the local inclusiveness of the data, how data were transformed and weighted for 
participant feedback, how participants interpreted and reacted to the data, what truth value 
and applicability was ascribed to the data through the participants’ interpretations and 
reactions to the data, what were the participants' feedback on the research, what impact the 
research had on the participants, and what impact the researcher and participants had on 
each other are contained in this experiential accounting.
The experiential accounting of the research also includes demonstration of the 
principle tools of the researcher, i.e., participant observation and the semi-structured, 
spontaneous interview. The reader will experience participant observation in the 
descriptions of the methodology enactment as a mutual bringing forth of the participants' 
tacit knowledge for co-observation. This methodology casts participants as co-researchers 
and researcher as co-participant Spontaneity in semi-structured interviews will be seen as 
a key for eliciting tacit knowledge and motivating participation.
These descriptions are organized under the titles of the five phases introduced in 
chapter IV. However, the reader will note that the actual enactment of the research did not 
always have the precise boundaries that were ascribed to each phase in chapter IV. Instead, 
the methodology and strategy described in chapter IV for enacting the research 
methodology were often co-discovered with the participants through enactment, versus 
having been pre-planned. This co-discovery of methodology and strategy, however, 
should be seen as part of the participant research methodology.
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Finally, there are two important notes to the experiential descriptions of this 
chapter. First, the observations are largely the researcher's as opposed to the participants', 
and the conclusions represent the researcher’s personal beliefs, as opposed to the research 
findings. However, many of these observations and beliefs are supported by the 
participants' perspectives, assessments, and verbal comments. The participants' 
perspectives and assessments can be found in appendix 4, and many individual and group 
comments, as they occurred, are quoted in this chapter. These perspectives, assessments, 
and verbal comments are used as anecdotal evidence in support of the research findings and 
implications of the later chapters. Second, it should be noted that certain labels or terms, 
which could be associated with specific individuals or the participant organization, have 
been changed to more generic labels or terms to ensure confidentiality. Where such labels 
or terms have been changed, the substituted label or term appears in italics. Nonetheless, 
some individuals were cited in this chapter by their organizational position to provide 
context or chronology to the research enactment descriptions. Accordingly, they could be 
identifiable to a fellow participant. However, in such cases, their confidentiality is 
maintained by not revealing their personal organizational perspectives in the same context 
for which they might be identifiable by another participant
Phase 1: Focus Development and Orientation
(i.e., Getting Started)
As stated in chapter IV, this phase begins after a preliminary commitment by the 
prospective organization to perform the research. In its ideal form, it consists of forming a 
focus group of several organizational representatives to explore the focus for the research 
and to begin the dual orientation of the researcher and practitioner to each other’s respective 
domain of experience. As will be recalled from chapter IV, this focus group is 
representative of the larger proposed participant group. They lend their perspective in co- 
constructing with the researcher a "local theory of organization" through which the research 
is framed in terms that are understandable and acceptable to the participants, and through 
which preliminary in-depth interview questions are formed and tested for relevancy. They 
assist the researcher with the logistics of the research and in forming suitable "rules of 
engagement", which address issues of confidentiality, voluntary participation, 
dissemination within the participant organization of the information generated by the 
research, and use of the research results for academic purposes. These are also the issues 
of concern for research which involves human subjects. The proposal for such research 
must be reviewed and approved by Old Dominion University's College of Engineering
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Human Subjects Review Committee. A summary of the research protocol and how the 
issues regarding confidentiality would be addressed were accordingly submitted and 
approved.
The research is presented to the proposed participant group in this first phase to 
gain their support for the research, and the research is presented a second time, but in small 
groups, to facilitate a dialogue on the research, and to orient the researcher to the various 
sub-organizations, and vice versa. The reader will note, as mentioned above, that the 
actual enactment of phase one did not have the precise boundaries described in the above 
idealized summary, nor was the strategy for enactment totally known, before the actual 
enactment
As stated in chapter I, the purpose of this research was to observe organizational 
self-reflections on issues of importance to an organization in a participatory action research 
setting to further understand the organizational learning phenomenon. This idea was in 
need of a participant organization. Informal discussion of this idea with several associates 
led to a conversation with a person who could be labeled, according to the function he 
served, as the chief operating officer (COO) of his organization. This organization could 
be classified as a large diverse engineering organization. It provided expert engineering, 
logistic, and training services for a large class of high technology machines. This COO 
was interested in my research idea from a perspective of what the organization might learn 
from such an effort. His interest led to an invitation to observe routine organizational 
meetings dealing with the organization's operations and to interview the organization's key 
managers. These interviews presented an opportunity to interest one or more of these key 
managers in my research idea, and in turn an opportunity to potentially work with several 
of their managers in developing a research proposal that would be acceptable to their 
organization. The key managers, who were initially interviewed, could be labeled as the 
organization's operational vice presidents according to the function they served. They 
were quite willing to grant individual interviews as a result of the COO's introduction, but I 
believe their willingness was connected to my introduction by the COO, because, at least 
initially, I would be at a loss to cite other motivation.
These early interviews and observations of routine operational meetings led me to a 
keen appreciation of the organization's diversity and complexity. Each operational vice 
president seemed to espouse a different perspective of the organization. These 
perspectives ranged from managing through a strict hierarchy and preserving the status quo 
to espousing broad employee participation and organizational change. It became apparent, 
and was widely stated, that each operational section of the organization virtually functioned
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as a separate company, even though each operational section shared common general 
directions and constraints, and provided services to the same complex machines and 
machine owners. I came to attribute this apparent diverse individuality to several factors. 
First, the organizational culture appeared to highly value individuality and independence. 
This characteristic seemed related to the nature of their work. The technicians and 
engineers of the company were experts in their respective fields. Consequently, these 
employees operated with a high degree of autonomy and independence, because they led 
their field in expertise. Further, the service to their customers occurred in diverse 
geographical locations, which required them to exercise a high degree of self-reliance. 
Second, the offices and facilities of each operational section were geographically separated 
from the offices and facilities of the other operational sections. Third, each operational 
section served different and separate functions (i.e., structural, mechanical, electrical, 
electronic, etc.) of the complex machines they served. The physical working conditions of 
each of these various engineering disciplines appeared to be quite different, and this 
appeared to create different cultures for each discipline. Finally, each operational section 
interfaced with different operators of the machine owners, which further separated them. 
This appreciation of organizational diversity and individual operational vice president 
perspectives led me to conclude that a focus on the entire organization would unnecessarily 
increase the complexity of the study, and complicate the logistics of the study. From this 
perspective I decided to limit the "participant organization" to one section of the larger 
organization. Indeed, each section had the complexity and autonomy of any reasonably 
sized company with a diverse technological product
The section of my first choice comprised approximately 300 technicians and 
engineers, 13 "first-level" managers, and four second-level managers organized under the 
operational vice president for the section. There were a combination of factors that made 
this section my first choice. First the operational vice president espoused broad employee 
participation and organizational change, and seemed receptive to conducting a study within 
his section. Second, 90% of the section was located in one large office building, and its 
location was geographically more accessible than the location of the other sections. Third, 
the engineering expertise of the section was in a field in which I held a degree and extensive 
experience. I felt my engineering education and experience would provide a context to 
better understand the perspectives of this particular group.
I approached this particular operational vice president, with an informal proposal to 
perform a study within his section a few weeks after my initial interview with him. I 
explained that my purpose for the study would be to better understand the group's culture
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and learning through their organizational perspectives. These perspectives would be 
elicited through a confidential interview, anonymously assessed by the entire group, and 
shared through individual exploration of assessments and subsequent group discussions. 
In our conversation the preferred group of people to participate in the study emerged as the 
managers of the section, including the operational vice president himself. It was felt the 
perspectives of this group not only would be the perspectives of the section's management, 
but also would be reflective of many perspectives held by others in the section. (Nearly all 
of the first line managers had been in their respective positions for many years, and worked 
closely with their technicians and engineers. Accordingly, it was believed by this 
operational vice president that the viewpoints of their employees would be similar to their 
respective manager's viewpoint) I explained to the operational vice president that if he 
was agreeable to the idea, I would construct a formal proposal detailing the process and 
would detail the time commitment for the participating managers. To do this, I needed to 
work with several managers to co-construct the initial formal proposal to ensure relevance 
to the organization. He was concerned with the time commitment for his managers, but 
given that this could be quantified prior to the study, he was agreeable to co-developing a 
formal proposal. This agreement led to an introduction to one of the four second level 
managers. This introduction provided the opportunity to explain my research ideas and 
solicit this second level manager's support in co-developing a formal research proposal that 
would be acceptable to the organization.
This second-level manager proved to be very receptive. However, his initial 
courtesy was, like earlier introductions, probably linked to the introduction by his boss. 
Our early conversations consisted of unstructured conversations regarding what I wished to 
accomplish and his impressions of his organization and its history, and what he felt were 
some of the current major organizational concerns. As we continued to meet several times 
over a period of a few weeks, I felt he became enthusiastic concerning the prospect of an 
organizational inquiry with a focus on self-discovery and learning. He even coined a 
metaphor for the proposed research in a spontaneous and enthusiastic statement of his 
interpretation of our conversations: "You want to hold a mirror for us so we can see 
ourselves! But, you don't want us to just see our reflection, you want to look into the 
mirror with us!" Out of this conversation, the term "organizational mirror" emerged as a 
metaphor for the process of co-constructing and reflecting upon organizational 
perspectives.
The conversations with this second level manager led to the initial proposal for a 
process of organizational inquiry and reflection, which was modeled after Keating’s (1993)
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Organizational Learning Process. Interview questions and a presentation to introduce the 
proposal to other managers of the section were also developed. The role the second level 
manager played in this construction was to reflect on my successive constructions. The 
research proposal, interview questions, and presentation became a co-construction through 
his specific insights and perceptions of what he thought others would perceive as relevant 
or important. In this process, there was no up front agreement, per se, to provide his 
reflections on the construction of a research proposal, interview questions, or presentation. 
Instead, each step and each construction was accomplished through informal conversation 
and informal request to consider or reflect on each product as it emerged. His enthusiasm 
and support for the proposed research grew as he came to see his "finger print" on the 
proposal, interview questions, and presentation. Accordingly, these products came to 
reflect the concerns and language of the organization's culture as seen by this second level 
manager.
Once the proposal, questionnaire, and presentation reached a certain level of 
maturity, this second level manager agreed to introduce me to two first level managers in 
his division. The plan was to try these products on them. They, too, were very receptive 
to me, but again I felt their courtesy was as a result of their boss’s introduction. In our first 
meeting, I informally explained the idea for the research proposal, and provided them with 
a proposed "handout" explaining the theory and motivation for the research. In our next 
meeting, when I asked if the handout had clarified the intent of the research, one of the two 
manager's replied with a laugh, "I don't want to hurt anyone's feelings, but whoever wrote 
this was smoking something." With this statement, I realized that organizational learning 
theory was fairly irrelevant to them, and would probably be irrelevant to the other managers 
in the section. From this I decided against a handout or discussion of any theory. Instead 
the presentation would be structured in terms of what would be accomplished, how 
confidentiality would be maintained, and the value of the research to them. Organizational 
learning would only get an honorable mention as something of my personal interest and 
motivation. The value of the research to them would be presented in terms of what they 
would discover about their own perspectives, the perspectives of others, and the 
relationship of their perspectives to others.
After several more revisions of the research proposal with the second level 
manager, I met with the operational vice president to explain the proposed research 
process. Again he expressed reservations as to the amount of time the research process 
would take for his managers. This resulted in agreement to eliminate an iteration of 
reflection on the perspectives, which was contained in the initial proposal. He also agreed
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to allow presentation of the proposal to the rest of the managers in the section, but did not 
commit to performing the research.
The presentation meeting was scheduled a few weeks after this meeting with the 
operational vice president.. So far, four managers were familiar with the proposed 
research. The remaining 14 managers heard the proposal for the first time at this 
presentation. The presentation centered on how the research process would be enacted and 
what the value of the research would be to the participants in terms of the self and mutual 
discovery of individual and composite perspectives. Assurances of confidentiality were 
emphasized. There were a number of questions asked by the managers, which principally 
centered on how much of their time the research process would take and what they could 
expect the research to do for them.
Just before the presentation, I learned that the operational vice president for the 
section of the company for which the proposal had been developed was to become the new 
COO, while the new operational vice president was yet to be determined. The former 
COO, who afforded my original introduction into the organization, was to retire. This 
introduced an added uncertainty as to whether I would be allowed to perform the research 
in this section of the company, or even if there would be any support left at all to do 
research anywhere within the company.
At the end of the presentation, the operational vice president, new COO select, 
asked several questions to clarify various points, but finally asked, "Just what are we going 
to get out of this?" I had already explained the value of the research in terms of self and 
mutual discovery of individual and composite perspectives. Not wanting to repeat myself, 
a metaphor for the research value to the participants occurred to me as the operational vice 
president asked his question. My reply was, "Have you held a job or position at sometime 
in which you felt it was difficult?" His reply was, "Yes, of course. I think we all have." I 
asked, "If you could go back and do this same job now, would it be easier or more 
difficult?" His answer was, "Of course, I think it would be easier now." I then asked, 
"Why?" His answer was, "Well, I would know certain things now that I did not know 
then." My reply was, "I submit those 'certain things' that you know now can be summed 
up as your perspectives, and this is what I submit is the value of this research. I contend 
you normally gain your perspectives, which to a large extent includes perspectives on the 
perspectives of others, in a very circumstantial and haphazard way. This research will 
facilitate an accelerated development of your perspectives both individually and as a group. 
It will help you to gain and clarify your perspectives in an accelerated and methodical way."
I clearly remember his reply as a sort of guttural "hump" sound, and with this the meeting
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ended. I approached the operational vice president after the meeting, and complained that I 
still did not have his commitment to conduct the research. He replied by asking if he could 
add his administrative assistant as a participant in the research. He stated that although she 
was not a manager and did not have people working for her, she had coordinated their 
TQM effort the last several years, and was intimately connected to the workings of the 
section and all the managers. I took this as a tacit approval for conducting the research; it 
was a relief to learn that I had apparently won the support of the new COO.
My first interview was with one of the managers who assisted in co-constructing 
the proposal. In this interview I wanted primarily to test the interview questions that were 
co-constructed with his boss. The interview seemed to go well. This manager did not 
have objections to tape recording, and seemed to accept my assurances of confidentiality. 
The questions were not followed verbatim, as the interview took more of a conversational 
tone, most likely because this first level manager and I were well acquainted from his 
earlier assistance. Later, as I listened to the tape, I was surprised at the extent of its 
content. Most of the interview was spontaneous, and the value of this spontaneity became 
apparent upon reflection on the interview. I decided that I would work to achieve such 
spontaneity in following interviews.
The questionnaire also seemed to serve as an excellent guide in this first interview 
and appeared to be relevant This was confirmed by several reflective questions at the end 
of the interview regarding the content of the interview. It appeared that the insights of the 
first interviewee's boss were good, at least for this subordinate. And, as to what was 
specifically important to other managers, I believed the questions good enough to get other 
interviewees into the "ball park” of their specific concerns. Consequently, this initial set of 
questions, provided under appendix 1, served as the interview schedule throughout the 
perspective generating stage of the research project. Again, it is emphasized that this 
interview schedule served as a guide, and not all the questions listed were necessarily 
posed to all participants. Instead, questions and insights raised by participants in 
interviews were fed back to them in the form of reflective questions. Such reflective 
questioning seemed to facilitate "spontaneous" conversations, as evidenced by spontaneous 
behaviors, figurative language, and their speaking in terms of "here and now". Through 
such spontaneous conversations a portion of the participant's previously non-articulated 
organizational experience would often be expressed. These expressions would frequently 
contain generalizations of the participant's organizational beliefs, and would also often 
imply how such beliefs were formed from experiences. These spontaneous conversations
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would also often address unasked interview questions, thereby rendering some questions 
redundant before they were asked.
The second person who was interviewed was in another division of the 
participating section of the organization. By this time, I was fairly confident of the 
relevancy of the interview schedule and my ability to stimulate spontaneous conversation, 
and I wanted to try the schedule and my newly found skills on someone I did not know. It 
should be noted that the fact this particular person became the second person to be 
interviewed out of those whom I did not know was a matter of chance. I started the 
interview with this individual with an invitation to ask about the research or its process. 
This first-level manager replied that in spite of what I had said in the presentation about the 
research being voluntary, this interview was not voluntary to him. He said he had 
protested to his boss, one of the four second-level managers in the participating section of 
the organization, about being interviewed. He told me his boss had told him that he would 
like for him to give the interview a try before he passed judgement, and this was the reason 
he was here. My reply was to the effect that he is free to choose whether we proceeded or 
not He conveyed that he felt he really did not have a choice, because "people" would 
figure out if he was meeting with me or not. I conveyed that the interviews are 
confidential, and because the meetings would be scheduled on an individual basis over a 
period of months, no one would know whether we met or not We continued on with this 
conversation for several minutes until he seemed to acknowledge that indeed I could and 
would keep non-participation anonymous. I also offered, however, that if he did extend 
me the courtesy of his interview, he would also be free to decide at any time during the 
interview or later to not continue the research process. With this offer, we entered into a 
conversation which lasted about a half hour regarding who I was, why I was doing this 
research, who was paying me, who in the organization did I serve, and who would benefit 
from the research data. In our conversation I explained my theoretical motivation for the 
research as well as my motivation to fulfill a requirement for a PhD. I explained that I was 
not being paid to do the research. I explained that the research would only serve those who 
participated in the research, because the only person that would have individual 
perspectives would be the individual who generated the perspectives, and the only people 
who would have the group perspectives or their assessments would be the group itself, 
unless the individual or the group decided to share those perspectives with others. I 
explained that outside the organization, I would use the data only for academic purposes, 
subject to the approval of the participants, and further, given this approval, it would be 
disguised to the satisfaction of the participants so as to not reveal the identity of individuals
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or the organization. I explained all the phases of the research, and that I believed the value 
of the research to the participant would be self-discovery of one's own perspectives, and 
the perspectives of others, especially in relation to one's own perspectives. (Part of this 
conversation was again repeated in the actual interview, which can be found under 
appendix 2.) At the end of this conversation he revealed that he had suspicions that I was 
doing the research for the COO or at least for the COO select, and was fearful that the 
research had a hidden agenda, such as "to prove" some notion or point of view already held 
by people at the top of the organization, or "to make them look good" in some way. He 
acknowledged that our present conversation had helped to dispel these suspicions. He 
never stated that his decision to go forward with the interview was linked to feeling he had 
a choice. He simply said that now that he had met me and gotten to talk with me, he didn't 
mind talking with me, and therefore it was okay with him to do the interview. With this we 
did the interview; however, I strongly felt my act of "re-framing" the context of the 
research from one of mandatory to one of choice, as it happened to have occurred, made a 
difference in this individual's decision to willingly grant his interview and to continue with 
the research. Also, although I can not know for sure, I believe that the context under 
which we proceeded made a marked difference between the interview that occurred, versus 
what otherwise would have probably been a superficial interview.
The interview directly followed this conversation and lasted slightly more than two 
hours. The interview proceeded well, and quickly became spontaneous as was hoped 
could be achieved. This interview is included as appendix 2, and serves to demonstrate the 
interview technique guided by the principle of eliciting tacit organizational knowledge 
through use of spontaneity. This interview provides a good representation of the 
spontaneity and candidness that occurred in many of the interviews. The interviewee edited 
the interview and resulting perspectives to protect his and the organization's identity. 
Where a word or phrase was changed to a more generic word or phrase, the text is 
italicized. The perspectives generated from this interview are included as appendix 3, 
which provide an example of individual perspectives derived from interview data.
As a footnote to this interview, the issue of choice with regard to participation never 
arose again with this participant, and he eventually became one of the stronger supporters 
of the research; he later expressed emphatically that he had never participated in such an 
effort that "gets to our feelings" as this research did. He also expressed that the study had 
helped him to realize important aspects about himself and his organization. He felt he 
would not have otherwise realized these aspects, without which he would be handicapped 
in what he wanted to accomplish.
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As a result of my experiences from this second interview, I realized that most of the 
other potential participants probably were not feeling that the research was voluntary. 
Also, if what this interviewee said in his interview was correct (see appendix 2), most 
participants intensely disliked anything associated with TQM, and I had been put under a 
"TQM study" label. Consequently, I felt I needed some sort of remedial action were I to 
win the support of the remaining prospective participants. My solution to this was to 
request a meeting with the remaining three of the four divisional groups for which I was 
not yet well acquainted. These three groups would consist of four to five individuals each, 
which I felt was small enough to spark a good dialogue on the research. My intent was to 
address in such small group setting the points the second interviewee had raised, and 
provide a more intimate forum for individual questions. Of these points, I specifically 
wanted to address that the research could not be successful without the support of the 
participants, and consequently, participation had to be the choice of the individual. 
Accordingly, I would address how I would ensure a decision to not participate would be 
anonymous and remain anonymous. I also wanted to specifically address that the research 
was not motivated by their TQM endeavors.
My strategy was to accomplish such a meeting with each divisional group just 
before scheduling the interviews with the members of the divisional group. I was granted 
the first such meeting with the divisional group of the second interviewee with the help of 
the second interviewee. In this small group, the others in the meeting cross examined my 
presence and purpose in their organization nearly as intensely as the second interviewee had 
done in our pre-interview conversation. However, I could sense that a lot of individual 
uncertainty and mis-perceptions about the research were answered, and that it seemed to 
make a difference that I was concerned with ensuring that participation was a matter of 
individual choice. The understanding I established during this first meeting and the other 
two divisional meetings which followed was that when I met with the participants 
individually, they could decide to proceed or not to proceed. If we did proceed, individuals 
would also be free not to proceed at any later point in time. Finally, the decision not to 
participate would be treated confidentially so as not to reveal instances of non-participation. 
Some individuals still chose to engage in a conversation similar to the pre-interview 
conversation I had with the second interviewee, but none decided not to continue. 
Additionally, the hard concerns raised by the second interviewee were only raised again by 
a couple of the next several interviewees. Later interviewees did not express such 
concerns. Also, I did not seem to come under as intense scrutiny in the other two 
divisional meetings as I did in the first divisional meeting. In fact, it was more typical to
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hear from the later interviewees, "I was wondering when you would get to me," or, "I have 
really been looking forward to this interview." I never queried why I received less scrutiny 
in the later divisional meetings or the source of individual pre-interview enthusiasm when it 
occurred, but I believe the turn in participant attitude was as a result of the participants 
believing they had a choice, believing that I was not there to serve some political interest 
within the organization, and believing that confidentiality would be maintained. I believe 
that these points were probably experienced by the earlier participants, and consequently 
socially transmitted to later participants in their routine conversations.
In summary, the enactment of the first phase resulted in securing the requisite 
commitments necessary for the continuation of the research, and in focusing and orienting 
the research for both the researcher and the participants. A "local theory of organization" 
and appropriate interview questions were co-constructed, which led to framing the research 
in terms acceptable to the candidate participants. However, the actual enactment differed 
from the idealized description given in chapter IV of phase 1 in that it contained several 
important discoveries. One discovery included the realization of the apparent importance of 
choice in gaining the trust of the participants. It is believed that trust in the researcher and 
research was facilitated not only by the proper billing and consistent enactment of the 
research, but also through the participants' social sharing of their research experiences. It 
is also believed that trust was important to achieving spontaneity in the perspective 
generating interviews. Perhaps the most important discovery was the apparent importance 
of spontaneity to eliciting, what I perceived at the time, "deep" versus "shallow" 
organizational perspectives, and later recognized to be, in the language of Argyris and 
Schon (1978), perspectives which express the organization’s "theory in-use", i.e. actions, 
as opposed to only the organization's "espoused theory", i.e., rhetoric (please see later 
sections in this chapter under phases 3 thru 5, chapter VI, "Perspective Analysis", and 
chapter VII, "Local Findings", for further discussion of rhetoric and action gaps).
Phase 2: Elicitation of Individual Organizational Perspectives
As stated in chapter IV, the second phase involved the generation of participants' 
organizational perspectives. The interview questions generated in the first phase were used 
to stimulate, as much as possible, spontaneous conversations. Accordingly, the interview 
schedule (appendix 1), unlike Keating (1993), was not faithfully followed from one 
interviewee to the next Instead it was used as a guide to relevant subjects for the 
interview. The desired result was to stimulate spontaneous reflection and articulation of the 
interviewee's organizational experiences. This result was discovered to be desired through
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the enactment of the first several interviews by observing that spontaneous conversations 
seemed to facilitate rich articulations of experiences. With this discovery, spontaneity was 
further rationalized from a theoretical viewpoint (see "Assumptions of the Research”, 
chapter I) by literature on elicitation of tacit knowledge, such as that required in 
constructing expert systems (Berry, 1988).
Achieving spontaneity in conversations, like conversation itself, became an art 
form. In this research, it consisted of actively listening to the interviewee and responding 
with appropriate questions to his or her replies. Consequendy, subjects that would emerge 
were often unpredictable, but seemed always to be those subjects that were important to the 
interviewee. This was the desired result, since the desired purpose of the interview was to 
facilitate reflection and articulation of organizational experiences which were uniquely 
significant to the interviewee. An example of such a facilitation is the interview of 
appendix 2.
It is believed that good to excellent spontaneity was achieved in all the interviews of 
this research with one exception. In this exception I felt the participant did not achieve a 
level of trust, for reasons unknown to me, for either the research or for me. It was 
interesting to note two other unique characteristics of this participant, which I believe were 
related to the participant's resistance to spontaneity. First, he was the only participant who 
did not differentiate his assessments of the perspectives on the three scales (please see next 
section of this chapter, i.e., phase 3, for a description of the three assessment scales). This 
seemed to indicate disinterest in the research, because it took some effort and reflection to 
position one's self with respect to each perspective in three different ways. Second, it was 
found that his personal perspectives were assessed, in general, by the rest of the participant 
group (in phases 3 and 4) as "high agreement" on the "talk" scale, and "low agreement" on 
the "walk" scale . This seemed to indicate that what this participant did articulate in 
interview was more of what represented the rhetoric of the organization than that which 
represented the actions of the organization. In other words, the participant seemed to relate 
more "the party line" and less actual organizational experiences, perhaps because what he 
said in interview was guarded and therefore did not contain the spontaneity necessary to 
draw out his personal experiences.
In contrast to this exception, where spontaneity was achieved with the other 
participants, it seemed to be related to trust This trust at a minimum, probably included a 
trust that confidentiality would be maintained and that the research was not designed to 
serve some political agenda. Spontaneity also seemed related to a need to talk about one's 
experiences. Indeed, after the initial interview, many of the participants would engage in
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hours of unsolicited conversation about their organizational experiences. Certainly, such 
conversations would seem to require both trust and a need for such conversation in order 
for them to occur.
In those cases in which spontaneous conversations emerged in the initial interview, 
many of the perspectives generated were later assessed by the participant group in phases 3 
and 4 as "high agreement" on the "walk" scale, but "low agreement" on the "talk" scale, or 
vice versa (please see next two sections of this chapter, phases 3 and 4, for descriptions of 
the "talk" and "walk" scales). In other words, spontaneity seemed to yield articulations of 
the actions that occurred in the organization as opposed to just the "party line" or rhetoric of 
the organization. In contrast, the perspectives of Keating's (1993) study did not yield a 
body of perspectives with as large a differentiation in their assessments in rhetoric versus 
action. The fact that Keating (1993) followed his questionnaire consistently from one 
interviewee to the next, and the fact that Keating has acknowledge in conversation with me 
that he achieved little spontaneity in his perspective generating interviews points toward 
attributing this difference to spontaneity. These observations help to support the thesis that 
the dynamics of spontaneous conversation facilitates articulation of experiential knowledge, 
and that trust is an essential element to such dynamics.
It is important to reiterate at this point that trust was not automatic. It was a 
commodity that had to be earned. The actions which appeared to be instrumental in earning 
such trust were, first, acknowledging and honoring the choices of the participants; second, 
clearly explaining the purpose and context of the research; and third, enacting the research 
consistent with its billing. And, although trust was not automatic, it was a commodity that 
seemed to be easier to earn as the research progressed. It appeared that trust in the 
researcher and research was being transmitted socially through the participants' everyday 
conversations. From several passing references to conversations that the participants had 
among themselves, it appeared that conversations regarding my presence in the 
organization were occurring naturally between the participants. Accordingly, I would 
hypothesize that where comparisons from such conversations were consistent, the rhetoric 
of the research would be confirmed. Consistent with the thesis of this dissertation, I would 
hypothesize that such social confirmation occurred in a tacit domain.
Each interview was tape recorded and transcribed verbatim. From the transcribed 
interview, the researcher drew out a set of prospective perspectives, which represented the 
researcher's best attempt to state in short explicit statements the essence of the participant's 
interview. These short explicit statements would then be validated by the participant The 
transcribed interview and the set of statements were given to each participant to review,
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reflect, and modify as necessary. Each participant was asked to review the statements and 
to make changes, additions, and/or deletions with the purpose of ensuring that the final set 
of statements was "highly reflective of his or her organizational thoughts, feelings, and/or 
experiences." It was also re-emphasized at this point that the individual participant was the 
only one who would see his or her own interview transcription or perspectives, and that the 
validated perspectives would only be used to form a set of composite perspectives for the 
entire group. Finally, it was re-emphasized that this set of composite perspectives would 
only be used for individual and joint assessment by members of the group in such a way 
that no perspective could be attributed to any single individual, and that the composite 
perspectives and their assessments would not be available to anyone outside the group 
unless members of the group, or the group as a whole, provided same to someone outside 
the group.
Transcription of the interviews was essential for this researcher to produce a set of 
perspectives that faithfully represented the interview data. Although this was, of course, 
very time consuming, it seemed to serve several essential functions as described in the 
following paragraphs.
The transcribed interview allowed the interview data to be scrutinized for not only 
what was said, but also how it was said in terms of the metaphors that the participant chose 
to use. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980) contend, metaphors are a part of everyday speech 
that affect the ways in which we perceive, think, and act Accordingly, understanding the 
participant's metaphors was important to my ability to formulate an explicit statement in the 
language of the organization that would be highly reflective of the participant's actual 
feelings and viewpoints. Transcription facilitated paying attention to metaphors, and this 
practice seemed to produce "good" prospective perspectives in the eyes of the participants. 
As one participant said, while banging on the table, "This is exactly what I think, and now 
that I can say it, I'm not ashamed of it!" While another participant exclaimed in referring to 
his perspectives, "This is just like you got into my head!" Approximately 60% of the 
participants made no changes in their perspectives, while others made only minor editing 
changes. An example of translating interview text into perspective statements is included as 
appendix 3, which contains the perspectives drawn from the interview data of appendix 2.
Transcribing the interview assisted the participant in reflecting on his or her 
interview. After the interview was transcribed and a set of prospective perspectives were 
drawn from the interview data, the transcribed interview, along with the perspectives, were 
given to the participant. The participant was asked to review his or her perspectives, and to 
make any additions, deletions, or changes as the participant wished. The stated goal was
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for the set of perspectives to be a good representation of the participant's organizational 
perspectives. It was explained that the prospective perspectives represented my best 
interpretation of what was said in the interview, while the transcription was provided for 
review and reflection. It seemed to serve this purpose well. Nearly all participants 
indicated that they read their prospective perspectives first, which then inspired them to 
read their transcribed interview. As one participant stated, "Although I agreed with the 
perspectives, I did not understand how you were able to produce these perspectives from 
my interview. But I went back to my interview and found out I really did say these 
things!"
Transcription served as a base line for agreement of what was said in the interview. 
Participants were asked to point out any inaccuracies they believed might exist in the 
transcribed interview, although it was a verbatim transcription. All participants agreed that 
their respective transcriptions were very accurate. In fact, one participant commented, "The 
text was not only exactly what I said, but it even sounded like I talk, and I've decided I 
don’t like the way I talk." I hypothesize that this base line of what was said served to build 
trust in the research process. Like the participant in the above paragraph who said, "I... 
found out I really did say these things", other participants gained confidence that research 
enactment sought to produce an accurate representation of their perspectives, versus an 
enactment of an agenda not their own. I hypothesize that this consistency also lent 
credibility to the perspectives that were presented for assessment by all participants in 
phases 3 and 4, because they understood experientially how the perspectives were 
generated. As one participant said, in comparing this research to his organization's earlier 
"quality of life" surveys, "These are oar perspectives, and not just someone's 'I thought' 
experiment."
Finally, transcription seemed to serve as an important motivating factor. Nearly all 
participants indicated they read their prospective perspectives and interviews with great 
interest. Most indicated they had made some sort of personal discovery in the process. A 
significant number even stated they had shared their interview text and prospective 
perspectives with their wives. From these observations, it appeared to me that the 
participants enjoyed reading their own words, and in many cases also enjoyed sharing 
those words with someone close to them. In general, enthusiasm for the research built 
individually as each participant individually went through the interview and perspective 
development process. It appeared to me that the motivating aspects of the interview and 
perspective development process were related in part to narcissism, and also in part to the 
social aspect of the process. By the social aspect of the process I mean that the self­
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reflection involved at least one other, namely the researcher, and that the subjects of the 
individual reflections were either about others or involved others in the organization. It is 
also worth noting at this point that enthusiasm appeared to continue to build in the 
following phases of the research from similar mechanisms, i.e., in part from a group 
narcissism, and in part from the social aspect of the individual self-reflections in relation to 
the individual self-reflections of the other members of the group. These comparisons of 
self-reflections occurred when the participants were able to anonymously compare their 
assessments with the assessments of others (please see phase 4 for a description of these 
comparisons). The social aspect of these comparisons is believed to have occurred as the 
participants took the perspective of these comparisons into the organization's social arena 
through both their everyday conversations, and did occur through the group meetings of 
phase 5.
In summary, phase 2 generated individual organizational perspectives, while 
providing a rigorous means to compile the beliefs and assumptions held by a representative 
group of the organization. The interview questions generated in the first phase were used 
to facilitate spontaneous conversations intended to lead to organizational subjects important 
to the individual interviewee. It was discovered that such spontaneity seemed to facilitate 
the interviewee in articulating more of how he or she experienced the organization, as 
opposed to just what he or she perceived to commonly be espoused within the 
organization. This observation was later found to also be supported by the assessments of 
the composite perspectives in phases 3 and 4 in that there were many perspectives assessed 
by the participant group as "high agreement" on the "walk" scale, but "low agreement" on 
the "talk scale". This result was in contrast to Keating's (1993) study, which did not have 
as many perspectives that were significantly assessed differently on these two scales. It 
was discovered, for such spontaneous conversations to arise, a level of trust for the 
research and researcher needed to exist, and that this trust had to be earned through respect 
for the participants' choices, clear billing of the research, and consistent enactment of the 
research billing. The interview was tape recorded and transcribed, which served as an aid 
in observing interviewees' construction of metaphors, in formulating "good" prospective 
perspectives, in establishing the credibility of the composite perspectives used in the 
remaining phases, and in building participant motivation for the research. The individual 
prospective perspectives were validated by each participant, and the validated perspectives 
were then used to build a set of composite perspectives for the remaining phases.
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Phase 3: Individual Assessments of Composite Perspectives
There were 273 individually validated perspectives from phase 2. As stated in 
chapter IV, these perspectives were synthesized into a composite set of perspectives and 
grouped by topic. A number of the individually validated perspectives could be combined 
due to similarities, so the composite set of perspectives consists of only 181 perspectives. 
Care was taken to eliminate the redundancy, but not the diversity of ideas, represented by 
the original set of individual validated perspectives.This composite set of perspectives is 
included under appendix 4. These perspectives were individually and confidentially 
assessed in four different ways, i.e., through the participants' open-ended comments, 
through the participants' personal positions with respect to the perspective, and through the 
participants' perceptions of organizational rhetoric and action. Accordingly, these 
comments and assessments are included in appendix 4. The perspectives and comments in 
appendix 4 are disguised so as to protect the identity of the organization. Where a word or 
phrase was changed to a more generic term, it is italicized. Phase 3 comments are labeled 
as la, lb, lc, etc., while phase 4 comments are labeled as 2a, 2b, 2c, etc., where each 
labeled comment corresponds to a response by a single participant. The other three 
assessments were accomplished through the participants marking three seven point Likert 
scales, labeled "Personal", "Talk", and "Walk", which correspond to the participants' 
personal positions with respect to the perspective, and to the participants' perceptions of 
organizational rhetoric and action, respectively. Each scale varies from strongly agree to 
strongly disagree. The frequency of each assessment is presented as a number appearing 
in each of the seven positions of the three scales. The scale assessments of appendix 4 
reflects the participants' final assessments from phase 4. Accordingly, the numbers on 
each scale total to 15, because there were 15 participants in the study at the end of phase 4. 
The number of participants in the study varied from 18 to 15 during phases 2 thru 4, and 
remained at 15 till the end of the study. The loss of several participants were all due to 
transfers and/or retirements. Consequently, all of the managers of the participating section 
of the company voluntarily chose to continue with the study.
Each participant was able to assess the composite perspectives by being presented 
with a copy of the perspectives, same as appendix 4, but with no comments or numbers on 
the scales. The participants were given a written set of instructions to assist in 
distinguishing the three Likert scales, and to operationally define the seven distinctions of 
each Likert scale. These instructions are included in appendix 5. Each participant assessed 
the perspectives in a dedicated session in his or her personal office. I was available for 
questions in an outer office. Each participant normally would call for help several times
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with questions regarding clarification of the three different scales in relation to the first 
several perspectives, and/or clarification of the semantics of at least a few individual 
perspectives. A short ten minute in-process interview was conducted after each assessment 
to gain feedback on the process.
The individual assessments exposed the participants to a wide variety of 
organizational perspectives, and caused each to individually reflect on these perspectives 
from the multiple viewpoints of his or her personal position, and his or her perception of 
organizational rhetoric and action. In other words, for each perspective, each participant 
had to ask three questions. First, "Do I personally agree or disagree with this statement?" 
Second, "Do I agree or disagree this is what others prevalently say?" And third, "Do I 
agree or disagree this is what others prevalently do?" Accordingly, this facilitated the 
participants to individually reflect on their organizational beliefs, assumptions, and 
understandings. As one participant stated, "This really made me question things I’ve taken 
for granted." The in-process interviews revealed several patterns in these reflections. 
First, nearly all participants said that they were "overwhelmed", "amazed", and/or 
"surprised" by the "extent", "breath" and/or "depth” of the composite perspectives. As one 
participant said, "This is everything that is important to us, and then some!" Second, 
nearly all participants indicated that assessing the perspectives on the three scales forced 
them to think about their organizational perspectives in a different way. Comments from 
participants indicated that their trying to decide what others said and did caused them to 
question their assumptions. Third, nearly all participants discovered there were a number 
of commonly held perspectives. As one participant stated, "There were a number of 
perspectives which didn't come from me, but if we had talked about it, they could have." 
Another participant stated, "I found out that there are a whole lot of other managers that 
think like I do. I should figure out who they are and form coalitions." Fourth, nearly all 
participants discovered that there were a number of perspectives with which they strongly 
disagreed. As one participant said, while referring to several specific perspectives, "I don't 
see how anyone could possibly think this," while another participant stated, "I was 
wondering who the fool was that said some of this stuff. Then I realized, for some of it, 
the fool was me! I realized it was different people saying these things!" Fifth, all 
participants stated they definitely recognized their perspectives in the composite 
perspectives. Sixth, nearly all participants reported it was "difficult" or "exhausting" to 
assess such a comprehensive body of organizational perspectives on three scales. For 
many, such assessment took nearly three hours. Seventh, many felt semantics was a 
problem with some perspectives. In such cases, they felt my presence to clarify certain
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perspectives was valuable. As a footnote, semantics, in a reflective study such as this 
would probably always present some problem, since the individual perspective formulation 
process causes perspectives to emulate the language of the individual. Clarification of 
semantics was seldom requested for the same perspectives, indicating that where the 
semantics of one perspective presented a problem for one individual, it apparently did not 
present a problem for other participants. Finally, it seemed that motivation for the 
research increased as the participants enacted this phase. This was indicated by participants 
contrasting the superiority of the research with traditional surveys in understanding 
"sentiment", "beliefs", or "feelings", participants electing to continue the ten minute in- 
process interview into an hour or more of conversation, and participants not broaching the 
subject of not continuing the research process.
In summary, a composite set of perspectives were formed from the individually 
validated perspectives and assessed by all participants in phase three. These assessments 
caused the participants to individually and anonymously reflect on their organizational 
beliefs and assumptions, and caused the participants to examine their perception of the 
organizational beliefs and assumptions of their fellow participants. The assessments 
provided a rigorous means to assess the beliefs and assumptions held by a representative 
group of the organization, and, accordingly, to test what individual knowledge was shared 
by the larger group (see chapter VI, "Perspective Analysis", and chapter VH, "Local 
Findings"). A wide variety of individual discoveries resulted from these reflections, which 
in turn appeared to create an increased awareness of the individual perspectives of the other 
participants, and appreciation for similarities and differences. Finally, this method of 
organizational reflection appeared to increase the motivation of the participants to participate 
in such joint reflection.
Phase 4: Individual Exploration of Assessments
In the fourth phase, after all participants responded to the first survey, each 
participant assessed the composite perspectives a second time. This time, for each 
perspective, for all three scales, the survey showed the respondent the distribution of all 
individual assessments and open-ended comments made in phase 3, while the individual’s 
own responses and comments from phase 3 were highlighted. Thus, the respondents were 
able to quickly see, in confidence, how their responses and comments compared to 
everyone else's. Respondents were given the option to change their response on any of the 
three scales, as well as to add additional comments. This process allowed each participant 
to know the positions taken by all other participants and to reflect on his or her position.
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After the participants were able to explore the assessments of their fellow 
participants, a short in-process interview was conducted. These in-process interviews 
revealed several patterns as explained in the following paragraphs.
First, most participants stated they would initially compare their marks on the three 
scales with others. Participants indicated they did so because their attention was drawn 
toward the yellow highlights of their phase 3 marks, and also because they were curious as 
to how they stood in relation to their fellow participants. Participants universally expressed 
that the set of perspectives took on another level of meaning to them when they were able to 
see how others had assessed them.
Second, most participants said, if their assessments were generally in line with the 
majority, they moved to the next perspective, stopping only to read the comments. 
However, where their phase 3 assessments were not in line with the majority, most 
participants reported spending considerable thought on the perspective. Most said they 
initially checked the perspective to ensure they had not misinterpreted the perspective. If 
the perspective had been misinterpreted, participants reported changing their mark. 
However, where they felt the perspective had been correctly interpreted, most participants 
reported not changing their mark. Several even indicated the process caused them to be 
firmer on their initial position, although they now understood they where not in 
conformance with their fellow participants. When a participant did change position on one 
or more perspectives, the change of position was often expressed as a significant discovery 
for the participant There were, however, many more examples of participants espousing 
entrenchment rather than change, and consequently, the average participant only made 
several dozen changes to the 543 marks (3 scales times 181 perspectives) made in phase 3. 
As a result the aggregate of all the changes did not have a significant effect on the overall 
participant group assessment of the composite perspectives, i.e., there were no 
perspectives on any of the three scales, whose assessments changed from a majority 
agreement to a majority disagreement or vice versa, as a result of the second assessment 
nor was there any perceptible move toward or away from the mean response.
Third, a number of participants volunteered they knew who originated certain 
perspectives. As one participant stated, "I know who said this, because he even used the 
same words in a meeting yesterday." I could only listen to such comments, since I was 
bound by rules of confidentiality. However, I made note of such instances, and in each 
case, when I checked the record, the participant was wrong. This indicated to me that 
either the perspective was already commonly held by other participants, or that participants 
where enacting perspectives as they became aware of them through the research process, or
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perhaps a combination of both. In some of these instances, the perspective had been 
generated from several similar perspectives from different participants. This indicated to me 
that the perspective was already commonly held, since the same perspective was espoused 
by at least several participants in individual interviews. In other instances, the perspective 
had been generated from a single individual. In these cases it seemed that the perspective 
was being enacted as a result of the research process, because participants, other than the 
single participant who originally espoused the perspective, were espousing the perspective 
as their own. If it had been commonly held before the research, it would seem likely that at 
least one other person would have espoused a similar perspective in the interview process.
Finally, a number of participants remarked they were surprised by the number of 
other managers who "agreed" with them. As one participant remarked, "This has taught
me that a lot of other managers feel like I do when I want something, I need to form a
coalition, instead of going it alone with upper management" A number of other managers 
also expressed the idea of forming coalitions when discovering the number of assessments 
similar to theirs. In fact one such coalition occurred during this study regarding the issues 
expressed in perspectives 8 through 16 regarding quality charts (please see appendix 4). 
These perspectives expressed, among other things, that lower management was being made 
to maintain a number of quality charts that were of no benefit to them. In fact, the various 
first level managers were together maintaining a total of over 200 quality charts before the 
start of this phase of the research project. At the same time, higher management was 
imposing new variables for charting weekly. As it was told to me by one participant 
toward the end of phase 4, "We all converged on the COO and told him we were only 
going to maintain charts which we thought were of benefit to us." The final result was the 
retention of only 17 quality charts, while the rest were discontinued. I cannot say for sure 
that this "quality chart revolution" was a direct result of the awareness created out of this 
research project, but the timing and the action suggested by perspectives 8 thru 16 are 
uncanny. Perhaps this would have occurred anyway. Certainly, from perspectives 8 thru 
16, the potential for a "quality chart revolution" existed before the research project. 
However, it appears that the awareness of this potential created by the research project may 
have served as a catalysis for action.
There were other examples of participants enacting perspectives. One example is 
perspective 172. This perspective suggests that an automated computerized system for 
technical reports should be formulated to serve the needs of their business. The person that 
volunteered this perspective stated he was afraid to voice this need himself, until such time 
he felt he had made considerable progress in formulating such a system himself. He felt,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
102
once he voiced the idea, he would be pressured to implement such a proposal in an 
inadequate amount of time without additional resources. During the course of the research 
project, perspective 172 was adopted by others and such a system was a reality before the 
end of the group discussions. Other examples of enacting various perspectives also arose 
during the group discussions, as discussed in the next section. There also may have been 
many other examples of enacting perspectives, of which I am not aware, since my 
observations were confined to individual conversations and the group meetings.
It is noteworthy that during this phase the section of the company participating in 
the study received a new operational vice president from another section of the company. 
Recall that the former operational vice president of the section was promoted to COO at the 
very start of the research project Prior to this time, various second level managers were 
serving as the operational vice president for the section on a rotating basis. I canvased the 
other participants to find out if they would like their new boss to join in the study in the 
current phase. The choice was theirs, since the perspectives to which their new boss 
would be exposed came from them. I told each participant that if any single one of them 
did not want their new boss to have access to their perspectives, then it would not be I who 
would expose him to the composite perspectives, and, consequently, he would not 
participate in the study. All 14 of the current participants expressed approval for their new 
boss to join the study. Accordingly, I made an appointment with him, explained the 
research project, and gave him the choice of joining the study. I proposed to him that he 
first assess a blank copy of the perspectives, so his responses would not be biased by the 
marks of others, and then perform a second assessment, where he would be able to see his 
marks in comparison to all others, just as others in the study had done and were doing. A 
week later he stated he had talked with a number of his managers and they all thought it 
would be a good idea for him to join the study, and that, of course, he was certainly 
interested in anything going on in his section. He spent nearly four hours on the first 
assessment, and over three hours on the second assessment I cannot break confidentiality 
of his specific remarks, but I can say, with his permission, that he repeatedly emphasized it 
would have taken him months, or even years, without the benefit of this study to fully 
appreciate many of the perspectives held by his managers. His specific remark was, "In 
just a few hours I feel I have had a meeting with the minds of all my managers. This 
would have taken me months, even years, if at all." His perspective helps to support what 
I presented at the beginning of the study as the value of the research process to the 
participant, i.e., an accelerated learning of the perspectives of others relative to the 
participant's own perspectives. He was also able to hold and present a second unique
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perspective on the study, since he came from inside the company, but outside the section. 
He felt a similar study in his former section would have yielded similar results, only in 
different words. According to this perspective, it would seem, at the time of the study, that 
the composite perspectives of this section of the company were also representative of the 
larger company.
In summary, participants were able to explore and determine in this phase where 
their assessments stood relative to the assessments of their fellow participants. Participants 
indicated a natural curiosity for these explorations. Understanding the assessments of their 
fellow participants appeared to give the composite perspectives a new level of meaning for 
the participants. Participants appeared comfortable with being in the majority with their 
assessments, but spent considerable reflection when they were outside the majority. 
Nevertheless, most participants became firmer on most of their non-majority opinions, 
rather than changing their perspective. When a change of perspective did occur, 
participants often expressed the change as a significant discovery.
Many participants felt they recognized the perspectives of specific fellow managers, 
but were always wrong when the record was confidentially checked. This, as well as 
specific examples of participants enacting certain perspectives, provides anecdotal evidence 
that the research provided a catalysis for the enactment of the perspectives by the participant 
group.
Many participants were surprised by the number of participants agreeing with them. 
This discovery caused several participants to espouse forming coalitions on issues 
important to them. Some coalitions did, in fact, self-organize on issues for which the 
composite perspectives revealed potential for action, such as quality charts and a 
computerized system for technical reports.
Finally, the new operational vice president joined the study during this phase with 
the consent of the current participants. He provided the perspective that it would have 
taken a considerable effort for him to otherwise understand the perspectives of his new 
section, a result I predicted at the beginning of the study as the value of the study to the 
participants. He also provided a perspective which indicated that the results of this study 
were, to some degree, generalizable to the rest of the company.
Phase 5: Joint Exploration of Assessment Results
The fifth phase involved group discussions of the composite perspectives and their 
assessments. The first objective for these meetings was to create a significant participant- 
group dialogue into the local discoveries of the participant group, as represented by the
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composite perspectives and their assessments. Each participant was provided a copy of the 
composite perspectives with assessment results, and the history of their own two 
assessments for reference. Additionally, to facilitate the group's dialogue, the composite 
perspectives were organized for the group discussions in terms of the personal belief, 
rhetoric, and action gaps evidenced by the assessments. Perspectives were arranged by the 
type of gap and the magnitude of the gap (see chapter VI, "Perspective Analysis", and 
appendix 6). This aided the participants in ordering and making sense of their 
assessments. It increased the participant group’s awareness of personal belief, rhetoric, 
and action gaps, while facilitating their understanding for the differences that existed in the 
participant group. As mentioned in chapter IV, the theoretical basis for facilitating the 
participant group's discussions with such gaps is Argyris and Schon's (1978) contention 
that rhetoric and action gaps are ubiquitous in organizations, are often "undiscussables", 
are frequently actively hidden by "camouflage", and often present formidable barriers to 
organizational learning.
The second objective of the group meetings was to yield local discovery beyond 
that represented by the perspectives and their assessments. As mentioned in chapter IV, it 
was hoped that the spontaneity that might be achieved in group meetings would facilitate 
articulation of shared knowledge in much the same way that spontaneity facilitated 
expression of individual knowledge in the individual interviews.
The final objective of the group meetings was to achieve closure. As previously 
stated in both chapters in  and IV, the responsibility for generating actions as a result of 
discoveries rested with the participants. Therefore, closure was not expected in terms of a 
set of actions or adoption of new processes. Instead, closure would consist of providing 
reflection and feedback in the group meetings until the participant group itself decided on a 
form of closure. Accordingly, the form for closure could not be predicted or planned 
before the group meetings. Instead, it was to be a matter for observation.
To assist in the observation of the group meetings of the final phase, the group 
meetings were tape recorded. Accordingly, the chronology and observations for these 
group meetings, which are presented in the following paragraphs, are constructed from 
these recordings.
The group meetings consisted of three meetings, each lasting two hours. The three 
meetings occurred over a span of six weeks, with three weeks between each meeting. The 
attendance at each meeting ranged from 80 to 90 percent In each case, apologies were 
expressed for participants that were unable to attend, usually at the request of the missing 
participant Only those participants who were explained as being out of town or having to
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attend to urgent business were absent All participants attended at least one meeting, and 
there was only one participant who missed two of the meetings. A new first level manager 
attended the meetings at the invitation of the other participants. Besides the 15 participants 
who completed the phase 4 assessments, and me, this new first level manager was the only 
other person to attend the meetings.
In the first meeting the participants were given a complete copy of the assessed 
composite perspectives showing the final assessments and all comments, like that shown in 
disguised form in appendix 4. Additionally, each participant was given the copy of the 
composite perspectives he or she had marked in phase four, which, of course, also 
contained their individual phase three marks and comments in highlight. Together, these 
two documents provided each participant the results of the assessments as they stood after 
the first assessment, the final assessments, and a record of all their marks and comments.
The first meeting was started with a presentation of an analysis of the composite 
perspectives. The analysis that was presented sorted the composite perspectives into eight 
possible categories based upon whether the majority agreed or did not agree with the 
perspective on each of the three scales. In making this distinction each scale is divided into 
two categories by drawing a line between the middle mark, i.e., "neither agree nor 
disagree", and the adjacent mark to the right of the middle, i.e., "somewhat agree". For the 
scale under consideration, if the majority assessment is to the left of this line it is 
considered as majority non-agreement by the group, and if it is to the right, it is considered 
as majority agreement. In making these two distinctions on the three scales, eight 
categories are formed. Additionally, perspectives can be arranged within their respective 
categories according to how strongly they are manifested in the category. For example, a 
perspective in which all participants marked "strongly agree" on all three scales would be 
stronger in its category than a perspective with just a minimum majority agreement on the 
three scales. The primary usefulness of such a categorization is that it orders the composite 
perspectives and their assessments for group discussion, where otherwise the 181 
perspectives with their various assessments would present an amount of information too 
overwhelming for any group to try to discuss in any systematic way. In particular, this 
form of analysis divides the perspectives into groups for which certain generalizations can 
be drawn, and then ranks the perspectives according to their strength in the category. For 
example, the perspectives for which there were majority agreement on all three scales, 
referred to as AAA perspectives, point toward the culture of the participant group, because 
the perspectives are what the majority of the group believe, say, and do. The letter "A” 
represents majority agreement, and the letter "N" represents majority non-agreement, while
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the first, second, and third letter designations corresponds to the belief, talk, and walk 
scales, respectively. Opposite of the AAA perspectives are the perspectives for which there 
is majority non-agreement on all three scales, referred to as NNN perspectives. NNN 
perspectives point toward the antithesis of the group's culture. These two groups of 
perspectives are said to be congruent perspectives, since the majority assessments are the 
same for all three scales. Perspectives that rank high in these two categories would more 
strongly point toward the group’s culture or its antithesis, as the case may be, than 
perspectives that ranked low. When the majority assessment differs among the three 
scales, a perspectives is said to be incongruent. The incongruent perspectives form the 
other six possible categories. This analysis is more fully explained in chapter VI, 
"Perspective Analysis". Appendix 6 also presents summaries of the composite 
perspectives, which are arranged and ranked according to this scheme. Each summary 
attempts to state the essence of the perspective in as few words as possible. These 
summaries are, of course, also disguised to protect the identity of the organization. Where 
a word or phrase has been substituted for a more generic word or phrase, it is italicized.
The first meeting began with my presentation for categorizing and ranking the 
composite perspectives, which lasted approximately 30 minutes. The rest of the meeting 
consisted of presenting individual perspectives with comments and assessments on an 
overhead projector, one by one, in the order of its ranking in its particular category. It was 
desired to start with the incongruent perspectives, so the AAN category, i.e., those 
perspectives with majority agreement on the personal belief and talk scales, and majority 
non-agreement on the walk scale, was arbitrarily chosen first. The group was then allowed 
to self-organize their own discussion around the displayed perspective. When the group 
indicated they were through discussing the present perspective, the next perspective would 
be displayed. It was observed that the presentation of these perspectives coupled with my 
silence was more than sufficient to stimulate the spontaneous discussions that were desired. 
It was planned to present the top twelve perspectives in each of the categories, but 
discussion of the first seven perspectives in the first category consumed the remaining time 
for the first meeting.
Five of the first seven AAN perspectives referred to qualities that management, 
especially upper management, should possess. These perspectives were assessed as strong 
majority agreement on the personal belief and talk scales, but strong majority non­
agreement on the walk scales. Because of such an assessment the perspectives take on the 
meaning: "We believe and say our upper management should have these qualities, but 
think they actually don't." Such meaning was strongly confirmed by the group in exactly
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these terms. As one participant explained, while receiving an approving chorus from the 
rest of the group, "We believe our management should do this, we say our management 
should do this, but we don't think they are!"
A great deal of the discussion regarding the first five perspectives in the AAN 
category referring to management was centered on various participants offering various 
situations as examples of the various individual perspectives. What was striking in these 
examples was that although these perspectives were generated as much as a year prior to 
this meeting, there was a wealth of recent situations that supported the perspective as 
assessed. In other words, it seemed that the participant group in their interactions with 
higher management was constantly and consistently reenacting the perspectives. In the 
words of one participant, "This gives a good indication of what people are thinking. If you 
did it (these perspectives) over again, it would come out even stronger. Nothing has 
changed!" This statement was followed by a chorus of approval by the other participants.
A second venue of reoccurring discussion regarding these first five AAN category, 
upper management perspectives concerned whether the participant group should present 
these perspectives and assessments to higher management The group discussed how and 
in what form the perspectives should be presented, what might happen if they did, and how 
various higher management individuals "would" react.1 The group took a somewhat 
pessimistic perspective on this prospect They seemed to reach a consensus that if they 
sent some form of general statement that they would get nothing back, and if they sent the 
details, it would be "picked apart". That is, it was expressed that they would be asked to 
provide details in support of various perspectives and their assessments, and this would be 
answered with various rationales, until such time as upper management had the last word 
and they had lost stature in the process.
The discussion on the two perspectives involving their TQM  program were 
different. These perspectives coupled with their assessments, like the five upper 
management perspectives, said, "We believe and say our TQM program should have these 
qualities, but it does not." This was true at the time of the assessments. However, these 
two perspectives involve quality charts. Recall, that during phase 4, a "quality chart 
revolution" occurred, where perspective number 12, involving the review of quality charts 
and the discontinuance of non-productive charts, was enacted. In the discussion of 
perspective number 12, which ranked fourth in the AAN category, participants quickly 
agreed that this perspective was now "O.B.E.", i.e., overtaken by events. The perspective
11t was interesting to note how the participants referred to supposed upper management reactions in certain 
terms, i.e., "would", as opposed to probable or possible terms, e.g., "might".
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expressed that quality charts should be reviewed and non-productive charts should be 
discontinued. The comment was proudly made, "We now only have 17 charts." There 
was little further discussion of the perspective. The other perspective involving TQM 
presented in this meeting also referred to collecting "useless data" for quality charts. 
However, it enjoyed a lively discussion centered on how higher management abused TQM 
to satisfy their personal political agendas, or how higher management used information 
contained in various quality charts out of context to the detriment of the first level manager 
providing the information.
I concluded the first meeting with a brief review of what had not yet been 
discussed, and recommended continuing with the discussion of the top twelve perspectives 
in each category if the group decided in favor of another meeting. In other words, I framed 
the possibility of future meetings as something the group would have to decide they wanted 
in order for it to occur. I wanted to ensure that the "voluntariness" emphasized throughout 
the research process carried through into the meetings, at least in a majority sense. The 
question was raised by one participant, "Do we want another meeting? Several participants 
volunteered, "I think we should go on," and, "I would like to see us do something instead 
of just talk." A vote was quickly and spontaneously self-organized and the result was 
unanimous for another meeting. The operational vice president wanted to hold the next 
meeting to one hour, but the other participants insisted on a two hour meeting.
In the interval between the first and second meeting, I became concerned with the 
amount of time it took to discuss just seven perspectives. I wanted to get the group 
reaction to as many perspectives as possible before the group self-organized some sort of 
closure to the group meetings. From this concern I formulated the perspective summaries 
presented in disguised form in appendix 6, and prepared such a summary for the AAN 
perspectives for the next meeting. I wanted the participants to be able to see the essence of 
many perspectives and their assessment results at a glance. The format for the perspective 
summaries shown in appendix 4 was designed to assist the group to pick out the 
perspectives they deemed important, while providing an option to bypass perspectives the 
group chose not to comment upon. It was also hoped that such a summary would assist 
the participants in discovering connections among the perspectives, and that this gestalt 
would facilitate a broader discussion.
In the second meeting we continued with the presentation and spontaneous 
discussion of the next five perspectives in the AAN category to round out the discussion of 
the top twelve perspectives in this category. These perspectives again expressed qualities 
that upper management should possess. Their assessment in this category again expressed,
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"We believe and say our upper management should have these qualities, but think they 
actually don't" Again, such meaning was strongly confirmed, and again participants 
offered many situations as examples of the various individual perspectives, which further 
supported the premise that the participant group, in their interactions with higher 
management was consistently reenacting the perspectives. Various actions were proposed 
by the operational vice president for the section, but the group was unable to reach any 
form of consensus on any of his proposals. These discussions lasted more than half of the 
two hour meeting. I then introduced the summary for the first 36 perspectives in the AAN 
category as presented in disguised form in appendix 6. I explained that I attempted to pick 
out the essence of each perspective for the summary. Some discussion followed and 
several participants pointed out that the summaries expressed exactly what had just been 
said in discussing the last five perspectives (i.e., perspectives ranking 8 thru 12 in the AAN 
category). Various other perspectives were picked out of the AAN perspectives summary 
and discussed. Again, all of the perspectives coupled with their assessment expressed 
qualities that should be a part of their management, culture, company, etc., but were not. 
Again, the perspectives were discussed in these terms. As time ran out, another vote was 
taken to continue with another meeting, and again the vote was unanimous. The 
operational vice president for the section expressed that he thought the summaries were an 
"important tool". As a result, I committed to providing the rest of the composite 
perspectives in this form for the next meeting.
I was several minutes late for the next meeting, as I had some last minute difficulty 
reproducing the perspective summaries for handout. As a result the participant group was 
able to meet a few minutes without me. Additionally, the operational vice president was 
out of town, so the meeting consisted of only the first and second level managers. On my 
way to the meeting room, the second level manager who initially worked with me in 
preparing the proposal for the research intercepted me. He informed me that the group had 
a discussion in my absence. He said that they felt if they tried to organize actions 
suggested by the perspectives, these actions would be of no avail in the context of their 
higher management. In his words, "The guys pretty much feel nothing is going to change 
until our upper management changes, and there is nothing we can do to change them." 
Consequently, he said that the current feeling was that this was the last meeting everyone 
wanted to have. With this, the third meeting started five minutes late.
The third meeting began with acknowledgement that this would be the last meeting. 
Copies of the perspective summaries were handed out, and the first page of the ANA 
category perspectives summary was displayed on an overhead projector. A discussion
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spontaneously arose: "You would think someone just wrote number 4 (the perspective 
ranking fourth in the AAN category)! I saw an example of it today!" (Laughter from the 
group at large.) Another participant offered, "I saw a perfect example of number 4 this 
morning!" Yet another participant said, "Yeah, we all did!" Another participant 
proclaimed, "It's all your fault!" (More laughter.) A discussion followed on this 
perspective, which entailed how upper management uses TQM to avoid making difficult 
decisions. Other examples, weeks and months old, were offered. One participant asked 
how long ago was this perspective generated. The answer, slightly more than one year. 
Another participant offered, "Now that it's on paper, it's like we keep doing this. Would 
you agree?" His question was met with a chorus of agreements. Another participant 
added, "I think we keep living this out (as he held the perspectives up); proving it to be 
true." Another participant adds, "It not just us. Its the whole company." The other 
participants sound with another round of approval, while another participant explains, 
"This is why we want to wind down this effort." Different participants contribute stories 
as evidence supporting the premise that if the group did continue trying to translate the 
study into actions, why it would not produce change, but instead would result in different 
forms of harm to them. Another participant brings up ANA category perspective rank 
number 15 (perspective number 129), "Number 15 pretty much sums it up." I put page 3 
of the ANA summaries containing this perspective on the overhead, which expresses that 
most issues are discussed freely except upper management's inability to listen, their being 
out of touch with the business, and their breaches of faith. The majority assessment 
indicates the participant group believes the perspective, enacts the perspective, but does not 
say the perspective. The group focuses on the perspective. Another participant reaffirms, 
"Yeah, that pretty much sums it up!" More stories follow, and the case is once again made 
that this perspective could have been written just yesterday. Another participant offers an 
explanation in terms of their culture: "We could get the CEO here, reduce him to tears, get 
him to agree. But as soon as he is confronted with a career or personal interest conflict, he 
is going to fall over backwards. It's too much ingrained in our culture." Another 
participant adds, "I agree with you, but I wouldn't limit it to just the CEO. As long as we 
say career first and then window dressing, we are going to stay just as we are. We say it,
we believe it, but we don’t do i t  I would be here forever and do this if I had one
glimmer it would help!" Another participant adds, "The problem with this company is 
there is a lot of fear. You speak out and you get rotated."2
2 "Rotated" in the sense it is used here is synonymous with being put out to pasture.
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The discussions in this meeting were particularly vivid. In reviewing the tape I 
noticed that although the other meetings where surprisingly spontaneous, this meeting was 
in a class of its own. The absence of the section's operational vice president appeared to 
make a difference in the frankness of expression. The discussion continued some time 
regarding "fear in the company", and then turned to whether their upper management 
should be given the perspectives and the results of their assessments. Again, participants 
offered their beliefs of what would happen if the results of the study were given to higher 
management, whereby the consensus opinion was that what the perspectives and their 
assessments said would be denied or attributed to earlier managers. (Recall, the COO had 
been replaced a year ago at the start of this study. Also, the CEO had been replaced about 
two years ago.) Finally, the group came to an unanimous agreement, whereby I was asked 
if I would present the perspectives and their assessments to the COO in the presence of 
their operational vice president (who was not at this meeting). However, they were very 
explicit in asking for me not to say that they had asked me to do this. Instead, they asked 
me simply to act as though my presentation was a normal close out of the research! I felt I 
could agree to this, because to do so simply required me to make the presentation without 
explanation of why I was making the presentation. The COO knew of the study and would 
naturally assume that my presentation was a routine closing of the project
After this consensus was reached, I handed out the rest of the summaries for the 
categories that were manifested by the assessments, i.e., the ANN, AAA, NNN, and NNA 
categories. (The NAA and the NAN categories were not manifested by the assessments.) 
Unfortunately, we were out of time, and the consensus was to end discussion of the 
perspectives and their assessments.
I met with the operational vice president several days after the third and last meeting 
as soon as he returned from his trip, and requested a meeting with him and the COO to 
present the COO with the composite perspectives and their assessments. He contacted the 
COO by phone, who was apparently anxious to meet with me. He cleared his calendar so 
we could meet early the next day. This meeting was to last approximately two hours, 
however lasted over four hours. Other business was rescheduled as the initial two hours 
expired. Before reviewing the perspectives and their assessments, I carefully explained the 
entire research process. I emphasized that he might find perspectives and assessments that 
might conflict with his perceptions or beliefs, but that each perspective was both generated 
and validated by one or more of the fifteen managers of his former division, and 
accordingly assessed and commented upon by all. He was provided a copy of the 
perspective summaries (appendix 6), and a copy of the composite perspectives with
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comments and assessments as they appeared after phase 4 (appendix 4). The perspective 
categories were explained and we worked from the perspective summaries to review the 
perspectives and their assessments, while occasionally referring to the complete perspective 
and comments. The COO was intensely interested in the perspectives and their 
assessments, while scrutinizing the meaning of each perspective and assessment The 
perspectives and their assessments seemed to challenge some of his beliefs and it was 
evident that the four hours we spent were somewhat exhausting to him. He asked if I 
would present the perspectives to the CEO at the end of our meeting and offered to pay me 
to do so. I declined the offer of pay, but agreed to present the perspectives to the CEO at 
his convenience. I kept in touch with the operational vice president for several months after 
this meeting, who indicated that he thought the COO seemed to listen more intently to his 
managers in the weeks following our meeting, but also relayed that the COO never took 
action to schedule the meeting with the CEO in spite of his reminders. Consequently, it 
appeared that the lasting organizational results were far fewer quality charts, a new 
computerized technical reporting system, and a greatly increased awareness by fifteen 
managers and one COO of themselves.
Summary
This chapter developed the contextual setting for the research by describing the 
experience of enacting, with the participant organization, the research design developed in 
chapter IV. The principle tools of the researcher, i.e., participant observation and the semi­
structured spontaneous interview were demonstrated through the descriptions of the 
methodology enactment The process of co-constructing the participants' tacit knowledge 
was described. Enactment of the research methodology was seen to also be a co-discovery 
of methodology and strategy with the participants, versus having been completely pre­
planned. This co-generation of knowledge and co-discovery of methodology and strategy 
was experienced as an essential component of the participant observation methodology, 
whereby the participants became co-researchers and the researcher became a co-participant 
The most significant discovery affecting the research methodology was the apparent 
importance of spontaneity in facilitating the elicitation of participants' organizational 
experiences, and hence the tacit knowledge associated with these experiences. The most 
significant discovery affecting the strategy for enacting the research methodology was 
discovery of the apparent importance of choice and trust in achieving spontaneity. These 
discoveries are seen as co-discoveries as they were bom out of the rich interactions 
between researcher and participants.
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Obstacles to gaining individual and organizational support for the research were 
chronicled. Research relevancy and the clear billing of researcher, research, and research 
benefits were believed to be important in gaining both individual and group support. 
Enacting the research consistent with its billing and ensuring individual choice appeared to 
be key in obtaining individual trust Trust appeared to be further transmitted through the 
participants' social sharing of their research experiences. Individual discovery of explicit 
articulations of perspectives appeared to be key in motivating individual enthusiasm for the 
research, while the social aspects of joint discovery and joint articulation of common 
perspectives appeared to be key in motivating group enthusiasm.
Data collection methods and the contextual settings for data collection were related 
through describing the experience of co-generating the data with the participants. 
Appropriate interview questions were formulated through the co-construction of a "local 
theory of organization" with a small focus group. These question's were used to conduct 
semi-structured spontaneous interviews from which prospective individual perspectives 
were generated and then validated. Careful attention to metaphors was found to be 
important in understanding the participant's perspective so that meaningful perspectives in 
the language of the participant could be generated. Transcription of the entire interview 
was found to be important in recognizing and understanding the participant's metaphors. 
Feedback of the transcribed interview was found to be important to the participant's 
validation of his or her proposed perspectives and to the participant's motivation. 
Participants' comments provided evidence that this process was seen by participants to be 
helpful in assisting them to articulate their organizational perspectives. Participants' 
comments also provided anecdotal evidence that many of their perspectives were held as a 
result of their organizational experiences, and that often these perspectives were previously 
unarticulated. Individual perspectives were combined to form a set of composite 
perspectives. Care was taken to eliminate redundancy but not the diversity of ideas 
represented by the original set of individual perspectives. The composite perspectives were 
used to facilitate individual reflections through individual assessments and individual 
exploration of assessments. The assessments consisted of open-ended comments and 
evaluation of the perspective on three Likert scales designed to measure personal agreement 
with the perspective, and perception of the rhetoric and action of others in relation to the 
perspective. These assessments caused participants to individually and anonymously reflect 
on their organizational beliefs and assumptions, and to examine their perception of the 
organizational beliefs and assumptions of their fellow participants. Such assessments of a 
diverse and comprehensive set of organizational perspectives provided a rigorous means to
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assess the beliefs and assumptions held by a representative group of the organization, and, 
accordingly to test what individual knowledge was shared by the larger group. These 
assessments were also used to categorize and rank the composite perspectives into several 
categories, which, in the case of congruent perspectives, pointed toward the culture of the 
organization, or its antithesis, and, in the case of incongruent perspectives, revealed gaps 
between personal belief, rhetoric or action. The number of perspectives with a significant 
gap between rhetoric and action was contrasted with Keating's (1993) study, which had a 
smaller number of perspectives with such significant gaps, whereby this difference is 
attributed to a difference in the level of spontaneity that existed in the perspective generating 
interviews in Keating's (1993) study as contrasted with this study. The assessed 
composite perspectives were used to stimulate spontaneous group discussions, which were 
intended to facilitate the joint elicitation of the group's shared experiential knowledge. 
Finally, such elicitation became a matter for co-observation and co-discovery.
Organizational changes the researcher attributes to the conduct of the research were 
detailed. And although specific changes did occur, what instead was primarily discovered 
was a surprising consistency in the participant group's perspectives. Individual and group 
comments and actions provided anecdotal evidence that the participants consistently 
reenacted many of the perspectives co-discovered by researcher and participants.




The purpose of this chapter is to describe and apply the analysis method used to 
interpret the research data. In so doing, it is noted that other analysis methods might have 
been applied in interpreting the research data. Indeed, other forms of statistical analysis 
were applied by this researcher to the assessment data. However, in the enactment of the 
research it was found that the meaning ascribed to the research data by the participants was 
deeply connected to the semantics of their perspectives and the distinctions they made in 
their assessments. Therefore, it was discovered that any form of interpretation of the data 
that was going to be meaningful to the participants had to preserve the semantics of the 
original perspectives and its linkage to its assessment. Accordingly, an analysis of the 
assessments was constructed which ordered the participant's perspectives according to the 
type and magnitude of the differences in the participants' personal belief, and their 
perceptions of what the organization says and does. This ordering of perspectives was 
then used to stimulate participant dialogue by presenting the perspectives in summary form 
according to this ordering (appendix 6). What was discovered in this process was that 
participants repeatedly asked the question in their group discussions, "What is this 
perspective really saying?" They would then proceed as a group to provide their 
interpretation of the perspective in connection with their assessment. This dialogue 
inspired the "semantic" analysis of the perspectives and their assessments in the last section 
of this chapter. This section attempts to explore and summarize the meaning of the 
perspectives according to their assessments. It is important to emphasize that these 
explorations and interpretations of the perspectives according to their semantics and 
assessments are, in fact, co-constructions of the researcher and the participants. They are 
co-constructions as a result of the processes of this research, i.e., perspective formulation, 
assessments, and group dialogues, of which the researcher was an integral part. As a 
result, these co-constructions serve in this and the next chapter, "Local Findings", as a 
most sensible lens for pointing toward the organizational specific insights co-constructed 
throughout the research process.
The motivation for the type of participant assessments, which led to ordering 
perspectives according to belief, rhetoric, and action differences, is based upon Argyris and 
Schon's (1978) contention that rhetoric and action gaps are ubiquitous in organizations, are 
often "undiscussibles", are ffequendy actively hidden by "camouflage", and often present
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formidable barriers to organizational learning. Personal belief relative to the perspective 
was motivated as a third dimension by Keating's (1993) study, which found that 
individuals wanted to be able to respond to organizational profile statements based on their 
personal belief, as opposed to just the perspective they perceived the organization to hold. 
These assessments were formed by first generating individual organizational perspectives 
from confidential interviews of the participants. These perspectives were then 
confidentially assessed by the entire group by marking three seven-point Likert scales, 
which vary from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The three Likert scales represent 
three differing viewpoints of the perspective. The first scale represents the participant's 
personal belief relative to the perspective, and asks the question, "Do I personally agree or 
disagree with this statement?" The second scale represents the participant's perception of 
the organization's rhetoric (talk), and asks the question, "Do I agree or disagree this is what 
others prevalently say?" The third scale represents the participant's perception of the 
organization's action (walk), and asks the question, "Do I agree or disagree this is what 
others prevalently do?" Instructions, which are contained under appendix 5, were given to 
the participants to assist them in operationally defining and marking these Likert scales. 
The assessments of these three scales form the basis for ordering and summarizing the 
participant's perspectives according to the type and magnitude of belief, rhetoric, and action 
gaps (appendix 6). This ordering of perspectives was used to provide a focus for the data 
to better stimulate the participants' dialogue in their group meetings. These group 
meetings, where participants continually questioned what the perspectives in relation to 
their assessments meant to them, inspired the "semantic" analysis of the assessed 
perspectives contained in the last section of this chapter. This "semantic" analysis is used 
to point toward evidence supporting the findings of chapter VII, "Local Findings". These 
findings address the local research questions posed in chapter I. They also serve to point 
toward evidence for a body of tacit organizational knowledge formed from the participants' 
shared experiences, which appears to have deeply affected their behavior.
Categorization of Perspectives
Assessing the composite perspectives on three scales allows each perspective to be 
categorized into one of eight possible categories, if one distinction is made for each scale. 
The distinction that can readily be made for a Likert scale assessment is whether there is 
majority agreement or majority non-agreement Note that in making the distinction of non­
agreement, versus disagreement, the mid-scale assessment i.e., "neither agree nor 
disagree", is counted as a non-agreement assessment
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When the data is analyzed in this fashion, the 181 statements in this particular case 
study fell into six of the eight possible majority assessment categories as shown in table 1 
below. The letter "A" represents majority agreement, and the letter "N" represents majority 
non-agreement, while the first, second, and third letter designations corresponds to the 
personal belief, talk, and walk scales, respectively.
AAA perspectives, point toward the organization's culture, because these 
perspectives are what the majority of the participant group assessed they believe, as well as 
perceive the organization to say and do. These perspectives also provide a window into 
understanding what is explicit in the organization. Opposite of the AAA perspectives are 
the NNN perspectives. These perspectives point toward the antithesis of the organization's 
culture, because the majority of the group assessed these perspectives as what they do not 
believe, as well as perceive the organization to not say or do. These two groups of 
perspectives are said to be congruent perspectives, since the majority assessments are the 
same for all three scales.
When the majority assessment differs among the three sales, a perspectives is said 
to be incongruent. These incongruent perspectives point toward the participant 
organization's gaps in what its members personally believe, and what its members perceive 
the organization to say and do. They form the other six possible categories of which four 
were manifested in this study as addressed below.
The AAN perspectives point toward areas in the organization where perceived 
organizational actions are not congruent with either the perceived organizational rhetoric or 
personal beliefs. These perspectives suggest action is necessary to either clarify the















Table 1. Number of perspectives in majority assessment category.
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rationale for the incongruent organizational actions, or that the suggested organizational 
actions need to be changed so that they can be brought into alignment with personal beliefs 
and the perceptions of organizational rhetoric.
The ANA perspectives point toward areas in the organization where the perceived 
organizational rhetoric is incongruent with both what individuals personally believed and 
the perceived organizational actions. These perspectives suggest an examination of why the 
perceived organizational rhetoric differs from personal beliefs and perceived organizational 
actions.
The ANN perspectives point toward areas in the organization where both the 
perceived organizational rhetoric and actions are incongruent with personal beliefs. These 
perspectives suggest an examination of possible opportunities for organizational change, 
since they represented areas which are supported by personal beliefs, but which are 
perceived to not be part of the organization's rhetoric or actions.
The NNA category was only weakly manifested in this case study by one 
perspective, which is not considered sufficient to infer generalizations concerning this 
category. In fact this one perspective would have fallen into the NNN category if just one 
more assessment had registered "non-agreement" on the "walk" scale.
Although no generalizations regarding the NNA category were able to be inferred, a 
generalization may be inferred from the two non-manifested categories, i.e., the NAN and 
NAA categories. In that there were no perspectives in these two categories, it appears that 
if a perspective is not believed by a majority of the participants, then it will not be perceived 
by a majority of the participants as part of the organization's rhetoric.
Each perspective in each of the above categories can also be ranked according to 
how strongly the perspective is manifested in its particular category. A simple ranking 
system was devised to so order perspectives in their respective categories. This ranking 
system assigns a weight to each category of the seven point Likert scale as shown in table 
2 .
The weights shown below in table 2 are multiplied by the number of participants 
that chose each category and then summed for the scale. The result is a single number that 
is calculated for each scale. This number can range from-15 to +15. For example, if all 
15 participants chose "strongly disagree" on a scale, the number for the scale is -15. Once 
such a number is calculated for each of the three scales of a perspective, a single number is 
calculated for each perspective by multiplying each scale assessed as "majority agreement" 
by +1, and each scale assessed as "majority non-agreement" by -1, and summing the result 
for the three scales. Therefore, the maximum "score" a perspective might have is +45.
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This would occur if, for example, all fifteen participants chose "strongly agree" on all three 
scales for an AAA perspective. By calculating this "score" each perspective can quickly be 
ranked as to its strength in its respective category. The higher this "score", the stronger the 
perspective is manifested in its particular category.
Choice Weight
1. Strongly Disagree -1
2. Disagree -2/3
3. Somewhat Disagree -1/3
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree 0
5. Somewhat Agree +1/3
6. Agree +2/3
7. Strongly Agree +1
Table 2. Likert scale weights for ranking perspectives.
Appendix 6 contains summaries of the 181 perspectives categorized and ranked by 
the method described above. The summary of each perspective was an attempt to state the 
essence of each perspective. This can be confirmed by the reader by comparing the original 
perspectives to their respective summary. Also, the discussions in the group meetings, as 
chronicled in chapter V, provides anecdotal evidence that the summaries do reflect the 
essence of the perspectives in the participants' eyes. The discussions for the second 
meeting occurred after the summaries were written for the perspectives that were discussed 
in this meeting, but before these summaries were handed out The discussion of the 
perspectives discussed in this meeting were observed to be in the same terms as their 
respective summaries. Other discussions before and after the summaries were written were 
also observed to match closely the ideas portrayed in the respective perspective summary. 
There were also several direct comments in the group meetings attesting to the accurate 
reflection of the group's perspective by the various summaries. Finally, there were no 
dissenting comments regarding what the summaries said.
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The perspective summaries of appendix 6 are arranged first by the six of eight 
possible categories that were manifested in this study. Each category is labeled according 
to how the majority of participants assessed the respective perspectives. For example, 
AAA perspectives are labeled as "AAA Perspectives (or) What We Believe, Say, and Do". 
Each perspective category contains seven columns. The first column is the perspective's 
rank within its category according to its score, which was calculated as described above. 
Since the perspectives are ordered according to their rank within their respective category, 
this first column numbers the perspectives in each category from 1 to the number of 
perspectives in the category. The second column is the perspective's number as it was 
labeled in the original assessments. This number can be cross-referred to the number 
assigned to the perspective in appendix 4. The third column is the numerical score 
calculated as describe above and rounded to the nearest whole for each perspective. The 
fourth column is the text which attempts to summarize the essence of the original 
perspective. The fifth, sixth, and seventh columns are the number of participants that 
agreed with the perspective with respect to their personal belief, and their perception of the 
organization's rhetoric and action, respectively. They are labeled "P", "T", and "W" to 
represent "personal belief', "talk", and "walk", respectively. These summaries assist the 
reader in quickly viewing not only the perspectives and their assessments, but also how 
they were assessed relative to the other perspectives.
Perspective and Assessment Semantics
The purpose of this section is to explore and summarize the meaning of the 
perspectives according to their assessments. This will be done for each of the five 
categories of perspectives which were sufficiently manifested in this study by their majority 
assessments. As explained in the above section, perspectives which rank higher in their 
respective category more strongly suggest the meaning of the category than perspectives 
which rank lower. Accordingly, the below interpretations will not necessarily include 
commentary on all perspectives. Perspectives that ranked low in their respective category, 
especially if they represented a theme not expressed by other perspectives in the category, 
might not be commented upon. Also, most perspectives which pertain to specific business 
aspects of the organization might not be commented upon, especially if they do not happen 
to shed some insight into other aspects of the organization.
AAA perspectives suggest the organization's culture, because these perspectives 
are what the majority of the participant group assessed they believe, as well as perceived 
the organization to say and do. These perspectives also provide a window into
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understanding what is explicit in the organization. The highest ranking perspectives in the 
AAA category suggest that the organization's culture is centered on providing high quality 
technical services to their customers, (no. 1 thru 4,6, and 8).1 Constant training and re­
training is viewed as core to maintaining these high quality technical services (no. 5). 
They see themselves as the best in what they do (no. 1, 22, and 24). The organization is 
viewed as "family". It is expected that the organization place a high priority on the welfare 
of its members, and that its members "look out for each other" (no. 9, 10 and 14). It is 
believed that the organization and other members generally do this, but not to the extent of 
expectations. It is felt that their culture of "family" is changing and will come under greater 
pressure in the future as the company re-organizes (no. 10 and 14). Their upcoming 
reorganization is one of their greater uncertainties (no 48). Self-criticism to outsiders is 
taboo (no. 9).
A number of the AAA perspectives cast light on many of the shared feelings and 
experiences regarding the organization's five year TQM effort. This effort produced 
conflict from what members perceived TQM should be, versus its actual practice in the 
company (no. 7). Their TQM efforts, and resulting innovation, had stagnated, while the 
company focused on more day to day concerns (no. 11 and 20). The company exercised 
TQM rhetoric, but failed to implement it (no. 29). An anti-TQM culture existed (no. 18). 
The core reason why was that upper management abused TQM principles to satisfy then- 
own ends (no. 31). This caused upper management's actions to run counter to what was 
perceived to be the correct concept of TQM (no. 40). Upper management's espousal of 
TQM principles, while abusing these principles, was perceived as hypocrisy (no. 43). 
Several perspectives articulate specific TQM failures. Personnel affected by TQM decision­
making processes were not properly represented (no. 32). Rewards for quality were 
inadequate and sporadic (no. 36). Financial constraints to quality goals were not 
adequately resolved (no. 41). TQM  priorities and standards were not sufficiently 
established (no. 51 and 52). Other perspectives attribute TQM failures to their culture. 
According to these perspectives, this culture is a culture of highly independent members, 
born out of the nature of their work. This culture resists consistency, shared 
communications, and interdependencies, whereby resistance to such qualities are perceived 
to run counter to TQM concepts (no. 34, 42, and 47). On the other hand, the participant 
group articulated well their concept of quality. Quality practice recognizes quality in its 
reward system (no. 12). Quality includes proper documentation, anticipating customers
* The reference to various numbers in this context refers to perspective ranking within the category. Please 
see appendix 6 for quick reference to these perspectives.
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needs, and translation of those needs into programs through strategic planning (no. 19). 
Quality should be measured by customer and employee satisfaction, consistency of goods 
and services, and working-level perceptions (no. 21). The manager's contribution to 
quality should be facilitating a working level definition for quality and then fostering 
commitment to this definition (no. 33).
There are a number of AAA perspectives concerning what upper management 
should do or failed to do. New CEOs should understand their culture, and top 
management should be pro-active in educating new CEOs in their culture (no. 13 and 15). 
Management should recognize their success has been built on working level employes, and 
accordingly should build their trust through proper communication and the meeting of their 
needs (no. 26). On the other hand, upper management has forgotten the employee factor 
for their success, and this is the reason for low employee satisfaction with higher 
management (no. 37). When a decision must be made quickly and autocratically, it should 
at least be explained after the fact, but upper management does not do this (no. 49). Upper 
management's failures are a poor excuse for lower management inaction, although upper 
management is blamed for their inaction (no. 34). Finally, the operational vice presidents 
should individually set the vision for each department, because the company has grown too 
large for top management to otherwise effectively set vision for the entire company (no.
35).
Other AAA perspectives have implications for strategic planning, their evaluation 
system, and this research project. Strategic planning is important (no. 23), but such 
planning is fragmented (no. 50). There are no set standards for performance appraisals, 
which results in different managers working at cross purposes, while discouraging the 
working level employee's performance (no. 44 and 45). Finally, 80% of the participants 
believe that initially they were reluctant to engage this research, because it was perceived as 
"just another TQM study to help upper management to look good", but that these feeling 
changed as the participants engaged the research (no. 28). It attests to the tacit nature of 
these perspectives, where 13 of 15 participants personally agree that the perspectives "are 
just 'common sense'", which "is nowhere written down" (no. 30). Where this perspective 
goes on to say, "...there is no good mechanism for sharing each other's 'common sense'", 
I would say that there was no good mechanism for explicitly sharing each other's "common 
sense". The mechanism for the participants implicitly sharing each other's common sense 
seemed to be quite good as evidenced from the number of perspectives for which 
participants shared common sentiment
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NNN perspectives point toward the antithesis of the organization's culture, 
because the majority of the group assessed these perspectives as what they do not believe, 
as well as perceive the organization to not say or do. The three highest ranking 
perspectives in this category, as well as the perspective ranking eleventh, indicate that the 
organization does not lack a system of awards, nor is the system of awards that does exist 
problematic, counter-productive, inequitable, or based on favoritism. The organization is 
not perceived to be over-managed (no. 4), or to lack diversity as a result of their largely 
male representation (no. 5 and no. 12). Participatory management does not go un­
promoted (no. 6). Their evaluation system has not destroyed their ability to evaluate 
employees (no. 7), or to equitably distribute monetary awards (no. 12). Higher 
management encouragement has not been completely absent, nor has their products, as a 
result, trended toward mediocre (no. 8). Neither their bureaucracy, nor their top 
management's unwillingness to listen and share risk with the bottom, is seen as an 
impediment to learning (no. 9). Finally, it is not perceived to be difficult to evaluate their 
quality based on the perceptions of their workers (no. 10). The remaining perspectives in 
this category are weakly manifested (a score less than zero), which would make inferences 
drawn from their semantics and assessments less valid.
AAN perspectives point toward areas in the organization where perceived 
organizational actions are not congruent with either the perceived organizational rhetoric or 
personal organizational beliefs. The assessments for these perspectives say: "We believe 
this, and we perceive we say this, but we perceive that we do not do this." Accordingly, 
since there are a number of high ranking AAN perspectives pertaining to qualities which 
upper management should possess, these perspectives, as a group, are saying: "We 
believe and perceive we say our upper management should have these qualities, but that 
their actions do not support these qualities." In particular, these perspectives say we 
believe, and perceive we say, that top management should, but does not
1. provide quality leadership (no. 1);
2. set and maintain their vision through their daily actions (no. 3);
3. have a clear vision (no. 5);
4. stay in touch with the fact that their business was built by its workers (no. 6);
5. guide and encourage innovation (no. 8);
6. advocate first level management concerns (no. 9);
7. act as a "steadying board" for different CEO's (no. 12);
8. define and support what they feel is important (no. 14);
9. evaluate itself on its fairness, and on giving recognition and support (no. 16);
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10. encourage lower management to build and improve their business (no. 20 and 24);
11. address employee survey data and ask how to resolve problems illuminated by such 
surveys (no. 28);
12. co-develop "guiding principles" with lower levels of management (no. 31);
13. facilitate actions toward common goals, co-leam with lower management, and eliminate
opposing agendas (no. 35);
14. identify and facilitate sharing of the best elements of their business (no. 41); or
15. foster feelings of trust and feelings of ownership in the business (no. 43).
There are also a number of AAN perspectives that simply refer to just 
"management". It is believed that most of the respondents were probably viewing the term 
"management" as at least one level above them, especially since 14 of the 15 participants 
were either first or second level managers. With this interpretation, these perspectives 
coupled with their assessments then say we believe, and perceive we say, that their 
management should, but does not:
1. do their job (no. 2);
2. explain adverse decisions (no. 10);
3. strive to make decisions jointly with the people they affect (no. 11);
4. respect and listen to the ideas and concerns of the working level (no. 19,45, and 47);
5. foster feelings of trust and ownership in the business (no. 43);
6. work for change toward diversity of ideas, be more in tune with their products and
employees, and strive for a more efficient business that fixes classes of problems 
instead of single problems (no. 45); or
7. prevent good ideas from dying at the working level (no. 47).
There are a number of AAN perspectives which refer to TQM or "quality". Like the 
AAN perspectives referring to management, these perspectives can be interpreted as 
saying, "We believe and say we should have these aspects of quality, but our actions do 
not support these aspects of quality." Accordingly, these perspectives then say we believe, 
and perceive we say we should, but that we do not:
1. review quality charts and discontinue non-productive charts (no. 4);2
2. enact TQM in a way that informs our business decisions (no. 7);
3. have our work force buy into the ideal of quality in their own terms (no. 15);
4. just do TQM instead of talking about it (no. 11);
5. pair our people with the correct issues in our TQM efforts (no. 30 and 40);
2Note this was true at the time this perspective was assessed, but such a review was instituted between the 
last assessment of the composite perspectives and the group meetings, as described in chapter 5.
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6. reward quality by formal recognition (no. 33);
7. facilitate worker quality by receiving and giving feedback (no. 34);
8. continually review and improve procedures and training to improve our products (no. 
37 and 44);
9. have a TQM quarterly review process (no. 39); or
10. effectively set long range goals and plans (no 49).
There are two other AAN perspectives on "quality", which, because of their 
semantics, carry a different message than that ascribed to the other AAN "quality" 
perspectives. One says that they believe and say that their people do not want to be 
involved with TQM, but, due to the "walk" assessment, their actions are in fact that of 
involvement (no. 32). This should not be surprising, since many other perspectives and 
comments demonstrate dislike of TQM, but members, nonetheless, have engaged TQM, 
since it is dictated. The other says that they believe they have difficulty enacting TQM due 
to their culture, but, by a bare minority, their actions do not indicate the same difficulty (no
36). This is especially interesting, since there is an NNN perspective which says that they 
do not believe they would be able to more effectively adapt to TQM if their culture were 
different (no. 14). Together, the two perspectives acknowledge that specific aspects of 
their culture are not well suited for TQM, but changing these specific aspects would not 
make a big difference in their TQM efforts. This also should not be surprising, since other 
perspectives and comments clearly identify much of the sentiment against TQM to be a 
result of a perception of upper management abuse of TQM concepts, versus any aspect of 
their culture that might otherwise not be ideally suited for embracing TQM.
Finally, there are a number of AAN perspectives, which represent potential 
innovations. Like the other perspectives above, they also say we should do something, but 
(by the "walk" assessment) we do not. These perspectives then say we believe, and 
perceive we say that we should, but do not:
1. design a performance appraisal system to support our goals, document and measure 
progress, and encourage team work (no. 14);
2. adopt a pro-active approach to generating customer satisfaction (no. 17);
3. exchange our ideas in periodic forums (no. 18);
4. have periodic meetings with the CEO and upper management to learn from each other, 
to innovate, and to build the business (no. 21);
5. establish award and accompanying criteria that encourages team work (no. 22);
6. help new managers hired from outside achieve congruence with our culture (no.23);
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7. train our managers in elements of a well thought out performance improvement system 
(no. 25).
8. automate and computerize our technical reports (no. 26);3
9. assimilate the value of these perspectives (no. 27);
10. formulate equipment correction programs that compliment our inspection programs 
(no. 38);
11. implement a mechanism to document and resolve front-line problems (no. 42); or
12. establish a mechanism for sharing information and innovations between different 
sections of the company (no. 46).
ANA perspectives point toward areas in the organization where the perceived 
organizational rhetoric is incongruent with both what individuals personally believed and 
the perceived organizational actions. The assessments for these perspectives say: "We 
believe this, and we perceive we do this, but we perceive that we do not say this." Several 
reasons might be speculated why certain perspectives are believed and enacted, but not 
spoken. One reason may be fear. The perspective might simply represent some perceived 
reality in the organization, which, if attention is called to it, members perceive they will 
suffer adverse repercussions. Indeed, ANA perspective ranking eighth speaks directly to 
fear in the organization, while many of the other perspectives cover issues that most 
members of any organization would approach with some trepidation. This "fear" 
explanation may be likened to Argyris and Schon's (1978) explanation for rhetoric and 
action gaps. They contend organizations have "undiscussibles", which are difficult for 
organizations to surface, because they are often actively hidden by "camouflage". Another 
explanation for rhetoric and action gaps may be simply that the perspective is tacit Argyris 
and Schon (1978) allow for this explanation where they acknowledge that many such 
rhetoric and action gaps are often tacit. However, they do not distinguish the "tacit" 
explanation as separate from their "undiscussibles" explanation. In the purely "tacit" 
explanation, members may be engaged in a pattern of un-articulated behavior, which is 
experienced in concert with others. Because of its experiential nature, this behavior resides 
primarily in the unspoken domain. Such behavior may eventually become articulated, 
should members happen to verbally distinguish their behavior patterns with each other. 
When the behavior remains un-spoken, it may be due simply to chance, e.g., the context 
does not arise for the behavior to become verbally articulated. It may also be that the
3Note this innovation was unrealized at the time this perspective was assessed, but such a system was 
instituted between the last assessment of the composite perspectives and the group meetings, as described in 
chapter 5.
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behavior remains un-articulated because it is prevented by a perception of possible adverse 
repercussions, if articulated. Although not specifically tested in this case study, it is 
speculated that rhetoric and action gaps in this category can be explained by one or both of 
these explanations, since one or both explanations are suggested by many of the 
perspectives in this category.
Just as in the other categories, there are a number of ANA perspectives which refer, 
directly or indirectly, to upper management Many of these perspectives suggest a fear of 
openly saying the perspective, while a few also suggest unarticulated patterns of behavior. 
These perspectives then say we perceive we don't say this, but we believe, as well as 
perceive that (top or upper) management actions:
1. lack leadership, support, and vision for TQM (no. 2);
2. have misused TQM in self-serving ways (no. 3 and 4);
3. founded our current evaluation system based on their misuse of our old system (no. 5);
4. have trended toward mandates, versus participatory management (no. 6);
5. have instilled fear in the recent "Driving out Fear" seminar (no. 8).
6. have implemented our current evaluation system under false TQM assumptions (no. 9);
7. have caused middle management to be under-employed, while putting an excessive 
work load on lower management (no. 10);
8. have caused the first line manager's loyalties to become divided between the technical 
products and management functions (no. 11);
9. have caused individual branches to define their own guiding philosophies, values, and 
culture due to the absence of leadership (no. 12); and
10. do not demonstrate requisite business knowledge, take appropriate risks, or listen to 
lower level input (no. 13,15, and 16);
There are other ANA perspectives which make statements about their TQM efforts. 
Some of these statements were enacted over a period of time, and therefore may have been 
un-articulated because of their experiential nature, while others may have been un­
articulated because they would have directly criticized their TQM leadership. The 
perspectives, which appear to be un-articulated, because they were enacted over a period of 
time, then say that we perceive that we don't say, but believe, as well as perceive that our 
TQM actions:
1. failed the first time, and only appeared to produce gains the second time (no. 1);
2. went into generating statistics versus doing real things for the customer (no. 7); and
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3. have caused management's focus on quality to shift from employees and customers to 
lines on a chart and self-generation of what upper management thinks the customer 
wants (no. 18).
The perspectives, which appear to have been un-articulated because they would criticize 
their TQM leadership, say that we perceive that we don't say, but believe, as well as 
perceive that our TQM leadership's actions:
1. have cause a fragmented TQM approach (no. 2);
2. have caused us to hate TQM (no. 3); and
3. have caused our TQM efforts to be focused on menial "we thought" internal problems, 
versus concentration on our customers and technical systems (no. 16);
Finally, there are a few other ANA perspectives which reveal other issues which the 
participant group indicated in their assessments are not generally articulated. These 
perspectives say that we perceive we don't say, but believe, as well as perceive that
1. most of our managers are unwilling to make hard choices (no. 14);
2. the company as a whole has lost track of what generated the company (no. 17);
3. we have become comfortable with mandating (no. 19); and
4. personnel with specialties in phased out technical systems have not been effectively 
retrained or utilized in other areas (no. 20).
The ANN perspectives point toward areas in the organization where both the 
perceived organizational rhetoric and actions are incongruent with personal beliefs. These 
perspectives say, "We believe this to be true, but we perceive that we don't say it, and our 
actions don't support it." The source of the majority "personal belief' assessment often 
appears to stem from shared experiences. This may also account for the majority non­
agreement "talk" assessment Since these perspectives are experientially generated, they 
reside primarily in the tacit, and hence, unspoken domain. It is also likely that many of 
these perspectives may remain un-articulated due to fear. Indeed, many, like the ANA 
perspectives, refer to issues that any reasonable member in most organizations would be 
timid to express openly.
There are a number of ANN perspectives, which express inability to do some action 
or actions. The majority non-agreement "walk" assessments then properly say that we 
perceive the lack of these actions to not exist, i.e., since the perspective semantics express a 
negative, a non-agreement assessment creates a double negative. However, the majority 
agreement "personal belief' assessment is saying that we personally believe the lack of 
these actions to be true. This is, of course, contradictory. This contradiction is believed to 
have resulted because participants were unable to properly deal with the double negative in
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making their "walk" assessment The lesson from this, is that perspectives evaluated in 
this manner should be stated in positive terms so that they do not present a possibility of a 
respondent having to account for a double negative in order to make the intended 
assessment If this interpretation is made, it resolves the contradiction. This interpretation 
results in ignoring the double negative for the "walk” assessment The majority non­
agreement "walk" assessment is then interpreted as participants agreeing with the lack of 
actions implied by such perspective statements. There are a number of ANN perspectives 
of this kind, which refer to higher management or to their TQM efforts. For these 
perspectives it should be noted that when the contradiction is resolved in favor of the 
"personal belief' assessment their gestalt is consistent with the gestalt of the perspectives 
in other categories, i.e., the gestalt consistently points toward a general perception of 
serious shortcomings in their upper management and TQM efforts. The perspectives that 
refer to higher management then say, with this interpretation, that we believe, but perceive 
we do not say, that upper management cannot:
1. attend to the cost of measures, or create measures which have utility to the first line 
manager (no. 1);
2. make changes without effectively consulting first line management (no. 2);
3. maintain sight of the fact that the primary source of our quality has been quality people 
(no. 4);
4. do TQM as designed, or listen to input from lower levels (no. 7);
5. properly recognize the quality employees put into their work effort (no. 13);
6. create a culture to bring forth our best ideas (no. 14);
7. establish through their actions a working set of organizational philosophies and goals 
to assist and guide mangers in their decisions (no. 24);
8. understand the technical aspects of our business (no. 26);
9. be clear on their agenda (no. 29);
10. require TQM participation from everyone (no. 30);
11. formalize mechanisms to document and resolve front-line problems (no. 32);
12. pay attention to our business (no. 33);
13. support what they espouse with resources (no. 34);
14. listen to lower level input, and admit that they don't know it all (no. 39); or
15. make good sound decisions (no. 40);
The ANN perspectives, which refer to their TQM efforts and present the double 
negative "belief' versus "walk" assessment contradiction, are resolved in the same way: 
the double negative created by the non-agreement "walk" assessment is ignored. These
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perspectives then say that we believe, but perceive that we do not say, that our actions, or 
the actions of others, cannot:
1. "chart" quality according to our intuitive understanding of what quality is (no. 3);
2. facilitate conversations among our technicians and first line supervisors as to how they 
experience quality in the things they do, and how these experiences might be exported 
beyond their local area of interactions (no.8);
3. gain employee enthusiasm for TQM, or learn that enthusiasm cannot be mandated (no. 
13);
4. effectively establish the behavioral, human resource, training, team building, and 
facilitator infrastructure in our TQM implementation (no. 37).
Finally, there are a set of ANN perspectives which represent some sort of 
innovation. These perspectives say we believe we should do this, but we do not say it, nor 
do our actions support it. The non-agreement "talk" and "walk" assessments are then 
believed to have resulted because the idea of innovation was not shared prior to the 
research. These perspectives then say that, although we have not yet said or done, we 
believe we should:
1. have a performance improvement program which consists of a circular process of 
defining and evaluating expectations between supervisor and subordinate (no. 16);
2. measure quality through survey of employee and customer satisfaction (no. 17);
3. have our TQM issues be customer focused, versus focused on administrative processes 
(no. 19);
4. establish an award system with specific criteria that would motivate employees to work 
toward goals implied by such an award system (no. 22);
5. return to conversations on our perceptions of quality in order to regain our focus on the 
whole (no. 31);
6. focus on how to reinstitute pride into our evaluation system (no. 35);
7. accomplish our TQM training "just in time" (no. 36);
8. enact our own vision, goals, and support at our respective levels of management (no. 
38).
Summary
The perspective assessments were analyzed by a method which placed the 
perspectives into categories and ranked them relative to other perspectives according to the 
participants’ assessments of their personal beliefs, and their perceptions of organizational 
rhetoric and action. The results of this analysis are presented under appendix 6. This
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method of analysis preserves the semantics of the original composite perspectives relative 
to their assessments. This was believed to be an essential quality for any type of analysis, 
since construction of meaning relative to the assessments had been the focus of the research 
process. Also, it was desired to use the results of the analysis to facilitate the participants' 
group discussions, and it was felt that a form of analysis was needed to reduce the 
complexity of the perspectives and their assessments, while preserving the participants' 
constructed meaning, so that they could be more readily comprehended by the participants.
Once the perspectives were categorized according to their assessments, their 
meaning according to the semantics of the perspectives and their assessments was analyzed 
and summarized. This semantic analysis will point toward evidence for the local findings 
of chapter VII, which point toward the existence of a body of socially constructed tacit 
organizational knowledge in the participant organization, which is largely experiential in its 
nature and highly influential to the organization's behavior.
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CHAPTER V n  
LOCAL FINDINGS
The purpose of this chapter is to address the research questions posed in chapter I, 
which pertain to the participant organization. Evidence from the interviews, perspectives, 
perspective assessments, and the group meetings are used to gain insight into these 
questions and the participant organization.
The research questions posed in chapter I were motivated by the participant 
organization's TQM efforts, the organizational learning focus of this research, Argyris and 
Schon's (1978) work, and Keating's (1993) Organizational Learning Process (OLP). 
These questions were posed as a guide for observing and probing the participant 
organization to gain insight into their organizational learning. In exploring these questions, 
results of this study and Keating's (1993) study are compared. Significant insights are 
developed into how the participant organization's TQM efforts affected their culture and 
ability "to learn as an organization". Speculations are made as to the future ability of their 
TQM program to affect their future learning. Instances of specific learning thought to be 
attributable to this research project are cited. Evidence of Argyris and Schon's (1978) 
"undiscussibles" and "camouflage" are found in exploring differences in the participant 
group's "belief, "talk", and "walk" perspective assessments. Evidence of shared tacit 
knowledge, its nature, how it was generated, how it was shared, and what its influence on 
the participants' decisions, choices, actions, and their own learning are explored.
Although the research questions yielded significant insights into their respective 
issues, the end result from asking these questions in a participant research methodology 
could not be anticipated. Consequently, a one to one correlation from these questions to 
the evidence and its resulting implications may not necessarily exist. This, however, 
should be seen as part of the exploratory nature of a participant action research enacted with 
a purpose of generating, as opposed to testing, theory.
Original Research Questions
There were four research questions specific to the participant organization posed in 
the original proposal for this research. The first three of these questions were motivated by 
the fact that the participant organization was in its fifth year of a Total Quality Management 
(TQM) implementation.. The last question was motivated by Keating's (1993) work. 
These original questions are as follows:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
133
1. What affect has TQM had on the participant organization's culture and ability "to learn 
as an organization"?
2. What is TQM's future potential to affect the participant organization's culture and ability 
to learn?
3. What effect will this research have in its attempt to assist the participant organization to 
assess its TQM effort, its culture, and its ability "to learn as an organization".
4. Will a process similar to Keating's (1993) OLP enacted in a completely different 
organization by a different researcher produce similar results?
To address the first question, the perspectives and assessments will be examined 
for insight into the participant organization's culture before and during their five year TQM 
implementation effort These insights will be compared with perspectives which point 
toward attributes the participants associate with TQM. Evidence of conflict between the 
organization's culture and these attributes will be sought by examining the perspectives and 
their rhetoric and action gaps. This evidence is then examined to gain insight into the 
effects such conflicts may have had on the organization's culture and its ability "to learn".
First, there are a number of perspectives on higher management, which indicate that 
their higher management was perceived to be "autocratic", to "mandate", and to not 
properly communicate with, listen to, or encourage lower levels of management and 
personnel. (See perspectives AAA 7, 31, 37, 40, 43, and 49; AAN 10, 11, 19, 20, 21, 
24, and 28; ANA 11, 15, and 19; ANN 2, 7, 11, 12, 14, 21, 22, 24, and 39.) These 
perceptions point toward an upper management hierarchical mind set From my experience 
with the participant organization, this hierarchical mind set appears to have existed from the 
time the company was first founded in the early 1970's. On the other hand, the participants 
perceived that TQM should be enacted primarily through a working level employee 
formulation of quality that upper management facilitates, supports, and encourages. (See 
perspectives AAA 12, 21, 31, 33, and 36; AAN 34; ANN 8, 17, and 31.) These 
perceptions of how TQM  should be enacted is assumed to have resulted from the 
organization's TQM efforts, and therefore is assumed to not have always existed in the 
participant organization. This assumption is made, because participants described in 
numerous interviews their experiences of attempting to enact elements of TQM, as trained, 
while reference to such elements never pre-date their TQM efforts. Through these 
experiences, participants appeared to have learned the TQM "bottoms up" approach 
experientially, which seemed to have taken quite well, because participants deeply 
espoused the principles of participatory management The sample interview in appendix 2, 
which is typical of other interviews, serves well to demonstrate this point Even though
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
134
participants had learned the "bottoms up" approach experientially, they too showed 
evidence of a hierarchical mind set left over from their earlier days. For example, they 
acknowledge that management should be autocratic, at times, (AAA perspective no. 7), and 
in the final analysis, decided that they could not accomplish any improvements suggested 
by this research until "their upper management changed" Oast group meeting, chapter V). 
Consequently, when TQM was imposed on the organization, the "bottoms up" TQM 
philosophy appears to have seriously conflicted with the preexisting hierarchical culture. 
Upper management espoused support of their TQM  program, but continued to act in 
traditional ways, which, of course, conflicted with their employee's perceptions of proper 
TQM practice. This is made explicit in AAA perspective 40, which says, "...upper 
management's actions run counter to Total Quality concepts..." This resulted in many of 
the "talk" and "walk" gaps demonstrated by the perspectives and their assessments, such 
as: upper management should, but does not provide quality leadership, guide and 
encourage innovation, advocate first level management concerns, encourage lower 
management to build and improve their business, address employee survey data, co- 
develop "guiding principles" with lower management, or co-leam with lower management 
(see AAN perspectives 1, 8, 9, 20, 24, 28, 31, and 35); and upper management lacks 
leadership, support, and vision for TQM, have misused TQM in self-serving ways, trended 
toward mandates, and instilled fear (see ANA perspectives 2, 3 ,4 ,6 , and 8). Indeed, the 
existence of TQM "talk" and "walk" gaps are made explicit by AAA perspective 29, which 
says that the company exercised TQM rhetoric, but failed to implement it, and AAA 
perspective 40, which says that upper management needs to respond to issues in a quality 
manner before lower levels can feel TQM is more than just "lip service". The effect these 
"talk" and "walk" gaps have had on the participant organization's learning is expressed by 
perspectives which say that their TQM is all talk and no walk, that talking about TQM has 
formed an "anti-culture" to TQM, and that their TQM efforts are "bogged down" (see AAA 
perspectives 18,20, and 29). Finally, these perspectives were essentially reenacted by the 
results of the third group meeting, where the participants expressed that they felt there was 
little they could do (to improve, learn, or change) until upper management changed (see 
chapter V, phase 5).
From the above evidence, the argument is made that the participant organization's 
TQM efforts produced expectations which conflicted with their existing culture. Their 
TQM  implementation, as endorsed by upper management, produced lower level 
expectations that they should form committees to innovate and improve their business. 
However, upper management continued to act in an entirely autocratic manner. Instead of
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fostering lower levels to act according to what they were learning experientially from their 
TQM actions, they produced a separate set of experiences which said, "Don't innovate; just 
do what I tell you." Indeed, many of the stories, which were volunteered beyond the 
established research interview framework, related numerous instances of individual 
innovation, which were in some way punished by upper management due to some political 
expediency or even whim. So members experienced expectations of innovation and 
empowerment through their TQM experience, but then experienced the opposite when they 
started to behave according to their TQM experience. This produced what I would label as 
"experiential conflicts", which I hypothesize, because of their experiential nature, reside 
primarily at a tacit level, and therefore are difficult to address or resolve. Accordingly, 
these experiential conflicts appeared to have produced serious impediments to learning, as 
represented in the perspectives and their assessments by perceptions of an autocratic and 
hypocritical higher management which conflicted with perceptions that lower levels should 
be empowered, and by the acknowledgement that their TQM efforts were "bogged down".
In summary, the affect TQM appeared to have had on the participant organization's 
culture and ability "to learn as an organization" was to have produced cultural elements 
which conflicted with pre-existing cultural elements. These conflicting elements appeared 
to have resulted in numerous rhetoric and action gaps, many of which appear to have been 
tacit or even hidden by "camouflage", just as Argyris and Schon (1978) contend will occur 
where such rhetoric and action gaps form in organizations. These local findings have 
implications for TQM, which are addressed in chapter Vm, Research Implications.
The second organizational specific research question was essentially addressed in 
exploring the evidence for the first question. The future potential of the participant 
organization's TQM  program to affect their culture and ability to learn appears to be 
minimal, as long as desires for empowerment generated by their TQM program continue to 
conflict with the perceived hierarchical behavior of their upper management I would 
postulate that until the participant organization, as a whole, is able to address the issues 
raised by the participant group's perspectives and assessments, they will continue to have a 
perception of being "bogged down" in their TQM efforts. I would also postulate that if the 
participant organization continues with the status quo of enacting TQM methodology, while 
ignoring the resulting cultural conflicts, their current perspectives will persist These 
postulates are supported by results that were observed during the course of the research 
project which lasted slightly more than one year. During this time the participants 
confirmed with few exceptions that the composite perspectives and their assessments had 
remained valid from the time they were formulated, through the time they were assessed,
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and to the time of the last group meeting, a period of slightly more than one year. This 
observation also has implications for operationally defining and measuring organizational 
learning, which will be addressed in chapter VIII, Research Implications.
In addressing the third organizational specific research question it was seen in 
chapter V that this research assisted the participant organization in their learning in two 
specific incremental ways. It called attention to two innovations, which appeared ready to 
occur, i.e. "a quality chart revolution", and an automated technical reporting system (see 
chapter V). These instances of learning might be classified as incremental, or "single-loop" 
learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978). The research created an awareness among the 
participants that many others felt as they did, and consequently that they should form 
coalitions in order to accomplish their organizational goals (see chapter V). One such 
coalition did form regarding their "quality chart revolution". Forming such coalitions might 
be seen as paradigm breaking, or "double-loop" learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978). The 
research assisted the participants in creating an explicit shared awareness for many 
perspectives which were previously either tacit and not shared, explicit and not shared, or 
tacit and shared. This shared explicit awareness, while a good first step, did not enable the 
participants to transition to actions that would, in time, modify their now explicit 
perspectives. Therefore, the research was not able to facilitate the participants to make their 
own learning a subject of their learning, or to "deutero-leam" (Argyris and Schon, 1978).
In addressing the fourth question, as to whether similar results would be produced 
by enacting a process similar to Keating's (1993) OLP in a completely different 
organization by a different researcher, one difference has already been pointed out, i.e„ 
that this study produced a higher percentage of perspectives with a significant rhetoric and 
action gap than did Keating's (1993) study. These higher percentages of high rhetoric and 
action gaps are hypothesized to have resulted from the depth of the interviews that were 
generated in the semi-structured spontaneous interview technique employed in this study, 
as opposed to the structured interview technique employed by Keating's (1993) study. 
This technique is postulated to have elicited more of the participants' organizational 
experiences as opposed to their organizational rhetoric. These rhetoric and action gap 
differences between the two studies will be examined in more detail in the following 
section. Other comparisons of this study to Keating's (1993) study show a number of 
similarities between the two studies. Both studies deeply motivated a participant dialogue 
and self-reflections into organizational perspectives. I hypothesize this to be a result of a 
methodology that creates a shared experience of deep interest and importance to its 
organizational members in a non-confrontational and non-threatening context, which allows
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this shared experience to occur outside of normal organizational defenses, such as 
"undiscussibles", "camouflage", and defensive routines. Both studies revealed 
perspectives, in which Keating's (1993) study cited as tacit, and this study produced 
evidence as being tacit I hypothesize this to be a result of the perspectives of both studies 
richly expressing the shared experiential knowledge of their participants, where such 
knowledge is known through shared experience versus articulation. Both studies created a 
temporary process outside normal organizational processes, whereby the participants 
reflected into their governing variables, norms, and assumptions, and hence, their own 
learning. I hypothesize this to be a result of a methodology designed to facilitate a deep 
individual inquiry and reflection into organizational perspectives outside normal 
organizational defenses that is later brought back into a more normal organizational arena 
through group dialogues. In both studies this process was not sustained beyond the end of 
the study. I hypothesize this result to be normative, in that learning to jointly learn can only 
be accomplished and sustained, first, through a commitment to do so, and then through an 
explicit joint effort, which challenges the group's governing variables, norms, and 
assumptions. Argyris and Schon (1978) make a similar contention by saying that instances 
of "double-loop" learning (i.e., breaking the paradigm) rarely appeared, while instances of 
"deutero-leaming" (i.e., learning to leam) were not observed. Further, they contend that in 
order to move toward a learning system where such learning is not rare requires a 
"comprehensive intervention". Finally, although it was not the purpose of this study to 
reproduce Keating's study, i.e., to examine and detail the various processes of individual 
and joint reflection and learning resulting from enactment of an Organizational Learning 
Process (OLP), it can be recognized from the perspectives, assessments, comments, and 
descriptions of the methodology enactment in chapter V that this study produced many of 
the same processes as did Keating's (1993) study.
Research Questions Inspired by Argyris and Schon (1978)
Argyris and Schon (1978), in their model for Organizational Learning, contend 
gaps between rhetoric and action are ubiquitous in organizations, and are further 
accompanied by "camouflage", i.e., routines that turn such gaps into "undiscussibles". 
Argyris and Schon (1978) contend that these routines hide or disguise such gaps, which 
prevent their explicit articulation and create barriers to learning, especially to double-loop 
learning, i.e., breaking the paradigm, and to deutero-leaming, i.e., learning to leam. There 
are several problems with their assertion for action and rhetoric gaps, "camouflage", and 
"undiscussibles". First, Argyris and Schon (1978) cite only narrative evidence for the
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existence of rhetoric and action gaps, "camouflage", and "undiscussibles". Accordingly, 
these gaps, "camouflage", and "undiscussibles" appear to be constructions from their 
experiences of various organizations, as opposed to a methodology of observations 
constructed to reveal their existence. Second, other than Keating (1993), there appears to 
be no studies in the literatures for organizational theory or organizational learning which 
explore the existence or nature of action and rhetoric gaps in organizations. Finally, 
Keating's (1993) methodology and case study results only yielded a few perspectives with 
a significant rhetoric and action gap. Keating's (1993) methodology was not specifically 
intended to observe rhetoric and action gaps, so consequently it was not ideally suited for 
this purpose. One weakness was that Keating (1993) assessed perceptions of 
organizational rhetoric and actions against perspectives that were not validated by the 
individual interviewees as being truly representative of their organizational beliefs. A 
second weakness is that Keating's interviews did not seek spontaneity, and therefore 
probably did not reveal some of the deeper underlying issues in the organization. This may 
have also been exacerbated by the fact that Keating's interviews were relatively short, less 
than one-half hour, as opposed to two hour interviews for this study. As a result, most of 
the perspectives generated in Keating's research were probably more representative of the 
rhetoric in the organization and less representative of much of their tacit and unspoken 
actions, if such tacit and unspoken actions did in fact exist In any case, most of the 
perspectives in Keating's (1993) study demonstrated only minor differences in rhetoric and 
action. Therefore an objective of this research was to observe differences in the 
participants' organizational rhetoric and action through a research methodology that co­
constructs such rhetoric and action gaps with the participants should they exist Chapter 
IV, "Research Design", detailed the methodology used to test for such rhetoric and action 
gaps. The research questions which guided this design and venue of observation are as 
follows:
1. Will the modified OLP design co-construct with the participants rhetoric and action gaps,
if they exist?
2. If rhetoric and action gaps are revealed to a significant extent in this research, what are 
the differences between this research and Keating's (1993) research which have caused 
these gaps to be more prominent in this research?
3. If rhetoric and action gaps exist, do they provide evidence for "camouflage" and 
"undiscussibles", and if so, what is the nature of such "camouflage" and 
"undiscussibles"?
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4. If rhetoric and action gaps are revealed, what are their relation to the organization's 
knowledge and learning?
To address the first question, a measure for differences in rhetoric and action can be 
formulated by calculating the average response for each scale of each perspective. This is 
done by numbering the responses from 1 thru 7 corresponding to the seven Likert scale 
distinctions from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree". Therefore, for example, an 
average of 4.0 would indicate there are as many participants who disagree, and by the same 
magnitude, as there are participants who agree. The absolute difference of the averages for 
the "talk" and "walk" scales for each perspective is then calculated. A difference of 1.0 
would then indicate that the participants' assessments have an average difference of one 
interval between their "talk" and "walk" assessments. Note that there are six intervals on a 
seven point Likert scale, so that the maximum difference that could possibly occur would 
be six intervals in the case where all participants together assessed the opposite ends of the 
"talk" and "walk" scales of a perspective.
The "talk" and "walk" interval differences (T-W gaps) for the 181 perspectives of 
this study, as well as the 236 perspectives of Keating's (1993) study, were calculated 
according to the measure formulated above. The T-W gaps between the two studies can 
then be compared overall by simply calculating the average interval difference for each 
study. When this is done it is found that the average T-W gap for Keating's (1993) study 
is .52, while the average T-W gap for this study is .60. A more instructive comparison, 
however, is the distribution of T-W gaps for the two studies. Table 3 shows this result in 
terms of the percentages of perspectives within specific ranges of T-W gaps for each study. 
The significance of table 3 is that there are a number of perspectives in both studies that are 
substantially greater than the average T-W gap for each study, which demonstrates that an 
OLP is capable of producing perspectives with a significant gap between rhetoric and 
action. Also it is seen from table 3 that the distribution of T-W gaps for this study is 
skewed more toward higher gaps than the T-W gaps manifested in Keating's (1993) study. 
For T-W gaps of at least 1.5 there is nearly twice the percentage of perspectives, and for T- 
W gaps of at least 1.0 there is more than forty percent greater percentage of perspectives in 
this study than Keating's (1993) study. In response to the second research question of this 
section, these higher percentages of high T-W gaps are hypothesized to have resulted from 
the depth of the interviews that were generated in the semi-structured spontaneous 
interview technique employed in this study, as opposed to the structured interview 
technique employed by Keating's (1993) study. The validation of proposed perspectives 
and the longer length of the interview that was done in this study, and not Keating's (1993)
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study, is also hypothesized to have produced a set of perspectives that more closely 
reflected the governing variables, norms, and assumptions of the participant group.
Table 3 also shows that the number of perspectives with a "low" T-W gap (a 
rhetoric and action interval difference less than .5) to be more than half of the perspectives 
in both studies. This high percentage of perspectives with a low T-W gap in this case 
study should not be surprising, since a significant portion of most of the interviews 
reflected the perceived organizational rhetoric, which, in general, was a commentary on 
many of the perceived organizational actions. So, in both studies, uncovering perspectives 
with a high T-W gap should be seen as an exception, as well as a discovery, since most 
perspectives with a high T-W gap seem to point toward tacit behavioral aspects in the 
participant organization. In attempting to uncover more conclusive evidence of such tacit 
behavior, while addressing the third and fourth research questions of this section, 
perspectives demonstrating gaps between rhetoric and action, between belief and rhetoric, 
and between belief and action are examined in the following paragraphs.
Interval difference Keating (1993) This study
Between 3.0 & 3.49 0 .6
Between 2.5 & 2.99 0 0
Between 2.0 & 2.49 1.1 .9
Between 1.5 & 1.99 1.7 3.9
Between 1.0 & 1.49 11.4 14.9
Between 0.5 & .99 28.4 26.0
Between 0.0 & 0.49 57.6 53.7
Table 3. "Talk" vs. "walk" interval differences, percent of perspectives.
The perspectives which have a very high T-W gap in this case study were all 
perspectives in which the rhetoric espoused a set of actions, but these actions were 
perceived to be missing. For example, perspective no. 5 (appendix 4), which has a 
rhetoric and action interval difference greater than 1.5, says that because of changing 
customers and shrinking budgets, they must improve quality. This, according to the 
perspective's assessments, is perceived to be widely expressed, but is perceived as not 
supported by their actions. I would also postulate that knowledge of lack of such action is 
tacit, i.e., that their actions did not support the improvement of their quality was not in their
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explicit awareness until such time they were asked to reflect and make an assessment on 
this dimension of their behavior. Therefore, I postulate that knowledge of this dimension 
of their shared action was tacit until made explicit by the perspective. Other perspectives 
with a rhetoric and action difference greater than 1.5 are perspectives no. 6 ,7 ,13,42,43, 
71, 72, 76, and 97. They, like perspective no. 5, all demonstrate organizational rhetoric 
that is perceived to not be supported by organizational action.
Just as it was instructive to examine gaps between rhetoric and action, it is also 
instructive to examine gaps between belief and rhetoric (B-T gaps), as well as between 
belief and action (B-W gaps). First an average interval difference for all 181 composite 
perspectives can be calculated for these two gaps in the same way that it was calculated for 
T-W gaps above. Appendix 7 shows the results of these calculations for all perspectives 
and all three gaps. From these results the average B-T gap is found to be .73, and the 
average B-W gap is found to be 1.1. Recall from above that the average T-W gap is .6. 
These three gaps can be further compared by examining the distributions, which is shown 
in table 4 as the percentage of perspectives within a specified range of interval differences. 
The data for rhetoric and action is repeated from table 3 above for easy comparison. The 
significance of table 4 is that it demonstrates that there are a number of perspectives with a 
substantially greater than the average B-T gap and B-W gap, and that the distributions for 
the gaps with the higher averages are skewed more so toward the larger interval 
differences. Therefore, it can be conclusively said that the composite perspectives' 
assessments demonstrated larger B-W gaps than B-T gaps, and larger B-T gaps than T-W 
gaps. Accordingly, the participant group, in general, not only perceived the organization’s 
actions to deviate from its rhetoric, but also perceived action and rhetoric, respectively, to 
deviate even more from their beliefs. To examine the significance of this, the perspectives 
with the larger B-T and B-W gaps will be considered in the following paragraphs.
As can be seen from appendix 7, there are 18 perspective with a B-T gap higher 
than 1.5. A summary of the essence of the top five perspectives in this group in order of 
decreasing B-T gap are as follows:
1. We lack top management leadership, support and vision. (Perspective no. 31, B-T gap 
= 2.27).
2. TQM is hated by most, because upper management has misused TQM teams in self- 
serving ways. (Perspective no. 34, B-T gap = 2.0).
3. TQM serves as a scapegoat for different layers of management who can't make a 
decision. (Perspective no. 32, B-T gap = 2.0).
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4. Upper management has created a number of measures which take a lot of time and have 
no utility. (Perspective no. 9, B-T gap = 2.0).
5. Upper management tends to make changes without the consult or support of first line 
management (Perspective no. 153, B-T gap = 1.93).
Interval difference Belief & Rhetoric Belief & Action Rhetoric & Action
Between 3.0 & 3.49 0 1.1 .6
Between 2.5 & 2.99 0 3.3 0
Between 2.0 & 2.49 2.2 7.7 .9
Between 1.5 & 1.99 7.7 13.8 3.9
Between 1.0 & 1.49 19.3 27.2 14.9
Between 0.5 & 0.99 28.7 25.4 26.0
Between 0.0 & 0.49 42.1 21.5 53.7
Table 4. Interval differences, percent of perspectives.
The other perspectives exhibiting this very high B-T gap are similar to these top five 
perspectives. They all address perceived failings of their higher management or their TQM 
program, or both. These two subjects were attested, during the course of this research, to 
be two of the least addressable subjects in the participant organization. Strong criticism of 
their TQM program was not acceptable, because the program was mandated, and, of 
course, criticism of one’s boss is never in vogue. Perspective 129 of appendix 4 validates 
this last premise not only by what it says, but also by its assessment This perspective 
essentially says that most issues are discussed freely except upper management's failings, 
while its assessment confirms that the participants believed the perspective and perceived 
organizational actions to reflect the perspective, but perceived the perspective to not be said. 
Furthermore, out of the 181 perspectives, 65 perspectives can easily be judged to be fairly 
critical of either upper management or TQM. All but 12 of these perspectives have a B-T 
gap of 1.0 or greater. Of the 12 perspectives with a B-T gap of less than one only four had 
a B-T gap less than .5. Three of these perspectives were assessed strongly to not be 
believed, which explains their lack of a B-T gap, i.e., the perspectives were not believed, 
so, of course, they were not espoused, and hence there were no gaps. The other 
perspective with a low B-T gap involved TQM in relation to the finance officer, who was
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not a taboo subject for criticism. The eight perspectives with a B-T gap between .5 and 1.0 
involved very specific issues of criticism. It is postulated that it was the specific issue of 
these perspectives that was supported by members' rhetoric, thereby giving these 
perspectives a "talk" assessment more in line with their "belief1 assessment Aside from 
these exceptions, all of which have explanations, perspectives which were critical of upper 
management or TQM had a high B-T gap. On the other hand, all of the perspectives with a 
very high B-T gap, i.e., greater than 1.5, are very critical of upper management or TQM. 
These facts lead to the finding that a high B-T gap in this case study points toward what 
Argyris and Schon (1978) labeled as "undiscussibles". This also seems to make some 
sense, because a high B-T gap indicates that the beliefs of the participant group are not 
congruent with their perceptions of organizational rhetoric, which is a commentary on 
themselves, since, as a group, they represent a significant cross section of the organization. 
Therefore, a high B-T gap points toward that which the participants believed to be true, but 
did not feel free to discuss, and in this sense, are representative of what Argyris and Schon 
(1978) labeled in their work as "undiscussibles".
If a high B-T gap points towards "undiscussibles", it is instructive to look at the 
perspectives other than those critical of upper management or TQM that have a high B-T 
gap to discover some of the other possible "undiscussibles" in the organization. The word 
possible is used, since these perspectives may have a low "talk" assessment for reasons 
other than that associated with "undiscussibles"; i.e., they may instead represent actions 
which are not well expressed in the organization's rhetoric, because they are known 
experientially, and hence only implicitly. These other possible "undiscussibles" are found 
to be their upcoming re-organization (perspective no. 83), hiring new manager’s from 
outside the organization (perspective no. 84), the unwillingness of most managers to make 
hard choices (perspective no. 91), lower management not enacting their own vision, goals, 
and support locally (perspective no. 92), and their performance appraisal system 
(perspective no. 145).
Generalizations regarding perspectives with a high B-W gap are more problematic. 
The reason generalizations for such perspectives are more problematic is that for some of 
these perspectives a different portion of the perspective appears to have produced the B-W 
gap than that which produced the B-T gap. For example, perspective no. 9 of appendix 4, 
which was cited above as having the fourth largest B-T gap, has the largest B-W gap, i.e., 
a B-W gap of 3.47. As cited above, what appears to have produced the high B-T gap, is 
the perspective stating that upper management has created a number of measures which take 
a lot of time and have no utility. All 15 participants personally agreed with this perspective,
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and there is ample evidence in other perspectives and comments that upper management 
was perceived to have done exactly this. It is this statement that it is interpreted that the 
participants were saying by their assessments, "We don't "talk" about this." On the other 
hand, only two participants agreed with the perspective on the "walk" assessment. So 
what caused the low "walk" assessment that resulted in a high B-W gap for this 
perspective? If it were true that upper management acted true to the above statement, the 
"walk" assessment should be high, and therefore more in line with the "belief' assessment 
However, the perspective goes on to end with, "If a measure is to be adopted, attention 
should be given to the cost of doing the measure versus how and who it benefits. Upper 
management quality boards that create measures should contain representation by those 
who must do the work of compiling such measures." It is interpreted that it is this ending 
statement which triggered the very low "walk" assessment of this perspective, and thereby 
creating a high B-W gap, because this ending statement represents actions in which there is 
ample evidence in other perspectives and comments of not being representative of the 
actions in the participant organization.
One way to resolve the ambiguity that perspectives like no. 9 present to making 
generalizations regarding perspectives with a high B-W gap, is to examine perspectives 
with a high B-W gap, but a low B-T gap. For these perspectives participants are saying 
that they perceive the organizational rhetoric, but not action, to be in line with their beliefs. 
Such an examination will isolate the type of actions that are different from the participants' 
beliefs, but not absent in their ±etoric, i.e., that which is okay to say. A summary of the 
top perspectives with a high B-W gap (greater than 1.5), but low B-T gap (less than .6) in 
order of increasing B-T gap are as follows:
1. Our changing customers and shrinking budgets demands that we improve quality. 
(Perspective no. 5, B-T gap = .13, B-W gap = 1.67).
2. To achieve high quality we need our work force to buy into this ideal in their own 
terms. (Perspective no. 68, B-T gap = .2, B-W gap = 1.53).
3. An employee oriented focus on quality requires that management recognize employees' 
contributions, identify and satisfy employee needs, communicate well, and build trust. 
(Perspective no.72, B-T gap = .27, B-W gap = 2).
4. We should establish awards that encourage team work. (Perspective no. 27, B-T gap = 
.27, B-W gap = 1.53).
5. Quality leadership from the top is especially critical at this point in time due to the 
turmoil we are currently facing in relation to declining budgets, customer base, and 
personnel. (Perspective no. 7, B-T gap = .33, B-W gap = 3.33).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
145
6. Top management needs to have a clear vision and pay daily attention to this vision, so 
that it is perceived and believed that we walk our talk. (Perspective no. 97, B-T gap = 
.33, B-W gap = 2.73).
7. The best way to ensure our viability is to ensure we have a product of such high quality 
that it would be unthinkable for our services not to be sought (Perspective no. 6, B-T 
gap = .33, B-W gap = 2.13).
8. The best way to improve quality is for management to focus on the training, tools, 
morale, and needs of our technicians, according to what they feel they need to render a 
quality job. (Perspective no. 72, B-T gap = .33, B-W gap = 2).
9. Generating customer satisfaction requires a pro-active approach of satisfying customer 
needs, communicating well, and building trust (Perspective no. 77, B-T gap = .33, 
B-W gap = 1.67).
10. It is essential that top management define and support what they feel is important If 
they can do this, most of us will "work our little buns off1 trying to accomplish it. 
(Perspective no. 4, B-T gap = .4, B-W gap = 1.67).
11. It is important to constantly retrain personnel specialized in systems that are being 
phased out (Perspective no. 116, B-T gap = .47, B-W gap = 1.67).
12. Our primary resource is our people. (Perspective no. 88, B-T gap = .47, B-W gap = 
1.67).
13. "Guiding principles" should be developed through an evolution of circular processes 
between upper and lower management (Perspective no. 94, B-T gap = .47, B-W gap 
= 1.6).
14. Quality should be measured by customer satisfaction, consistency, our technicians' and 
first line supervisors' perceptions, and employee satisfaction. (Perspective no. 13, B-T 
gap = .53, B-W gap = 2.22).
15. A critical element in establishing a performance improvement system is training of all 
managers in well thought out elements of such a system. (Perspective no. 151, B-T 
gap = .53, B-W gap = 1.73).
16. We should have periodic all-managers' meetings to provide a forum for exchanging our 
ideas. (Perspective no. 100, B-T gap = .6, B-W gap = 1.87).
17. We should have periodic meetings with the CEO and upper management to learn from 
each other and facilitate long range innovations for building and improving our 
business. (Perspective no. 174, B-T gap = .6, B-W gap = 1.67).
18. We should measure quality through surveys of both customer and employee 
satisfaction. (Perspective no. 14, B-T gap = .6, B-W gap = 1.53).
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From the above summary of perspectives with a high B-W gap, but low B-T gap, 
several generalizations become apparent. First, in contrast to perspectives with a high B-T 
gap, i.e., the "undiscussibles", none of these perspectives are overly critical of either upper 
management, TQM, or anyone else for that matter. Further, their low B-T gap indicate that 
they are discussed within the participant organization. So, they are the "discussibles". 
Also, however, they are, as evidenced by their semantical representation, the "camouflage" 
to the "undiscussibles". That is, it is not okay to be overly critical of upper management or 
their TQM program, but it is okay to say the qualities upper management should possess, 
or what the attributes for quality should be, or how quality should be measured and 
achieved. So the nature of "camouflage" is found to be tangential discussions of the 
"undiscussibles". Such rhetoric can easily be seen as masking the real perceived issues 
expressed by the high B-T gap perspectives, such as, "TQM is hated by most, because 
upper management has misused TQM teams in self-serving ways" (perspective no. 34, B-T 
gap = 2.0). Therefore, the "undiscussibles" are the real issues, versus the "discussibles", 
and in this sense, the "discussibles" become the "camouflage" to the "undiscussibles". 
This is just as Argyris and Schon (1978) contend:
Camouflage may take the form of resort to espoused theory, where
everyone makes an open secret of the incongruity. (Argyris and Schon,
1978, 117)
It is seen from above that the modified OLP can elicit and categorize perspectives 
which point toward "undiscussibles" and their corresponding "camouflage". It is also seen 
that perspectives with a very high T-W gap point toward the absence of actions that were 
espoused in the organization's rhetoric. It was hypothesized that knowledge of these 
missing actions was primarily tacit until made explicit through a perspective. Although it is 
seen that high T-W gaps point toward perspectives representing missing actions, the 
knowledge of these missing actions appears to be experiential, and hence largely not 
explicit It would, however, be more gratifying if this indicator, or some other indicator, 
provided evidence of tacit knowledge in actions that are ever present, as opposed to 
missing, if such tacit knowledge of such actions in fact exist In searching for such an 
indicator, the gap characteristics of an ideal perspective that would represent actions that are 
ubiquitous and largely known through experience, versus rhetoric, will be explored. 
Knowledge of such an ubiquitous set of actions would be shared. They also would be 
largely tacit because of their experiential nature. Finally, for such actions to be ubiquitous.
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they would be supported by the personal beliefs of the organization's members. Such a 
perspective would have a high agreement assessment on the "belief' and "walk" scales, but 
a low agreement on the "talk" scale, indicating that the perspective did not represent the 
organization’s rhetoric. This would result in high B-T and T-W gaps, but a low B-W gap. 
It is acknowledged that perspectives not corresponding to our ideal "tacit" perspective 
might have a similar assessment, such as a perspective representing actions in which there 
is some fear of openly discussing. In this case, a low agreement "talk" assessment might 
indicate an absence of rhetoric due to fear, as opposed to non-awareness of the actions. 
However, the above analysis creates a focus to find perspectives similar to our ideal "tacit" 
perspective. Perspectives which fall into the latter category, i.e. perspectives in which 
there is probably some fear of openly discussing, should be easily identifiable by their 
semantics. When appendix 7 is reviewed with this focus, the results are disappointing. 
There are only a few perspectives with just a moderately high B-T and T-W gap, but low 
B-W gap. However, they stand out from the other perspectives, because most of the 
assessments for the other perspectives deviate far from these gap specifications. These 
perspectives in order of decreasing T-W gap are as follows:
1. Exacerbating our lack of organizational philosophies and goals is the unwillingness for 
most managers to make hard choices. (Perspective no. 91, B-T gap = 1.2, B-W gap = 
0, T-W gap = 1.2).
2. Our first efforts at TQM fell flat on its face. Our second efforts at TQM appeared to 
produce significant gains, but was actually more attributable to circumstance than TQM. 
These gains would have happened anyway. They were simply documented under the 
title of TQM. (Perspective no. 1, B-T gap = 1.5, B-W gap = .6, T-W gap = .9).
3. Our upper management has become less employee oriented over time. They tend to 
forget our business and reputation was built by it's employees. This has resulted in 
low employee satisfaction with their higher level management (Perspective no. 123, 
B-T gap = 1.7, B-W gap = .9, T-W gap = .8).
4. The recent "Driving out Fear" seminar held for all middle and upper management 
encouraged all participants to openly discuss organizational perspectives that are not 
normally discussed. The purported purpose of this discussion was to "drive fear out of 
the work place" by bringing issues out into the open for public discussion and 
resolution. However, certain issues which were brought out were ultimately used 
against various individuals, and consequently the seminar did not drive out fear. 
Instead it instilled fear, and many middle and upper managers no longer feel they can
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discuss issues as openly as they once might have. (Perspective no. 110, B-T gap = 
1.3, B-W gap = .5, T-W gap = .8).
5. Top management does not posses the requisite depth of knowledge on our programs, 
do not take appropriate business risks, and do not readily listen to lower level input, 
because most who have succeeded to top management are those who have played a 
political game of echoing higher management wants, versus taking risks to build our 
business and listening to their subordinates. (Perspective no. 119, B-T gap = 1.4, B- 
W gap = .8, T-W gap = 1.6).
From the five perspectives above it is seen that the indicator worked reasonably 
well. The first two perspectives represent actions that, if true, would be experienced 
throughout the organization. Since the B-T gap is higher than the B-W gap, the 
assessments indicate these actions are more widely experienced than talked about. Because 
of their experiential nature, knowledge of these actions would be more implicit than 
explicit The same can be said for the last three perspectives, although in their case, the 
lack of organizational rhetoric could have been due more to fear than a lack of explicit 
awareness.
In summary, it was found in addressing the third research question that rhetoric and 
action gaps were significantly elicited in this case study by the modified OLP. These 
rhetoric and action gaps, in conjunction with either belief and rhetoric gaps, or belief and 
action gaps, provided evidence in the participant organization of Argyris and Schon's 
(1978) "camouflage" and "undiscussibles". The "undiscussibles" were found to primarily 
consist of severe criticisms of upper management and the participant organization's 
mandated TQM efforts, while the "camouflage" was found to primarily consist of fairly 
non-critical commentaries of how upper management should respond to quality philosophy 
and how quality should be achieved. Accordingly, the nature of the "undiscussibles" was 
found to be unsaid criticisms (mostly of their perceived upper management and TQM 
failings), while the "camouflage" was found to be tangential discussions of the 
"undiscussibles, i.e., rhetoric that spoke to such criticisms without actually addressing 
them. This was seen to conform to Argyris and Schon's (1978, 117) contention that 
"camouflage" may take the form of resort to espoused theory, where everyone makes an 
open secret of the incongruity." In exploring the questions inspired by Argyris and 
Schon's (1978) work, evidence of shared tacit knowledge was found to be indicated by 
perspectives with a high T-W gap in the form of actions that were espoused but missing in 
the organization's behavior. Finally, evidence of shared tacit knowledge was also found
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to be indicated by several perspectives with a moderately high T-W and B-T gap, but a low 
B-W gap in the form of actions that were widely experienced, but not widely espoused.
In addressing the fourth and last question of this section, evidence is explored as to 
the affect the participant group's apparent "undiscussibles", "camouflage", and shared tacit 
knowledge had on their learning. The evidence from the participant group’s perspectives, 
their assessments and comments, and from the group meetings, overwhelmingly points 
toward an organization whose learning was steeped in the status quo. First, the participant 
group not only represented a significant cross section of the larger organization, but also 
many participants indicated, as related in chapter V, that they felt the perspectives of the 
larger organization were similar to their perspectives. Second, the participant group 
perspectives demonstrate a stagnant TQM program. Perspective no. 2 of appendix 4 
directly states, "Our current efforts at TQM are "bogged down", i.e., not moving, 
changing, evolving, improving." This perspective ranks twentieth among the AAA 
perspectives with 13 of 15 participants personally agreeing with the perspective. The 
problem is further revealed by AAA perspective no. 18 (appendix 6), which states, "Our 
history of 'talking' about TQM has formed an 'anti-culture' to TQM, i.e., a rejection of 
actions if associated with the label 'TQM' ". Third, this research project ended with the 
participants jointly declaring that to pursue improvements suggested by their perspectives 
and assessments would be pointless, because nothing would change until upper 
management changed. This perceived problem is further revealed by the scores of 
perspectives that are very critical of the perceived failings of their upper management 
Finally, some of the most convincing evidence that the participant organization's learning 
was "steeped in the status quo" is the enduring nature of the participant's perspectives 
during the time of this research. As related in chapter V, there were numerous comments 
from individual interviews and the group meetings, whereby the participants expressed that 
a perspective had just occurred, often exactly as written, and, in some cases, accompanied 
by a declaration that this could not have possibly been written months ago, because it just 
happened. As outlined in the introduction of chapter I, the perspective this research takes is 
that the creation of new shared knowledge in an organization, without judgement as to its 
goodness, is taken as evidence of an organization having undergone learning. It was 
acknowledged, as Fiol and Lyles (1985) also pointed out, that the problem with taking new 
knowledge as evidence of learning is that sometimes it is not clearly perceptible. I postulate 
this will especially be the case with knowledge that is experiential, and hence mostly tacit. 
However, the modified OLP was designed to bring forth experiential knowledge, and to 
make gaps between belief, rhetoric, and action explicit Further, the enactment of this
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methodology brought forth what one participant attested to be, "Everything that's important 
to us, and then some." Accordingly, I postulate that the participant group's shared 
perspectives are an exceptionally good representation of their shared knowledge at the time 
of this research, and as such, a change in these perspectives would be a representation of 
their shared learning. The fact that this body of comprehensive perspectives were 
extremely enduring during the time of the research project presents good evidence of a 
participant group, and by implication also the larger organization, whose learning had 
stagnated. Finally, I postulate, in the terms of Argyris and Schon (1978), that the 
"undiscussibles", and their corresponding "camouflage", as represented by the participant 
group's perspectives, are evidence of a "limited learning system"; i.e., a learning system 
that is inhibited by "primary inhibiting loops", such as unawareness of dysfunctional group 
dynamics and organizational norms, which sustains the "limited learning system" and 
creates "secondary inhibiting loops", characterized by "undiscussibles" and "camouflage", 
which further sustains the "limited learning system". More simply put, the participant 
group's perspectives endured as they did, because they were not able, due to their current 
perspectives, to create the new experiences necessary for creating new perspectives.
Emergent Research Questions
It was acknowledged in the original proposal for this research that, "as it is the 
design of action research, other research questions may emerge that may be seen even as 
more important..." (p.2, addendum 1, dated January 1993 to dissertation proposal dated 
December 1992). As mentioned in chapter I, what emerged and stood out in this particular 
case study, were the unwritten norms and shared assumptions which seemed to affect 
decision, choice, and action within the organization, of which participants seemed to often 
not be fully aware. These observations led to the following emergent research questions:
1. What are the unwritten norms and shared assumptions influencing decision, choice, and 
action in the participant organization that might be indicated by evidence?
2. What were the mechanisms that generated such norms and shared assumptions?
3. If such norms and shared assumptions were not explicitly articulated prior to this 
research, how were they known and shared?
4. Why did these norms and shared assumptions so influence decision, choices, and 
action?
The interviews, perspectives, assessments, comments, and group meetings lend 
only indirect evidence to some of the questions posed above. Consequently, some of these 
questions must be addressed more from the researcher's personal experience of enacting
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
151
the research than from other more formal evidence. However, the interviews, 
perspectives, assessments, comments, and group meetings point toward norms and shared 
assumptions which foremost said that the participants believed that their upper management 
actions were incongruent with their organization's TQM efforts. This incongruity appeared 
to have been primarily produced by the perception that upper management had subverted 
the principles they had dictated. This appeared to have created a perception of distrust of 
upper management and a rejection of TQM. Both of these perceptions were amply 
expressed in the perspectives, where their assessments indicated that such perceptions were 
much more believed than espoused. Hence, the classification of these perceptions as 
"undiscussibles". This perceived distrust of upper management and rejection of TQM 
appeared also to have been "camouflaged" by forms of rhetoric, which espoused the 
qualities that upper management should posses and the actions that "quality" should dictate. 
The rejection of TQM appeared to have created a perception of a stagnated TQM program. 
By the number and intensity of perspectives which spoke to it, the incongruities generated 
by the perceptions of upper management's TQM rhetoric and action gaps, also appeared to 
have created a perception of stagnating the participant organization. This is evidenced both 
by the number of perspectives which remained constant during the course of this research, 
and by the participants insisting in their last group meeting that nothing would change until 
their upper management changed.
The participant group expressed other unwritten norms and shared assumptions, 
such as, "we are family", and, "we pride ourselves in providing the highest quality 
technical services". These other unwritten norms and shared assumptions are postulated to 
have also been influential in the participant group's decisions and actions. However, these 
other norms and shared assumptions did not appear to be as influential during the time of 
this research, as evidenced by the number and intensity of perspectives on TQM and upper 
management in contrast to other issues. Consequently, the TQM and upper management 
issues are the focus in addressing the research questions of this section. Accordingly, the 
first research question asks, "What produced the influential norms and shared assumptions 
surrounding TQM and upper management?
The participant organization was in their fifth year of their TQM implementation. 
They had even won a state senate award for quality. However, this recognition was 
perceived to have been won more through documentation of normal accomplishments 
under the guise of quality, than through new achievements (see perspective no. 1, appendix 
4). What the organization had done, and done well for twenty years, was now perceived 
as being presented as TQM. As a result, that which was traditional before TQM was now
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being interpreted in terms of perceptions of quality. In addition to casting traditional 
experiences as TQM, the participant organization's TQM efforts did create a multitude of 
new experiences that were directly attributable to TQM. These experiences included 
extensive TQM  training of all employees, formation of many "quality teams" for 
examining, recommending, and implementing "improvements", and, of course, the 
creation and maintenance of more than 200 quality charts in just one department It was 
this interpretation of typical experiences under the guise of quality, and the multitude of 
new TQM experiences which created a perception of TQM pervading the organization. 
Experience of upper management's influence was also just as pervasive, as evidenced by 
perspectives which indicate that upper management "dictated" and "mandated" many details 
controlling the organization. Consequently, I hypothesize that it was this multiplicity of 
experience which generated the unwritten norms and shared assumptions surrounding 
TQM and upper management The participants lived in, and perpetuated through their 
actions, a "sea" of experience associated with TQM. This sea of TQM experience gave rise 
to interpretations of quality, which generated incongruities as upper management continued 
to act in traditional ways. Experience as the generator of these norms and shared 
assumptions is also evident from the perspectives themselves. First, the perspectives were 
formulated from participants' experiential accounts elicited through interview. As a result, 
the perspectives reflect in their generalizations a multiplicity of direct experience. Finally, 
the assessments of the participants not only validate many of these perspectives as true in 
the participants' eyes, but also validate many perspectives as representing the perceived 
actions of the participant organization.
The third research question of this section questions whether the norms and shared 
assumptions, in this case surrounding TQM and upper management, were articulated prior 
to this research, and if not, how such unspoken norms and shared assumptions came to be 
known and shared. In particular, a highly agreed upon perspective, no. 180 of appendix 4, 
states, “These perspectives are just 'common sense'. However, such 'common sense' is
nowhere written down, either individually or collectively currently there is no good
mechanism for sharing each other's 'common sense'." This perspective is direct validation 
by the participants that they perceived that they knew and shared these perspectives, but 
that they were at least unwritten, if not un-articulated. However, other evidence can also be 
found in the participants' assessments attesting to the tacit nature of their perspectives. 
Although I tried to eliminate redundancies in composing the composite perspectives from 
individually validated perspectives, I discovered from the assessments that a number of 
perspectives essentially say the same thing although they are very differently worded.
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These syntactically different, but semantically similar, perspectives become obvious as the 
perspectives are not only ordered and grouped together by their relative ranking under their 
respective perspective categories, but also as their semantics are reduced to the essence of 
the perspectives, as was done by appendix 6. For example, all the top AAN perspectives, 
which are so grouped by their assessments, all pertain to how it is perceived that upper 
management should behave, or how TQM should be enacted. Examination of other 
groupings of perspectives reveals that similar perspectives are universally close to each 
other in their respective assessments. That the participants could intuitively assess such 
differently worded, but essentially same, perspectives so closely demonstrates their shared 
and tacit aspects of their knowledge represented by the perspectives elicited in this research.
If the participants knew and shared the perspectives elicited by this research, and 
they were at least unwritten, and probably mostly unarticulated and tacit, how were they 
known and shared? Just as it was uncovered under the second research question of this 
section that it was the experiences of the participants that generated their individual 
perspectives, this same evidence yields that it was their shared experiences that generated 
their unarticulated norms and shared assumptions. Simply stated, the participants' shared 
experiences created their norms and shared assumptions, and because these norms and 
shared assumptions were largely produced experientially, they were mostly tacit Finally, 
although enacting norms and shared assumptions may create new experiences leading to 
new norms and shared assumptions, it was seen in this case study to have mostly 
reinforced existing norms and shared assumptions. This was especially evidenced during 
the research project by the enduring nature of the participants' perspectives.
The group meetings provide some insight into the fourth research question of this 
section, which is, "Why did the participants' norms and shared assumptions so influence 
their decisions and actions?" Again, the discussion of this question is limited to the norms 
and shared assumptions regarding TQM and upper management In the first meeting a 
venue of reoccurring discussion concerned whether the participant group should present 
their perspectives and assessments to higher management (see chapter V). The discussion 
included how various higher management individuals "would" react as opposed to might 
react There was no uncertainty in their perception of the behavior that would ensue from 
specific individuals in higher management It was apparent from these discussions that the 
participants were expressing this certainty based on their perceptions of past experiences. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the discussions that occurred in the last group meeting, 
whereby the participants provided numerous examples of experiences where various 
perspectives had been reenacted. It was a chorus of individually narrated experiences
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which caused one participant to summarize for the participant group, "I think we keep 
living this out (as he held the perspectives up); proving it to be true.” From this anecdotal 
evidence it seems that the reason that these particular norms and shared assumptions so 
influenced the participants decisions and actions were the experiences they had jointly 
accumulated. These shared experiences formed joint beliefs that certain decisions and 
actions would have definite and certain results. Because outcomes resulting from certain 
decisions and actions were believed to be known, decisions and actions were made 
accordingly. From this and the evidenced summarized by the statement "I think we keep 
living this out...", it seems the participant group's belief in definite outcomes may have 
resulted in decisions and actions that resulted in certain other experiences, which, in turn, 
reinforced their original beliefs. If this is true, such beliefs could be seen as a serious 
impediment to the participant group's learning, and by implication, to their organization's 
learning. In summary, this anecdotal evidence points toward participants' decisions and 
actions being so influenced, because these norms and shared assumptions were based on 
experiences which resulted in beliefs that removed from their minds any uncertainty of the 
consequences of certain decisions and actions. These beliefs ensured inevitable decisions 
and actions, and because these beliefs were experientially formed, I hypothesize that they, 
and the ontological reasons for their ensuing actions, were mostly tacit
Summary and Conclusions
This chapter addressed the research questions posed in chapter I pertaining to the 
participant organization. Evidence from the interviews, perspectives, perspective 
assessments, and the group meetings were used to gain insight into these questions and the 
participant organization.
In exploring these research questions it was found that the participant organization's 
TQM efforts produced expectations which conflicted with existing cultural elements. These 
conflicting elements appeared to have resulted in numerous belief, rhetoric, and action 
gaps. Examination of these gaps produced evidence of Argyris and Schon's (1978) 
"undiscussibles" and "camouflage", which appeared to sustain the participants' existing 
perspectives. As a result of these enduring conflicts and perspectives, the future potential 
of the participant organization's TQM program to affect their culture and ability to learn was 
postulated to be minimal.
Results between this study and Keating's (1993) study were compared. It was 
found that the assessments of this study yielded larger and more significant rhetoric and 
action gaps than did Keating's (1993) study. This was attributed to the semi-structured
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spontaneous interview technique employed in this research, which is thought to have 
elicited more of the participants' organizational experiences as opposed to their 
organizational rhetoric. Many similarities were also found between the two studies, 
including the ability of the methodology to highly motivate its participants, to stimulate 
significant participant dialogue and deep organizational reflection, to produce similar 
processes of individual and joint reflection and learning, and to elicit tacit perspectives. 
Neither study, however, was able to transition its participants from the temporary learning 
system introduced by the respective studies to a more permanent learning system.
Several instances of "single-loop" learning were found to be connected, by their 
timing and subject matter, to the perspectives of this research project. The research project 
was also able to create a keen awareness of "undiscussibles" and "camouflage", but it was 
not able to produce instances of "double-loop" learning or "deutero-leaming".
Evidence of shared tacit knowledge, its nature, how it was generated, how it was 
shared, and what its influence on the participants' decisions, choices, actions, and own 
learning were explored. It was concluded that the greater portion of the participant group's 
shared tacit knowledge surrounded TQM and upper management perspectives. This 
knowledge was found to be produced from the multiplicity of experiences that existed 
regarding these subjects, and found to be shared from the participants' mutual exposure to, 
and creation of, such experiences. This knowledge was found to be self-perpetuating, i.e., 
these shared perspectives affected decisions and actions in a way that reinforced the original 
perspectives. As a result, this knowledge was found to limit the participant group's ability 
to learn, and by implication, their organization's ability to learn.




The purpose of this concluding chapter is to project the implications and to 
summarize the results and conclusions of the research. Chapters VI and VII presented the 
results of an in-depth study of a participant group in one section of one organization. The 
results presented by these two chapters appear to be generalizable to the participant group's 
section of the organization, because the participant group represented the entire 
management structure of this section, and many of the first line managers expressed the 
belief that they felt they were close to their employees so that their perspectives probably 
represented many of their perspectives. These results also appear to be generalizable to the 
participant group's larger organization, because the participants perceived that their 
perspectives were widely held and shared throughout their organization. A number of 
generalizations, supported by both evidence and the researcher's experience, were drawn in 
chapter VII pertaining to how the participants came to hold their perspectives, the 
mechanisms through which their perspectives were shared, how their perspectives were 
related to their learning, the ways in which the research data presented evidence for barriers 
to learning, and how TQM and this study affected the participant group's learning. From 
these generalizations for this case study, implications for other organizations are proposed 
as to what constitutes learning in an organization, how learning may be indicated, through 
what mechanisms learning can occur, what may constitute barriers to learning, how such 
barriers to learning might be identified and overcome, and what are the processes and skills 
that can contribute to learning. While these implications are intended to seem reasonable to 
another observer for other organizations and to serve as a model for future research, no 
claim is made that these implications will necessarily apply to other organizations. Instead, 
the applicability of such implications is left to the reader and future research. Accordingly, 
it is within this context that this chapter develops: (1) the response to the original cross- 
organizational questions; (2) the response to the cross-organizational research questions 
that emerged during the research regarding organizational knowledge and learning; (3) a 
proposal for an explanatory model of the processes through which learning is generated in 
an organization; (4) implications for the management of organizations; (5) implications for 
organizational learning theory; (6) directions for future research; and (7) a summary of 
results and conclusions.
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Original Cross-organizational Questions
Several cross-organizational questions were constructed in the original proposal to 
guide thinking about the implications of this research for other organizations. These 
original cross-organizational questions as introduced in chapter I are as follows:
1. Can organizational learning be enhanced by an organizational improvement technology 
or philosophy, such as TQM?
2. How may the enactment of such a technology be evaluated in terms of organizational 
learning?
3. How may the potential of such a technology to facilitate organizational learning be 
evaluated?
The research methodology was constructed to inform these questions, as opposed 
to rigorously answering them. As such, they are informed not only by evidence gathered 
through the research methodology, but also by the researcher's experience of enacting the 
research. Consequently, the addressing of these questions takes the form of perspectives 
intended to inform both theory and practice.
In addressing the first question, i.e., can organizational learning be enhanced by an 
organizational improvement technology or philosophy, such as TQM, it is necessary to 
revisit the perspective on organizational learning developed by this research. 
Organizational learning is taken to be the creation of new shared knowledge in an 
organization, without judgement as to its goodness. It was seen in this case study that the 
TQM enacted by the participant organization did indeed create many perspectives regarding 
quality. These perspectives were likely to not exist prior to the participant organization’s 
TQM efforts. Further, these perspectives seemed to be based upon the experiences 
surrounding the participant organization's TQM efforts. Therefore, this case study implies 
that an organizational improvement technology, such as TQM, enhances learning in so far 
as it is able to create new experiences. From such new experiences new knowledge is 
created. This case study also demonstrates that such new knowledge may conflict with 
pre-existing knowledge. In the case of the participant organization, perceptions of quality 
appeared to conflict with enduring perspectives regarding hierarchy, control, and possibly 
individualism. Consequently, such conflicts may produce incongruent perspectives and 
barriers to learning.
The second question asks how may an an enactment of an organizational 
improvement technology be evaluated in terms of organizational learning. Fiol and Lyles 
(1985) suggest that organizational learning is evidenced by new actions. On the other 
hand, they contend that taking new knowledge as evidence of learning is problematic,
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because sometimes it is not clearly perceptible. In addressing this question in the context of 
Fiol and Lyles (1985), it is necessary again to examine the perspective developed by this 
research. This research implies that new knowledge as learning creates a potential for new 
action. In particular, this research elicited several perspectives regarding quality charts and 
a technical reporting system. However, there was a significant lag between the time when 
these perspectives were made explicit and shared through the research process, and the time 
when new actions ensued. It was only after participants strongly agreed with these 
perspectives in two assessments did the actions suggested by these perspectives come to 
fruition. When these new actions did occur, they were the effects of the learning, i.e., the 
new perspectives. There were also many other perspectives that were made explicit and 
shared through the research process that may have resulted in actions that were simply not 
observed within the bounds of this research. Nonetheless, these perspectives existed, 
whether or not they affected action. They presented a potential for action, and also 
interpretation, and therefore are considered by this research to represent learning. Because 
new action lags new knowledge, a consequence of evidencing learning by new action may 
be that the learning will not be evident until the new actions have already effected the 
organization for better or for worse. Because of this, seeking evidence of learning by new 
action is seen by this research as problematic.
The above perspective then views evidencing learning by knowledge as not 
problematic, but instead as pro-active. In so doing, the consequences of new perspectives 
may be anticipated before they occur. Indeed, this research demonstrates that 
organizational perspectives can be made explicit and assessed in non-threatening ways, and 
that even knowledge that is experiential and tacit can be made explicit. Further, it is 
hypothesized that perspectives can also be compared over time to assess the direction of 
learning in an organization by mapping changes in organizational knowledge. Conflicts 
between previous values and emerging values, gaps between belief, rhetoric, and actions, 
"undiscussibles", and "camouflage" can all be detected. This data can then be employed to 
modify the implementation of an organizational improvement technology, as appropriate, 
while it is enacted. Therefore, it is hypothesized that an organizational improvement 
technology can be evaluated in terms of organizational learning through processes designed 
to elicit and assess organizational perspectives as the organizational improvement 
technology is implemented.
The last question of this section asks how may the potential of such an 
organizational improvement technology to facilitate organizational learning be evaluated. 
This research demonstrated that new knowledge ensued from new experiences. Therefore,
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this suggests that the potential of a technology to facilitate organizational learning should be 
evaluated in terms of the experiences that it may create. Also, since this research 
demonstrated that such new knowledge may conflict with existing knowledge, the 
experiences that the technology is designed to create should be compared with present 
organizational experiences, and the potential for fit or conflict should be determined. Some 
of the questions that could be asked to assist such an evaluation are the following: what 
new experiences will implementation of this technology create in the organization; how will 
these new experiences be interpreted in the context of existing experiences; what new 
perspectives are implied from these new experiences in the context of existing perspectives; 
what are the possible incongruities that may be generated between the potential new 
perspectives and pre-existing perspectives; and, how will such possible incongruities be 
addressed?
This case study also demonstrated a methodology that elicited perspectives and 
stimulated dialogue. In particular, the methodology elicited both perspectives that were 
explicitly articulated and those that were not Those that were not explicitly articulated prior 
to this research were shown to often be tacit, due to their experiential nature, and required 
both trust and spontaneity to elicit The methodology assessed these perspectives as to 
how they were shared and as to the gaps in belief, rhetoric, and action that they presented. 
Finally, the methodology stimulated the awareness of these perspectives, which, in turn, 
stimulated dialogue. Accordingly, it was seen that such processes facilitated learning 
through creating new experiences which facilitated the sharing, as well as the evolution, of 
organizational perspectives. The case study also demonstrates that such facilitations can 
also translate into new appropriate actions. Accordingly, the case study would then imply 
that a technology's potential for facilitating organizational learning processes should also be 
evaluated in terms of its ability to surface and test perspectives, to stimulate dialogue, and 
to create new appropriate actions. Additional questions that might be asked in this 
evaluation of a technology's potential could then be the following: what are the 
mechanisms through which the explicit articulation of perspectives is facilitated; do these 
mechanisms facilitate articulation of experiential perspectives, i.e., are they non­
threatening, do they inspire trust, and do they prompt spontaneity; and, what are the 
mechanisms that facilitate the sharing of perspectives once they have been made explicit?
In summary, this case study implies that an organizational improvement technology 
can enhance learning through its potential to create new experiences. However, the case 
study implies that such an organizational improvement technology: (1) should be evaluated 
before it is implemented in terms of its ability to create new desired experiences, to surface,
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share, and test perspectives, to create dialogue, and to do this in a non-threatening context 
that fosters trust and stimulates spontaneity; and (2) should be evaluated as it is 
implemented by eliciting and assessing organizational perspectives, by comparing new 
perspectives to existing perspectives for conflict, and by charting the direction of learning 
through mapping change in perspectives. In addition to whatever other purpose that might 
be served by such an organizational improvement technology, it is hypothesized that 
enacting it according to these implications will move the organization toward a learning 
system that makes its members' own learning a subject of their learning.
Emergent Cross-organizational Questions
It was acknowledged in the original proposal for this research that, "as it is the 
design of action research, other research questions may emerge that may be seen even as 
more important..." (p.2, addendum 1, dated January 1993 to dissertation proposal dated 
December 1992). Accordingly, enacting action research to further understand the 
organizational learning phenomenon led to several emergent research questions, which 
were introduced in chapter I. All of these questions are intended to serve as a guide for 
thinking about the implications of this research for other organizations. Some of these 
questions emerged as a result of the participant observations to further understand the 
organizational learning phenomenon, while others are intended as an aid in developing an 
explanatory model of the processes through which learning is generated in an organization, 
in developing implications for the management of organizations, and in developing 
implications for organizational learning theory. These questions then represent theory that 
is intended to inform practice, and, as such, their response takes the form of perspectives. 
Some of these perspectives have already been stated elsewhere in this dissertation, but are 
included again under this section for completeness.
Several questions were implied in this research from the observation of the 
unwritten norms and shared assumptions of the participant organization. Questions 
specific to the participant organization regarding these unwritten norms and shared 
assumptions were addressed in chapter VII. These specific questions suggested similar 
cross-organizational questions as follows:
1. How is knowledge that is largely un-articulated generated in an organization?
2. How does such un-articulated knowledge become shared in an organization?
3. Why would shared knowledge that is not explicitly articulated be influential in an
organization's decisions and actions?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
161
The response to these questions follows the perspective developed in chapter VII 
from addressing similar questions pertaining to the participant organization. This 
perspective holds that a form of un-articulated knowledge is generated in organizations 
through the experiences that ensue from the actions of its members. Such un-articulated 
knowledge is shared by members jointly experiencing their co-created actions. This un- 
articulated shared knowledge is influential in an organization's decisions and actions for 
several reasons. First, it is experiential knowledge, so it is deeply believed. Second, 
because it is experiential, it is often tacit, so that it typically leads members to decide and act 
according to such knowledge without benefit of explicit consideration. Third, it is shared, 
so that the decisions and actions ensuing from such knowledge are typically socially 
validated. Fourth, such knowledge is known and generated relative to the knowledge of 
other members. Through these relational interactions, it forms a context for generating 
what members jointly see as possible or not possible. And finally, such knowledge is 
often self-reinforcing, i.e., the decisions and actions that ensue from such knowledge 
produce experiences that will often serve to validate the knowledge.
Several distinctions for organizational knowledge and learning are implied from the 
above. Therefore, to make these distinctions explicit the following two questions are 
proposed:
1. What are the distinctions this research suggests for organizational knowledge?
2. What are the implications of these distinctions for organizational learning theory?
In response to the first question, the above implies that organizational knowledge 
may have varying degrees of tacitness or explicitness, and varying degrees to which it is 
shared. Can such knowledge not be shared and still be organizational knowledge? It is 
hard to imagine from the experience of this research an individual member with a unique 
perspective generated in isolation from other members that would contribute to producing 
the organization, especially without then influencing other members. Therefore, the 
perspective this research holds is that for knowledge to be "organizational knowledge", it 
must be shared to some degree. And if it is shared, then it is likely to have been generated 
through members acting in concert with each other. This implies that the organizational 
perspectives held by individuals must also be relational, i.e., connected to the knowledge 
held by others in the organization. Through the interactions of such connected knowledge 
it is hypothesized that a relational knowledge arises beyond that knowledge held by the 
organization's individual members. The implications of these distinctions for 
organizational learning theory is that they suggest mechanisms for the generation of 
organizational knowledge, which can be observed, learned, facilitated, and measured.
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These distinctions and implications are addressed further in the following sections of this 
chapter.
Several questions were introduced in chapter I to serve as an aid in the formulation 
of an explanatory model of the processes through which learning is generated in an 
organization, which is presented in the next section of this chapter. These questions build 
upon the above distinctions for organizational knowledge, and are as follows:
1. What is learning in an organization?
2. What constitutes evidence for learning in an organization?
3. How does learning in an organization occur?
The perspective taken by this research is that organizational learning is simply the 
generation of organizational knowledge, without judgement as to its goodness. 
Accordingly, evidence of learning in an organization is taken to be the generation of new 
knowledge. The learning occurs through a cyclic process whereby members first 
experience the articulations and actions of others, interpret these articulations and 
experiences into perspectives, and then interact and share these perspectives through further 
articulations and actions. This proposed process for learning in an organization is detailed 
further in the next section, which proposes an explanatory model of the processes through 
which learning is generated in an organization.
Several questions were introduced in chapter I to serve as an aid in developing the 
implications of this research for the management of organizations. These questions are as 
follows:
1. How can barriers to learning in an organization be identified and overcome?
2. What are the processes and organizational skills which contribute to organizational
learning?
3. How may an organization discover and learn the processes and skills which contribute 
to organizational learning?
4. Will making the subject of learning in an organization explicit serve to improve and
sustain organizational learning?
Each of the above questions could well be the subject of an entire research study 
and dissertation. The intent here is to briefly address each question from the perspective of 
this research as an aid in addressing the implications of this research in the management of 
organizations addressed later in this chapter.
Barriers to learning in the participant organization were indicated and made explicit 
through an elaborate and lengthy process as described by this research. Until such a 
process had been enacted, neither I nor the co-researchers could explicitly articulate many
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of the participant group's perspectives, could point to differences in their beliefs, rhetoric, 
and actions, could identify their "undiscussibles" and "camouflage", or could explicitly 
answer the persistent question of one participant, "If TQM is such a great management tool, 
which we all acknowledge that it is, then why is it that we as managers all hate TQMW  
That their experience of TQM conflicted with persistent and underlying norms and shared 
assumptions, that there were subjects that were not fireely discussed, that these subjects 
were "camouflaged" through tangential discussions, that gaps existed between beliefs, 
rhetoric, and actions, and that many influential perspectives were not clearly articulated, all 
resided in the tacit domain. It was only through a facilitated methodology, trust, 
spontaneity, and a considerable effort that what was tacit was made explicit. Further, 
although this research increased the awareness of these tacit aspects of the participant 
group, it did nothing to overcome their barriers to learning. This, of course, can be 
attributed to the research not having a charter to undertake such a facilitation. The 
implication of this from this case study is then that there appears to be no easy answers for 
uncovering barriers to learning. Such barriers to learning appear to not only reside in the 
tacit domain, but can dampen spontaneity, can be hidden by fear, can be forbidden for 
discussion, and can be disguised by "camouflage". Then, for an organization to uncover 
barriers to learning, it must first make a sincere commitment to do so. This commitment 
must include a commitment to honesty, trust, and spontaneity. It probably would also 
require a professional facilitation with a clear charter, since it would probably be difficult 
for an organization to pre-posses the skills needed for such an inquiry, and it would 
probably be equally difficult for an insider, even if the required facilitation skills were 
assumed, to be free of the very barriers that the organization is attempting to identify and 
overcome. If such an inquiry were conducted, the skills that organizational members 
would need would be the ability to clearly articulate purpose, to surface and test 
perspectives, and to jointly engage in an honest and committed dialogue of inquiry into 
their own culture and learning. It is hypothesized that organizational members would need 
to experience these skills in order to truly learn and discover such skills for themselves. 
Finally, it was seen in this case study that making the subject of learning explicit did not 
serve to sustain the participant group's own learning, and may have only marginally 
improved their learning, if at all. However, there was no charter to do this, so what was 
missing was the corresponding commitment. Therefore, since it is postulated that 
commitment is essential, the last question of this section remains unanswered.
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An Explanatory Model for Organizational Learning
The purpose of this section is to propose an explanatory model of the processes 
through which learning is generated in an organization. The perspective of this research is 
that learning is a change in knowledge, and that knowledge is perspective that creates 
potential for action. Therefore, a model for organizational learning is in terms of the basic 
processes through which knowledge may be generated in an organization. To provide an 
example for this perspective, consider a blind man feeling his way with a stick. What is it 
that the blind man has learned that creates the potential for him to be able to find his way? 
The blind man feels the impact of his stick against his fingers and palm. Through 
experience he has learned to transform these feelings into a sense of its point touching the 
objects he is exploring. So what the blind man has learned is a perspective for interpreting 
the feelings the stick causes in his hand into images of his environment. This perspective 
creates a potential for action, i.e., the blind man may correcdy find his way in his 
environment As the blind man then commits the actions of finding his way with his stick, 
his existing perspective is reinforced when he does so correctly, and modified when he 
errs. In the same way, perspective creates potential for action in an organization, as well as 
a means for interpreting action. The perspectives that members hold and share provide 
them an ability to interpret their organizational environment, which then creates potential for 
action. When these actions produce the desired effects, perspectives are reinforced, and 
when they produce error, perspectives are modified. It is through this perspective of 
knowledge and action that an explanatory model for learning in an organization is proposed 
from the basic processes of joint action, interpretation through current knowledge, and 
experiencing.
An organization's knowledge may be either explicit, implicit, or possess elements 
of both. Explicit knowledge is like trigonometry, which can be taught, learned, and known 
explicitly through measures and logical propositions. Tacit knowledge is like riding a 
bicycle. Although it is known, as may be evidenced by the successful action of riding a 
bicycle, it is extremely difficult to explicitly teach or learn, because it is difficult to express 
the measures and logical propositions by which one rides a bicycle. Instead, the measures 
and logical propositions of riding a bicycle are best learned through the experience of so 
doing. Accordingly, not only is tacit knowledge principally learned through experience, 
but also experience typically produces knowledge that is tacit On the other hand, tacit 
knowledge may become explicit knowledge, and vice versa. Tacit knowledge may become 
explicit knowledge through discovering the measures and logical propositions through 
which it can be expressed, taught and learned effectively. And finally, explicit knowledge
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may become tacit knowledge through the experience of doing that which is explicit until it 
becomes known more through the experience than through its explicit measures and logical 
propositions. An example is typing. At first, each key stroke is an explicit movement of 
the fingers, but with practice, the knowledge as to how to move the fingers to produce the 
desired result becomes known more through the experience of doing than an explicit 
awareness for movement of the fingers.
Figure 2, on the following page, introduces the concept of the learning cycle, and 
depicts the cyclic process through which new knowledge may be generated. It is important 
to understand that while the cycle is explained as a series of processes, these processes 
occur continually and simultaneously.
Organizational members may hold perspectives explicitly, implicitly, or both as 
depicted by the overlapping diagrams in figure 2. Such knowledge may then be shared 
through articulations, actions, or both. Articulations may involve the explicit expression of 
measures and logical propositions, and if it is interpreted in the same terms, the explicit 
knowledge is shared and reinforced. Articulations may also involve conversations, which 
create a context for sharing knowledge. Often these conversations relate experiences, 
beliefs, and feelings. Such conversations may then create a context whereby explicit 
measures and logical propositions emerge, in which case they provide a mechanism for 
conversion of implicit knowledge to explicit knowledge. Most often, however, such 
conversations simply provide contexts for others to experience and to interpret their 
experience. In such case, such conversations facilitate the sharing of the tacit knowledge of 
other members. Members' knowledge may also be shared through actions that are 
influenced by both explicit and tacit knowledge. Explicit knowledge may directly affect 
decisions and actions, while tacit knowledge may influence the context under which such 
decisions and actions are made. The experiences created by the articulations and actions 
described above are finally interpreted by members in the context of their existing 
knowledge, thereby completing the cycle. Through this cyclic process, either new 
perspectives may be produced, or existing perspectives may be reinforced. Where new 
perspectives are produced they present the potential to be shared through new articulations 
and actions, which thereby creates the potential for new action.
Finally, it is recognized that individual perspectives that are produced through this 
learning cycle reside with the organizational members. However, organizations produce 
discoveries and actions that would not be possible through individual knowledge or action. 
It is hypothesized that these discoveries and actions are evidence for a knowledge unique to 
the whole organization, as opposed to the knowledge residing with just individual
































members. This "relational" knowledge is hypothesized to arise from the interactions 
between the knowledge of individual members, and to cause the organization's total 
knowledge to be greater than the sum of its parts. It is through the generation of such 
relational knowledge that the organization is postulated to learn, as opposed to just its 
members learning.
Implications for the Management of Organizations
This research concerns in-depth observations of an organization in order to better 
understand the phenomena of organizational learning. The work of this research was to 
make explicit that which was tacit in the participant organization in order that explicit 
measures and logical propositions could be formulated through which the learning of 
organizations could be better understood. In the enactment of this work it was discovered 
that there was an important body of largely tacit organizational perspectives that established 
a strong context for decision and action in the participant organization. This context was 
not only largely implicit with the participants, it was not understood or even suspected by 
the participants' upper management. Accordingly, the implications from this research are 
three for those organizations that wish to make their own learning a subject of their 
learning: First, the lesson from the participant organization is that such organizations 
should endeavor to articulate and understand their own perspectives and experiences, and 
the relationship between them. Second, the lesson from the example set by the enactment 
of this research is that such organizations should, just as this research did, endeavor to 
make explicit that which is tacit. And third, in so doing the first two, such organizations 
will have made their own learning a subject of their learning.
To illustrate the first lesson, it was seen that this research demonstrated that an 
important body of shared perspectives were born from the participant group's joint 
experiences. Some of these experiences were seen to produce conflicting perspectives, 
i.e.., interpretations of quality versus the pre-existing norms regarding hierarchy, control, 
and possibly individualism. These perspectives established a strong context for the 
decisions and actions of the participants, and as such were often self-reinforcing. Many of 
these perspectives revealed barriers to learning in the form of "undiscussibles", 
"camouflage", and perspectives that constrained possibilities for decision and action. 
Accordingly, this implies that organizations that wish to make their own learning a subject 
of their learning should recognize the importance of the experiences that are created through 
the actions and dialogue of the organization. It implies that a fundamental awareness of the 
actions and dialogue of the organization, and how these actions and dialogue affect the
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experiences of its members, should exist Such awareness can be facilitated by sampling 
and testing perspectives as they may emerge from specific experiences surrounding 
implementation of new structures, strategies, programs, technologies, and/or other 
organizational changes. Such changes should be examined for the experiences they create, 
and how these experiences conflict or complement past experiences. When such changes 
produce experiences that conflict with existing perspectives, past experiences, and/or the 
organization's culture, these conflicts should be addressed explicitly in concert with those 
affected.
To illustrate the second lesson, the work of this dissertation can be seen as making 
explicit that which was implicit regarding organizational learning through observation and 
subsequent proposal of measures and logical propositions, in order to better understand the 
phenomena of organizational learning. The very work of this dissertation sets an example 
for the management of organizations that wish to make their own learning a subject of their 
learning, in that a part of the work of such organizations should be making explicit that 
which is implicit through joint observation and dialogue and the subsequent proposal and 
testing of measures and logical propositions, in order to better understand that which 
produces the organization. In particular, the demonstration of this case study implies the 
importance for such an organization to understand its own perspectives, experiences, 
and/or culture, since the demonstration implies that these elements contextually affect the 
organization's decisions and actions. Also, the demonstration implies that many of the 
perspectives, and the resulting culture, of an organization is formed experientially, and 
accordingly is tacit Then, this would then imply that an essential component of the work 
of such an organization should be converting their experiential knowledge into explicit 
measures and logical propositions so that this knowledge may be understood and exploited 
explicitly. To accomplish this work such an organization should strive to make their 
implicit knowledge explicit by committing to an open dialogue in a context of trust and 
spontaneity. Such a commitment implies a pro-active approach. In particular, this research 
demonstrated that what was tacit was elicited through the dynamics of a dialogue, first 
through individual interviews, then through assessment of perspectives, and finally 
through group meetings. Trust and spontaneity were seen to be essential to this dialogue in 
order for the implicit to effectively emerge. Although the methodology of this research is 
seen as effective in accelerating the conversion of tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge 
and in facilitating its sharing,1 it is not necessarily being suggested that organizations
^This assertion is also validated by the remarks of the Vice President of the participating department. 
Recall from chapter V where be asserted that he felt that in just a few hours he had had a "meeting of the
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wishing to make their own learning a subject of their learning should try to duplicate these 
steps. Instead, the lesson that should be drawn is that it requires a conversation to create an 
appropriate context for surfacing the organization's experiential knowledge. Such work 
cannot be accomplished by individuals working in isolation. Accordingly, for such 
organizations there should be a fundamental recognition that the work of an organization is 
social, and that which may facilitate such social work should be discovered and employed. 
In particular, the organization's space, structure, technologies, ethics, rewards and 
punishments, norms and shared assumptions may either promote this work or isolate its 
members, and accordingly should be examined, evaluated, and changed accordingly in 
order to improve and facilitate the social work of the organization where it is desired to 
make its learning a subject of its learning.
Finally, where an organization wishes to do the above work, it should be made 
explicit, because in so doing the organization will have made its own learning a subject of 
its learning. Specifically, where organizational members explicidy strive to articulate and 
understand their own perspectives and to make explicit that which is tacit, they will have 
strived to learn about their own learning.
Implications for Organizational Learning Theory
The implications of this research for organizational learning theory is that this 
research, through rigorous observations, demonstrates measures and logical propositions 
that serve to move organizational learning from a theory of a phenomenon to measurable 
elements that may serve in the practice of organizational learning.
In particular, this research served to demonstrate organizational learning in terms of 
the knowledge and the knowledge generation of an organization. It served to enhance the 
understanding of the processes essential to such knowledge generation. It defined the 
knowledge of an organization in terms of the explicit and implicit perspectives that could be 
elicited, assessed, and tested. It demonstrated a distinct methodology for eliciting the 
implicit knowledge of the organization. It showed that distinctions could be made between 
members' personal beliefs and their perceptions of the organization's rhetoric and action. It 
provided empirical evidence for Argyris and Schon's (1978) theoretical constructs of 
rhetoric and action gaps, "undiscussibles", and "camouflage", and established that such 
organizational barriers to learning could be made explicit From the observation of these 
demonstrations, the research constructed a model for the generation of knowledge in an
mind" with all of his managers, and that it would have taken him months or even years to have understood 
the perspectives held by bis managers, if ever at all.
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organization from the cyclic and continuous processes of dialogue and actions, 
experiencing and interpreting.
Through establishing these measures and logical propositions for organizational 
learning, the research serves to move organizational learning toward measurable elements 
that may be used to evaluate and facilitate the learning of an organization. As such it 
connects theory to practice through which managers and organizations may learn practical 
means for facilitating and measuring their own learning.
Directions for Future Research
There remain many challenges in further development and refinement of measures, 
logical propositions, and processes through which the learning of an organization may be 
facilitated, and through which managers and organizations may learn practical means for 
facilitating and measuring their own learning. However, the two major challenges for 
future research are demonstrating such a facilitation as a permanent structure, and realizing 
substantial appropriate action from knowledge of suggested action.
This research was able to implement a temporary structure to facilitate 
organizational inquiry, dialogue, and discovery. However, with the completion of this 
research the structure to maintain such organizational inquiry, dialogue, and discovery was 
not sustainable by the members themselves. It was not the charter of this research to 
transition the participant group to a permanent structure for learning, but where such a 
commitment might be made, a major challenge to future research will be how to transition 
such a facilitation of organizational learning processes into a permanent structure 
sustainable by the organization's members.
Finally, the knowledge elicited from the participants of this research suggested a 
cornucopia of possible actions that offered a potential not only to improve the participant 
organization incrementally, but also to change it fundamentally. However, this research 
was only able to demonstrate weakly evidence of realizing incremental learning from such 
elicited awareness for suggested action. It is acknowledged that a charter for translating 
awareness into actions did not exist for this research, but where such a charter might be 
realized, the challenge to future research will be the discovery of the measures and 
processes through which actions suggested by organizational members' elicited knowledge 
may be appropriately assessed, moved to commitment, and then facilitated. Answering this 
challenge will serve to move the subject of organizational learning from perspective and 
theory to relevant applications for the manager.
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Summary of Results and Conclusions
This research conducted in-depth participant observations of an organization in 
order to better understand the phenomenon of organizational learning. The research 
employed a participatory action methodology to co-construct these observations with 
participant co-researchers. The intent of the research from these observations was to 
generate theory, rather than to test theory. The work of the research then was to make 
explicit that which was tacit in the participant organization in order that explicit measures 
and logical propositions could be formulated through which the learning of organizations 
might be better understood. In the enactment of this work it was discovered that there was 
an important body of largely tacit organizational perspectives that established a strong 
context for decision and action within the participant group. This implied a new essential 
process for the development of an advanced organizational learning system, i.e., the co- 
constructing of the tacit experiential knowledge of the members of an organization. The 
processes through which this co-construction of tacit experiential knowledge appeared to 
occur naturally in the participant organization was detailed as a proposed explanatory model 
for organizational learning. This model proposed a cyclic process for knowledge 
generation via organizational members experiencing and interpreting their articulations and 
actions into either new or existing perspectives.
The research demonstrated a methodology for eliciting what the participants 
perceived to be their most important perspectives regarding their organization. Accordingly 
the methodology suggested a means for eliciting an organization's contextual knowledge 
for organizational decision and action. Key to this methodology was seen to be trust, 
spontaneity, and a shared reflective inquiry. The methodology was seen to be not only 
motivating to the individual participant and the participant group, but also valuable to the 
individual participant in terms of his or her self-discovery. The methodology proved to be 
a powerful tool for observing the knowledge, and hence learning, of the participant group, 
while also revealing the differences in the participants' personal beliefs, and their 
perceptions of their organization's rhetoric and actions. These differences, termed as 
belief, rhetoric, and action gaps, served to demonstrate effectively Argyris and Schon's 
(1978) theoretical constructs for organizational barriers to learning.
The research implied that a tenet of organizational management should be to 
endeavor to articulate and understand their organizational perspectives and experiences by 
making explicit that which is tacit, and in so doing, to make their own learning a subject of 
their learning. The contribution of this research to organizational learning is its implication 
for moving the subject of organizational learning from theory to measurable elements that
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may serve in the facilitation of learning in an organization. Finally, this research challenges 
future research to: (1) further develop and refine measures, logical propositions, and 
processes through which the learning of an organization may be facilitated; (2) demonstrate 
an organizational learning facilitation as a permanent structure; and (3) realize substantial 
appropriate action from knowledge of suggested action.
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APPENDIX 1 
PHASE 2 INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
The interview schedule of this appendix was used as a guide in the 14 interviews 
accomplished by this study, but was not followed verbatim so as to take advantage of 
opportunities that offered spontaneity. Each interview was taped and transcribed in its 
entirety.
Instructions
The following instructions were given to each interviewee before his or her 
interview:
"This interview will be used to develop your perspectives on your organization and 
your organization's Total Quality efforts. The interview is anonymous and will be used 
only for the purpose of generating your personal perspectives. These perspectives will be 
given to you for validation. After validation they will be only used to form a body of 
perspectives for the entire participant group. Your validation ensures that you will be able 
to ensure that these perspectives are highly reflective of your organizational perspectives, 
and will provide you with the opportunity to ensure that the wording of any of your 
personal perspectives will not identify you as the originator when combined with other 
perspectives. I request that this session be tape recorded to aid in accurately capturing your 
perspectives. The security and confidentiality of your tape is assured.
The interview questions will involve questions regarding your organization and your 
organization's Total Quality program."
Organizational and Total Quality Interview Questions
1. From your perspective, what is your company's purpose?
2. What do you feel are the priorities at your company? (Reputation, get the job done at 
all cost, adherence to the rules, documentation, quality correspondence (clarity, 
correctness, timeliness), training and professional development of personnel, merit 
promotions, teamwork, training customer to be self-sufficient, avoiding criticisms of 
company personnel to outsiders, economy, efficiency?).
3. In an ambiguous work situation, such as that which might involve allocation of 
resources, setting of priorities, or resolution of a personnel situation, do you feel there 
is some organizational philosophy or philosophies (vs. rules) that employees would be
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likely to look toward in resolving the situation? (YES/NO) (If yes), what do you feel 
are some of the key company philosophies that might be used in such ambiguous 
situations?
4. From your perspective, what is the "product" of your division, department, or section?
5. What are the resources which you use to generate your product?
6. Who are your customers?
7. What do you think would indicate quality in what you do?
a) From your supervisor's perspective?
b) From your perspective?
c) From your subordinates' perspectives?
d) From your peers' perspectives?
e) From your customers' perspectives?
f) From a communications perspective?
1) Internal - Peers, superiors, subordinates, inter-section/division?
2) Extemal-Customers, suppliers, other organizations?
8. What measures exists to assess these quality perspectives?
9. What measures do you think are needed to assess these quality perspectives?
10. What role do you feel "suppliers" play in the quality of your product?
11. How do you feel you are able to influence the quality of your suppliers' products?
12. What do you think would be needed to change or improve your ability to influence the 
quality of your suppliers' products?
13. How do you feel quality is rewarded in your organization?
14. What rewards for quality products do you feel are needed?
15. How do you feel you are rewarded for your practice of "quality"?
16. What do you see as the major road blocks in your area of responsibility to do a quality 
job?
17. What do you feel would need to be done to remove these road blocks?
18. Have you undergone training sponsored by your company that stresses "quality"?
(YES/NO). (If yes), what was the training about?
19. How have you found it to be useful in your job? How has it made a difference in
your "product"? How can you tell it has made a difference?
20. Are there other types of training sponsored by your company that could make a 
difference in "quality"?
21. What are the meanings of "quality" that appear to you to be important in your 
company's environment?
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22. Imagine an organization like yours, with the same resources and responsibilities, if it 
had all the characteristics of "quality" that you can imagine, how would it be different 
from your company?
23. Do you feel the total quality program at your company is "bogged down"? (Yes/No). 
(If yes):
a) Why do you feel the total quality program at your company is "bogged down"?
b) What do you think would be needed to "free up" your company's total quality 
program?
c) If these things could be done, how do you think your company might change or 
be different?
24. What do you feel the main impediments to change or learning are for your company?
25. Let me define an "undiscussible" as something everyone knows, but is afraid to say. 
Often an "undiscussible" might result when a basic policy or assumption, especially 
by a superior, becomes a problem in the context of a new situation? Can you think of 
any "undiscussibles", i.e., what everyone knows, but is afraid or reluctant to say or 
discuss within your company? (YES/NO). (If yes) What do you feel some of these 
"undiscussibles" are?
25. For each of the "undiscussible" you mentioned, how do you think someone would be 
received if they pointed out the "undiscussible" and raised it as an issue that is in need 
of discussion and/or correction?




This interview serves as a typical example of the 14 interviews that were conducted 
in this study. Each interview was taped and transcribed in its entirety. The interview 
schedule of appendix 1 served as a guide for these interviews, but was not followed 
verbatim so as to take advantage of opportunities that offered spontaneity. This interview 
serves to demonstrate the use of spontaneity to elicit tacit organizational knowledge, and 
provides a good representation of the spontaneity and candidness that occurred in many of 
the interviews. The interviewee edited this interview and his resulting perspectives, which 
are presented in appendix 3, to protect his and the participant organization's identity. 
Where a word or phrase has been changed to a more generic word or phrase, the text is 
italicized. The perspectives of appendix 3 that were generated from this interview provide 
an example of individual perspectives derived from interview data.
The interview questions drawn directly from the prepared interview schedule are 
numbered Q l, Q2, etc. Questions that were spontaneously asked as a result of an answer 
to a prepared question are designated under the original interview schedule question as, for 
example, Qla, Qlb, etc.
This interview, as disguised, is printed with the explicit permission of the 
interviewee and the participant organization.
Interview of Mr. X 
Ql. What do you feel the main impediments to change or learning are for 
X Y Z ?
The fact that a lot of it is driven down from the top without a lot of room for discussion or 
how is this going to effect me day to day. There are quite a few people who have been 
successful and play a big part in this company's reputation over the years, they've done it 
a certain way. Well now days, everything changes by necessity. You either change or die 
these days. And a lot of the impediment to change is I think people just simply don't feel 
comfortable with it. Which is natural, and we've started to overcome some of that A lot 
of the other impediment to change is that it often comes as a mandate without any logic or 
reason why. Like: "We need to re-organize and become that division or this division, 
because it is a good thing to do.” Without any reason behind it, certainly without any
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bottom up indication of: "Where do you see us going, what do you guys think might be a 
good idea, somebody give me an idea for change." It's usually, to put it simply, "We 
know what is best, here it is." People are put off by that A lot of people at the working 
level, and even at the first supervision level, which is where I am, see it as pretty heavy 
handed, and not well thought out.
Q la. If a change comes to you this way, a directed change without 
explanation, certainly, I would imagine, people would try to understand the 
change, and certainly there would be inquiries as to why the change? In 
such a situation, do you get answers back?
Sometimes I guess we do, but a lot of the times they're really vague or politically correct, 
like XYZ CORPORATE is going this way, or it's because we need to re-organize. I 
mean, you don't ever get a really good answer. Nobody will ever say, because I'm the 
boss, that's why. They don’t do that! But they tend to leave that taste in people's mouths. 
And the biggest reason they do that is because it is never posed as a "what iff before it 
happens. No one ever says "Hey, we are thinking of re-organizing along the lines of the 
customer products, or we are thinking of re-organizing how XYZ CORPORATE is or our 
customers, what do we think of that?” No. Either that or it will be, "Here is the new 
thought from the Board o f Directors how we will do something, it's out for chop, you 
guys give me your comments." This would be our division head talking to us. Well very 
many times we've given him our comments, and gone back recommending we do things or 
look at things, and the next week you see it, and it's a zerox copy of what we were handed 
to chop. It's like it is already mandated. I think certain things you have to do it like this, 
because you can't drive every decision down. But quite a few decisions you could. But I 
think the Board o f Directors makes too many decisions too quickly, in a knee jerk type 
way. Either that or they are not giving me a good feeling that it's not that way. If they 
don't give me that feeling, I in turn, can't give it to the people in my section either.
Q lb. Are decisions at a lower level enacted the same way, from a top 
down mode?
At the vice president level they have been a lot of times in the past The division level to 
the sections in our division, I can honestly say, it's not like that At one time it was, but 
maybe I've grown a little bit, or he's changed, or we've met in the middle. But I don’t feel 
he asks us to do anything now that we don't get some type of explanation. There have 
been times we've been told it's just because the vice president wants it. We all know what
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it is to work for a living, and you do things like that Sometimes we're really told a little bit 
about the inner workings why. I feel at the division level to the section level it's explained 
as well as it can be. I don't feel he keeps anything back from us.
Qlc. More of a circular process at the section /  division level?
Yes.
Qld. But at the Vice president level is where it stops?
For the most part Sometimes it's true at the vice president level, but most of the time it's 
not and above the vice president level, definitely not.
Q2. What is one of the most far reaching decisions you feel you've made 
at your level?
Probably decisions involving promotions.
Q2a. What are some of the assumptions you make in making promotion 
decisions?
I have my own guidelines within my section as to what a person should be able to do. Part 
of it is my own feelings, part of it comes from talking to other senior subordinates; "Hey, 
what do you think we ought to be looking for?" Because part of that we are changing 
now. We're looking at that a little differently than we did before. Part of it is basic 
requirements which we have established at the division level and vice president level, 
which is pretty good. As far as assumptions, I think the biggest assumptions I have to 
make are character, if someone is adaptable, cooperative, attitude, the type of things you 
can't really tell from reading a resume. General things, things that are really hard to 
measure. I have things that tells me how many jobs this person did, what his performance 
level was, has he ever won any awards. I can draw upon all of those things as facts, but I 
make the assumptions on the harder to nail down things. The things that really make the 
decision.
Q2b. So you feel, first of all, a person has to fill the facts? Once they've 
done this, then they're a candidate for the more esoteric criteria, which you 
alone have to weigh and make a decision on?
Yeah, pretty much. Because before they would even be considered as a candidate they 
have to meet the minimum criteria. Then beyond that, I have to weigh it out. They're
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pretty comfortable in letting me do that and recommending it to the division and vice 
president and so on. I've never been challenged on that I don’t think anybody really ever 
has. So I think they're pretty good in letting us make those kind of decisions.
Q2c. In reaching a decision in promoting somebody vs. somebody else, do 
you do that in isolation, or do you have conversations with your division 
head and other people in reaching the decision?
Pretty much I make up my mind myself, because I don't think it is proper to talk to anyone 
in the section in that person's peer group. I know how people in the section feel about 
each other, so I don't really need to ask them. But after I've made my latest decisions, I 
did talk it over with my division head. If he had really challenged it or given me something 
else to consider, yeah, I would have reconsidered the decision, because I value his input 
and judgement, but I pretty much do it in isolation. It's my call. They allow me to make it.
Q2d. How about other decisions within your section ?
I think it depends on the circumstance. My natural disposition and personality is to just 
throw everything on the table and say this is what we need to get done, you all come back 
and tell me how we're going to do it. But you can't always do that. It depends on the 
maturity of the individual, or how quick the job comes up. But I think for the most part, 
any decision that people can make, I try to let them or even force them to make. Like this 
morning, I had a talk with a guy, and I told him, "You need to let me know your 
preferences a little more. You may be either embarrassed to tell me, or feel like I'm going 
to think less of you if you come in here and tell me, 'Hey boss, I really don't want to do 
this, because it is my daughter's birthday. Can I swap with someone else.' I really don't 
view those things as problems. If you have something you want to discuss, come in here 
and tell me!" I say this a thousand times, "The only problem I can't do something about is 
one I don't know about." So I try to be pretty open. Some things I reserve the call to 
myself, because if I didn’t it would lead to conflict between the people involved. If I let 
one guy decide what he was going to do, then all of them would rightly feel that way. 
Generally, I'm more comfortable in letting the guys make as many decisions as they can, 
because if they make them, I don't have to hear about them later. When and where I can 
support them, I always do.
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Q2e. Do you feel most section  heads have your style of decision making?
No, I don't feel I'm in the majority. I think there are other people that try to do things that 
way, because I drew from their experience. There are some that are kind of in the middle, 
and then we have some that are completely autocratic. I'm making the decision and you 
guys live with that So we have all ends of that I don't feel the way I try to do things is in 
the majority, because the tendency is, if you try to manage like I do, the fall back from that 
is you get told quite a lot that you got one foot in the supervisors office and you got one 
foot out on the floor, and you can't have both. Well, I don't accept that I don't think you 
need to draw that firm of a line. I do think certain times, certain things you have to make 
clear this is what you want done. I mean, everything, you just can't say, "Will you do 
this." Sometimes you just have to say, "Do it!" But for the most part, I think it leads to 
better ideas, better relations, better everything, if you kinda just try to be, like the literature 
says, a coach or advisor, rather than a disciplinarian or a guy with a stick, and it's not my 
nature anyway.
Q3. Do you feel that the sections in XYZ  work together for common goals 
and purposes?
Yeah, I do. I think you find that more in the sections that are grouped together by 
function. The guys within our division work closer together, but that's just the nature of 
the work. Some of our systems tie in together. We work with other people. We have 
team leaders that are multi-customer type function. We do an engineering test and 
evaluation. I think at a working man level, the guys out with the customers, the sections 
work very closely together. I'm really proud of that Good cooperation.
Q3a. You said that some managers are autocratic, some are in the middle, 
some are more your style. Does that affect boundaries around sections or 
divisions?
Oh yes. Particularly when there is a call to be made which way you are going to lean. 
Let's say my guys call up and say we've really got to work this Saturday. Unless there is 
some real reason why not, I'm going to tell them to go ahead. They may be working on 
the job with some section head who is more authoritarian and not so easy to compromise, 
and he might say, "No, come in here on Friday and lets go over everything you've done, 
and everything you got left to do, and then I'll tell you if you can work Saturday or not." 
Sometimes that makes for conflict, because they'll be standing there and will say, "Your 
boss told you that you could work, why can't we?" They tell their boss that, and then he'll
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come in to me, and say, "Why are you just throwing the door open?" You can see how 
those types of things happen. That happens to me fairly often. Particularly there's another 
guy who is a section head in another division, not our division, I've known him for 20 
years, and we work closely together, because his equipment and my equipment interface 
directly. Constantly that sort of thing happens. And it's mainly the difference between his 
style and mine. It's not that the guys servicing our customers butt heads or see differently, 
they don't They're all in sync. It's just that the direction they're given and my guys are 
given is different So that makes for some conflict
Q3b. If the people from your section and another section work as a team, 
then if your people are servicing a customer on a Saturday and the other 
section Is not, this must decrease their effectiveness?
Very much so.
Q3c. How is that resolved when the other section head comes in and says 
you are just giving it away?
It's about 50/50. Half the time I'll convince him, other times it is not worth my time to 
spend all day convincing him. Because, some jobs he may have the lead. I may be 
working off some money he has control over. And, even that doesn't prevent me from 
entirely doing what I want to do, but I don't have time for me and him to go see the 
division heads, because most of the time it's not that vital anyway. So 111 give in. And 
it's not always a shouting match. Sometimes it is just a matter where he and I should have 
talked first, because he might have scheduling conflicts that I didn't know about, and so 
forth.
Q3d. What issues might sway the argument in his direction, what issues 
might sway the argument in your direction?
Probably, prior commitments might sway it in my direction, where I say, "If we don't do it 
right now, because of what we have scheduled, it's not going to get done." That's 
probably my strongest persuader. His strongest persuader is when he says, "I don't have 
enough money to support i t  If you do, that's fine." I can't argue that, because I don’t 
know his money situation. Sometimes it is things that involve personnel. If I want to 
make a guy travel on Sunday, for free, so hell be available for a job Monday morning or 
whether I want to let him take a 6 am flight Monday so that he's there at 8 am instead of 
8:30 am. My leaning would be to let him go Monday morning. If he is going to be riding
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in the same rental car as the guy leaving Sunday, then we've got a conflict! Most of the 
time m  just dig my heals in and say, "You do whatever you want to. I'm not making my 
guy go before Monday." Normally he gives in. That same type of give and take is normal 
between other sections and divisions. I just use him because he's such a good example. 
And, I'm not saying I'm always right It just depends how you want to look at i t  If you 
want to see yourself as a manager or as a leader. I feel like I'm a pretty good leader. I feel 
I know how to get the best out of the people that work in my section without driving them 
like dogs or treating them like dogs. Now sometimes the general thinking is, if you're 
going to be a manager, you got to be a manager, and people's feelings come second. Well, 
there's very few cases where I do that Every case, I'm going to put the person's feeling 
first unless it's to the detriment o f our company's profitability or it's something involving 
a safety thing or someone is obviously just misconduct There's issues like that where 
there is no question, where you don't give the guy the benefit of the doubt You just come 
down hard and take what you need to do. But for the most part I try to treat people as an 
asset, as a very valuable asset not something to be taken for granted. That's just my 
nature.
Q3e. Do you feel your feelings are considered by the people you have to 
work for?
My immediate supervisor, yes. But above him, no. And, I think it has only been recently 
that he has come to feel that way. And I think the biggest reason he has, I like to think, is 
that the rest of us section heads have swayed him into thinking more like we do, and come 
in with us and not just be management's representative. Even though we're management 
too. That's not right. I don't want to say it like that. I just say that my immediate 
supervisor has come to understand my feelings a lot better in the last year, and treats me 
accordingly.
Q3f. How long have you been the se c tio n  head for L M N  custom er 
equipments ?
Since 1988; about five years.
Q4. In this situation where you have to work with other section  heads and 
you have an ambiguous work situation, such as you described, where 
allocation of resources, setting of priorities, or a personnel situation or a 
conflict between sections  needs to be resolved, do you feel there is some
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organizational philosophy or philosophies that XYZ people would be likely 
to look toward in resolving the situation? If so, what do you feel are some 
of the key XYZ philosophies that might be used in such situations? For 
example a local hospital that I  am acquainted with has a set of core values 
that people look toward to resolve situations that are not clear cut Do you 
feel XYZ has similar philosophies, either in writing, or just by tradition? 
Yeah we do. We have both. We have tradition, which is a long standing tradition. In the 
last couple years, we’ve developed a mission statement, and a subset of those, and there’s 
a lot of written things in pretty fancy language that basically say what we've always held. 
Our number one guiding principle has always been service to our customers, whenever, 
wherever or for whatever, at any time! So the basic thing around here, you do whatever 
you have to do to get someone to wherever they have to go to assist a customer, because 
their equipment is broke and they need their equipment working. That's always been like 
number one. And you do some wild things to get that to happen, like leaving their luggage 
behind, charging tickets on charge cards, etc. We do a lot of things like that, and 
everybody got stories over the years they can tell you. And all that was driven, because 
our reputation, our goal, our number one guiding principle was always to do the best job 
we could of providing service to the customer whenever they ask for i t  So, we do lean on 
that a lo t and there's a lot of other little subsets of that which we have broken down over 
the years: what different values are, what things we do do, what things we don't do. 
Some of them are corporate directives, things we can or can't do. But I think everybody 
knows those, and we do use those as reasons why we do some things and reasons why we 
don't For instance, because of that general philosophy, we have a priority listing for jobs. 
Operational requirements come before routine equipment updates, etc. I know if I do it 
that way, I'm going to get backing all the way up to the CEO. So we do have some things 
that are easy to define by our values, our tradition. Some are written, some aren’t.
Q5. What do you think would indicate quality from your perspective?
I guess quality in what I do would be a little harder to do than the guys. The guys perform 
engineering services for our customers, come back, get a thank you, and that's quality. In 
my job it is a little harder. To me personally, I think if I can make as many people content 
with what they are doing and give them the tools to do it, that's quality as far as my job 
goes. In other words, if I can maintain a well trained, happy work force, I guess that 
sounds a little sappy, but if I can give them all the training, tools, mixed in with a little perk 
now and then, then I can send him, and be confident in telling the customer a guy is
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coming to fix your equipment, then I've done my job, and I've done it in a quality manner. 
That's about as deep as I try to go into it. I don't try to make it into anything very fancy, 
because in my opinion, it's plain, simple work.
Q6. What do you think would indicate quality from your supervisor's 
perspective?
I think quality to him is more if I can show him something structured. Do I have a training 
plan in the section, and here's my chart of how far we are along on that; here's how many 
jobs we did last year, here's my chart how I brought cost and overtime down, and I still 
managed to do 30% more customer service calls, and so forth; the little things that are easy 
to throw up on a projector and brag to whoever about I think those things are considered 
more quality by my supervision than what I just told you. Not that they disregard those 
things, because in all fairness, they don't they're aware of them. B ut I think in their 
mind, which is driven by the overall up line philosophy, show me a chart with the trend 
line going the right way, and IH show you quality.
Q6a. Why do you think your supervisor's focus and upper management's 
focus for quality is on a upward trend line, versus satisfaction of the 
customer and other things you gave for your own perspective of quality?
Two reasons. I think middle and upper management doesn't choose to be involved with 
our customers anymore. They basically see it as that's the end that the sections and section 
heads take care of, and they always like to say, "You guys do a good job at that. We’re 
going to focus more on the management issues." They don't see that as important, because 
they don't deal with it day to day. I do, they don't. And also, I think, because over the 
last three or four years, ever since we've become involved in this TQM program, I think 
people made certain assumptions when we got into it, what we needed to do to achieve 
success in it, and if you look at the award and all the other things that go into it, yeah, 
we've been smashingly successful. And I think upper management down to middle 
management has wrapped themselves in that for so long, they've lost their vision for 
anything other than how to measure something, how to chart something, and how to plan 
something. Now occasionally they'll get wrapped up in the drill that XYZ Corporate 
wants some hard data about how many customers we've fixed and what we've done, what 
are success rates are, and they'll come down and get i t  But left to their own, day to day, 
they're more interested in fulfilling some of Deming's prophecies and principles, if you
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will, than they are really in what my guys are doing with our customers, and how happy 
they are, and how good they are at doing it
Q6b. You raise and interesting perspective: that total quality has caused 
middle and upper management to lose their vision for their organization?
Absolutely!
Q6c. And instead their focus has come to a reductionistic view of charting, 
breaking the business into pieces, and measuring it?
Yes! You got it! Exactly right! Again, that's my view, but that's the way I see it! (Pause) 
I don't think it is out of maliciousness or not caring, it just evolved that way. I think when 
the word came down, you're going to get involved in this, now go out and do it well, I 
think the mission became: weH do it better than anybody has ever done i t  For an entire 
year we had that entire wall covered with charts. We were charting absolutely ridiculous 
things, but we were charting them.
Q6d. Let's go back to Deming's 14 principles, one being consistency of 
purpose. So what you are saying is that they focus on maybe ten points, 
and they missed the consistency of purpose principle?
(Laugh). We've joked about that a lot, but it's really serious. We say that Deming must 
have only had seven principles, because that's all we follow. What little bit I've learned 
about it, it is an all or nothing. You can't just adopt part of it; you have to adopt all of it. 
We've given good lip service to that, and we, on the surface, appear to do that, but we've 
never done that
Q6e. Do you feel the total quality effort has taken more away from the 
organization than it has given?
I do. I do.
Q6f. And you would say, it's because it has caused the organization to 
lose it's focus, it's vision, it's purpose. It has caused the organization to 
focus on a lot of little things, and in that process people have lost a vision?
Yes. It has caused us to become fragmented on a lot of things. We go out in the name of 
customer relations, well generate four things we're doing now, that we didn't do before, 
and there is some merit to them, but at the same time we're doing these four things, we're
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also doing everything we've ever done before, and it's like if I say to you, "I want to sit 
down and talk things over with you once a week. Don't you think that would be a good 
idea?" You're not likely to say, "No, I don't." You probably would say, "Gosh, if you 
think you need to, that would be fine." You may never thought you needed to talk to me 
once a week, but if I go out in the name of customer relations and give you a full report 
once a week, you are going to take it  You may not read i t  but you are going to take it! 
Then I go back and tell everybody, "Gosh, I've got this fellow that wants this report once a 
week, he's dying to have i t
and we're going to give it to him, because that's the way we improve our relationship with 
the customers. We keep him informed weekly." Well now, everybody goes out works a 
lot harder, just so they can give me this paper, just so I can give it to you, just so you can 
go, "Hmmm", and put it over to the side. Now that's a real simplistic answer, I know, but 
that type of thing is what has happened. We've gone out and created meetings, get 
togethers, and it's like a self-fulfilling kind of idea. This, this, and this was voted as the 
top three things, so they must be good ideas, so we're going to do them. Well, sometimes 
the best thing to do, instead of offering them these three things, is to go out and ask them, 
what would you really like to see me do different I don't think we did that. I think we hit 
people between the eyes with what we would like to do for them, rather than take a real 
good look at what they would have us do.
Q6g. So you feel the focus on improving your products was something 
that was generated from within, versus taking the viewpoint, let's let the 
customer tell us where we need improvement, and what he would like to 
have?
I think so overall. If you were to ask someone else, you might get the exact opposite 
opinion. This is just my viewpoint. But a lot of the time consuming, silly little things we 
spent doing was nothing more than a need we generated, not something we were requested 
to do. And if you take the same group of people, who everyday their job is to go down 
and get our customers fixed, to get them going, and you start constantly adding these little 
paper work drills with no good explanation and without any consensus from them, it 
doesn't work. You can direct people to do things, but you can't direct them to be 
enthusiastic about i t  That has to come from within. I think we've directed people to do a 
lot of things and we've also tried to direct them to be enthusiastic.
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Q6h. So you feel the organization, as a whole, has directed people to do a 
lot of things, and as a result a number of people have lost their enthusiasm 
for their job?
Absolutely. If not for their job, they've lost enthusiasm for any type of TQM endeavor. 
You put that tag on the front of anything, the switch goes off. I don't think anyone has lost 
their enthusiasm for doing their job technically. But if you hand the TQM tag on anything, 
the majority of the guys around here just switch off.
Q6i. I wonder if people have hung a TQM tag on me, because that's not 
exactly what I am about?
Yes. Yes.
Q6j. I'm not an advocate of TQM.  On the other hand, I'm not dis- 
advocating TQM. I'm value neutral towards i t  It's simply an issue in my 
research, since it's part of your history.
I think the reason people perceive that and I'm talking section heads now, because below 
that I don't believe you've talk to other people, because at least 5 others I've talked to all 
had the impression you were working on your PhD, and it had something to do with TQM, 
and you knew our Chief Operating Officer and our Vice President, and they wanted you 
to come in here and talk to us, because it would make us look even better what we were 
doing for TQM. That's the impression most people had. Now after we have talked, I 
don't feel like that now, but that was the impression people had.
Q6k. Your COO is just an acquaintance. I met your Vice President 
through introducing him on the possibility of this research. I had to sell 
him on the idea. I don't have a charter with either of them. If their intent 
is to let me do this because it would make them look good with regard to 
TQM,  then I'm not privy to that intent I don't have an agenda with 
either. What my agenda is, is to facilitate generation of new organizational 
understandings with the participants about their own organizational 
situation, history, and culture, and to observe this process as it may or may 
not happen. TQM  is a part of this, since it is a part of the organization's 
history.
I think another reason that might have led to everyone making this assumption is that we 
got very little background as to how all of this came about, and our participation was not
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voluntary. We were simply told we were just going to submit to an interview. If someone 
had said, "Would you mind doing this?", I don't know if I would have said yes or no. I 
probably would have said, "Give me a little more what it's about" But I wasn't even 
given that option. Now I can tell you I don't mind doing it. It's not that I’m here under 
duress, but nobody asked me if I wanted to either. And that kinda ties back into some of 
the other things I was telling you. Not only did I not get an option whether this would 
benefit anybody or anything, I didn't even get much of a background about what it was 
about, until you spoke to us the other day. It wasn't really until I could ask a few 
questions and listen to some of the other guys questions and talk with you, that I really felt 
I understood what you were trying to do.
Q61. That's also kinda counter-productive to what I want to do, if people 
are doing this under duress, because it won't work.
It's not really duress, as I said.
Q6m. I've asked for this opportunity, but I take it as I have an obligation 
to sell to each individual what I am doing, because you are the ones 
investing your time. But if people feel they are being made to do this, it 
won't work.
I don't know if people feel they are being made to. I don't feel I was absolutely made to. 
Nobody told me anything to say or not say. If they did, I would have had a fit But I was 
just trying to give you an example that it wasn't a volunteer effort No one explained and 
asked would you participate, if not tell me why you don't want to. No one gave us a 
choice. I don't feel anyone is here because they absolutely had no other alternative. I 
suppose if I told my divisional manager I will lay out sick, I will do anything I have to do, 
but I will just absolutely not talk to that man, probably he would excuse me. But the 
perception ties back to what I said about the TQM tag. Around here, if that's tied to it, I 
think the majority opinion is that here we go again. It's another drill, because we've been 
through so many things, from group sessions, to training, to lectures, you name it! The 
general perception with this was, "Well, here we go again, here's one more!" Now I think 
I'm seeing now, that's not really what we are doing. Certainly that is the perception that I 
had. I think the other day and our conversation turned me around on it a little bit.
Q6n. I think what I should do, as I generate these perspectives on 
individuals, try to get back to as many people as I can, show them their
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perspectives, and request if I could meet with them, and make it plain that 
if they don't wish to participate in this, that's O.K. I would like their 
participation. Because it would be valuable to let people who do not want 
to do this, to just not do i t  It would be valuable to the research....
It might even show me something, too, if you came back and said, "Mr. X, you were the 
only one that felt that way, then if nothing else, it might make me re-examine why I feel 
this way, and that could happen.
Q6o. But if you didn't want to talk to me again, you wouldn't get this 
feedback from me, because I wouldn't contact you again.
Yes, right That's what really swayed me that this might be a good thing, that we are going
to go back and look at how I felt about things, what my perspective  (Ran out of tape
on first side. Failed to capture the complete response to this question).
7. What do you think would indicate quality from your subordinates' 
perspectives?
I think for the most part they look for me to be fair, that I treat them fair along with their co­
workers. They want to be rewarded and recognized when they do a good job, and I think 
they want to feel that I have a confidence in them. I think they look for me to be there 
when they need me, not to pawn them off on somebody else. I think one of the most 
important things is if they bring a problem to me, they look to me to get them an answer. 
They look for the answer they want, but when I can't, they look to me for a well thought 
out answer. An issue recently was a guy who was injured on the job; he was required to 
take sick leave versus compensatory time for the time he was out And his question was 
why did I have to take sick leave? So and so went on traumatic injury pay. I didn't know, 
but I said I would find out I spent a lot of time finding out and I didn't like the answer 
either, he didn't like it either and said, "That is kinda crazy, isn't it?" I said, "Yeah it is." 
But he said, "I appreciate you looking into i t  at least now I know why." You see, that's 
quality in their eyes. I think, pretty much, just support and recognition is what they look to 
me for and fairness!
Q7a. Do you feel any look to you for mentoring?
No. I really don't Because most are pretty professional and secure in what they do, and 
some are even senior to me in how long they've been doing it. Now I have one young 
engineer who just came to work for us from Va. Tech.; possibly, he does a little b it but
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that's understandable, because he has never done this sort of work before. Most of the 
guys are from one ofXYZ's subsidiaries or from some place where they have had a heavy 
technical background. So, in general, I don't think they look to me for that. I'd be 
flattered, but I don't think they do.
Q7b. Do you feel you should mentor the young engineer in your section? 
Yeah. Oh Yeah, I think I should, because there are a lot of things he needs to be shown. 
There's a lot of things the guys will show him with our customers when I'm not there. 
That's their responsibility. I owe him a lot of little things he needs to know to function 
with our customers and this organization, like career path, how you get ahead, the things 
you need to do. In fact, I owe that to all of them. Right now I'm trying to come up with 
some sort of administrative training plan for them. I don't know if you want to call that 
being a mentor or not, but I want to make sure each one of them become a little more 
proficient in doing the things I have to do each day, so if I'm not here, they can move in 
and take right over. Last year I had an easy road. I had one of two guys that could fill in 
for me. Well, it was brought to my attention that maybe I ought to be training everybody to 
do that, because it gives me a lot larger pool to draw from, which can take some of my 
work load off, and also it’s doing the guys a favor, because if they are ever looking 
towards any kind of management, they're going to need to know how to do this. And even 
if they don't, they ought to be qualified to do certain things. If you want to call that a 
mentor type relationship, I guess that's what I do have.
Q7c. Do you feel what you have said would indicate quality from your 
supervisor's eyes, from your eyes, and from your subordinate's eyes 
should have any sort of measures associated with them?
I'm going to give you an answer, but then take the easy way out. Yeah, I think there 
should be, but I don’t know how you could do it, because a lot of them are just so 
subjective. I can count how many problems you fix, I can count how many reports you 
gave me, but I can't count how well you conduct yourself, how well you function, how 
cooperative you are, how willing you are to come in and say, "Hey, is there anything I can 
do to help you today, or do you want me to go and help so and so?" Those type of things 
are hard to measure, but if you are a people oriented person, like I feel I am, you 
instinctively know those. I think that's a cop out type answer.
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Q7d. Not really, because I have a couple questions on that. It's certainly 
hard to measure a service type industry.
That's one of the biggest problems we have with the whole concept
Q7e. A lot of measures would probably be subjective and probably best 
measured by the intuitive and subjective feelings of the line managers.
I think that is exactly right!
Q7f. But my question is, if you agree with this.....
Oh, I think so, I think so!
Q7g. My statement is, if you feel this way, you're not alone, because this 
has been expressed to me several times in preparing to do these interviews. 
And, given that this seems to be a pattern, that some of the best measures 
of your business might reside with the intuitive thoughts and feelings of 
the line managers as to your situation and possible futures, has there been 
any sort of dialog that has been facilitated, a conversation between line 
managers, to get people together to talk about the business and how and 
why you do things, how people are doing, or how you might do things 
differently, to foster or bring forth these possible intuitive measures, 
collective wisdom or knowledge, i.e., sort of a different approach than 
charts on the wall?
To the best of my knowledge, we have never, ever done that, discussed it, considered it, or 
even thought it to be beneficial!
Q7h. Do you think it might be beneficial? I am just now sitting here
inventing this, because your conversation has led me to this thought
Yes, I absolutely do! I think that might be a real breath of fresh air. Because, I think I 
could tell you without exception, if you could find a section head in this building who isn't 
tired of charts, I sure would like to know who the guy is. Some of them are good, some 
are bad, but the majority of them are useless. And there are some bad charts that I don't 
like, because they don't make me look good, but I can see the usefulness of them. There 
are some charts that I love, because they make me look good. But the majority of them are 
functionally useless! We could track the phases of the moon, but what the hell has that got 
to do with our real work. O.K., I'll track the phases of the moon for six months, but after
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that time you tell me what you're doing with that, and how it impacts how I do my job, and 
111 continue to track i t  But if not, let's get off this dead horse. Well, we may be backing 
away from it a little now, but only a little! And certainly not to the point where we might 
do something along the lines you just suggested. No! I've never seen one iota that 
anybody would be interested in that And the reason being, is because that throws back to 
how we always did it before. You know, we use to always do that before! But we didn't 
have a name for it. We didn't have a buzz word, a phrase, a group, or theology that 
embraced that type of style! Now we do! We just can't bring ourselves to say, "Maybe the 
way we use to do things was good, we just didn't call it anything." You know? Do you 
follow me? I think what you said is absolutely correct It would be very nice to do that
Q7i. How I came to the this thought, I probably should not go into this, 
but most of our science is what is called reductionistic: you make a
distinction by drawing a line; once you do this, you now have two halves; 
our science is based on drawing distinctions, which leads to breaking 
things down to their smallest parts in order to better explain and understand 
our world; the whole is then, supposedly, preserved by establishing, 
defining, or explaining the relationships of the parts. Now it dawned on 
me, as we were talking, that Total Quality tends to do the same sort of 
thing with an organization. It breaks things down into 14 points, process 
charts, etc. This can be really good for organizations, in that it may help 
them see things about their business that they didn't see before. But what 
you have explained is that the focus has shifted so much to the "parts" of 
"Total Quality", the whole, the focus of the business, has been lost, where 
you think it has done more harm than good. It has subdivided the business 
so much it has actually taken away from the business instead of adding to 
it .
I truly believe that!
Q7j. That's how my thoughts developed as we were talking.
I think you're right on track there, because it has gotten to the point where it has even put 
us into two camps. It has put us into the shop floor and the business. And, I've even 
heard some managers basically say that. That they have chosen to deal with the "up line" 
function, as it is called, or the relationships with XYZ Corporate or the business end of 
things, and let the lower end take care of the water front, because that's not where our
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problems were. You see, they've drawn a line, and the line has become a wall. It was
maybe just a line in the sand, but now it’s a stone wall, and it's getting taller.
Q7k. What does that do to the business where people draw this distinction, 
let the shop floor  take care of itself, and management focus on the XYZ  
Corporate aspect of the business?
What it does, like I told you earlier, everything at the working level that comes down from 
up above is perceived as another management initiative that is just for them, or it is for that 
end, and it's not going to translate into anything that is any good for us in working with 
our customers.
Q71. So it has produced boundaries, divisions, a morale problem between
lower ranks and higher management?
And usually the focal point for all of that is the section head. Our day to day is dealing with 
the shop floor, and our loyalty, if you want to call it that, is on the other side of the wall 
with management, which we really are suppose to be. It really pulls at us from both sides. 
Because there are certain times when I can understand why we need to talk up a certain 
issue, or work on this, or why we need all this extra input, and it's hard for me to explain 
that to the guys. But if I truly understand it, bought into it, I can usually get it across to 
them, and usually they will see. But you've got to flow that information down, because 
I'm not going to campaign for your guy if I don't like what he says, or I at least don't 
understand what he has to say. Some things you are a good soldier, and you carry out 
your orders, because it came down through the chain, and you are a part of the chain, and 
if you don't, you don't have any chain. I know why that is, because I'm prior military 
myself. But, when you are dealing with highly educated and trained professional people, 
you can't treat them like people on an assembly line. You can't simply just say, do this, do 
that, it's for your own good, we know best, because we are management Again, if you 
are putting on lug nuts in a Ford plant you can measure i t  look at the process, and maybe 
improve i t  It's a little harder to take a guy out there and say, "Take this five page form on 
how you service a customer, this is the way you do it, and we are going to come up with a 
measure to send back to our customers to see how well you are doing this. But don't take 
this personally. It's not a check to see how well you do your job. It's a management tool 
to help us figure out where we have our short comings as a company. They don't buy that. 
They don't buy that That's just one example. It goes on and on. And then at the same 
time, if you are taking away the little benefits, coming up with all kinds of nit picky rules.
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and coming up with all kinds of restraints against these people, you don't sell them 
anything that way. You certainly don't get their enthusiasm. A lot of that we can't control, 
because we are a bureaucratic organization, because a lot of things are mandated, a lot of 
things are mandated by the CEO, who changes every two or three years. So certain things 
aren't going to change, there is no way around them, no fixing them ever, but certain 
things, and I tried to indicate that in the little questionnaire, are like let's make a change, 
there it is, let's pass it out Certainly not well thought out I'm getting off subject.
Q7m. No! Anything you have to say is not off subject
Well, that was all I had there.
Q8. How do you feel you are rewarded for the things that you do that you 
feel are quality?
A lot of people say I get paid every two weeks. I think my reward I get a lot more
reward when I can sense there is a harmony in the section, and there's a teamwork spirit 
going on there, guys are helping each other, and the guys are doing their job without me
having to really I guess I feel I'm more in tune with what I ought to do when that
place is running itself with just a little suggestion from me. To me, that's job satisfaction. 
If I have to get out there and say you do this, and you do that, then there's not much job 
satisfaction. To me the reward is when people feel they are mature enough and self 
motivated enough to go do their job, and do what is expected of them and get along with 
each other. To me, that's a big factor with me, is the relationships among people. Now 
they don't all have to be best friends at work and away from work, but it sure makes a heck 
of a lot better unit if you do get along and you do care for one another, at least 
professionally. Because these guys travel together and live together just like troops in the 
field, and if you have a harmony, it clicks. And if you don't, it doesn't There are days 
it's beautiful, and there are days I wonder if I'm doing anything right like this morning.
Q8a. How do you feel you've developed this style of management? What 
experiences have been important to you that have led you to the way you 
think now?
I guess because what I worked under when I was coming up through the ranks here. I 
came to work here in Apr 74. Part is just my personality. Part is I've tried to draw from 
people I've worked for in the past. When I worked for somebody who respected me as a 
person, that's the most important thing, and respected me as a human being, and treated me
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like an adult, gave me the job at hand, and had the confidence that I would go and do it 
without being questioned or looked over every five minutes, and a guy who would have a 
little bit of understanding if I came to him with something personal, if he could fit that in. 
That's the kind of people I would always feel like working my butt off for, and I was 
fortunate enough to work for a couple of those guys, and I felt like, "I would do anything 
for this guy.” Why would I do that, because he treats me like a human being, he treats me 
like a man, he treats me like an adult, and he has a little understanding and compassion 
when I have a personal problem. That's really where it came from. I guess just a lot of it 
was how you were raised as a child, how you were taught to treat people. Some people 
tend to change when they go from the working level to the section: ''O.K., now I have the 
club to take out all the frustrations I ever felt towards everyone else.” And, I don’t do that. 
That's one thing I promised myself I would not do. I would not say, "O.K., I use to get 
the hell beat out of me, now I've got the club." No! Because you don't do anything but 
really create problems. I also had the benefit of working for a couple guys that I didn't 
particularly care for and seeing what other people's experience was working for similar 
guys. So I guess I kinda cheated. I drew from all the good examples and all the bad 
examples, and I kinda blended that with how I am naturally, and that's why I am how I 
am.
Q8b. I don't think that's cheating at all.
(Laughter) That's pretty much what I do. To this day there are a couple of guys, and
every so often I'll get something pounding on me, and I'll sit there and think, I know you 
don't know who Mr. A is, he was the best supervisor, and I'll sit there and say, "O.K., 
what would Mr. A do?" And sometimes 111 get to laughing, because sometimes he would 
tell me, "No matter how bad it gets, no matter how bad you think you screwed up, no 
matter what's happening, if you really don't know what to do, don't do anything. Get up 
and get a cup of coffee. Do something for a few minutes, then sit down and think about 
it" And I do that, and it regularly helps me.
Q8c. Good advice, real good advice!
Yeah, and there was another guy I worked for whose basic philosophy was, "I’m going to 
react to whoever called me on the phone first; if I get a call from a customer, and some 
manager chews me out because he's mad as hell that no one was there to fix his equipment 
this morning," the first thing he would do is slam the phone down, go out and pick one of 
us out and chew us out word for word. Then he's shifted the burden. I don't do that, and
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the biggest reason I don't do that is because I don’t like being treated that way. Now I 
don't make everybody happy. I had a couple people recently that I wasn't able to please, 
because I had two promotions and four people eligible. That's a can't win situation. I did 
the best job I could to explain to the two people why it didn't work out for them this time. 
One understood it a lot better than I thought he would, and one understood it a lot less than 
I thought he would. And that's bothered me, but at the same time. I'm kind of at peace 
with it, because I know there was no way to make all four of those people happy. But I 
feel I made the best decision I knew how, and I feel I did the best job I could to explain it. 
So therefore I'm not grieving it  So that's sort of how I evolved the style that I am.
Q9. Let me try to jump to this question. Try to imagine an organization 
like yours, with the same resources and responsibilities, if it had all the 
characteristics of "quality" that you can imagine, how would it be different 
from XYZ1
I think it would be a lot different because the people at my level and below my level would 
feel a lot more secure about the type of leaders they had. We use to feel that way, because 
we knew from the top down, our CEO, our COO, everybody in the company structure, 
was really aware from day to day what people were doing. And if I had a problem on the 
ship and I had to push it up, most of the time the COO already knew about it, because he 
read the company briefs everyday. They'd even show up at our customer sites sometimes.
Q9e. Was this Mr. W*i
Yes.
Q9f. Other people have mentioned him.
In all fairness to our present managers, he was the only one with a smaller organization. 
But I don't know that our vice presidents couldn't carry on exactly as he did, now, if they 
wanted to within their own area.
Q9g. What keeps them from doing so?
Their own desires. Also, I think this overall philosophy the company has gotten caught up 
in, because, you see, our present CEO for a while had our vice presidents going to 
meetings four days a week. It took half the morning, or half the day! It was ridiculous! 
Now that's eased up a little bit, but that's the philosophy, and if he's their boss, they're 
going to fall in line with that, and so on, and so forth. But to put it simply, I think you
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would have a lot more lower end confidence in the upper end, and if you had that, you 
would have a lot more enthusiasm and cooperation on the lower end, and if you had that, 
you really would have more quality. You'd have a lot more openness, more sharing of 
ideas, people would speak up more because they would have more assurance that they 
would be listened to. You can tell anybody, "I might not give you everything you want, 
but I sincerely will listen to you, and IH take it under advisement, and if I don't do it, I'll 
come back and tell you why." Now, there’s no perfect world, not everybody that works in 
this entire organization is going to feel that every idea that they have or everything they 
want is going to get heard at the highest level and answered all the way back to them. But. 
I can't tell you how many times I've asked for input and heard something like, "Why 
bother? Nobody listens to it anyway.” Maybe that is a universal complaint from the 
working man. I guess it is, because I feel that way. But I think if someone really, really 
said I'm the leader of this organization, and my number one goal is going to be get the 
confidence back from those guys, that their leaders are truly working for them, their best 
interest, and this company, and if those two come into conflict, I want those guys to 
understand why I can't support more promotions, or why I can't support hiring more 
people, or why I can't support whatever. I want them to know and understand I'm really 
on their side, and if I can't help them, I'm going to try to do everything I can to not hurt 
them. I just think it seems pretty simple. I don't know why we can't have that. I think the 
biggest impediment is that top leadership got off on the wrong foot with this whole 
philosophy. Because we use to do things differently than this, and we never had 
everybody happy, but I think we had a lot more camaraderie, and whatever. Maybe getting 
bigger took a lot of that away, too. Because over the years we've grown. Over the years 
we've taken in four new functions. See, we use to just be our current primary function. 
Maybe we lost some of this as we grew. But a lot of it, I am convinced, just started to 
come about with the approach we took to TQM. Our first exposure to that was when all 
the top managers went off to Williamsburg for three days for some big get together with 
Dr. S from Tech. Maybe that was just fine. Maybe that was necessary. But, you know, 
the worker bees were never really informed of it, and they were going off to get educated in 
this new process. It stayed at the top for too long before it was ever pushed down, and 
then when it came down, it was like thrown down. It wasn't brought up. So we got off 
on the wrong foot. So if we had the type of organization that I sort of outlined, the 
outcome would be, the bottom line, you would have more trust and cooperation. And if 
you had that you would have enthusiasm, and if you had that kind of stuff, anything else 
you could get You can demand that I do task A, but you can't demand that I have a good
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attitude about i t  You can't mandate my enthusiasm, trust, or respect. You have to earn 
that And these people don't understand that!
Q9h. If you could do anything you wanted to with X Y Z , what would you 
do, what position would you take on TQM ?
Right now, I think I would make a very loud statement with everybody that I'm throwing it 
out the door! I would say, "Folks! TQM is dead! We don't have it anymore! What I 
want to get is your trust, your cooperation, your respect, and when we work out how to do 
that, well have something, and I'm not going to call it TQM, maybe 111 just call it a good 
organization, but we're going to work toward those goals." Now, if we reach that point, 
in my mind, we would have been practicing TQM. We may not have called it that, we 
may not have even given it a name, but we would have in fact taken up all these principles 
that go with it, because it's nothing new! It's common sense! A lot of it, as I understand 
it, is just listening to people, and acting on what they say, and being willing, as someone in 
a management position, to take this guy's word who put's the lug nuts on that maybe he 
has got a good idea. I got hit right between the eyes with that last Thursday. One of my 
guys I was trying to talk to why he didn't get promoted, right out of the blue, he hit me 
with something concerning another individual that I never even thought about, and he was 
so right, I had to stop what we were doing, and go fix it right there. You know, so I just 
got a good idea from him. That's what you do. You get those ideas and act on it. But I 
think we have abused and misused TQM for so long, the first thing I think I would do is 
tell everyone, "It is dead, forget it, don't worry about it. Idea implementation teams, 
discussion groups, points, charts, graphs, everything we ever did, everything we ever 
associated with TQM, forget it folks. It's dead. We're going to start from scratch. 
Here's are goals. It's very simple." Now XYZ Corporate, has (laugh) mandated TQM. 
So you got to fit that somehow, too. But my first goal would be to make sure everybody 
really knew we were really going to change our focus, not just for six weeks, or until 
somebody came down on me, but we were, by God, (sound of hand hitting table) as long 
as I was in charge of this organization. And, I would stick to it, even if it got tough.
Q10. Have you undergone training sponsored by X Y Z  that stresses 
"quality"?
Yes.
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QlOa. Has it helped you in any way with your job?
Honda Power and Light has some pretty good training. I went to a team leader training. 
Part of that training, we did a day and a half on meetings, how to conduct meetings, and 
how not to conduct meetings. And, honestly, I did get something from that I've tried to 
use some of that, to keep a meeting focused and directed, and listening to everybody. So I 
can't say I've never gotten anything from i t  That team leader training, I thought was pretty 
beneficial to me.
Q ll. What do you see as the major road blocks in your area of 
responsibility to do a quality job?
I would say, right now, the management structure I am forced to operate under.
Q lla . By management structure, you mean....?
It the differences in opinion I have with the rest of my management chain of what quality 
is, and how you bring it out That’s the biggest impediment to me.
Q llb . Do you feel they are focused, I forgot exactly how you said it, 
bottom down, or top up?
I think they are focused on the top up.
QUc. Do you feel that is an appropriate focus in that, for example, perhaps 
XYZ must be sold at a top level in order to survive?
I know we can't survive in a vacuum, so I understand why our CEO and COO have to go 
up to XYZ Corporate and sell us constantly. But, I think they do this at the expense of not 
really having the pulse of what is happening within the company. I think they go too far 
overboard with that I think they went after the Senate Productivity Award like a duck goes 
after a June bug. I think they went after that with all their heart and soul and committed 
much more time to that than it was ever worth. We won it! Now what!? Certainly, I'm 
proud of that But, I really truly believe that in the long run winning or not winning that 
award is going to make one iota of difference in where we go or what we do. I'm 
absolutely convinced, it will never ever be worth the effort we put into it! You would not 
believe what we did. I'm not saying we manufactured things.
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Q lld . Was that under a different CEOl
Yes. CEO Mr. C actually brought in total quality. It was under CEO Mr. D we actually 
won the award.
QUe. I think I knew of him.
J. D.
Q llf. I did know of him.
He could be quite difficult I think he drove a lot of nails. And, you see, that's another 
thing we have to contend with. I don't know who hears this. I hope it is just you.
Q llg . Let me assure you that I am obligated under the ethics of this 
research to not release this conversation to anyone but you, unless you 
gave me specific permission, and even then, I would have to protect your 
identity, that is, even you cannot give me permission to associate these 
words specifically with you.
I think a lot of what we probably suffer under is the fact that every two to four years we 
change CEO's. The CEO's that we get, with few exceptions, are not upward bound. 
And a lot of them come in here with baggage. I really do. (Pause). That's not to say there 
hasn't been some very capable and good ones, but I think a lot of them come in here with 
baggage. And, for the most part, they all come in, and priority one is to make their mark, 
and do their thing that distinguishes them from all the other CEO's before them. I know 
that's a traditional thing that every company deals with. You see, we've been in such 
transition for so long that every time we get a new CEO, everybody holds their breath, and 
this is even worse than the last one. And in some ways, every time you get one it's like, 
"Hey, this is better." But then someone says, "Did you hear what he did last week."
And  (Ran out of tape, which ended the capture of this interview, although our
conversation continued for approximately another 15 minutes.)




These individual perspectives were developed from the interview of a Mr. X 
presented under appendix 2. These perspectives serve to demonstrate the translation of 
interview data into individual perspectives. The formulation of the proposed individual 
perspectives sought to not include anything that might be identified specifically with the 
individual where the perspectives might be included in their original form with other 
perspectives in the composite perspectives. The interviewee edited these perspectives to 
protect his organization's identity. Where a word or phrase has been changed to a more 
generic word or phrase, the text is italicized. These perspectives, as disguised, are printed 
with the explicit permission of the interviewee and the participant organization.
Interviewee Instructions
The following statement was made to give all interviewees guidance in the 
validation of their perspectives:
"The following perspectives were developed from your interview. They consist of 
opinions you verbalized, as well as interpretation of opinions that were perceived to be 
inferred. It is important that the final product represents your perspectives. For each of the 
below statements to be your perspective, you should feel comfortable with the statement, 
and it should be highly representative of your personal beliefs regarding your company's 
history, culture, and/or current situations. If it is not, you should feel free to add, delete, 
and/or change any or all perspectives that you desire. Your perspectives will only be used 
to generate a set of joint perspectives for joint reflection by all of the participating 
managers."
Mr. X's Validated Perspectives
1. Change at XYZ is usually perceived as being mandated without logic or reason as to 
why, since first line management is normally not consulted before a change is 
introduced, or if they are, more often than not, the change is introduced without 
incorporating any of their recommendations.
2. Change at XYZ comes with difficulty due to, at least partially, first line managers 
feeling they are not consulted in most changes.
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3. Upper management's pattern of mandated change has caused first line management to 
feel that they have less ownership in the business and less trust in our leadership.
4. If first line management does not have feelings of ownership in the business or feelings 
of trust in our leadership, it is difficult for them to foster these same feelings with XYZ 
employees.
5. Upper management has not only mandated change, they have directed employees to be 
enthusiastic about i t  This solicits the opposite reaction, since enthusiasm cannot be 
directed, but must come from within.
6. Decisions within XYZ should be made jointly with the people they affect
7. XYZ's culture does not promote TQM's premise of participatory management If a
manager tries to include his employees in as many decisions as possible, he may often 
be told, "You've got one foot in the supervisors office, and the other out on the shop 
floor, and you can't have both."
8. There is very little division of employees at the working level. If XYZ employees 
from different sections or divisions are on a ship as a team, there is normally good 
cooperation and minimum conflict in accomplishing the job at hand. Distinctions that 
are made between the various sections or divisions usually occur at the section or 
division level of management
9. XYZ's key guiding principle is to provide the highest quality and most timely service 
possible in restoring to operation customer equipments under XYZ's charge.
10. Our reputation has been built on our tradition of placing high quality technical expertise 
and timely service as our first priority.
11. Since high quality technical expertise and timely service is our first priority and what 
we have built our reputation upon, management should concentrate on improving 
quality through both an employee oriented focus of improving the training, tools, and 
morale of our personnel, and a customer oriented focus of listening to the needs of our 
customer and then focusing on these needs.
12. TQM has caused middle and upper management's focus on quality to shift from an 
employee oriented focus to an upward trend line on a chart, and from listening to our 
customer needs to a self-generation of what upper management thinks the customer 
wants.
13. There is not only a mandate for TQM, but an implied mandate that employees be 
enthusiastic about TQM. Since enthusiasm cannot be mandated, but must come from 
within, this has resulted in the opposite effect of most employees losing enthusiasm 
for any type of TQM endeavor.
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14. There was reluctance in investing time in this research effort, since it was not presented
as something section managers had a choice of doing or not doing. Also, it was 
perceived as just another TQM study to help upper management look good.
15. With finding that the focus of this research is on the participants' perspectives, the 
feelings toward this research have become more positive.
16. XYZ employees look toward their leadership primarily for fairness in decisions that 
affect their jobs and careers, for recognition when due, and for support on special 
problems when called to management's attention. Quality management should include 
management seeking to evaluate itself on how well they perform these three basic 
employee expectations.
17. Quality is difficult to measure in a service organization. As such, the best measures of 
quality in a service organization are probably the perceptions of the people who are 
closest to the products of the business. As such, our primary measures of quality and 
formulations for improvement should be based on the perceptions of our technicians 
and first line supervisors.
18. Our attempt to "chart" quality has bypassed much of our intuitive, subjective 
understandings of what quality really is and what we need to do to achieve it
19. One of the best ways to measure quality in our service organization would be to 
facilitate conversations among technicians and first line supervisors as to how they 
experience quality in the things they do, and how these experiences might be exported 
beyond their local area of interactions. Attributes, such as the enthusiasm of 
individuals, diversity of ideas, and viability of the contributions from such 
conversations, would provide a far better indicator of quality and our progress than 
any quality chart might otherwise suggest
20. It would now be difficult for us to evaluate our quality by the perceptions of the people 
who are closest to the products of the business only because this is what we use to do 
before we felt the need to have a label for i t  and consequently, it would be perceived 
by some as going backwards.
21. We maintain many quality charts that tell us absolutely nothing about our quality or the 
products of our business.
22. We should have a semi-annual review of the quality charts that we maintain. For each 
chart there should be a formulation as to what it has told us over the last six months 
and the benefits we have derived from this information. If such a statement cannot be 
formulated for a chart, it should be discontinued.
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23. Our TQM efforts and resulting focus on charts, processes, and their statistical numbers
have divided our business into so many parts that we now have a hard time 
concentrating on the whole.
24. In the course of our TQM efforts we have become divided into two separate camps of 
"the shop floor" and "the business", where middle and upper managers have chosen 
to focus on the "up line" functions and let the "lower end" take care of the shop floor 
by itself.
25. If we could return to conversations on our perceptions of quality, we could once again 
regain our focus on the whole, and perhaps reduce the growing "wall" between the 
two XYZ camps of "the shop flo o r" and "the business".
26. Division of XYZ into the two camps of "the shop floor " and "the business" has 
resulted in upper management's trending more and more toward mandates versus 
participatory management
27. Upper management's mandates and one way flow of information has caused the first 
line manager's loyalties to become divided between the shop floor and management 
functions.
28. One example of a mandate that has served to divide the loyalties of first line managers 
is the mandated five page form on how well the technician is performing his services 
for the customer. It is difficult for first-line managers to win support for such a form 
from our professionals, because, without prior buy-in, such mandates are taken 
personally as a lack of confidence, versus something that will help.
29. Because we are a bureaucratic organization, many things must necessarily be 
mandated. But, this has caused us to be comfortable with mandating, and 
consequently, we tend to mandate many things that could be decided in a participatory 
fashion.
30. Because we tend to mandate many things which do not need to be mandated, we tend 
to waste time and energy on things that are simply not well thought out.
31. Upper management has become so comfortable with the mandate, they appear to 
mandate enthusiasm, trust, and respect These things cannot be mandated. They must 
be earned. Yet upper management appears to behave in a fashion that would indicate 
to first-line management and employees that they just don't understand this.
32. The best rewards that our leadership could possibly provide for quality are recognition,
respect, understanding, and freedom to perform what we do in an autonomous 
fashion.
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33. Management's decisions can never make everyone happy. But, management has an 
obligation to make the best decisions possible, and then explain those decisions fully, 
especially to those that might be adversely affected.
34. As XYZ has grown, it has become increasingly difficult for any one person in upper 
management, such as Mr. W, to be a good advocate for what we do all the way to the 
section level.
35. At X Y Z 's present size, the vice president should function as upper management's 
advocate of what we do at the section level.
36. It has been difficult for vice presidents to function as upper management's advocate 
for what we do at the section level, since they are strongly influenced by top 
management and their concerns.
37. It is important to have upper management advocacy for what we do at the section 
level, since if upper management could effectively listen and respond to section level 
concerns, there would be a lot more "lower end" confidence in the "upper end". This 
would, in turn, result in a lot more "lower end" enthusiasm, cooperation, openness, 
sharing of ideas, and trust, which would result in more quality in what we do and a 
more unified approach to our business.
38. Many good ideas within XYZ die at the working level, because employees often feel: 
"Why speak up? No one at a level that could act on the idea will listen."
39. XYZ leadership's number one current priority should be to regain the confidence of 
XYZ working level employees.
40. The best way for XYZ leadership to regain working level employee confidence is to 
go to work for them in their true best interests, i.e., to listen and understand their 
concerns, and to help them enact the ideas that they feel would improve our business. 
Implied in this course of action is that management truly respect the ideas and concerns 
of the working level, and in order for that to happen they must truly listen to their ideas 
and concerns.
41. Many of our past CEOs have come into XYZ with perspectives different from ours.
42. It is important that a CEO learn and understand our perspectives on the operations of 
our business, on our culture, and on our individual and collective aspirations.
43. If a CEO fails to gain an understanding of our perspectives, he is likely to make policy 
decisions that will alienate and fragment the organization.
44. Top management has an obligation to educate a new CEO in our prevailing 
perspectives.




AND FINAL ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The following 181 perspectives were composed from 273 individually validated 
perspectives and arranged by subject Care was taken to eliminate redundancy, but not 
meaning in composing the composite perspectives from individual perspectives.
These perspectives were subsequently assessed by 15 participants in two phases as 
to their comments, personal belief, and their perception of the rhetoric and actions of 
others. These latter three assessments were correspondingly accomplished via three seven- 
point Likert scales labeled "belief', "talk", and "walk". In the first phase of assessments 
the participants recorded their initial assessments and comments. In the second phase of 
assessments the participants were able to see their first phase comments and assessment 
choices, as well as the comments and distribution of choices of the other participants. The 
participants were then able to make additional comments, and/or change their assessment 
choices as desired in the second phase of assessments. They were also able to register 
votes as to their desired to discuss respective perspectives in their subsequent group 
discussions, and as to their desired to have respective perspectives referred to their higher 
management. The tally for these votes are so indicated following the Likert scale 
assessments. The instructions that were provided to the participants for assessing these 
composite perspectives are included under appendix 5.
The assessment choices of the last assessment by the participants are indicated in 
this appendix by a number in each category of each scale of each perspective. Since there 
were 15 participants who assessed these perspectives, the numbers on each scale will total 
to 15. The comments labeled la, lb, lc, etc. are the respective comments of the 
individuals who chose to comment on the respective perspective in the first assessment 
The comments labeled 2a, 2b, 2c, etc. are the respective comments of the individuals who 
chose to comment on the respective perspective in the second assessment
These assessments were used to stimulate participant dialogue in the group 
meetings and as a tool for observing and understanding the participant group's 
perspectives.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
214
COM POSITE PERSPECTIV ES
I. TOTAL QUALITY PERSPECTIV ES
1. ORGANIZATIONAL TQM HISTORY
1. Our first efforts at TQM fell flat on its face. Our second efforts at TQM appeared to 
produce significant gains, but was actually more attributable to circumstance than TQM. 
These gains would have happened anyway. They were simply documented under the title 
of TQM.
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Belief / 0 / 0 / 2 / 0 / 3 / 5 / 5
Talk / 2 / 1 / 4 / 2 / 0 / 2 / 4 /
Walk / 1 / 0 / 3 / 1 / 2 / 3 / 5 /
Group Discussion 4 Refer to higher management 7 .
Comments:
1a. Though our efforts were not totally successful, we learned from our mistakes and 
made an effort to correct them. Some things would have happened, but our work 
documentation improved as well as working in teams. We became aware!
1b. TQM is a vehicle to absolve one of responsibility.
1c. I perceive upper management's "Talk" and "Walk" to be "Somewhat Disagree", while 
I perceive the working level's "Talk" and "Walk" to be "Strongly Agree".
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
215
2. Our current efforts at TQM are "bogged down", i.e., not moving, changing, evolving, 
improving.
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Walk / 0 / 1 / 2 / 2 / 2 /  6 / 2 /
Group Discussion 4 . Refer to higher management 7 .
Comments:
1a. I do not think they are "bogged down". I think they are changing negatively.
3. TQM and fostering innovation within XYZ is currently in a holding pattern, because 
we are primarily occupied with our current reorganization efforts and our concerns of 
fully employing our personnel as our customer base  shrinks and budgets are reduced.
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Talk / 0 / 0 / 1 ( 0 / 5 f 6 / 3 /
Walk / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 6 I 6 / 3 /
Group Discussion 3 . Refer to higher management 5
Comments:
1a. What better time to use TQM. What worse time not to.
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4. Exacerbating the current stagnation of our TQM efforts is the recent deletion of our 
quarterly review process. It is through a process of obtaining support, respect, 

























c  £ o o> 
i: < 
CO
Belief / 2 / 0 f 1 / 3 ! 1 / 6 / 2 /
Talk t 0 f 1 1 0 ! 3 / 6 / 5 ! 0 !
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Group Discussion 4 .
Comments:
1a. Top management does not accept criticism. 
Additional comments:
2a. Agree Totally!
Refer to higher management 6 .
2. NEED FOR HIGHER QUALITY
5. XYZ's current environment of changing customers and shrinking budgets demands 
that we improve quality.
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Belief / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 2 / 7 / 6 /
Talk / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 4 / 5 / 6 /
Walk / 0 / 2 / 2 2 / 5 / 2 / 2 /
Group Discussion 3 . Refer to higher management 5 .
Comments:
1a. Politics over rides quality.
Additional comments:
2a. Agree with above comment: wish I had said it first!
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6. The best way to ensure XYZ's viability to our customers is to ensure we have a 
product of such high quality that it would be unthinkable for our services not to be 
sought.
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Group Discussion 5 . Refer to higher management 6 .
Comments:
1a. Cost and politics are big factors.
1b. I see no move to interface with customers to find out if we are meeting their needs. 
Additional comments:
2a. Disagree with 1b.
7. Quality leadership from the top is especially critical to XYZ at this point in time, due 
to the turmoil we are currently facing in relation to declining budgets, customer base, 
and personnel.
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Belief ! 0 / 0 / 1 ! 0 I 1 / 1 / 1? /
Talk / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 4 / 4 / 7 /
Walk ( 3 ! ? f 4 / 2 ! 3 / 1 / 0 /
Group Discussion 4 . Refer to higher management 8 .
Comments:
1a. We lack leadership.
1b. Top leadership is not what I would define as 'quality leadership"
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
218
3. QUALITY MEASURES
8. Our attempt to "chart" quality has bypassed much of our intuitive, subjective 
understandings of what quality really is and what we need to do to achieve it. We 
maintain many quality charts that tell us absolutely nothing about our quality or the 
products of our business. Furthermore, our focus on charts, processes, and their 
statistical numbers have divided our business into so many parts that we now have a 
hard time concentrating on the whole.
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Walk / 1 /  3 / 5 / 4 /_ 0 / 1 / 1 /
Group Discussion §_ Refer to higher management 7 .
9. Upper management quality oversight has created a  number of measures which take a 
lot of time to compile and have no utility in helping first line management to improve or 
monitor what they do. On the other hand, measures that are important to first line 
management, like technical installation backlogs, seem to have no interest to upper 
management. If a measure is to be adopted, attention should be given to the cost of doing 
the measure vs. how and who it benefits. Upper management quality boards that create 
measures should contain representation by those who must do the work of compiling such 
measures.
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Group Discussion 3 . Refer to higher management 8 .
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10. TQM is formalized common sense. It is common sense that we need data to make 
informed decisions and common sense that social solutions to problems are superior to 
individual solutions. However, we did not properly enact this formalized common sense. 
At first you cannot always know which data is useful, so you must necessarily collect 
some useless data. However, we were forced to continue collecting useless data even 
after it was discovered as such. On the other hand, useful data was not used in a way to 
make informed social decisions on the details of our business. It was this improper 
enactment of TQM that caused many people to "revolt" against the disproportionate 
number of hours spent collecting useless or unused data.
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Talk 7 0 / 1 / 1 ___4 _ L
Walk / 0 / 5 / I 1 2__L /
Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management 7 .
11. Upper management has historically discarded the data gained from our personnel 
surveys. Instead of taking up the issues presented by the surveys and asking what they 
can do to resolve the problems, they have taken a defensive position, such as, “Those 
people! What do they know! After all I've done for them!!"
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Group Discussion §_
(cont. next page)
Refer to higher management 7
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(cont. from previous page)
Comments:
1a. Surveys are the easiest way to gather customer feedback. However, upper 
managements inaction on previous surveys now lessens involvement, participation, and 
sincerity.
1b. Upper management does not discard the information; they justify it in their minds. 
I.E., "I should not be as popular; the employees don't see me as much."
Additional comments:
2a. I'll wager they will do it again.
12. We should have a semi-annual review of the quality charts that we maintain. For 
each chart there should be a formulation as to what it has told us over the last six months 
and the benefits we have derived from this information. If such a statement cannot be 
formulated for a chart, it should be discontinued.
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Talk / 0 / 0 / 1 / 4 / 8 /  1 / 1 /
Walk / 1 /  4 / 3 / 5 J 1 / 0 / 1 /
Group Discussion 3 . Refer to higher management 7 .
Comments:
1a. Semi-annual might not be often enough for some measures.
13. Although measurement of quality in a service organization is problematic, quality 
should be measured by:
a) customer satisfaction;
b) consistency, i.e., no matter who we send on a job, the job gets done in the same high 
quality way;
c) our technicians' and first line supervisors' perceptions as to how well they are 
meeting our customer needs, since they are closest to the products of our business;
(cont. next page)
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(cont from previous page)
d) employee satisfaction, since motivated employees will be more likely to do those 
innovative things that will identify and satisfy customer needs.
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Group Discussion 3_
Comments:
Refer to higher management 5
1a. In talk, management would agree with this statement, but after five years, there has 
been no real effort in making this our measurement criteria.
14. One of the best measures for quality management is the quality displayed by their 
subordinates. This should be measured through surveys. Such surveys should measure 
both customer and employee satisfaction, and should be formulated through collaboration 
with both customers and employees.
® ®
£  ®
“  o> O)







































B ® c £ o o  t= < 
CO
L 2___/ - 7  / 1 /
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Walk 1 0 . /  _ 4 .  _ -L 4 / ? / 3 1 1 / 0 /
Group Discussion 5 Refer to higher management 5 .
Comments:
1a. If we would take corrective action occasionally, rather than just gather data, all 
surveys could be helpful for continuous improvement.
1b. We've just about killed any usefulness of surveys by justifying them instead of 
looking for answers.
(cont. next page)
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(cont from previous page)
Additional comments:
2a. Amen. (Refers to comment '1b' above.)
15. One of the best ways to measure quality in our service organization would be to 
facilitate conversations among technicians and first line supervisors as to how they 
experience quality in the things they do, and how these experiences might be exported 
beyond their local area of interactions. Attributes, such as the enthusiasm of 
individuals, diversity of ideas, and viability of the contributions from such 
conversations, would provide a far better indicator of quality and our progress than any 



























































Belief / 0  / 1 / 0  / 3 / 8 / 1 / 2 /
Talk / 0 / 0 / 3 / 8 / 3 / 1 / 0 /
Walk / 0  / 4 / 2 / .9. - L - . 0 / 0 / 0 /
Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management 5 .
Comments:
1a. Measuring quality in a service organization is difficult, but should be, as much as 
possible, based on data and facts, not feelings; hopefully, we all view our work as 
quality. Enthusiasm is great, but it does not necessarily relate to quality.
1b. These indications seem more quality of work life than quality of performance.
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16. It would now be difficult for us to evaluate our quality by the perceptions of the 
people who are closest to the products of the business only because this is what we use to 
do before we felt the need to have a  label for it, and consequently, it would be perceived 
by some as going backwards.
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Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management 5 .
Comments:
1a. Those closest would be the customer, not the employee. I don't think the person 
doing the work is a good indicator. Personal answers are always subjective.
4. WHY TQM HAS FAILED
A. Perceptions concerning TQM.
17. Upper management’s  propensity to create work of little benefit to lower levels 
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Group Discussion 3 . Refer to higher management 6 .
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18. Many XYZ  people do not want to be involved with TQM,  due to their highly 
structured past environment with our larger company. Their attitude is that they do 
their TQM by the quality they put into their jobs with their customers, and feel 
management should do the TQM internal to XYZ to keep them employed.
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Belief /  1 / 0 / 3 / 0 / 3 / 5 / 4 /
Talk /  0 f 2 / 1 / 3 / 3 / 6 / 0 /
Walk / 1 / 0 / 4 / 5 / 3 / 2 / 0 /
Group Discussion 3_ Refer to higher management 5 .
Comments:
1a. Most people given the opportunity to participate in controlling their own destiny 
will seize that opportunity. Its only the mirage of TQM that has frustrated them.
1b. This is one part we totally overlooked - the culture of our people and what steps 
should be taken to eliminate or reduce that resistance to change.
19. We tend to talk about TQM principles, but do not exercise the daily attention needed 
to institute such principles: this conveys the message to our employees that TQM is all 
talk and no walk.
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Belief / 0 / 1 / 1- / 0 / 2 ___L___3 _ /  .9. .  /
Talk L_ 0 / 3 / 1 / 1 / 3 .7  _/ 0 /
Walk / 1_./. 2 / 0 . / . . . 2 / 3 / 6__L_ 1 . . /
Group Discussion 2 . Refer to higher management__6
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20. Our history of "talking" about TQM has formed an "anti-culture to TQM, i.e., a 
rejection of actions if associated with the label "TQM".
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Belief / 0 / 1 / 0 / 0 / 2 / 6 / 6 /
Talk / 0 / 2 ! 2 / 0 / 1 / 6 / 4 /
Walk / 0 / 4 / 0 / 2 / 0 / 5 / 4 /
Group Discussion 2 . Refer to higher management 5 .
21. The most positive aspect of TQM is that it has occupied upper management's time to 
a  degree such that first line management can be somewhat more autonomous in the 
management of their respective areas.
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Belief / 0 / 5 / 0 / 0 / 2 / 6 / 2 7
Talk / 0 /  6 / 4 / 2 / 1  7 1 / 1 /
Walk / 1 /  6 / 1 / 2 / 0 / 5 / 0 /
Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management 5
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22. The best way to "do" TQM, is to just do it, versus talking about it. In particular, 
XYZ  personnel are not opposed to formulating strategic plans in groups and to 
continually find better ways to create and do their business, but we tend to relate better 
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Belief /. _o J _  . 0 .  .1 . ! . _ J  J .  1 / 8 1 .  4 . 1
Talk / 1 /  1 / 3 / 2 / 3 /  5 / 0 /
Walk f 0 / 3 / 3 / 3 ! 5 / 1 /  0 /
Group Discussion 2 . Refer to higher management 5 .
B. Perceptions concerning awards.
23. Quality is most often rewarded by management in an inadequate and sporadic way, 
primarily because they are often not aware of the majority of quality put into XYZ's
work effort, and secondarily because the monetary awards are mostly insignificant.
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Belief / 0 / 0 / _ 0 / 0 / 7 4_ /_ 4 /
Talk / 0 / 2 / 3 / 2 / 2 / 5 / 1 /
Walk / 0 / 2 ._1 / _3 / 5 / 3 / 1 /
Group Discussion 3 . Refer to higher management 7
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Belief / 0 / 1 / 0 / 1 / 3 / 8 / 2 /
Talk / 2 / 0 / 1 / 1 5 / 6 / 0 /
Walk /  2 / 0 / . 2 . .  / . . 4 / 4 / 3 /  0 /
Group Discussion 2 . Refer to higher management 5 .
Additional Comments:
2a. The best reward is the quality product derived from all contributions.
25. Rewards for quality are problematic and too often counter-productive due to 
favoritism that arises out of XYZ's "good ole boy" network.
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Belief / 3 / 4 / 2 / 2 / 0 / 3 / 1 /
Talk 2 / 2 J 2 / 5 / 1 / 3 J 0 /
Walk / 3 ! 4 / 1 4 / 1 / 1 / 1 /
Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management.
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26. We do not have an adequate award system, or much less, any type of TQM award 
system. Currently, the only awards are special awards, and often these funds go unused.
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Belief / 6 / 4 / 2 / 0 / 3 / 0  / 0 /
Talk / 4 / _3 / 3 / 2 / 3 / 0  / 0 /
Walk / 5 / 5 / 4 / 0 / 1 / 0 / 0 /
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 6
Comments:
1a. The award system is defunct But, I've never lost a dollar available to give to my 
employees.
1b. We do not have an adequate award nor reward system: however, as far as I know all 
money allocated for awards have been used.
1c. There are more than just special awards. Also a TQM award would be a special 
award. The annual evaluation system had built in awards with it, but the com pany  
circumvented it.
27. Most of our awards are traditionally awarded for outstanding individual efforts. By 
only making such traditional awards we reinforce our current culture that encourages 
individualist vs. cooperative behavior. Instead, we should establish some awards and 
accompanying criteria that will also encourage outstanding team work.
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Refer to higher management g_
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(cont from previous page)
Comments:
1a. We need to foster teamwork, but outstanding individual performance is going 
unrecognized; without the occasional "pat on the back*, high performers will sink into 
mediocrity.
1b. Excellent idea. Especially concerning establishing criteria for team work awards. 
1c. Two part question. First part, disagree; 2nd part agree.
28. The single team award that was awarded in the ABC Department last year resulted 
in alienating many, because the funds for our traditional special awards were used for 
the team award. This would have been O.K., if management had established up front a 
team award and specific criteria. Instead, it was done after the fact with no established 
criteria at the expense of other traditional award funds. Its "after the factness" produced 
a non-level playing field for others in competition for award funds.
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Group Discussion. Refer to higher management.
Comments:
1a. No whining!
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29. Upper management tends to promote and make awards in an ad hoc, after the fact 
fashion. If they promote because of certain qualities, or make an award for a specific 
reason, such as team work, they need to establish up front the specific criteria, not only 
to promote and motivate employees in working toward goals implied by our award 
system, but also in the interest and perception of fairness.
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Belief / 0 / 4 / 0 / 0 ! 1 / 7 / 3 /
Talk / 0 /  3 / 0 / 5 f 1 / 6 / 0 /
Walk I 1 /  3 / 4 / 2 I 2 / 3 / 0 /
Group Discussion___ Refer to higher management.
Comments:
1. No Whining!
C. Perceptions concerning management.
30. The primary source of our quality has been quality people. Upper management has
lost sight of this, and, consequently, our quality is eroding with time.
£ ®£ £O) o) ♦j
■zi © 2 •£ ® , jo m
§ s1 s* ® l  I I  s.O  CO <0
coo Q w z  ^  co co
Belief / 0 / 1 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 7 / 5 /
Talk / 0 / 5 / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 0 /
Walk / 1 / 3 1 . 4 2 / 3 / 1 /
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 5
Additional comments:
2a. I think the agrees are in answer to the first statement. My disagreement is with the 
second statement.
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31. We lack top management leadership, support, and vision. Consequently, we have 



























































Belief / 0 / .1  . . .0.. / . . .0 _/ 3 / 5 / 6 /
Talk / 1 / 6 / 1 / 1 / 1 /  S / 0 /
Walk 1. 1 I 4 / 1 / 1 / 1 / S / 2 /
Group Discussion 3 . Refer to higher management___7
32. TQM often serves as a scapegoat by different layers of management who can't make a 
decision; so, they form a committee. They really don't want to do anything, so they make 
business as usual look like TQM.
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Belief 1 / 0 /  0 / 0 / 5 /  4 / 5 /
Talk / P /  6 /  1 / 2 / 4 / 2 /  0 /
Walk / 1 / 3 /  0 / 2 / 5 / 2 / 2 /
Group Discussion 2 . Refer to higher management 8 .
Comments:
1a. Our top management seldom can agree on anything.
Additional comments:
2b. Amen, or it is an item that should be decided by the Branch Head anyway. (Refers to 
comment '1a' above.)
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33. Higher management espouses empowerment of the lower levels, but as soon as 
something goes wrong, the lower level “gets its head chopped off*. This pretty 
effectively kills empowerment.
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Belief / 1 / 2 / 0 1 0 / 5 / 5 / 2 /
Talk / 2 /  5 / 1 / 2 / 1 / 4 / 0 /
Walk / % /  3 / 0 / 3 1 3 / 3 / 1 /
Group Discussion 4 . Refer to higher management 6 .
Comments:
1a. I believe this command gives lower management lots of freedom to act. If something 
goes wrong, you got to take the hits and get over it.
Additional comments:
2a. I’ve never seen anyone get their head chopped off even though they may have 
deserved it. This to me is an indictment of upper management.
34. Although most within XYZ feel TQM provides a viable set of tools and philosophies 
that can make their jobs more productive and rewarding, and their business more 
competitive, TQM is hated by most, because upper management has misused TQM teams 
in the following self-serving ways:
a) to force unpopular decisions, whenever a team could be formed to produce the 
decision desired;
b) to label dissenters to such decisions as not being team players;
(cont. next page)
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(cont from previous page)
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35. Upper management has historically only enacted the TQM points that in some way 
benefit them, and have traditionally discarded the rest. This communicates a hypocrisy. 
Consequently, what management perceives as anti-TOM sentiment is actually only anti­
misuse of TQM.
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Belief / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 5 / 9 / 1 /
Talk / 0 / 4 / 2 / 1 / 4 / 4 / 0 /
Walk / 0 / 3 / 0 / 1 / 7 / 4 / 0 /
Group Discussion 2_ Refer to higher management £_
Additional comments:
2a. What else can you say?
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36. Among the items generated by lower level Quality Boards, upper management's
propensity to select for action the lower priority items that usually tend to measure
lower level performance, and to ignore the high priority items that would provide lower
level input to upper management, such as bi-monthly meetings of all managers, has sent
a signal that upper management is not interested in doing TQM as designed or is
interested in listening to input from the lower levels.
©
>» 0 






CB m  .C a>











0u.o>< O  CDi= < co
Belief / 0 / 0 / 1 / 4 / 2 / 5 / 3 /
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2a. One item was ignored for a year until it was no longer a high priority.
37. TQM has caused middle and upper management's focus on quality to shift from an 
employee oriented focus to an upward trend line on a chart, and from listening to our 
customer needs to a self-generation of what upper management thinks the customer 
wants.
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Belief / 0 / 2 / _ 2 / 0 / 5 / 5 / 1 /
Talk / 0 / 3 / 4 / 2 / 2 / 4 / 0 /
Walk / 0 / 2 / 3 / 2 / 5 / 3 / 0 /
Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
235
38. Since much of upper management does not understand the products of our business, 
our efforts with TQM has focused on menial "we thought" internal problems, versus 
concentration on the customer and the technical systems that we support.
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Belief / 0 /  2 / 1 / 1 /  3 / 5 / 3 /
Talk / 0 /  5 / 1 / 3 / 3 / 2 / 1 /
Walk / 0 / 4 / 0 / 3 / 6 / 1 / 1 /
Group Discussion 3. Refer to higher management 6.
39. Our past TQM efforts floundered because management would not require those who 
did not lend support to TQM efforts to make an equitable contribution. Consequently, 
management was prone to rely on those who would support a TQM effort for the details of 
those efforts, which resulted in a disproportionate effort by some. Consequently, if we 
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Talk / 0 f 3 / 2 / 4 / 3 / 3 / Q f
Walk / 1 1 2 / 1 . .5 . 2-_/. 4 / o /
Group Discussion 2_ Refer to higher management.
Comments:
1a. Participation cannot be "required" if TQM is to be successful.
1b. You can lead a horse to water but not make him drink. TQM must be rewarded and 
championed so others want to do it, and not forced on some who do not. They would only 
cause trouble if forced to do it.
(cont. next page)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
236
(cont. from previous page)
Additional comments:
2a. Agree with 1a and 1b.
2b. You should not have to put up with managers road blocking or not doing their share 
of a command effort. After all, we all receive *excellent" evaluations now.
40. In the course of our TQM efforts we have become divided into two separate camps of 
"the technical products and services" and “the business", where middle and upper 
managers have chosen to focus on the “up line" functions and let the "lower end" take 
care of the technical products and services by itself.














































Belief / 1 / 0  / 2 / o  / 3 / 6 / 3 /
! 0 /  2 / 4 / 4 /  2 / 3  / 1 /
f o /  3 / 2 / 3 /  4 /  2 / 1 /
Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management 6 .
Comments:
1a. The roles of middle and upper management is “business" - budgeting, return on 
investment, cost of goods and services, etc., so "the technical" work is possible.
1b. We have always been divided, but the line manager has always concentrated on the 
technical work. Now, the line manager has to do both.
Additional comments:
2a. IRT 1a, I would say that there is not enough "budgeting, etc." to keep that many 
middle and upper managers employed full time!
41. XYZ's Total Quality program has been ineffective because many of upper 
management's actions run counter to Total Quality concepts, such as their lack of 
employee orientation, and poor record of feedback and action when problems are 
presented up-line. Since upper management has not responded to organizational 
problems and issues in a quality manner, XYZ will have difficulty moving forward with 
the Total Quality concept. To move forward with the Total Quality concept, upper 
(cont. next page)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
237
(cont. from previous page)
management needs to set an example for the lower levels by applying quality practices to 
themselves. Lower echelons of the command need to see upper management respond to 
their problems, concerns, and issues in a quality manner before they can feel TQM is 
more than just "lip service."
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Belief / 0 /  0 / 0 / 0 / 6 / 6 / 3 /
Talk f 0 / 1 / 3 / 1 / 2 /  8 / 0 /
Walk / 0 / 4 / 1 / 2 / 7 / 1 /  0 /
Group Discussion 2_ Refer to higher management.
42. If we are to achieve the highest possible quality, management must do its job. This 
requires:
a) a fundamental recognition that our past and future success has been and will be due to 
the quality of our people;
b) a pro-active approach with our customers in collaboration with our workers to gain 
market share;
c) support of our work force with the requisite tools and training;
d) a hearing and meeting of the concerns of our personnel;
e) a  giving of the greatest care to the right choices in our new hires and promotions in a 
non-political, fair process.
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Group Discussion.
(cont. next page)
Refer to higher management.
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(cont. from previous page)
Comments:
1a. Amen - Can we add something about honesty and elimination of hidden agendas?
1b. Mother & apple pie statement
38. Since much of upper management does not understand the products of our business, 
our efforts with TQM has focused on menial "we thought" internal problems, versus 
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Talk / 0 / 5 / 1 / 3 / 3 / 2 / 1 /
Walk / 0 / 4 / 0 / 3 / 6 /  1 / 1 /
Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management 6 .
39. Our past TQM efforts floundered because management would not require those who 
did not lend support to TQM efforts to make an equitable contribution. Consequently, 
management was prone to rely on those who would support a TQM effort for the details of 
those efforts, which resulted in a disproportionate effort by some. Consequently, if we 
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(cont. from previous page)
Comments:
1 a. Participation cannot be "required" if TQM is to be successful.
1b. You can lead a horse to water but not make him drink. TQM must be rewarded and 
championed so others want to do it, and not forced on some who do not. They would only 
cause trouble if forced to do it.
Additional comments:
2a. Agree with 1a and 1b.
2b. You should not have to put up with managers road blocking or not doing their share 
of a command effort After all, we all receive ‘excellent" evaluations now.
40. In the course of our TQM efforts we have become divided into two separate camps of 
"the technical products and services" and "the business", where middle and upper 
managers have chosen to focus on the “up line" functions and let the “lower end" take 























































Belief / 1 / 0 / 2 / 0 / 3 / 6 / 3 /
Talk / 0 / 2 / 4 / 4 / 2 /  3 / 1 /
Walk /_ 0_ _ / 3 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 2 / 1 /
Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management 6
Comments:
1a. The roles of middle and upper management is "business" - budgeting, return on 
investment, cost of goods and services, etc., so "the technical" work is possible.
1b. We have always been divided, but the line manager has always concentrated on the 
technical work. Now, the line manager has to do both.
Additional comments:
2a. IRT 1a, I would say that there is not enough "budgeting, etc." to keep that many 
middle and upper managers employed full time!
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41. XYZ's Total Quality program has been ineffective because many of upper 
management's actions run counter to Total Quality concepts, such as their lack of 
employee orientation, and poor record of feedback and action when problems are 
presented up-line. Since upper management has not responded to organizational 
problems and issues in a quality manner, XYZ will have difficulty moving forward with 
the Total Quality concept. To move forward with the Total Quality concept, upper 
management needs to set an example for the lower levels by applying quality practices to 
themselves. Lower echelons of the command need to see upper management respond to 
their problems, concerns, and issues in a  quality manner before they can feel TQM is 
more than just “lip service."
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Talk / 0 /  1 / 3 /  1 / 2 / 8 / 0 /
Walk ! 0 J  .J_ . L.  1 _ __/ z  . / . 7 / 1 / 0 f
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management___ 6_
42. If we are to achieve the highest possible quality, management must do its job. This 
requires:
a) a fundamental recognition that our past and future success has been and will be due to 
the quality of our people;
b) a pro-active approach with our customers in collaboration with our workers to gain 
market share;
c) support of our work force with the requisite tools and training;
d) a hearing and meeting of the concerns of our personnel;
(cont. next page)
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(cont. from previous page)
e) a giving of the greatest care to the right choices in our new hires and promotions in a 
non-political, fair process.
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Belief / 0 /  0 / 0 / 0 / 3 / 6 /  6 /
Talk / 0 /  0 / 2 / 0 / 4 / 6 /  3 /
Walk / 1 / 1 / 7 / 3 / 1 / 2 / 0 /
Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management.
Comments:
1a. Amen - Can we add something about honesty and elimination of hidden agendas?
1b. Mother & apple pie statement
43. Top management needs: to set their vision; ensure congruence between our larger 
and subsidiary company leadership; establish customer focused goals; set priorities for 
customers and processes; ensure proper training in support of our goals; establish cross 
functional teams to set standards, improve processes, and ensure participation; 
establish an award system that encourages team work; prototype changes; monitor and 
facilitate customer and first line management input and corrections to changes; and 
ensure daily maintenance of their vision through their actions.
<D m 
2 ®— O) oj —
>, a> ® ® ® < ®  ® ^  ^
— a> 2  €  J  jo €  ® m —-fc ® <0 -t- (D m jC' „
1 ?  I Q I I  I  " 2
i s  « l  i < < S <to O u  CO ~Z. to CO
c  o> 
o  to <- 10
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management__ 6_
(cont. next page)
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(cont from previous page)
Comments:
1a. Not sure upper management should "ensure daily" actions. Ail responsibility for 
this command can not be placed on upper management 
Additional comments:
2a. I think "ensure daily maintenance" in this case means "Practice what you preach."
44. It is essential that top management define and then support what they feel is 
important. If top management can do this, most of us will "work our little buns off" 
trying to accomplish it. Failure to do this results in our current fragmented TQM  
efforts.
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Belief /  0 / 2 / 0 / 0 / 4 / 6 / 3 /
Talk / 0 /  0 / 1 f 2 ! 8 / 4 / Q /
Walk /  1 / 3 / 2 I 3 ! 5 1 _ ./. . 0 /
Group Discussion 1. Refer to higher management.
Comments:
1a. Top management, by definition, always supports what they feel is important. This 
statement implies if top management says to go left and this is not what lower 
management wants to do, lower management would not fight the change, but blindly do as 
told.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
243
D. Perspectives concerning management mandates.
45. Division of XYZ  into the two camps of *the technical products and services" and 
'the business' has resulted in upper management trending more toward mandates versus 
participatory management.
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46. Upper management's mandates and one way flow of information has caused the first 
line manager's loyalties to become divided between the technical product and service 
functions and management functions.
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47. One example of a mandate that has served to divide the loyalties of first line 
managers is the mandated five page form on how well the technician is performing his 
job . It is difficult for first-line managers to win support for such a form from our 
professionals, because, without prior buy-in, such mandates are taken personally as a 
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Group Discussion 4 Refer to higher management 5 .
Comments:
1a. This document was developed by 1st line managers and workers. It is open for 
changes and is a living document.
1b. I was not aware there was a "mandated 5-page form", at this time.
1c. What five page form?
48. If we could return to conversations on our perceptions of quality, we could once 
again regain our focus on the whole, and perhaps reduce the growing “wall" between the 
two XYZ camps of "the technical products and services" and "the business".
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49. Because we are a bureaucratic organization, many things must necessarily be 
mandated. But, this has caused us to be comfortable with mandating, and consequently, 
we tend to mandate many tilings that could be decided in a participatory fashion.
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management.
Comments:
1a. Hard to mandate if one can not make a decision.
1b. This has nothing to do with being a bureaucratic organization.
50. Because we tend to mandate many things which do not need to be mandated, we tend to 
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51. Upper management has become so comfortable with the mandate, they appear to 
mandate enthusiasm, trust, and respect These things cannot be mandated. They must be 
earned. Yet upper management appears to behave in a fashion that would indicate to 
first-line management and employees that they just don't understand this.
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52. There is not only a mandate for TQ/W, but an implied mandate that employees be 
enthusiastic about TQM. Since enthusiasm cannot be mandated, but must come from 
within, this has resulted in the opposite effect of most employees losing enthusiasm for 
any type of TQM endeavor.
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53. A lot of us take TQM as the wrong thing. TQM does not mean that management is not 
going to be autocratic at times. Sometimes a quick decision is warranted when top 
management is on the firing line, even if it is the wrong decision.
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 5 .
Comments:
1a. Quick decision? I'll settle for any decision.
1b. I don't think they can make a decision! I know they cannot make a power play. 
Additional comments:
2a. Changed my mind on this one.
54. When top management is forced to make a quick autocratic decision, what is
important is how it is handled after the fact. Normally, such decisions are not explained,
or if they turn out to be wrong, feedback is not heard for next time.
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55. Top management makes more autocratic decisions than they must. An example is the 
decision to do away with yearly appraisals. There was no immediacy to this decision, 
and since it affected the entire company, it should have been debated.
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Refer to higher management.Group Discussion 3 
Comments:
1a. A lot of autocratic decisions are not being made that should be.
1b. It was debated.
Additional comments:
2a. Debated by who? Change was discussed, but not what we have now.
2b. This decision was made to take the easy way out when the command found out that all 
top managers and 60% of all middle managers got the highest possible evaluations two 
years in a row. Two different standards. These are the things that make the employee's 
lose confidence in upper management.
E. Perspectives concerning constraints.
56. It is difficult to practice Total Quality in a bureaucratic  organization, since 
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(cont. next page)
Refer to higher management.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
249
(cont. from previous page)
Comments:
1a. Since we are not a profit making operation, I feel it is easier to do TQM.
Additional comments:
2a. Disagree with 1a.
57. A major technical roadblock to quality is often the Chief Financial Officer's 

























e <  as 


















Belief / O f 2 / 3 / 0 / 3 / 5 / 2 /
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Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management 6
Comments:
1a. This is not an impediment to quality, its an excuse. The Chief Financial Officer 
should offer more alternatives. Maybe we should be more pro-active in studying the 
financial manuals.
1b. He has a job and knows it better than the person performing the task or assigning 
the task.
Additional comments:
2a. Agree with 1a. We should do our homework. Strongly disagree with 1b.
2b. Where is upper management when we run into this problem?
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F. Perceptions concerning what we did wrong.
58. Much of our time and energy invested in TQM went into generating statistics versus 
doing real things for the customer.
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59. TQM team issues should be customer focused. Most TQM issues we have worked
have dealt with internal administrative processes. If they have had an impact on our
customers, it was by accident versus design, improvement of administrative processes
is O.K., but the processes we choose to work to improve should be focused and prioritized
according to how it will improve the delivery of our products to our customers.
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Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management 6
Comments:
1a. Best to let management mess-up the administrative process vice the technical 
products and services process.
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60. In the past we have not prioritized our customers or the processes we have chosen 
to work. Instead, we have had taken a  "shotgun” approach to our TQM efforts which has 
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61. We pair our people with the wrong issues in our TQM efforts. Our people should be 
paired with issues that affect their daily work lives. For example, technicians should 
focus on processes that improve rendering our technical products, while management 
should focus on administrative processes that are important in their everyday 
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Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management___6
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62. Typically, TQM team results have been nebulous. This may stem from pairing our 
people with the wrong issues. If we paired our people in TQM teams with the issues that 
they deal with on a daily basis, they would "have their hearts into it", and consequently 
their results would not be as invisible or as hard to measure as some of the past TQM 
team efforts.
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63. TQM team training should be accomplished “just in time". Instead, we took a 
"shotgun" approach resulting in both frustration and poor return on investment. Many 
never used the training, while others forgot what they learned by the time they were in a 
position to employ such training.
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64. In the past we failed to produce and set standards for our important processes, such 
as how we render effective and timely technical services. Consequently, everyone does 
what they think is right, and usually only certain aspects of 'total quality' are achieved 
in different processes by different individuals.
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 5 .
Comments:
1a. People will emulate high performance. They know who provides good technical 
services, probably better than most managers.
65. Staff TQM teams traditionally have not included a technician on their teams. Since
the technical departments are their customers, this has resulted in the outcomes of these
teams to be less concerned with the service provided to their customers, the technical
departments, and more concerned with issues such as their workload.
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Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management 8 .
Comments:
1a. Even if the Staff teams asked for a technician, they probably wouldn't get one very 
often. Our technicians are kept busy with our customers.
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66. In our implementation of TQM we did not:
A. develop the required behavioral, human resource, or team building skills with 
our managers or team members;
B. develop training beyond concepts and tools;
C. adequately define requirements for facilitator training;
D. clearly define Change Management Team (CMT) charters;
E. require establishment of POA&Ms by chartered CMTs;
F. clearly define CMT facilitator roles;
G. establish systematic means for implementing suggested improvements of CMTs;
H. involve the customer with CMTs;
I. adequately define expectations for CMTs;
J. facilitate communication of CMTs with rest of the command;
K. eliminate the fear of making mistakes;
L. understand what or how to achieve meaningful measurements;
M. use measurements in a positive vs. negative way;
N. emphasize making decisions based on facts;
O. encourage and promote risk taking and entrepreneurship;
P. facilitate empowerment of employees;
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 5 .
Comments:
1a. Many of the above are true - however, the main focus is missing - Improve for our 
customers - his material.
1b. We could always do things better, but a lot of these are B.S. For "A", we did team 
leader training. We did have CMTs with customers. I feel our biggest mistake with TQM 
was trying to do too much too fast.
(cont. next page)
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(cont from previous page)
Additional comments:
2a. Agree with 1b; a very good statement
5. HIGHER QUALITY DEFINED
67. Higher quality includes;
a) documenting what we do in a more complete, timely, and accurate manner;
b) anticipating and formulating our customers' needs;
c) translating customer needs into programs that improve their equipment and logistic 
condition;
d) continuously improving what we do through strategic planning as a group.












































Belief / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 6 / 6 / 3 /
Talk / 0 0 / 2 / 2 / 3 . / 7 / 1 /
Walk / 0 / 0 / 2 / 4 / 7 / 1 / 1 /
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6. HOW TO ACHIEVE HIGHER QUALITY
68. To achieve the highest possible quality we need our work force to buy into this ideal 
in their own terms such that they see it as a direct benefit to themselves.
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69. 'Quality' just happens, and on a daily basis, such as, when three technicians get 
together and discover a  better way. But, 'quality' does not just happen by accident: it 
takes a certain pre-disposition, ethic, and pride in work that desires 'quality'. As such, 
the manager's contribution to quality should be facilitating its definition and obtaining 
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Walk / 0 /  0 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 2 /  1 /
Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management 5 .
Comments:
1a. Three technicians getting together unplanned and coming up with a better way is 
innovation not quality.
Additional comments:
2a. Innovation leads to quality because it tends to provide improved ways of doing things.
70. Facilitating the XYZ  technician to render a quality product requires not only his 
feedback on the local level, but also that he be given other larger company and customer 
perspectives in order to be able to provide the appropriate feedback.
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71. Quality starts at the individual level of the technician. Accordingly, the best way to 
improve quality is for management to focus on the training, tools, morale, and needs of 
our technicians, while providing the inspiration to render a product that provides the 
most value to our customers. This focus should be formulated by the resources and 
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 5_
Comments:
1a. Mom & apple pie, i.e., statement and feeling is generally accepted as true.
72. An employee oriented focus on quality requires that management:
a) fundamentally recognize that our business has been built by the XYZ 
employee performing work on customer equipments;
b) pro-actively identify and satisfy employee needs;
c) communicate in a clear and timely way;
d) build trust.
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(cont. next page)
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(cont from previous page)
Comments:
1a. Building trust between top management and employees is a foreign concept.
1b. (a) more than the b, c, or d (strongly agree).
1c. Mom & Apple pie.
73. To improve consistency, i.e., the job getting done in the same high quality way no 
matter who we send on the job, we should improve procedures and training. Written 
procedures, such as those provided by our larger company technical subsidiary, should 
have mechanisms for continuous review and improvement. Training should include 
certification of basic skills, such as hand skills like soldering and crimping.
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 5 .
Comments:
1a. Good ideas to approach standardization. But - no two people are alike!
74. Quality should be rewarded. The most gratifying reward for quality is recognition, 
which entails respect, a degree of autonomy, having the opportunity to make a 
difference, being listened to, and ownership in the organization.
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75. XYZ employees look toward their leadership primarily for fairness in decisions 
that affect their jobs and careers, for recognition when due, and for support on special 
problems when called to management's attention. Quality management should include 
management seeking to evaluate itself on how well they perform these three basic 
employee expectations.
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76. For XYZ to continue to improve our business and reputation, higher management 
needs to stay in touch with the fact that our business and reputation was built by it's 
technical products and services employees. In order to do this, management should 
spend some small percent of their time working intimately with the operations of the 
business with our customers.
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Group Discussion 3. Refer to higher management 6 .
Comments:
1a. This does not mean that holding daily bulletin meetings is "working intimately" with 
the technical products and sen/ices. Meet the customer and talk with our people!
(cont. next page)
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(cont from previous page)
1b. Or they should have come up through the ranks, spent time with our technical 
products and services , and be responsible for rendering our front line services.
1c. Keep them away from our customers, please.
1d. Attempts at this in the past have produced questionable results.
77. Generating customer satisfaction requires a pro-active approach of both identifying 
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78. To improve the quality of our decisions, management should strive to make them
jointly with the people they affect. They should share as much information as possible
so that lower level input will become more valuable. They should explain and jointly
reflect on decisions as a means of learning once they are made. If management does not
continuously seek and share information with their subordinates in making decisions,
they will likely lose touch with our employee needs and our business operations.
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(cont. next page)
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(cont from previous page)
Additional comments:
2a. Putting together our reorganization is a prime example of again not involving the 
people that are affected or know the system best.
79. A major role that the Board of Directors should serve is as a "steadying board" for 
different CEOs as they come and go; i.e., they should take a pro-active role in the CEO's 
education on the operations of our business, the culture of our organization, and our 
collective visions and aspirations, so that the CEO will be better equipped to institute 
his policy decisions and directions. This function should be a bench mark for Board of 
Directors quality.
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Belief 7 0 / 0  /  1 /  0 / 3 / 6 / 5 /
Talk 7 0 / 0  /  2 / 5 / 1 / 5  / 2 /
Walk 7 1 / 3  /  2 / 6 / 1 / 0  / 2 /
Group Discussion 4 Refer to higher management 6 .
Comments:
1a. Board of Directors blender.
1b. I feel the effect of different CEOs has been small on our day to day operations. 
Additional comments:
2a. This task can be impossible for some CEOs. Present one made major moves after 
only three weeks on the job.
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II. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, HISTORY, AND CURRENT 
SITUATION PERSPECTIV ES
1. IDENTITY
80. XYZ's primary product is to provide the best people possible to ensure customer 
equipment is in top condition, primarily through the provision of technical assistance in 
response to non-routine customer requests.
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Belief / 0 / 2 / 0 / 0 / 2 / 5 / 6 /
Talk / 0 / 2 / 1 / 1 / 3 / 5 / 3 /
Walk / 0 / 2 / 2 / 2 / 4 / 4 / 1 /
Group Discussion. Refer to higher management.
Comments:
1a. Customer requests should receive our top people, but should not be our primary 
function. We should strive to eliminate non-routine customer requests through 
training and logistics improvements.
1b. Non-routine customer requests are only about 25% of our business. Other support 
businesses  can and do do this type of work. Our primary product is to be our larger 
com pany's  corporate memory to carry various programs of which non-routine 
customer requests is one.
Additional comments:
2a. 1b is forgetting what has built this “corporate memory" in the first place. If we 
keep thinking like this, other companies can and will! replace all of us.
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81. During a non-routine customer request, we take extra effort to provide training to 
make our customers as technically self-sufficient as possible, thereby increasing the 
probability of long term good condition of our customers' equipments.
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Belief / 0 / 1 / 1 / 0 / 2 / 5 / 6 /
Talk / 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 2 / 9 / 3 /
Walk / 1 / o / 0 / 3 / 2 / 7 / 2
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 5
Comments:
1a. B.S.
1b. For most customer requests for equipment repairs, the primary focus is to get the 
equipment fixed. Often, training takes a back seat to the equipment repairs.
82. Our main purpose is to serve as our larger company's corporate memory for 
technical expertise. Some contend our purpose is to be the best technical expertise 
available, but this is a by-product of our structure. Being the resident technical 
experts within our larger company and with having a low rotation of personnel, it is 
inevitable that we become the best.
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Belief / 0 / 0 / 2 / 0 / 6 / 4 / 3 /
Talk 0 / 1 / 1 / 3 / 3 / 5 / 2 /
Walk 0 /  1 / 1 / 3 / 6 / 3 / 1 /
Group Discussion. Refer to higher management.
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83. Our guiding unwritten command philosophy is that we are family and "get the job 
done." Because we are small, we take care of our own. Because we are called upon as the 
last resort trouble shooter in urgent situations, we have adopted "get the job done."
These aspects of who we are will come under pressure as we reorganize.
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Belief / 0 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 3 / 7 / 4 /
Talk / 0 /  0 / 2 / 3 / 6 / 2 / 2 /
Walk / 0 / 1 / 1 / 3 / 6 / 1 / 3 /
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management.
84. Our founders' vision was to put the absolute best people in our technical products 
and services delivery to resolve problems where all other expertise fails. This remains 
a strong part of our identity, which is best learned and shared through partaking in the 
"XYZ technical products and services experience". Consequently, conflict arises when 
new managers are hired from outside sources which do not hold these same values. 
Since the new manager has little opportunity to directly experience the “XYZ technical 
products and services  ", a situation is created that makes it difficult for the new 
manager hired from outside to achieve congruence with our culture.
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Belief / 0 / 0 / 1 / 0 / 4 /  5 /  5 /
Talk I 0 / 2 / 3 ! 1 / 6 / 3 / 0 /
Walk / 2 / 2 / 3 / 1 / 4 /  3 / 0 /
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management___5_
Comments:
1a. He sometimes brings other perspectives and insights.
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2. GUIDING PRINCIPLES /  VISION
85. XYZ's key guiding principle is to provide the highest quality and most timely 
service possible in restoring to operation our customers' equipments under XYZ's 
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Belief /  0 / . 0 J . J> . . / . . . _ . 0 _  / _J_ . / _ 7 7. 7 /
Talk f 0 / 0 / 0 / 2 / 1 / 8 / 4 /
Walk f 0 / 0 / 0 / . . .3 Z . 2_. / 6 f 4 /
Group D iscussion  2 Refer to higher management___ 5.
Comments:
1a. And training.
86. Our reputation is a high priority, since it is through our reputation of technical 
expertise and desire to help our customers that we are consistently sought out for 
technical assistance and training.
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Belief / 0 /  0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 9 / 6 /
Talk / 0 /  0 / 1 /  0 / 2 / 8 /  4 /
Walk / 0 /  1 / 1 / 0 / 3 / 8 / 2 /
Group D iscussion  2_ Refer to higher management 5_
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87. Since our reputation is so critical to what we do, a prime unwritten rule is to avoid 
criticisms of any XYZ personnel to all outsiders.
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Belief / 0 / 0 /  1 / 2 / 1 /  7 / 4 /
Talk / 0 / 0 / 1 / 4 / 2 / 4 / 4 /
Walk / 0 / 0 /  0 / 4 / 6 / 2 / 3 /
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 6 .
Comments:
1a. When problems arise we tend to admit them and take necessary corrective actions. 
Upper management tends to take a “Witch Hunt" approach when criticism occurs and go 
overboard to punish or criticize our people.
1b. This has little to do with reputation. I know of no business that wants criticisms of 
its people or programs discussed outside the organization.
88. Since our primary product is providing the best people possible to provide
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Belief / 0 /  0 /  0 / 0 / 1 / 3 / 1 1 /
Talk / 0 / 0 / 0 / P / 2 / 8 / 5 /
Walk / 0 / 1 / 2 / 1 / 5 / 4 / 2 /
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management.
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89. Although XYZ has a published set of *Company Philosophies* our personnel do not 
look toward these principles for guidance, because upper management has only espoused 
versus practiced these philosophies, while at the same time they have generated 
frequently changing implicit and explicit guidance through their directions and actions. 
Consequently, other than the common value that we are the best technical experts in the 
field, we do not possess a working set of organizational philosophies and goals to assist 





















































Belief /  0 / 1 / 2 / 2 / 2 / 7
Talk /  0 / 3 / 3 /  3 /  2 /  4 /_ 0 /
Walk / 0 /  4 / 4 / 4 / 1 /  2 / 0 /
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 5
Comments:
1a. This "best technical experts" is overrated.
Additional comments:
2a. IRT 1a, as a total group of people, and not on an individual basis, I strongly disagree 
with this statement.
90. In the absence of other higher leadership, it has largely been left up to individual 










































Belief / 0 / 0 / 1 / 0 / 2 / 10 / 2 /
Talk / 0 / 3 / 2 / 4 / 3 / 3 / 0 /
Walk / 0 / 2 / 1 / 4 / 3 / 5 / 0 /
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management___6
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91. Exacerbating X Y Z 's  lack of organizational philosophies and goals is the 
unwillingness for most managers to make hard choices.
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Belief / 0 / 2 / 1  / 4 / 2 / S / 1 /
Talk /  1 7 3 / 4 /  2 7 5 / 0 / 0 /
Walk /  0 /  1 1 2  /  4 / 3 / 4  /  1 /
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 5
Comments:
1a. Not most mangers but top management
1b. Where’s the lack? They are published. Its just that they are not and never will be 
useful. Managers who are unwilling to make "hard choices” will always work to some 
excuse not to make them.
92. Lack of top management vision, goals, and support is a poor excuse for lower
management not to enact their own vision, goals, and support at their own levels.
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Belief 7 0 / 0 / 0  / 1 / 3 / 8 7 3 /
Talk / 0 /  0 /  2 / 6 / 1 / 6 7 0 /
Walk 7 0 / 0 / 1  /  9 / 1 / 4  / 0 /
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 6
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93. Although lack of top management vision, goals, and support is a poor excuse for 
lower management inaction, it does impede synergy in our combined efforts. Our 
individualistic nature makes it improbable that a  single vision will autonomously 
emerge from the bottom to be embraced by all others.
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Belief / 0 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 3 /  8 / 2 /
Talk / 0 f 0 / 2 / 4 / 3 /  7 / 0 /
Walk / 0 / 0 / 2 / 4 / 3 _/. A . / 0 /
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management.
94. "Guiding principles" should not just be espoused from the top. They should be 
developed through an evolution of circular processes, whereby the lower levels of 
management are able to define and enact what they feel is important to the business; at 
the same time, upper management should facilitate definition and action through 
appropriate guidance and support.
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Belief / 0 / 0 / 1 / 2 / 6 /  5 / 1 /
Talk / 0 / 1 / 0 / 4 / 7 / 3 / 0 /
Walk / 0 / 3 / 4 / 5 ? . _ . /  1. . _/. P.__/
Group Discussion 4. Refer to higher management 5_
Additional comments:
2a. I feel "guiding principles" are not usually worth the paper they are printed on.
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95. It is critical that XYZ  leadership facilitate formulation of and action toward newly 
defined common goals and visions, because our departments, divisions, and branches all 
operate as separate businesses that are 'making it or breaking it" on their own. In an 
environment of a  shrinking marketplace we need to learn from each other, while 




















































Belief ! 0 / 0 / 2 / 2 / 1 / 8 / 2 /
Talk / 0 / 0 / 0 / 6 / 1 / 8 /  0 /
Walk / 0 / 1 / _ 3  . 8 / 2 / 1 _ /  0 /
Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management 5 .
Additional comments:
2a. The trend to operate as separate businesses is changing as income funds and the 
company move toward the customers. Where before there were all different types of 
income funds, now the source of funds will be more central and so will policy.
96. It is difficult for branch managers to be objective about what they do because they 
are so close to their business. For this reason, upper management should be pro-active 
in continuously identifying the best elements of our business and then promoting a 
continual sharing of these best elements.
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Belief /  0 / 3 / 0  /  1 / 4 / 6 7 1 /
Talk / 0 /  0 / 1  / 6 / 3 / 5 / 0 7
Walk 7 0 / 4 / 1  /  6 / 3 / 1  7 0 /
Group Discussion 6 Refer to higher management 6
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97. Top management needs to not only have a clear vision but pay daily attention to this 
vision, so that it is perceived and believed that we walk our talk.
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Belief / 0 / 0 / 0 /  2 / 0 / 9 / 4 /
Talk / 0 / 0 / 0 / 2 / 3 /  8 / 2 /
Walk ! 0 . . !  4 . . /  4 _6_ /  1 / 0 /  0
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management.
3. CULTURE
98. To enact TQM effectively, the principles must be tailored to the organization. The 
major obstacles that our culture presents to TQM are born out of the nature of our 
work. Our work requires technical expertise, independence, and the ability to react 
quickly to custom er problems. First, since we are primarily technical experts, we are 
not good at the humanistic issues TQM embraces. Secondly, since our work requires a 
person who is able to work independently, we have evolved into a culture that is not 
amendable to TQM team dynamics and consensus building. And finally, since we are 
accustomed to reacting quickly to cu stom er  problems, we find it difficult to pro­
actively apply TQM principles to improve complex processes.
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Belief 0 /  0 / 2 /  0 / 3 / 6 /  4 f
Talk / 0 / 0 /  1 / 6 / 4 / 2 / 2 f
Walk / Q .1 3. _ _4._ / 4 / 1 _ 2_. I
Group Discussion 2. Refer to higher management 5_
Comments:
1a. We should have first assessed our culture then tailored our principles.
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99. Consistency, i.e., accomplishing the job in the same high quality way no matter who 
we send on a job, runs counter to our culture that has been bom out of the nature of our 
work. Our work requires a  high degree of independence and creativity. Our creative and 
independent nature tends to resist consistency. This results not only in a high degree of 
variance in the technical services render by different branches, divisions, and 
departments, but also results in most innovations not being shared between branches, 
divisions, and departments other than by happenstance.
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Belief / 0 / 1 / 3 / 1 / 2 / 8 _  / 0 /
Talk / 0 / 0 / 1 / 4 / 6 / 4 / 0 /
Walk / 0 /  0 /  1 / 5 / 6 /  3 / 0 /
Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management.
100. Our independence and diversity within XYZ  arises in a natural way from the fact 
that we are a collection of many separate operations which need to proceed in many 
different directions at once. While this independence and diversity makes realizing a 
cohesive whole more problematic, our novel approaches in separate segments of our 
business should be recognized as a source of strength. Accordingly, our cohesiveness 
could be and should be enhanced by respecting and exchanging our diverse ideas in 
forums, such as periodic all managers meetings.
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Belief / 0 /  0 /  0 / 1 / 1 / 1 0 / 3 /
Talk I 0 /  0 / 0 / 2 / 6  / 6 /  1 /
Walk I 0 I 2 I 1 /  7 / 3  / 2 /  0 /
Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management 7
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101. Our independent nature causes us to not recognize as completely as we should our 
interdependences between our department and other support departments. 
Consequently, we often create our own messes by not providing complete information 
that a support department might need to properly support us, and by not taking the time 
to indicate to support departments more thoroughly what our needs and perspectives 
might be.
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Belief / 0 / 2 /  1 / 2 / 4 / 5 / 1 7
Talk / 0 / 0 / 4 /  3 / 4 7 4 / 0 /
Walk / 0 / 0 /  3 /  3 7 4 / 5 / 0 /
Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management 5
102. Higher management has problems listening to lower level input, because they 
largely come from an all male /arger company culture, which says, "the leader should 
know it all." Consequently, it is typically difficult for higher management to admit that 
they don't know it all, and to ask such questions as, "I’m not sure this is the right 
decision, what do you guys think?"
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Belief / 0 ( 1 / 3 / 0 / 5 / 4 / 2 /
Talk ( 0 ( 1 /  1 / 6 / 3 / 4 I Q (
Walk ( 0 ( 3 .1 3_ . I 4.. . ( .4. _ I 0 f
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management.
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103. We have a culture of not "tooting our own horn". Since we have a culture of not 
"tooting our own horn": a) most of the quality that XYZ employees put into their work 
effort is largely unrecognized by management; b) also, the ways in which quality is 
normally recognized run counter to our culture, because it is centered on creating lip 
service, a forced "toot on the horn", i.e., charts on the wall, which say, "Look what I did. 
Now, I'm a good guy."
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Belief / 0 / 2 /  2 / 3 / 2 / 5 / 1 /
Talk / 1 / 2 / 4 / 4 / 3 / 1 / 0 /
Walk / 2 /  2 / 5 / __4 / _1_ .. 1 / 0 /
Group D iscussion 2_ Refer to higher management 5_
104. XYZ's culture does not promote TQM's premise of participatory management. If a 
manager tries to include his employees in as many decisions as possible, he may often be 
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Belief / _ _ 1 / ,_4___L___ 5____ £___ 3___£__ 1 1 0  /__ 1 _ /
Talk / 0 /  4 / 4 / $ 0 / 2 / 0 f
Walk 0 /  5 / 3 / 5 / 2 I 0 0 f
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management___5_
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105. XYZ lacks in diversity, because, traditionally, new hires are nearly all male and 
come from a single culture, i.e., our larger company culture as represented by those 
whose experience is mostly from other subsidiaries of our larger company. This lack of 
diversity resulting from our homogeneous male culture with a  singular larger company
orientation, binds us into limited ways of seeing and addressing our problems and issues.
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Belief / 3 / 3 / 3 / 0 /  5 /  1 / 0 /
Talk / 2 / 4 / 4 / 1 / 2 /  2 / 0 /
Walk / 3 / 3 / 2 / 2 / 3 / 2 / 0 /
Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management.
Comments:
1a. Total B.S. Check out our co-op program.
1b. I'm glad we have some experience and background in the work we do. We have seen 
some atrocious examples of "diverse" personnel.
1c. XYZ overall has diversity, but the technical departments are guilty as charged. 
Past attempts to bring in upper mobility positions have failed. Females in our technical 
business is a cutting edge issue still subject to much friction.
106. If we were more aware of our technical vs. humanistic, independent vs. 
cooperative, reactive vs. pro-active natures, we would be able to more effectively adapt 
our culture to TQM principles.
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Belief 0 / 0 f 1 / 9 6 /  0 / 0 /
Talk / 0 / 2 ! 0 / 10 / 3 /  0 / 0 /
Walk / 0 / 2 ! 0 / 10 / 3 /  0 / 0 /
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management__ 5_
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107. There is minimal distinction of branch or division by employees a t the working 
level, especially when assigned to work together with a custom er as a team. 
Distinctions that are made between the various branches or divisions usually occur at 
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Refer to higher management 0_
4. HISTORY AND/OR CURRENT SITUATIONS
A. General perspectives.
108. The company as a whole has lost track of what generated this company: providing 
quality technical services in a timely manner. As a result we have situations where we 
(the ABC Department branches), the operations and money makers of the business, are 
subordinated to various support codes, versus being treated as their "customer".
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Belief / 1 / 1 / 2 / 2 / 3 /  3 / 3 /
Talk / 0 / 2 /._ 3 / 4 / 3 /  3 / 0 /
Walk / 0 / 2 / 2 / 3 / 3 /  4 / 1 /
Group Discussion 4.
(cont. next page)
Refer to higher management 6_
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(cont from previous page)
Comments:
1a. Because the technical emphasis is so great, it is not part of the culture to recognize 
that "staff" is necessary and plays an important role in supporting "the technical 
products and services",
1b. Our travel group is second to none. We can get travel arrangements and support 
faster than any other subsidiary company I know. Our contract people are the best. 
They still take orders at the year end when other subsidiary companies stop. The 
workers in finance produce. We may not always agree with the rules they have to 
follow, but overall our support personnel are the best there is.
Additional Comments:
2a. I agree! (with comment '1b' above).
2b. Agree with 1b.
109. We tend to loose track of our priorities due to "scattered signs of self interest."
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Belief / 0 / 2 /  1 / 6  7 4 / 2 / 0 /
Talk / 0 / 0 /  2 / 8 / 3 /  2 / 0 /
/ 0 / 1 / 2 / 7 1 2 / 3 / 0  /
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management___§_
110. The recent “Driving out Fear" seminar held for all XYZ middle and upper 
management encouraged all participants to openly discuss organizational perspectives 
that are not normally discussed. The purported purpose of this discussion was to "drive 
fear out of the work place’ by bringing issues out into the open for public discussion and 
resolution. However, certain issues which were brought out were ultimately used 
against various individuals, and consequently the seminar did not drive out fear. Instead
(cont. next page)
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it instilled fear, and many middle and upper managers no longer feel they can discuss 
issues as openly as they once might have.
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 8 .
Comments:
1a. Can't really say about this one. I'm not a middle or upper manager.
Additional comments:
2a. Just another example of our top management having hidden agendas and creating 
mistrust.
B. Communication perspectives.
111. There is no established way for information sharing between branches and 
divisions. We should have a mechanism for sharing innovations between branches, 
divisions, and departments. Currently, if one branch has an innovation that would 
benefit most other branches, like use of video cameras, the innovation spreads to other 
branches only in a slow and haphazard fashion, while often not being shared between 
different departments at all.
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Group Discussion.
(cont. next page)
Refer to higher management §_
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Comments:
1a. Over funded programs helped cause this. Those who have, get the goods - those that 
don't, do without.
Additional comments:
2a. No whining 1a! That wasn't the issue. The question raised (it) anyhow.
112. Upper management has no formalized mechanism to document and resolve front­
line problems. Consequently, such problems are mostly outside upper management's 
awareness. As a result, their focus is on conversations that occur across top layers of 
management, which results in one way dictations to lower management, which serves to 
increase the front-line employee's frustration and feelings that there is nowhere for 
him to voice and have resolved the problems he is unable to deal with himself.
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Walk / 0 / 2 / 2 / 7 / 2 / 2 / 0 /
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 5
Comments:
1a. Front-line problems should be mostly outside upper management's awareness. 
Additional comments:
2a. Open forums are a good way to inform upper management of problems with our 
technical products and services. These are discouraged here.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
280
113. Many XYZ employees are currently frustrated in that they feel that there is no one 
they can go to for resolution of problems, even problems that have an operational impact 
on the performance of their jobs, such as parking at subsidiaries of our larger company 
in an emergency technical assistance situation. There should be a formalized mechanism 
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Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management 5
114. Many good ideas within XYZ die at the working level, because employees often feel: 
"Why speak up? No one at a  level that could act on the idea will listen/
>. ® 
ra £ c o> 







I  «E m o □ co 1-1
® ® 
2 £ O) 









®wO)< o o> <
CO
Belief / 0 / 1 / 2 / _2 / 6 / 3 / 1 /
Talk / 0 I 1 / 4 / 2 / 4 / 4 / 0 /
Walk / 0 . /  _1 _ /  4 / 3 / 5 / 2 / 0 /
Group Discussion 2_ Refer to higher management 5.
Comments:
1a. Not sure about this. If the employee does not feel strongly about the idea, I doubt 
others will.
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C. Perspectives concerning retraining personnel.
115. Personnel with specialties in our larger company technical products and services 
systems that have been and are being phased out over time have not been effectively 
retrained or utilized in other areas. This has resulted in them receiving compensations 
not commensurate with their contribution.
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Group Discussion 4_ Refer to higher management 5_
Comments:
1a. Sounds like a branch problem to me. Get yourself some training money.
1b. This has happened on a limited basis. The issue of demoting a journeym an  
technician to an apprentice technician has never really been addressed.
Additional comments:
2a. This will be more of an issue in the future.
116. It is important that we constantly retrain personnel who may be specialized in 
systems that are being phased out to ensure the viability of their contribution as well as 
their own morale and feelings of self worth.
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Group Discussion 2_ Refer to higher management 5_
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
282
D. Perceptions concerning management.
117. Upper management is unclear on their agenda. This generates confusion as to what 
our priorities are or should be and a  perception that priorities are set to benefit upper 
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Group Discussion 2_ Refer to higher management 6_
Additional comments:
2a. 13 out of 16 agreeing on this makes a strong statement, doesn't it?
118. Top management has trouble making good sound decisions, because:
a) they do not have the necessary depth of knowledge of our programs;
b) they are not willing to take risks for long term dividends;
c) they do not readily take input from the bottom.
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1b. Lower management at times reviews upper management decisions like we do in a 
court room trial. We try to second guess the jury when we do not know all that went on 
in the court room.
(cont. next page)
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Additional comments:
2a. Why don't we know what happened in the court room? Because the judge locked the 
door! I.E., the "board of directors" and their sanctimonious closed door meetings!
119. Top management does not posses the requisite depth of knowledge on our programs, 
do not take appropriate business risks, and do not readily listen to lower level input, 
because most who have succeeded to top management are those who have played a political 
game of echoing higher management wants, versus taking risks to build our business and 
listening to their subordinates.
>» © 
a  ® 


























/  2 _Z §_
/  6 /  3
_2 i
0 /
Walk /  0 / 3 /__1
Group D iscussion 2_
/
Refer to higher management §_
120. Much of upper and middle management does not understand the technical aspects 
(purpose, mission, employment, importance, and use of the various technical systems 
we support) of our business. Consequently, it is difficult to include upper and middle 
management in decisions that involve the products of our business.
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Group Discussion 2_ Refer to higher management §L
Additional comments:
2a. If we expect them to include us, then we must find ways to include them.
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121. Without understanding the technical aspects of our business, higher management's 
focus has been other than our products. Consequently, there is no higher management 
encouragement of excellence in our products. This has resulted in our products trending 
towards mediocre as time progresses.
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Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management 5
Comments:
1a. I agree that higher management does not understand the technical aspect, however, 
our product has remained of good quality.
122. Upper management's inattention to our business, by necessity, promotes autonomy 
and independence. However, this same inattention breeds an ignorance that results in 
over reaction when political situations arise. Such over reaction, on the other hand, 
stymies the very autonomy that is needed if upper management is to remain ignorant of 
the products and operations of our business. Upper management needs either to be more 
familiar with our business or less prone to react in political situations.
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(cont. next page)
Refer to higher management 6_
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Comments:
1a. Upper management will always react to political situations. In order to provide 
causality control, lower management must strive to identify these areas and brief upper 
management before, if possible.
123. XYZ upper management has become less employee oriented over time. They tend to 
forget our business and reputation was built by it's technical products and services 
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Walk / 0 / 3 / 0 / 0 /  4 / 8  / 0 /
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 6 .
Comments:
1a. I feel our current upper management is employee oriented. However, they, like all 
of us, tend to get wrapped up in things which distract them from spending time with the 
technical products and services employees.
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124. As XYZ  has grown, it has become increasingly difficult for any one person in 
upper management to be a good advocate for what we do all the way to the branch level, 
such as Mr. X  was able to do. With our present size, therefore, the Department Head 
should function as upper management's advocate of what we do at the branch level. But, 
it is difficult for Department Heads to do this, since they are so strongly influenced by 
top management and their concerns.
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Group Discussion. 
Comments:
Refer to higher management.
1a. Mr. X  was not able to do what he did due to our size, it was more his drive.
125. Division heads are primarily focused on supporting top management versus the 
branch heads, because upper management has demanded that the division heads work for 
upper management vs. the branch heads. Consequently, most of the information demands 
of top management are simply passed to the branch heads. These information demands 
coupled with the inescapable responsibilities of running the operations of the business 
have put an excessive work load on the branch heads, while, on the other hand, the 
division heads are generally under-employed.
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Group Discussion 3_ Refer to higher management.
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126. XYZ is over-managed. We could improve our effectiveness by returning to branch 
heads as division heads and thereby eliminating current division heads.
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Group Discussion 2. Refer to higher management.
Comments:
1a. I wish I could find a division head who understood his job. Give the branch head 
spending signature authority and they could huddle around the top management 5 days a 
week instead of just one.
127. Upper management espouses initiatives, such as, we need to improve our 
correspondence. However, they often fail to support such espoused initiatives with 
resources, such as requisite secretarial support for the branches.
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management__
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128. Management sends a strong signal as to what is important by whom they promote. 
Promotions that are contrary to what management espouses, or promotions that are 
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 6_
Comments:
1 a. Management promotions are a disgrace.
129. Most issues within XYZ are discussed freely except upper management's lack of 
ability to listen to lower management, their degree of being out of touch with our 
business, and instances of their breaches of faith or confidentiality. These items are 
mostly discussed only in the hallways to "get over the hurt."
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 6
Comments:
1a. I'm not sure most issues are discussed freely.
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130. It is important to have upper management advocacy for what we do at the branch 
level, since if upper management could effectively listen and respond to branch level 
concerns, there would be a lot more "lower end" confidence in the "upper end*. This 
would, in turn, result in a lot more "lower end* enthusiasm, cooperation, openness, 
sharing of ideas, and trust, which would result in more quality in what we do and a more 
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management__ 5
Comments:
1a. Mom & apple pie.
131. XYZ leadership's number one current priority should be to regain the confidence 
of XYZ working level employees.
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Group Discussion 2_
Comments:
Refer to higher management 6_
1a. Keeping us alive should be the high priority confidence would follow.
1b. One of the top three, anyway.
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132. The best way for XYZ leadership to regain working level employee confidence is to 
go to work for them in their true best interests, i.e., to listen and understand their 
concerns, and to help them enact the ideas that they feel would improve our business. 
Implied in this course of action is that management truly respect the ideas and concerns 
of the working level, and in order for that to happen they must truly listen to their ideas 
and concerns.
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Group D iscussion 2_ Refer to higher management.
133. The type of support lower management would prefer from higher management is:
a) encouragement to formulate ideas and programs that will improve and grow the 
business;
b) a fair hearing of these ideas;
c) a general before-hand disposition to support testing of these ideas;
d) a willingness to tolerate failures born from taking risks to grow and improve the 
business;
e) and a disposition to reward those willing to take risks to grow the business, such that 
the good ideas are not quelled before they are born.
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(cont. next page)
Refer to higher management 6_
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(cont from previous page) 
Comments:
1a. We already have this.
134. Within first line management and their technical work force are many ideas for 
innovations that could both improve and build our business. Most of these ideas remain 
within the individual branches, because top management has not created a culture to 
bring forth our best ideas. Top management needs to facilitate such a culture not only by 
establishing a goal to facilitating such ideas from the lower levels of our organization, 
but also through taking actions to enact such a goal, such as, forums and communications 
channels for innovative ideas, anonymous feedback channels, elimination of the fear of 
failure from taking risk, and rewards for risk and innovation.
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135. Lower management needs upper management's vision, encouragement, and support 
in formulating new programs that build and improve the business. Vision and 
encouragement are needed so each manager is not acting alone in trying to improve his 
lone sector of the business, while support is especially needed if the individual manager 
is to have a suitable chance of assembling and selling the necessary elements of a new 
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 6 .
136. It is first line management's job to be innovative and formulate new programs that 
grow and improve our business. We get paid to innovate and we have the natural motive 
of making things better for our branches. However, by the same token, upper 
management is paid to guide and encourage such innovation, so that innovation not only 
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137. Management's decisions can never make everyone happy. But, management has an 
obligation to make the best decisions possible, and then explain those decisions fully, 
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Talk / 0 / 0 / 2 / 1 / 7 / 5 / 0 ,
Walk f 0 / .3 I _2 / . 4 / 4 / 2 / 0 /
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 5 .
Comments:
1a. Mom & apple pie.
Additional comments:
2a. May be mom & apple pie, but if we actually did this for a change, everyone would be 
better off.
E. Perspectives concerning the Chief E xecutive Officer.
138. Many of our past CEOs have come into XYZ with perspectives different from ours, 
especially since they come from a perspective of a  larger company career. If a CEO, or 
some other top manager that the CEO may bring in from outside, are not able to obtain 
proper perspectives on the operations of our business, on our culture, and on our 
aspirations, then their policy decisions and directions are likely to alienate many. 
However, since a CEO's perspective invariably takes what we do as extremely 
important, he can have a very positive impact on the organization during his tenure, if 
(cont. next page)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
294
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he can understand what we do and how we do it, respect our culture, as well as show 
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Group Discussion 2L Refer to higher management 6.
Comments:
1a. True for any manager at XYZ.
139. Top management should take a pro-active role in the CEO's education of our 
business operations, our culture, and our collective aspirations, so that different CEO's, 
as they come and go, will not only have a higher congruence with our top management, 
but also will be better equipped to institute their policy decisions in ways that are 
compatible with our culture.
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Walk / 0 / 0 / 4 / 2 . /  5__ / 4 / 0 /
Group Discussion___ Refer to higher management 6_
Comments:
1a. Top management does this. The question is what lower management does during the 
initial welcome.
Additional comments:
2a. Answer to 1a is simple. We are left out of the process!
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F. Perspectives concerning evaluations.
140. Our current evaluation system was implemented under the false assumption that 
Demming said to do away with performance evaluations. Demming actually said, 
institute leadership and a performance improvement program, and then do away with 
evaluations. Upper management did only the latter and not the former two.
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141. We eliminated evaluations because it was thought by top management that TQ/Vf and 
personnel evaluations are incompatible. However, TQM and personnel evaluations are 
not incompatible. There is nothing wrong with healthy competition or defining what is 
important through personnel evaluations. Competition spurs most to try harder, while 
standards ensure that we are not working at cross purposes. You need a properly 
designed personnel evaluation system that will set and support goals, document and 
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142. Our current evaluation system arose from not only tying evaluations to the 
distribution of monetary awards, but also from the failure of upper management to 
address the equitable distribution of monetary rewards across our various branches, 
divisions, and departments. This situation was further exacerbated by upper and middle 
management's failure to assure full utilization of reward assets by the end of our fiscal 
year as a matter of course.
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 6 .
Comments:
1 a. Upper management provides first line supervisors equal amounts of dollars to give 
as awards. It's unfair for them to provide this much freedom to the first line 
supervisor, and then take the blame for it not being equitably distributed. More award 
money has been paid out to employers over the last three years than over the previous 
ten. However, people rarely talk about the positive.
Additional comments:
2a. True statement (w.r.t. comment 1a).
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143. Our present evaluation system was adopted to ensure that we meet our larger 
company's criteria for achieving the average company evaluation grade. However, we 
were already closer to this average grade than any other local subsidiary company, yet 
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Group Discussion 2_
Comments:
Refer to higher management.
1a. This is a statement about our last system.
144. Our current evaluation system that awards everyone an average grade was founded 
on the misuse of our old system, i.e., a system that gave upper management and their 
staff a disproportionate number of the highest evaluation grades. Although our new 
system has resolved this problem, it has also removed a way of recognizing our top 
performers.
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Group Discussion  2_ Refer to higher management.
Additional comments:
2a. Also, our marginal performers.
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145. The single positive aspect of our present evaluation system is that it has 
eliminated top management and their administrative staffs from all receiving the highest 
evaluation grades at the expense of all others.
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 6 .
146. Our present evaluation system has not affected our top performers, although they 
are no longer recognized for their performance through our evaluation system. On the 
other hand, it has affected a number of our average performers, as reflected by such 
indicators as a decreasing number of technical recommendations.
<D ®
£ ®
® « ® < S1 «
£  ®  ®  - s ®  8  ■ §  ®  a ,  > -a. |  o> ® 5  |  £ ® a  •
a 8 E 8 § 5  |  < ® o o ,Q o g  ® £ o < £ <
C  CD 
O  CO
coo u  w m
Belief 7 1 / 0  /  2 / 0 / 4 / 8 7 0 /
Talk 7 0 / 1 /  1 /  4 / 5 / 4 7 0 /
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 5
Comments:
1a. Everyone is affected.
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147. Our evaluation system is flawed in it's premise that nearly everybody will get the 
same mark. This system, along with other constraints imposed by upper management, 
essentially has destroyed the supervisor's ability to evaluate his employees.
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Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management.
148. Currently we have no performance appraisals, and consequently most managers are 
doing whatever they think is right, rather than cooperatively working towards a common 
department or company strategic plan. With the current system, what managers may 
think is right can be and sometimes is at cross purposes with what may be right for the 
department or the company as a whole; within certain limitations, managers could even 
choose to do nothing if they so desired, because they know they will get the same mark.
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Walk / 0 / 1 / 0 / 5 / 4 / 5 / 0 /
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 5
Comments:
1a. Each supervisor or manager still has the prerogative of giving any rating, provided 
it is supported by documentation.
Additional comments:
2a. B.S. (Refers to comment '1a' above.)
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149. Establishing an evaluation system that grades nearly everyone the same has 
eliminated the negative aspects associated with relative ranking. However, the new 
system fails to foster pride. Accordingly, we should focus on how this essential element 
can be put into our new evaluation system. Individuals should be encouraged to strive to 
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Group Discussion 2 
Comments:
1 a. There are other ways to foster pride.
Refer to higher management 5_
150. A performance improvement program should consist of a circular process of 
defining and re-defining, evaluating and re-evaluating expectations between supervisor 
and subordinate. The supervisor and employee should not only mutually and jointly set 
and re-set expectations for each other, but also should mutually and jointly evaluate 
each other against these expectations. Each should not only have an active role in 
defining what each other's expectations should be, but also what one's own evaluation 
against the mutual and jointly set expectations should be.
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(cont. next page)
Refer to higher management.
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(cont from previous page) 
Comments:
1a. All this is easier said than done.
151. A critical element in establishing a performance improvement system is training 
of all managers in well thought out elements of such a system.
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 5 .
III. CHANGE
1. RESISTANCE TO CHANGE
152. Middle and upper management espouse change and actually think and believe 
they're for change, but their actions preserve the status quo.
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Additional comments:
2a. As do most Branch Heads.
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153. The main impediments to learning at XYZ are:
a) the bureaucratic barriers to ideas presented by our many layers of management;
b) the non-willingness of top management to take input from the bottom; and
c) the reluctance of top management to share risk with lower management.
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 6
Additional comments:
2a. #153b may be the largest problem this company faces, despite heated and frequent 
denials from the top.
154. Upper management tends to make changes without the consult or support of first 
line management. If first line management is consulted, more often than not, the change 
is introduced without incorporating any of their recommendations. Consequently, change 
is usually perceived as being mandated without reason as to why, which creates a natural 
resistance to the change even if the change is positive. First line supervisors should be 
involved in the initial stages of formulating and planning changes. This would make the 
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155. Upper management's pattern of mandated change has caused first line management 
to feel less ownership in the business and less trust toward our leadership. As a result,
it is more difficult for them to foster these same feelings with their employees.
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Walk / 0 /  1 / 1 /  6 / 3 / 4 / 0 /
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 5
Additional comments:
2a. 12 out of 16 makes a statement, doesn't it?
156. Upper management has not only mandated change, they have directed employees to 
be enthusiastic about it. This solicits the opposite reaction, since enthusiasm cannot be 
directed, but must come from within.
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157. XYZ's business was founded based on the need to have an inter-company expert 
technical expertise in our larger company technical systems. We fix problems that 
nobody else can, and have a reputation for doing this well. This makes change difficult, 
because it is hard for us to imagine being better than we already are.
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Refer to higher management.Group Discussion 2 
Comments:
1a. I have never heard anyone say this or act in this manner. We all know that we can 
learn something new every day.
1b. I disagree with "nobody else can fix the problems". Also, that all our people are the 
best We have poor technicians and some average technicians. The idea, however we may 
think we are the best, could impede change.
2. HOW WE HAVE CHANGED OR ARE CHANGING
158. The ABC Department has undergone a cultural change in moving from our old 
location to our present location. Before, branches and divisions were isolated from each 
other in a number of separate buildings. Now, conversations occur more easily between 
branches and divisions.
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Refer to higher management.
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(cont from previous page)
Comments:
1a. Maybe so, maybe not, but this building did not create that.
Additional comments:
2a. We have now been relocated back to our old location. We are (now) isolated in a 
number of separate buildings.
2b. I made comment 1a, because I feel that the people who talk to each other now did so 
before, and it was based on trust and confidence, not where we were physically located.
159. Even though our culture has been slow to change under our five year TQM effort, 
we have come a long way. Now, we continuously improve our products and services 
through the ever present questioning of the quality of what we do; five years ago we 
didn't give this a second thought. Because this evolution has been slow, we tend not to 
recognize the change.
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 5 .
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3. HOW WE NEED TO CHANGE
160. XYZ needs to diversify in its new hires, such as female engineers from other than 
traditional sources of our larger company, so that we will be able to posses more diverse 
ideas in our decision making processes.
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Group Discussion 2_ Refer to higher management 5_
Comments:
1a. B.S. again. We do practice diversity in our hiring. 
1b. Diversity has both positive and negative benefits.
161. We need to expeditiously change our culture to one with a greater diversity of 
ideas, to a management who is more in tune with the products of our business and able to 
listen and respond to the concerns of our employees, and to a more efficient business that 
fixes classes of problems instead of mostly just the single isolated problem, or "we are 
going to be out there plucking chickens instead of fixing our larger company's systems/"
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Group Discussion 3_ Refer to higher management 5
Comments:
1a. Somewhat an over statement. To say no management is “in tune with products", does 
not respond "to the concerns of our employees" is hyperbole.
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4. STRATEGIC PLANNING
162. Quality management is how well long range goals and plans are set and 
accomplished in continually improving our business and value to our customers. The 
"turn the crank, day to day get stuff done" should be a  given and not a  measure for quality 
management
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 5 .
Comments:
1a. Day-to-day stuff has to support the long range goals, so how can it not be a measure 
for quality management?
163. Currently our strategic planning is fragmented. Normally, strategic planning 
occurs only at the branch level. Therefore, there is no consistent standard of strategic 
planning among various branches and no consistent sharing of plans or learning between 
branches.
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Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management 5 .
Comments:
1a. There are two levels of strategic planning. When it occurs at the branch level it is 
naturally core confined.
1b. Until lately, monthly branch program reviews provided a forum to exchange ideas, 
(cont. next page)
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Additional comments:
2a. Agree with this comment (Refers to comment '1b' above.)
2b. Program reviews are only for upper management's ear now.
164. A circular process of feedback on the local level by the technician, and feedback on 
larger issues to the technician, is critical to strategic planning at the branch level. A 
circular process of feedback between lower and higher levels of management is critical 
to XYZ strategic planning. Circular processes of feedback between levels of management 
at XYZ are nearly non-existent, which is a primary reason we do very little strategic 
planning.
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165. A pro-active approach of anticipating our customers' needs and translation of 
these needs into programs through strategic planning as a  group, will: identify and 
generate new business initiatives; will continuously re-define XYZ's roles in a 
continuously changing Navy; and will serve to maintain our viability as change occurs in 
our larger environment.
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(cont. next page)
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Comment:
1a. Mom and apple pie.
Additional comments:
2a. Our customers needs are generated at a level above this company. I.E., new 
systems, quality of their engineering.
5. THE BUSINESS (Improvements/Considerations for Strategic Planning)
166. Currently, we tend to simply react to the needs that our customers might happen 
to express. This is manifested most greatly through our *broken equipment chasing", 
which provides short term fixes versus long term solutions. Fixing problems in 
isolation and "broken equipment chasing" is not a cost efficient way to improve our 
customer's equipments and self-sufficiency. If XYZ were to pursue “broken equipment 
chasing" as a primary business in our current environment of declining budgets and 















































Belief / 0  / 1  / 1  / 1 / 6 / 5 / 1 /
Talk / 0  / 1 / 1  / 3 / 5  / 5 / 0 /
Walk / 0  / 2 / 1  / 2 / 6 / 4 / 0 /
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 5
Comments:
1a. The term *broken equipment chasing" is offensive and overused by those who have 
neither the talent not the initiative to fix problems. "broken equipment chasing" has 
made us what we are, and given us an excellent staff of engineers and technicians.
167. We have a number of inspection programs which document our customers' 
equipment problems. The problem with these programs are that many are redundant 
(cont. next page)
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(cont from previous page)
with other custom er inspection programs, and therefore they often only re-document 
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 5
Comments:
1a. The problem is they don't repair or teach.
1b. This was true a few months ago, but our larger company's staff is very pro-active 
in consolidating inspections and reducing redundancy.
1c. Agree, however efforts to change this are happening now.
168. In order for our inspection programs to be of real value, we should be pro-active 
in formulating complimentary material deficiency correction programs that resolve 
classes of problems. Such programs are especially justified in the current custom er 
environment of shrinking requirements, if they are designed to reduce the number of 
costly single fixes. Programs that resolve classes of customer problems would not only 
reaffirm our value to the fleet, but would also assist in providing full employment of 
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 5
(cont. next page)
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Comments:
1a. Class problems tend to be more our larger company's design subsidiaries 
responsibility.
1b. The problem is they don't repair or teach.
169. Our current system of evaluation and rewards presents resistance to formulating 
programs to resolve classes of customer problems and to reduce the number of costly 
single fixes, because our managers' performance goals are in part based on the number 
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Group Discussion 3.
Comments:
Refer to higher management 5_
1a. I see no basis for this claim of how managers are rated!
170. We need to formulate programs that improve the material condition of our 
customers' equipments, not because it will reduce broken equipments, but because it is 
becoming more and more difficult to justify the low duty time of some of our technicians. 
We need to ensure our technicians are employed between "repair jobs" with work that 
is valuable to our customers.
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(cont from previous page)
Additional comments:
2a. Make work projects do not, in themselves, benefit our customers.
171. We are currently primarily focused on our technical subsidiary company issues. 
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 5
Comments:
1a. The agreement is with the last sentence. The first sentence was true in the past.
172. We have vastly improved the quality and information content of our technical 
reports, but it is still a paper product. To capture the "corporate knowledge" imbedded 
in this paper product, an individual has to dig through filing cabinets to construct the 
data in the format necessary to answer the question at hand. Our next step to improve 
our technical reports should be in the way technical reporting is stored, recalled, 
reconstructed, and used. Accordingly, we should build a computerized data base such that 
the technician's report would be automatically entered when typed, and could be recalled 
and reconstructed by the computer in whatever formats that might be desired. This 
would facilitate identifying trends with different customers and on different classes of 
(cont. next page)
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(cont. from previous page)
equipments, which would assist us in identifying the needs of our customers, building 
our business, and preserving the unique corporate knowledge of our technicians.
® ©
2  a  ®> 6»
>.  a © as (p <  cb <5
~  <D ©  ■ £  ©  ©  * S ©  m  —  _
c o> g> % 5. J  5  § 2 ® $
2 S  S e 5 § 5  £ < ® O a.
o r  ® O <  i : <
CO Q  a  5 Q  2  ^  CO '  cn
Belief / 0 /  0 /  1 /  2 / 3 / 6 / 3
Talk 7 0 / 0  /  1 /  3 / 7 / 3 / 1
Walk 7 1 / 1 /  1 /  8 /  1 / 2 / 1
Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management_________________
Comments:
1a. This is being worked.
173. Key to maintaining our reputation is documentation of what we do.
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management.
174. In the recent past we would have meetings with the CEO where we would all get 
together to review "hot issues." This would seem to be a waste of the CEO's time, since 
this is what first line management is paid to worry about. The one positive aspect of 
these meetings was that they did give us a forum to learn from each other. For this 
reason we should again have periodic meetings with the CEO and upper management, but 
(cont. next page)
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the focus should be a forum to learn from each other and facilitate long range innovations 
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Group Discussion 3 Refer to higher management 5
Comments:
1a. I think this is being done.
Additional comments:
2a. It is imperative to have first line managers invited to program reviews to ensure 
ideas are permitted to flow and improve other programs.
175. Although new programs will constantly reaffirm our value to our customers, our 
value to our customers should first be reaffirmed by the constant and consistent 
delivery of the best technical expertise available anywhere. We need to consistently 
make the investment in our personnel's training and welfare in order to assure that our 














2 £ ® 5)
<  <B 
1_ffl a
-C
■ffl 2  
Z  z
a





O TO-E < 
CO
Belief / 0 /  o / o / 0 / 1  / 12 / 2 f
Talk / P /  0 / 0 / 0 / 4 / 10 / 1 /
Walk / Q
CMo 2 / 8 / 2 / 1 /
Group Discussion Z. Refer to higher management 6_
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
315
6. THE FUTURE
176. With the increasing emphasis of the equipment operators as our customer, our 
work is becoming more of a "turn key" operation vs. "hands in the pocket" technicians. 
The equipment operators want equipments fixed. For this reason we will, over time, 
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Group Discussion 2 Refer to higher management 5 .
177. The uncertainty concerning our upcoming reorganization currently detracts from 
incentive that any reward might otherwise encourage.
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Group Discussion 2_ Refer to higher management 5_
Comments:
1a. This uncertainty should go away soon.
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178. During the course of this study, several major moves have taken place that will 
surely impact some of the perspectives as they are related here. I (the person 
generating this perspective) believe the impact will be positive as long as the major 
focus of customer support is maintained.
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Comments:
1a. Good for you.
1b. It was not.
IV. THIS RESEARCH PROJECT
179. There was reluctance in investing time in this research effort, since it was not 
presented as something branch managers had a choice of doing or not doing. Also, it was 
perceived as just another TQM study to help upper management look good. However, 
with participants finding that the focus of this research is on the participants' 
perspectives, the feelings toward this research have become more positive.
®  CD ® cd
— D> o>
■sS ® I S  < 5  I ®  cd *
2  5,  I  i g ,  | o  i  £  2  i 1 ®
2 5  ® i S  i s  e < ^5 5  Q o Q ®z  o < s <
Belief 7 0 / 1 /  0 / 2 / 4 7 6 / 2
Talk 7 0 7 0 7  0 7  6 / 3 7 5 7 1
Walk 7 0 7 0 7  0 7  7 7 2 / 5 7 1
Group Discussion 1 Refer to higher management 5_
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180. These perspectives are just "common sense". However such "common sense" is 
nowhere written down, either individually or collectively. If our collective "common 
sense" could be written down it would be quite valuable. Part of its value would be in 
seeing what the "common sense" among the various branch and division heads is, because 




o  CO »
ffl ffl ffl < ffl «ffl -£ffl ffl "5 ffl m _
S’ I s  I Q £ £  !  " s
s  I S  3 1  <  S ?co o  a  m z z co 55
Belief /  0 / 1 / 0 / 1 / 2  / 9 / 2 /
Talk / 0 /  0 /  0 / 5 / 6  / 4 / 0 /
Walk /  0 /  1 /  0 /  5 / 6  / 3 /  0 /
Group Discussion 1 Refer to higher management 5
Comments:
1a. I strongly disagree with some perspectives, so I would not agree they are common 
sense.
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181. These perspectives should be valuable because:
a) it should show if my thoughts are shared by others or if I am alone;
b) if I am alone in my thoughts, even if I continue to think the same way, it should give
me cause for reflection as to why;
c) it should show how others think toward our organizational issues;
d) it should show areas where most of the group feels strongly on different issues and
thereby potentially provide impetus to do something about it;
e) it should provide a medium which should be more of a "level playing field", in 
contrast to a meeting, where often only the loudest, most persistent, or most senior 
prevails;
f) it should help me to clarify my thoughts and feelings toward the organization.
> *  <D
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Belief / 0 /  0 / 0_Z  Z ( 7
Talk / 0 / 0 / 0 / 6 / 1 / 6 / 2 /
Walk / 0 / 0 / 0 / 8 / 1  / 4 / 2 /
Group Discussion 1_ Refer to higher management §_
Comments:
1a. The “walk" remains to be seen!
Additional comments:
2a. I would like to see at least a one day meeting on discussing these perspectives. Also, 
using the distribution to decide what action may be required. This research should be the 
basis for restarting our TQM review meetings.
2b. I prefer upper management to see all of these issues, and I would like the majority 
of these issues to be discussed in the group, although I did not check any particular 
perspective for group discussion.
2c. Group discussion should be handled as whole not as single perspectives.
2d. All perspectives should be given to higher management




This appendix provides the written instructions that were provided to the 
participants for their first and second assessments of the composite perspectives.
Phase 3 Foreword to Instructions
The following perspectives were generated directly from your interviews and are 
presented here for your individual assessment. Each perspective, or portion thereof, was 
validated by one or more in your participant group as being highly representative of their 
feelings or thoughts on your TQM efforts, organizational history, culture, or aspirations. I 
did not develop perspectives with all participants, because I discovered, after completing 
the perspective development process with the majority of you, that with each additional set 
of validated perspectives new issues or subjects did not continue to emerge. Rather, new 
sets of perspectives only added nuances. Since the purpose of these perspectives is to 
provide a catalyst for exploring organizational knowledge in a non-threatening arena, I 
made the judgement, after listening to the remaining tapes, that the current set of 181 
perspectives developed from 14 out of 17 participants was more than adequate to provide 
the desired catalyst, and that to transcribe and analyze additional tapes for additional 
perspectives would, at this point, needlessly delay this phase of the project.
I have tried to group the perspectives by topic. Additionally, I have attempted to 
combine perspectives without losing the essence of any single perspective wherever several 
perspectives reflect similar thoughts or feelings on the same issue. I feel I have taken extra 
care when combining perspectives to use only the original thoughts, indeed words, from 
which a combined perspective was constructed. Each of you that validated perspectives 
will certainly recognize your perspectives in both the combined perspectives as well as the 
perspectives that appear in their original, as validated form.
Phase 3 Instructions for Individual Assessments 
of the Composite Perspectives.
For each perspective you will be able to mark your degree of agreement or 
disagreement on each of three different scales and make open-ended comments as you may 
desire.
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The first scale, "Belief", is how you personally agree or disagree with the 
perspective. If the perspective is one you generated, you would probably mark "Strongly 
Agree". If the perspective is clearly contrary to your personal beliefs you would probably 
mark "Strongly Disagree".
The second scale, "Talk", is how you perceive your company's rhetoric to agree or 
disagree with the thoughts contained in the perspective. It might best be answered by 
asking yourself, "How much does our rhetoric agree or disagree with this perspective?" If 
you feel you need further help in marking this scale, the following is suggested as a guide: 
Definitions:
A. Official: Refers to official external and internal correspondence, communications, or 
meetings.
B. Unofficial: Refers to unofficial external or internal communications.
Scales:
A. Strongly Agree: You feel rhetoric which agrees with the perspective often occurs both 
officially and unofficially.
B. Agree: You feel rhetoric which agrees with the perspective often occurs at least 
unofficially.
C. Somewhat Agree: You feel rhetoric which agrees with the perspective occasionally 
occurs at least unofficially.
D. Neither Agree Nor Disagree: Either you are uncertain whether rhetoric occurs that 
agrees or disagrees with the perspective, or you feel rhetoric which agrees with the 
perspective is as likely to occur as rhetoric which disagrees with the perspective.
E. Somewhat Disagree: You feel rhetoric which agrees with the perspective normally does 
not occur.
F. Disagree: You feel rhetoric which agrees with the perspective never occurs.
G. Strongly Disagree: You feel rhetoric which agrees with the perspective never occurs, 
and rhetoric which disagrees with the perspective occurs at least occasionally.
The third scale, "Walk", is how much you perceive your company's actions to 
agree or disagree with the thoughts contained in the perspective. It might best be answered 
by asking yourself, "How much do our actions agree or disagree with this perspective?" If 
you feel you need further help in marking this scale, the following is suggested as a guide: 
Definitions:
A. Official: Refers to actions officially directed or encouraged.
B . Unofficial: Refers to actions which occur without official direction or encouragement. 
Scales:
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A. Strongly Agree: You feel actions which agree with the perspective often occur both 
officially and unofficially.
B. Agree: You feel actions which agree with the perspective often occur at least 
unofficially.
C. Somewhat Agree: You feel actions which agree with the perspective occasionally occur 
at least unofficially.
D. Neither Agree Nor Disagree: Either you are uncertain whether actions occur that agree 
or disagree with the perspective, or you feel actions which agree with the perspective 
are as likely to occur as actions which disagree with the perspective.
E. Somewhat Disagree: You feel actions which agree with the perspective do not normally 
occur.
F. Disagree: You feel actions which agree with the perspective never occur.
G. Strongly Disagree: You feel actions which agree with the perspective never occur, and 
actions which disagree with the perspective occur at least occasionally.
Feel free to make any open-ended comments as you may desire on any of the 
perspectives. Any open-ended comments you choose to make will be anonymous, and will 
be reprinted for the benefit of all participants in the next phase of this project exactly the 
way you choose to make the comment A distribution of how all participants marked each 
perspective and how you specifically marked each perspective will also be available for 
your individual reflection in the next phase.
Thank you for your participation. I hope you will enjoy exploring your fellow 
participants' perspectives.
Phase 4 Instructions for Individual Exploration 
of Initial Assessments
In this phase you will have the opportunity to view the distribution for all 
participants' choices in marking the 'Belief, the Talk', and the Walk' scales, as well as 
any comments that were made. The numbers that you view on each scale indicate the 
number of total responses for each of the seven possible categories. These number will 
always sum to sixteen, since there are sixteen participants.1 You will also be able to 
change your initial choices in marking the scales and to make additional comments. To 
facilitate this, your previous choices and comments are high-lighted on your individual 
copy of the "collective perspectives initial assessments". To change your initial mark for
1 There were 15 participants who finished the phase 4 assessments. Consequently this is reflected in 
appendix 4.
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any perspective simply mark a different choice other than your initial choice. The original 
instructions for marking the scales are included in the next section for your reference. The 
final distribution of choices for all participants will be available for the next phase, which 
will involve several group discussions.
To facilitate the next phase you will also have two new choices as follows:
1. Group Discussion  If you wish to call out a certain perspective for
discussion, place a check in this blank space. The total number of participants that 
check this category will be provided for each perspective in the next phase to establish 
your participant group's priority for discussing individual perspectives. This 
constitution of perspective priority is intended to facilitate discussion, and will not 
prevent participants from bringing up other perspectives as they may wish in the group 
discussions.
2. Refer to higher management  A number of you have indicated a desire
that these perspectives be provided to higher management Whether this is done or not 
is entirely the participant group's choice. However, to facilitate your participant group 
in making such choice, you have the opportunity to call out perspectives for referral to 
higher management If you wish to call out a certain perspective for referral to higher 
management place a check in this blank space. The total number that check this 
category will be provided for each perspective in the final results. This constitution of 
perspective priority is intended to facilitate the group in making choices in referring 
their perspectives and results to outside of the group, and will not prevent the group 
from referring all or none of the perspectives to higher management as the group may 
so decide.If you are opposed to referring a perspective to higher management, you are 
requested to make a brief comment in the comment section stating the reason for your 
opposition in order to make the rest of the participant group aware of reasons a 
particular perspective should not be referred to outside the participant group.
Please list any additional comments you would like to make in the comment section. 
Any open-ended comments you choose to make will be anonymous, and will be reprinted 
for the benefit of all participants in the next phase of this project exactly the way you 
choose to make the comment.
Thank you for your participation. I hope you will enjoy exploring your fellow 
participants' perspectives and their assessments.




Summaries of the composite perspectives of appendix 4 are ranked under six 
categories according to their assessments on the three Likert scales for "belief, "talk", and 
"walk". This ordering was used to provide a focus for understanding the assessment data 
relative to the perspective semantics to better stimulate the participants' dialogue in their 
group meetings.
The perspectives are first categorized according to their majority assessment for 
agreement or non-agreement on the three Likert scales. This distinction creates eight 
possible categories, of which six were manifested in this study. The letter "A" is used to 
designate majority agreement, and the letter "N" is used to designate majority non­
agreement Thus, if the majority of participants agreed with a perspective on the "belief, 
"talk", and "walk" scales, respectively, the perspective is categorized as an "AAA" 
perspective. The perspectives are then ranked within their respective categories according 
to the degree to which their assessment placed the perspective in its respective category. 
For example, an "AAA" perspective where all participants "strongly agreed" on all three 
scales, would be ranked at the top of its category, while an "AAA" perspective where a 
bare majority only "somewhat" agreed with the perspective on all three scales would be 
ranked toward the bottom of its category.
The six categories for the composite perspectives manifested by this study are 
presented in their respective categories, beginning with the "AAA" category, as follows:
1st column: "Rank" - indicates the ranking of the perspective within its category. The 
perspective with the strongest assessment for its category is ranked 1st.
2nd column: "#" - indicates the numbering of the perspective in appendix 4.
3rd column: "Score" - indicates the score of the perspective according to a ranking scheme. 
The highest possible score is 45. Please see chapter 6 for details.
4th column: The heading provides a summary of what the assessments imply for the 
perspectives in the category. The text under the heading provides a summary of the 
perspective.
5th through 7th columns: "B", "T", and "W" - The number of participants agreeing with 
the perspective on the "belief, "talk", and "walk" scales, respectively.
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AAA Perspectives (What we believe, say, and do)
#  Agreeing
Rank #  Score What we believe, sav. and do. B T W
1 88 30 Since our primary product is providing the best IS IS 11
people possible to provide customer technical 
support, our primary resource is our people.
2 85 29 Our key guiding principle is to provide the highest quality 15 13 12
and most timely service possible to our customers. This 
is what we have built our reputation upon.
3 6 27 The best way to ensure our viability to our customers 15 15 10
is to ensure we have a product of such high quality that 
it would be unthinkable for our services not to be sought
4 86 27 Our reputation is a high priority, since it is through our 15 14 13
reputation of technical expertise and desire to help our 
customers that we are consistently sought out for our 
technical support.
5 116 26 It is important that we constantly retrain personnel who 15 15 9
may be specialized in systems that are being phased out 
to ensure the viability of their contribution as well as 
their own morale and feelings of self worth.
6 5 25 Our current environment of changing customers and 15 15 9
shrinking budgets demands that we improve quality.
7 53 25 A lot of us take TQM as the wrong thing. TQM  does 14 14 11
not mean that management is not going to be autocratic 
at times. Sometimes a quick decision is warranted when 
top management is on the firing line, even if it is the 
wrong decision.
8 81 24 During non-routine technical support o f  our customers, 13 14 II
we take extra effort to provide training to assist our 
customers in their own technical self-sufficiency.
9 87 24 Since our reputation is so critical to what we do, a 12 10 11
prime unwritten rule is to avoid criticisms of any o f  our 
personnel to all outsiders.
10 175 24 Our value to our customers should be constantly 15 15 11
reaffirmed by the consistent delivery of the best 
technical expertise available anywhere. We need to 
consistently make the investment in our personnel’s 
training and welfare in order to assure that our high 
quality technical products are not compromised by 
other priorities.
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#  Agreeing
Rank #  Score What we believe, say, and do. B T W
11 3 23 TQM  and fostering innovation within our company is 12 14 15
currently in a holding pattern, because we are primarily 
occupied with our current reorganization efforts and our 
concerns of fully employing our personnel as our 
customer base and our budgets are reduced.
12 74 23 Quality should be rewarded. The most gratifying reward 15 14 10
for quality is recognition, which entails respect, a degree 
of autonomy, having the opportunity to make a difference, 
being listened to, and ownership in the organization.
13 138 23 Many of our past CEOs have come into our subsidiary 14 14 9
company with perspectives different from ours. If a CEO 
is not able to obtain the proper perspectives on our 
business, culture, and aspirations, then his policy 
decisions are likely to alienate many. However, since 
a CEO's perspective invariably takes what we do as 
important, he can have a positive impact on the 
organization during his tenure, if he can understand what 
we do and how we do it, respect our culture, and 
demonstrate appropriate support for our aspirations.
14 83 22 Our guiding unwritten company philosophy is that we are 14 10 10
family and "get the job done." Because we are small, we 
take care of our own. Because we are called upon fo r  
expert technical support in urgent situations, we have 
adopted "get the job done." These aspects of who we are 
will come under pressure as we reorganize.
15 139 22 Our top permanent subsidiary company management 14 14 9
should take a pro-active role in the CEO's education of 
our business operations, culture, and collective aspirations, 
so that different CEOs, as they come and go, will be better 
equipped to institute their policy decisions in ways that are 
compatible with our culture.
16 158 22 Our department has undergone a cultural change in our 12 14 10
last move to our present location. Before, branches and 
divisions were isolated in separate buildings. Now, 
conversations occur more easily.
17 13 21 Although measurement of quality in a service 15 14 8
organization is problematic, quality should be 
measured by:
a) customer satisfaction;
b) consistency in our service products and processes;
c) our front line perceptions as to how well we are 
meeting our customer needs; and
d) employee satisfaction.
18 20 21 Our history of "talking" about TQM has formed an 14 11 9
"anti-culture to TQM, i.e., a rejection of actions if 
associated with the label "TQM".
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#  Agreeing
Bank # Scots What w e believe, say, and do. B T W
19 67 20 Higher quality includes: 15 11 9
a) documenting what we do in a complete, timely, and 
accurate manner;
b) anticipating and formulating our customers' needs;
c) translating customer needs into programs that improve 
our customer support,
d) continuously improving what we do through strategic 
planning as a group.
20 2 19 Our current efforts at TQM are "bogged down", i.e., not 13 10 10
changing, evolving, or improving.
21 71 19 Quality starts at the individual level of the technician. 14 14 8
Accordingly, the best way to improve quality is for 
management to focus on the training, tools, morale, and 
needs of our technicians, while providing the inspiration 
to render a product that provides the most value to our 
customers. This focus should be formulated by the 
resources and support the technicians themselves feel 
that they need in order to do a quality job for their 
customers.
22 80 19 Our primary product is to provide the best people 13 11 9
possible to ensure our customer's equipment is in 
top condition, primarily through the provision of 
our technical support products.
23 165 19 A pro-active approach of anticipating our customers' 14 13 9
needs and translation of these needs into programs 
through strategic planning as a group, will: identify 
and generate new business initiatives; will continuously 
re-define our roles in a continuously changing 
environment; and will serve to maintain our viability 
as change occurs in our larger environment.
24 82 18 Our main purpose is to serve as our customers' 13 10 10
corporate memory for technical expertise. Same contend 
our purpose is to be the best technical expertise available, 
but this is a by-product of our structure. Being employed 
in rendering the technical products o f  our business with a 
low rotation of personnel, it is inevitable that we become 
the best
25 173 18 Key to maintaining our reputation is documentation of 13 14 11
what we do.
26 72 17 An employee oriented focus on quality requires that 15 15 8
management:
a) recognize that our business has been built by the 
shop floor  employee;
b) pro-actively identify and satisfy employee needs;
c) communicate in a clear and timely way; and
d) build trust
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What, we believe, say, and do, B. X w
We are currently primarily focused on issues 11 11 8
generated by our larger company. In our current 
changing environment we need to place more emphasis 
on our immediate customer issues.
There was reluctance in investing time in this research 12 9 8
effort, since it was not presented as something branch
managers had a choice of doing or not doing. Also, it was
perceived as just another TQM study to help upper
management look good. However, with participants finding
that the focus of this research is on the participants'
perspectives, the feelings toward this research have
become more positive.
We tend to talk about TQM principles, but do not exercise 13 10 10
the daily attention needed to institute such principles; 
this conveys the message to our employees that TQM  is 
all talk and no walk.
These perspectives are just "common sense". However 13 10 9
such "common sense" is nowhere written down, either 
individually or collectively. If our collective "common 
sense" could be written down it would be quite valuable.
Part of its value would be in seeing what the "common 
sense" among the various branch and division heads is, 
because currently there is no good mechanism for sharing 
each other’s "common sense."
Upper management’s propensity to create work of little 15 9 10
benefit to lower levels through TQM processes has caused 
the lower levels to brand TQM as "some upper management 
want."
Staff TQM teams traditionally have not included a 14 9 11
technician on their teams. Since the technical departments
are their customers, this has resulted in the outcomes of
these teams to be less concerned with the service provided
to their customers, the technical departments, and more
concerned with issues such as their workload.
'Quality' just happens, and on a daily basis, such as, when 11 11 8
three technicians get together and discover a better way.
But, 'quality' does not just happen by accident: it takes a 
certain pre-disposition, ethic, and pride in work that desires 
'quality'. As such, the manager’s contribution to quality 
should be facilitating its definition and obtaining buy-in of 
this definition.
Although lack of top management vision, goals, and support 13 10 9
is a poor excuse for lower management inaction, it does
impede synergy in our combined efforts. Our individualistic
nature makes it improbable that a single vision will
autonomously emerge from the bottom to be embraced by all
others.
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#  Agreeing
Rank #  Score What we believe, say, and do. B 1  W
35 124 15 As we have grown, it bas become increasingly difficult for 13 12 9
any one person in upper management to be a good advocate 
for what we do all the way to the branch level, such as 
Mr. X  was able to do. With our present size, therefore, 
the Department Head should function as upper management's 
advocate of what we do at the branch level. But, it is 
difficult for Department Heads to do this, since they are so 
strongly influenced by top management and their concerns.
36 23 14 Quality is most often rewarded by management in an 15 8 9
inadequate and sporadic way, primarily because they are 
often not aware of the majority of quality put into our 
work effort, and secondarily because the monetary awards 
are mostly insignificant
37 123 14 Our upper management has become less employee oriented 13 8 12
over time. They tend to forget our business and reputation 
was built by it's shop floor employees. This has resulted 
in low employee satisfaction with their higher level 
management
38 167 14 We have a number of inspection programs which document 11 10 11
our customer equipment problems. The problem with these 
programs are that many are redundant with other 
inspection programs, and therefore they often only 
re-document problems already known to our cummers.
39 170 14 We need to formulate programs that improve material 12 9 8
condition of our customers' equipments, not because it 
will reduce down time, but because it is becoming more 
and more difficult to justify the low duty time of some 
of our technicians. We need to ensure our technicians 
are employed between "yota" with work that is valuable 
to our customers.
40 41 13 Our Total Quality program has been ineffective because 15 10 8
many of upper management's actions run counter to Total 
Quality concepts, such as their lack of employee 
orientation, and poor record of feedback and action when 
problems are presented up-line. Since upper management 
has not responded to organizational problems and issues in 
a quality manner, we will have difficulty moving forward 
with the Total Quality concept. To move forward with the 
Total Quality concept, upper management needs to set an 
example for the lower levels by applying quality practices 
to themselves. Lower echelons of the company need to see 
upper management respond to their problems, concerns, 
and issues in a quality manner before they can feel TQM is 
more than just "lip service."
41 57 13 A major technical roadblock to quality is often the 10 11 11
Chief Financial Officer's interpretations of how monies 
provided for a specific task can be applied to accomplish 
that task.
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#  Agreeing
Rank £  Seem  What w e believe, sav. and do. B. X W
42 99 13 Consistency, i.e., accomplishing the job in the same high 10 10 9
quality way no matter who we send on a job, runs counter 
to our culture that has been born out of the nature of our 
work. Our work requires a high degree of independence 
and creativity. Our creative and independent nature tends 
to resist consistency. This results not only in a high degree 
of variance in the technical services render by different 
branches, divisions, and departments, but also results in 
most innovations not being shared between branches, 
divisions, and departments other than by happenstance.
43 35 12 Upper management has historically only enacted the TQM 15 8 11
points that in some way benefit them, and have 
traditionally discarded the rest. This communicates a 
hypocrisy. Consequently, what management perceives as 
aati-TQM sentiment is actually only anti-misuse of TQM.
44 146 12 Our present evaluation system has not affected our top 12 9 9
performers, although they are no longer recognized for 
their performance through our evaluation system. On 
the other hand, it has affected a number of our average 
performers, as reflected by such indicators as a 
decreasing technical documentation rate.
45 148 12 Currently we have no performance appraisals, and 10 8 9
consequently most managers are doing whatever they 
think is right, rather than cooperatively working towards 
a common department or command strategic plan. With the 
current system, what managers may think is right can be 
and sometimes is at cross purposes with what may be right 
for the department or the command as a whole; within 
certain limitations, managers could even choose to do 
nothing if they so desired, because they know they will get 
the same mark.
46 166 12 Currently, we tend to simply react to the needs that our 12 10 10
customers might happen to express. This is manifested 
most greatly through our fixing problems in isolation.
This is not a cost efficient way to improve meeting our 
customer needs. If we were to pursue this as a primary 
business in our current environment of declining budgets 
and shrinking customer base, we will likely and 
necessarily shrink in proportion to our current customer 
requirements.
47 101 11 Our independent nature causes us to not recognize as 10 8 9
completely as we should our interdependences between 
our technical departments and our staff departments.
Consequently, we often create our own messes by not 
providing complete information that a staff department 
might need to properly support us, and by not taking the 
time to indicate to staff departments more thoroughly 
what our needs and perspectives might be.
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#  Agreeing
Bank £  Score What w e believe, sav. and do. B 1  W
48 177 11 The uncertainty concerning our upcoming reorganization 12 8 9
currently detracts from incentive that any reward might 
otherwise encourage.
49 54 10 When top management is forced to make a quick autocratic 12 8 8
decision, what is important is bow it is handled after the 
fact. Normally, such decisions are not explained, or if they 
turn out to be wrong, feedback is not heard for next time.
50 163 10 Currently, our strategic planning is fragmented. 11 8 9
Normally, strategic planning occurs only at the branch 
IeveL Therefore, there is no consistent standard of 
strategic planning among various branches and no 
consistent sharing of plans or learning between branches.
51 60 8 In the past we have not prioritized our customers or the 11 8 9
processes we have chosen to work. Instead, we have 
taken a "shotgun" approach to our TQM efforts which 
has produced a low return on investment.
52 64 8 In the past we failed to produce and set standards for our 10 8 8
important processes, such as how we render effective and 
timely teclmical support services to our customers.
Consequently, everyone does what they think is right, and 
usually only certain aspects of 'total quality' are achieved 
in different processes by different individuals.
AAN Perspectives (What we believe and say, but don't do)
# Agreeing
Rank £ Score What we believe and sav. but don't do. B 1 W
1 7 27 We should have quality leadership from the top. 14 15 4
2 42 21 Management should do its job. 15 13 3
3 43 19 Top management should set and maintain their vision 
through their daily actions.
14 12 3
4 12 18 We should review quality charts and discontinue 
non-productive charts.
14 10 2
5 97 18 Top management should have a clear vision so it is 
perceived we walk our talk.
13 13 1
6 76 17 Higher management should stay in touch with the fact 
that our business was built by our shopfloor employees.
13 11 3
7 10 16 TQM should be enacted in a way that informs our business 
decisions.
15 9 3
8 136 16 Upper management should guide and encourage innovation. 15 14 7
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#  Agreeing
Rank £  SgQK What we believe and sav. but don't do. R  1  W
9 130 IS Upper management should have advocacy for branch 15 9 3
level concerns.
10 137 IS Management should explain adverse decisions. IS 12 6
11 78 14 Management should strive to make decisions jointly with IS 12 S
the people they affect
12 79 14 Management Council should act as a "steadying board" for 14 8 3
different CEOs.
13 141 14 Our employee rating system should be properly designed 12 8 0
so that it supports our goals, documents and measures 
progress, and encourages team work.
14 44 13 Top management should define and support what they feel 13 12 6
is  im p o rta n t
15 68 13 We should have our work force buy into the ideal of 13 14 5
quality in their own terms so they see it as a direct 
benefit to themselves.
16 75 13 We should have leadership that evaluates itself on its 14 8 3
fairness in decisions, on giving recognition when due, 
and on giving support on special problems when called 
to their attention.
17 77 13 We should generate customer satisfaction through a 15 14 6
pro-active approach that identifies and satisfies customer 
needs, communicates in a clear and timely way, and builds 
trust.
18 100 13 We should use the independence and diversity of the 14 13 5
separate segments of our business as a source of strength 
to enhance our cohesiveness by respecting and exchanging 
our diverse ideas in periodic forums.
19 132 13 Management should truly respect the ideas and concerns IS 10 4
of the working level by truly listening to their ideas and 
concerns.
20 135 13 Lower management should receive upper management's 13 12 5
encouragement and support in formulating new programs 
that build and improve the business.
21 174 13 We should have periodic meetings with the CEO and 13 8 5
upper management with a focus to learn from each other, 
to facilitate long range innovations, and to build and 
improve the business.
22 27 12 We should establish awards and accompanying criteria 13 11 5
that encourages outstanding team work.
23 84 12 New managers hired from outside should achieve 14 9 7
congruence with our culture.
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24 133 12 Lower management should receive the type of support 13 8 4
that they would prefer from higher management, such 
as encouragement and support to formulate ideas and 
programs that improve and grow the business, a 
tolerance to failures when risks are taken, and a 
disposition to reward those willing to take risks to 
grow the business.
25 151 12 All managers should be trained in well thought out 12 10 4
elements of a performance improvement system.
26 172 12 We should automate and computerize our technicians’ 12 11 4
reports to facilitate identifying trends and customer 
needs, to build our business, and to preserve the 
unique corporate knowledge of our technicians.
27 181 12 We should assimilate the value of these perspectives. 15 9 7
28 11 11 Upper management should take up the issues raised by 10 9 5
survey data and ask what they can do to resolve the 
problems.
29 22 11 We should just do TQM instead of talking about it. 13 8 6
30 61 11 We should pair our people with the correct issues in 13 8 3
our TQM  efforts, i.e., we should pair technicians with 
technical processes, management with administrative 
processes, etc.
31 94 11 Upper management should facilitate the development of 12 10 3
"guiding principles" through an evolution of circular 
processes whereby lower levels of management define 
and enact what they feel is important to the business.
32 18 10 Many company personnel do not want to involve 12 9 5
themselves with TQM due to attitudes resulting from a 
highly structured past environment where they feel that 
management should do the TQM to keep them employed.
33 24 10 We should reward quality by formal recognition. 13 11 7
34 70 10 We should facilitate our technicians to render quality 14 8 6
products through receiving their feedback on the local 
level and giving them feedback on the larger business 
perspectives.
35 95 10 We should have leadership that facilitates actions toward 11 9 3
common goals, we should learn from each other, and we 
should eliminate opposing agendas.
36 98 10 We have difficulty enacting TQM effectively due to our 13 8 7
culture of being technical experts, whom are not good 
at humanistic issues which TQM embraces, and due to 
our work, which requires quick reaction and independent 
natures, vs. long term planning and team building.
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37 73 9 We should have a continuous review and improvement of 12 11 6
both our written procedures and our training to improve 
the consistency of our technical products.
38 168 9 We should formulate material deficiency correction 12 10 6
programs that compliment our inspection programs, 
resolve classes of problems, and reduce the number 
of costly single fix technical repairs.
39 4 8 We should have a TQM quarterly review process. 9 11 7
40 62 8 We should pair our people in TQM teams with the issues 13 9 7
that they deal with on a daily basis.
41 96 8 Upper management should pro-actively identify the best 11 8 4
elements of our business in the various branches and then 
promote a continual sharing of these best elements.
42 113 8 We should implement a formalized mechanism where 11 10 7
front-line problems can be made known and documented 
until resolved.
43 155 7 Both upper and first-line management, should foster 12 9 7
feelings of ownership in the business and trust toward 
our leadership with our employees.
44 159 7 We should continuously improve our products and 11 10 7
services through the ever present questioning of the 
quality of what we do.
45 161 7 We should change our culture toward a greater diversity 9 8 5
of ideas, a management more in tune with our products 
and able to listen and respond to the concerns of our 
employees, and toward a more efficient business that 
fixes classes of problems instead of mostly just the 
single isolated problem.
46 111 5 We should establish a mechanism for sharing information 12 8 7
and innovations between branches, divisions, and 
departments.
47 114 5 We should prevent good ideas from dying at the working 10 8 7
level by effectively listening to such ideas.
48 157 5 We have difficulty changing, because it is hard for us to 10 9 7
imagine being better than we already are.
49 162 5 Quality management is how well long range goals and 9 8 3
plans are set and accomplished in continually improving 
our business and value to our customers. The "turn the crank, 
day to day get stuff done" should be a given and not a 
measure for quality management.
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1 1 13 Our first efforts at TQM failed. Our second efforts 13 6 10
appeared to produce significant gains, bat would have 
happened anyway. The gains were simply documented 
under the title of TQM.
2 31 13 We lack top management leadership, support, and vision. 14 6 8
Consequently, we have unclear goals and a fragmented 
TQM  approach.
3 34 13 Although TQM provides viable tools and philosophies that 14 7 9
can make our jobs more productive and rewarding, and 
our business more competitive, TQM  is bated by most, 
because upper management has misused TQM in self- 
serving ways, such as forcing unpopular decisions or 
labeling dissenters as not being team players.
4 32 12 TQM often serves as a scapegoat by different layers of 14 6 9
management who can’t make a decision: when they 
really don’t want to do anything, they form a committee.
5 144 12 Our current evaluation system that awards everyone an 13 7 9
"excellent" was founded on the misuse of our old system, 
i.e., a system that gave upper management and their staff 
a disproportionate number of ’’outstandings’’. Although 
our new system has resolved this problem, it has also 
removed a way of recognizing our top performers.
6 45 11 The division of our business into the two camps of "the 13 6 9
technical products” and "the business" has resulted in 
upper management trending mote toward mandates 
versus participatory management.
7 58 11 Much of our time and energy invested in TQM went into 13 6 10
generating statistics versus doing real things for the 
customer.
8 110 11 The recent "Driving out Fear" seminar held for all 10 6 9
middle and upper management encouraged all participants 
to openly discuss organizational perspectives that are 
not normally discussed. The purported purpose of this 
discussion was to "drive fear out of the work place" by 
bringing issues out into the open for public discussion and 
resolution. However, certain issues which were brought 
out were ultimately used against various individuals, and 
consequently the seminar did not drive out fear. Instead 
it instilled fear, and many of middle and upper 
management no longer feel they can discuss issues as 
openly as they once might have.
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9 140 11 Our current evaluation system was implemented under 13 5 8
the false assumption that Demming said to do away with 
performance evaluations. Demming actually said, 
institute leadership and a performance improvement 
program, and then do away with evaluations. Upper 
management did only the latter and not the former two.
10 125 10 Division heads are primarily focused on supporting top 12 7 9
management versus the branch beads, because upper 
management has demanded that the division heads work 
for upper management vs. the branch heads.
Consequently, most of the information demands of top 
management are simply passed to the branch heads.
These information demands coupled with the inescapable 
responsibilities of running the operations of the business 
have put an excessive work load on the branch heads, 
while the division heads are generally under employed.
11 46 9 Upper management's mandates and one way flow of 13 7 9
information has caused the first line manager's 
loyalties to become divided between the technical 
products functions and management functions.
12 90 9 In the absence of other higher leadership, it has largely 14 6 8
been left up to individual branches to define guiding 
philosophies, values, and/or principles, and to establish 
their own culture.
13 119 9 Top management does not posses the requisite depth of 12 6 8
knowledge on our programs, do not take appropriate 
business risks, and do not readily listen to lower level 
input, because most who have succeeded to top 
management are those who have played a political game 
of echoing higher management wants, versus taking risks 
to build our business and listening to their subordinates.
14 91 8 Exacerbating our lack of organizational philosophies 8 5 8
and goals is the unwillingness for most managers to 
make hard choices.
15 129 8 Most issues within our company are discussed freely 11 7 9
except upper management's lack of ability to listen to 
lower management, their degree of being out of touch 
with our business, and instances of their breaches of 
faith or confidentiality.
16 38 7 Since much of upper management does not understand the 11 7 8
products of our business, our efforts with TQM has 
focused on menial "we thought” internal problems, versus 
concentration on the customer and the technical systems 
that we support













£ Score What we believe and do. but don't say. £  1  W
108 6 The company as a whole has lost track of what generated 9 6 8
this company. Consequently, we have situations where we 
{the technical branches), the operations and money makers 
of the business, are subordinated to various support codes, 
versus being treated as their "customer''.
37 S TQM has caused middle and upper management’s focus 11 6 8
on quality to shift from an employee oriented focus to an 
upward trend line on a chart, and from listening to our 
customer needs to a self-generation of what upper 
management thinks the customer wants.
49 3 Because of our bureaucratic form o f  organization, many 9 6 8
things must necessarily be mandated. But, this has caused 
us to be comfortable with mandating, and consequently, we 
tend to mandate many things that could be decided in a 
participatory fashion.
115 3 Personnel with specialties in certain technical systems 9 7 8
that have been and are being phased out over time have 
not been effectively retrained or utilized in other areas.
This has resulted in them receiving compensations not 
commensurate with their contribution.
ANN Perspectives (W hat we believe, but don 't say or do)
# Agreeing
# §££££. What we believe, but don't sav or do. B T W
9 15 Upper management Quality Boards are unable to create 15 7 2
measures which have utility to the first line manager or 
to attend to the cost of doing the measure vs. how and 
who benefits.
154 13 Upper management is unable to make changes without 12 2 4
effectively consulting first line management Upper 
management should involve first line supervisors in 
formulating and planning changes.
8 12 We have not been able to "chart" quality according to our 12 5 2
intuitive understandings of what quality really is and 
what we need to do to achieve it.
30 9 Upper management has not maintain sight of the fact that 13 7 6
the primary source of our quality has been quality people,
This tends to erode our quality with time.
21 8 The most positive aspect of TQM is that it has occupied 10 3 5
upper management's time to a degree such that first line 
management can be somewhat more autonomous in the 
management of their respective areas.
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6 33 7 Higher management espouses empowerment of the lower 12 3 7
levels, but as soon as something goes wrong, the lower 
level "gets its head chopped off". This pretty effectively 
kills empowerment
7 36 7 Upper management cannot do TQM as designed or listen 10 4 5
to input from lower levels.
8 IS 7 We have not been able to facilitate conversations among 11 4 0
our technicians and first line supervisors as to how they 
experience quality in the things they do, and how these 
experiences might be exported beyond their local area of 
interactions.
9 131 7 Our leadership's number one current priority should be 13 7 6
to regain the confidence of our working level employees.
10 47 6 Mandates, such as the form on how well the technician 8 3 2
is performing his job, are taken personally as a lack 
of confidence, versus something that will help. It is 
difficult for first line managers to win support for such 
a form without prior buy-in.
11 32 6 We have not been able to gain employee enthusiasm for 13 6 7
TQM, because of an implied mandate that employees be 
enthusiastic about TQM. We have not been able to learn 
that enthusiasm cannot be mandated. It must come 
from within.
12 33 6 Top management makes more autocratic decisions than 10 6 6
they must An example is the decision to do away with 
empbyee evaluations. There was no immediacy to this 
decision, and since it affected the entire command, it 
should have been debated.
13 103 6 Most of the quality that our employees put into their 8 4 2
work effort is largely unrecognized by management, and 
the ways in which quality is normally recognized, i.e., 
charts on the wall, which say, "Look what I did", run 
counter to our culture, because we have a culture of not 
"tooting our own horn".
14 134 6 Top management has not created a culture to bring forth 14 6 5
our best ideas. Top management needs to facilitate the 
many innovations that exists in the lower levels of our 
organization; management should create forums and 
communications channels for innovative ideas, establish 
anonymous feedback channels, and reward risk and 
innovation.
15 145 6 The single positive aspect of our present evaluation 11 7 7
system is that it has eliminated top management and 
their administrative staffs from all receiving the 
highest possible rating at the expense of all others.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
338
#  Agreeing
Rank #  jSco.CS What we believe, but don't say or do. I  W
16 ISO 6 A performance improvement program should consist of a 9 6 2
circular process of defining and re-defining, evaluating 
and re-evaluating expectations between supervisor and 
subordinate. The supervisor and employee should not only 
mutually and jointly set and re-set standards for each 
other, but also should mutually and jointly evaluate each 
other against these standards. Each should not only have 
an active role in defining what each other's expectations 
should be, but also what one's own evaluation against the 
mutual and jointly set standards should be.
17 14 5 One of the best measures for quality management is the 10 7 4
quality displayed by their subordinates. This should be 
measured through surveys. Such surveys should measure 
both customer and employee satisfaction, and should be 
formulated through collaboration with both customers and 
employees.
18 40 5 In the course of our TQM efforts we have become divided 12 6 7
into two separate camps of "the shop floor " and "the 
business", where middle and upper managers have chosen 
to focus on the "up line" functions and let the "lower end" 
take care of the"shop f lo o r " by itself.
19 59 5 TQM team issues should be customer focused. Most 12 6 6
TQM issues we have worked have dealt with internal 
administrative processes. If they have bad an impact on 
our customers, it was by accident versus design. The 
processes we choose to work to improve should be 
focused and prioritized according to how it will improve 
the delivery of our products to our customers.
20 143 5 Our present evaluation system was adopted to ensure 8 5 3
that we meet an arbitrary criteria for achieving the 
average company evaluation grade. However, we are 
like "the Harvard of our company's subsidiary branches”
Our average evaluation grade should be higher!
21 156 5 Upper management has not only mandated change, they 10 5 4
have directed employees to be enthusiastic about i t  This 
solicits the opposite reaction, since enthusiasm cannot be 
directed, but must come from within.
22 29 4 Upper management tends to make awards in an ad hoc 11 7 5
fashion. They should establish an award system with 
specific criteria that would motivate employees to work 
toward goals implied by such an award system. They 
should create a perception of fairness in the competition 
for such awards.
23 50 4 Because we tend to mandate many things which do not need 9 6 6
to be mandated, we tend to waste time and energy on things 
that are simply not well thought out.
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24 51 4 Upper management has become so comfortable with the 9 4 5
mandate, they appear to mandate enthusiasm, trust, and 
respect These things cannot be mandated. They must be 
earned. Yet upper management appears to behave in a 
fashion that would indicate to first-line management and 
employees that they just don't understand this.
25 89 4 Our personnel do not look toward our published "Guiding 10 6 3
Philosophies" for guidance, because upper management has 
only espoused these philosophies, while at the same time 
they have generated frequently changing implicit and 
explicit guidance through their actions. Consequently, we 
do not possess a working set of organizational philosophies 
and goals to assist and guide managers in their decisions.
26 120 4 Much of upper and middle management does not understand 9 3 5
the technical aspects of our business. Consequently, it is 
difficult to include upper and middle management in 
decisions that involve the products of our business.
27 152 4 Middle and upper management espouse change and actually 9 5 7
think and believe they're for change, but their acdons 
preserve the status quo.
28 28 9 The single team award that was awarded in our department 9 6 5
last year resulted in alienating many, because the funds for 
our traditional special awards were used for the team award.
This would have been O.K., if management had established a 
team award and specific criteria. Instead, it was done after 
the fact, which produced a non-level playing field in 
the competition for award funds.
29 117 3 Upper management is unclear on their agenda. This 12 6 7
generates confusion as to what our priorities are or should 
be and a perception that priorities are set to benefit upper 
management more than anyone else.
30 39 2 Our past TQM efforts floundered because management 9 6 6
would not require those who did not lend support to TQM 
efforts to make an equitable contribution. If we are to have 
a Total Quality program, management needs to require 
participation from everyone.
31 48 2 We should return to conversations on our perceptions of 10 7 3
quality in order to regain our focus on the whole.
32 112 2 Upper management has no formalized mechanism to 9 2 4
document and resolve front-line problems. Consequently, 
their focus is on conversations that occur across top layers 
of management. This results in one way dictations to lower 
management and front-line frustrations in voicing problems, 
since such problems are mostly outside their awareness.
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33 122 2 Upper management's inattention to our business, by 10 6 4
necessity, promotes autonomy and independence.
However, this same inattention breeds an ignorance that 
results in over reaction when political situations arise.
Such over reaction, on the other hand, stymies the very 
autonomy that is needed if upper management is to remain 
ignorant of the products and operations of our business.
Upper management needs either to be more familiar with 
our business or less prone to react in political situations.
34 127 2 Upper management espouses initiatives, such as, we 10 5 7
need to improve our correspondence, but they often 
fail to support what they espouse with resources, 
such as requisite secretarial support
35 149 2 Our new evaluation system, which grades everyone 10 7 4
nearly the same, fails to foster pride. We should focus 
on how to reinstitute this essential element into our 
evaluation system.
36 63 1 TQM team training should be accomplished "just in time". 9 7 6
Instead, we took a "shotgun" approach resulting in a poor 
return on investment Many never used the training, while 
others forgot what they learned by the time they were in a 
position to employ such training.
37 66 1 We were not able to effectively establish the behavioral, 8 4 5
human resource, training, team building, and facilitator 
infrastructure in our TQM implementation, because we 
tried to do too much too fast
38 92 1 Lack of top management vision, goals, and support is a 14 7 5
poor excuse for lower management not to enact their own 
vision, goals, and support at their own levels.
39 102 1 Higher management has problems listening to lower level 11 7 5
input, and to admit that they don't know it all, because 
they largely come from an all male hierarchal culture, 
which says "the leader should know it alL"
40 118 0 Top management has trouble making good sound decisions, 9 5 6
because: a) they do not have the necessary depth of 
knowledge of our programs; b) they are not willing to take 
risks for long term dividends; c) they do not readily take 
input from the bottom.
41 128 0 Management sends a strong signal as to what is 9 7 7
importantby whom they promote. Promotions, which 
are contrary to what management espouses, or 
promotions which are based on a crediting plan that is 
revised as the promotion is determined, result in a 
breach of trust
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42 164 0 A circular process of feedback cm the local level by the 9 7 6
technician, and feedback on larger issues to the 
technician, is critical to strategic planning at the branch 
level. A circular process of feedback between lower and 
higher levels of management is critical to our strategic 
planning. Circular processes of feedback between levels 
of management at our company are nearly non-existent, 
which is a primary reason we do very little strategic 
planning.
43 178 -1 During the course of this study, several major moves 10 7 5
have taken place that will surely impact some of the 
perspectives as they are related here. I believe the 
impact will be positive as long as the major focus of 
customer support is maintained.
NNA Perspectives (W hat we don 't believe or say, but do anyway)
# Agreeing
Rank # Score What we don't believe or say, but do anvwav. B T W
1 56 3 It is difficult to practice Total Quality in a bureaucratic 7 7 8
organization, since management is highly constrained 
by rules and regulations in what it can or cannot do.
NNN Perspectives (What we don't believe, say, or do)
# Agreeing
Bank t  Score Whauye.tlon!ti?eHe.ve^§ay,.QrjB>. fi I  w
1 26 23 We do not have an adequate award system, or much 3 3 1
less, any type of TQM award system. Currently, the 
only awards are special awards, and often these binds 
go unused.
2 169 16 Our current system of evaluation and rewards presents 3 1 1
resistance to formulating programs to resolve classes 
of technical problems, because our managers' 
performance objectives are in part based on the number 
of resolved technical problems.
3 25 9 Rewards for quality are problematic and too often 4 4 3
counter-productive due to favoritism that arises out of 
our "good ole boy" network.
4 126 9 We are over-managed. We could improve our 6 4 1
effectiveness by returning to branch heads as division 
heads and thereby eliminating current division heads.
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5 105 6 We lack in diversity, because, traditionally, new hires 6 4 5
are nearly all male and come from a single culture. This 
lack of diversity resulting from our homogeneous male 
culture with a singular business orientation, binds us 
into limited ways of seeing and addressing our problems 
and issues.
6 104 5 Our culture does not promote TQM's premise of 2 2 2
participatory management If a manager tries to include 
his employees in as many decisions as possible, he may 
often be told, "You've got one foot in the supervisors 
office, and the other out on the floor, and you can't have 
both."
7 147 5 Our evaluation system is flawed in it’s premise that
nearly everybody will get the same mark. This system, 
along with other constraints imposed by upper 
management essentially has destroyed the supervisor’s 
ability to evaluate his employees.
8 121 3 Without understanding the technical aspects of our
business, higher management's focus has been other 
than our products. Consequently, there is no higher 
management encouragement of excellence in our 
products. This has resulted in our products trending 
towards mediocre as time progresses.
9 153 2 The main impediments to our learning are:
a) the bureaucratic barriers to ideas presented by our 
many layers o f  management;
b) the non-willingness of top management to take input 
from the bottom; and
c) the reluctance of top management to share risk with 
lower management.
10 16 1 It would now be difficult for us to evaluate our quality
by the perceptions of the people who are closest to the 
products of the business only because this is what we 
use to do before we felt the need to have a label for it, 
and consequendy, it would be perceived by some as 
going backwards.
11 142 0 Our current evaluation system arose from not only tying
evaluations to the distribution of monetary awards, but 
also from the failure of upper management to address the 
equitable distribution of monetary rewards across our 
various branches, divisions, and departments. This 
situation was further exacerbated by upper and middle 
management's failure to assure full utilization of reward 
assets by the end of the fiscal year as a matter of course.
12 160 -1 We need to diversify in our new hires, such as female
engineers from other than our traditional sources, so 
that we will be able to posses more diverse ideas in our 
decision making processes.
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13 176 -3 With the increasing emphasis of the "shop floor” as our 6 5 5
customer, our work is becoming more of a "turn key" 
operation vs. "bands in the pocket" technicians. Our 
customers want equipments fixed. For this reason we 
will, over time, acquire and evolve into warehouse 
facilities vs. just office facilities.
14 106 -7 If we were more aware of our technical vs. humanistic, 6 3 3
independent vs. cooperative, reactive vs. pro-active 
natures, we would be able to more effectively adapt our 
culture to TQM principles.
15 109 -7 We tend to loose track of our priorities due to 6 5 5
"scattered signs of self interest."
16 107 -10 There is minimal distinction of branch or division by 7 5 5
employees at the working level, especially when 
assigned to work together fo r  a single customer as 
a team. Distinctions that are made between the various 
branches or divisions usually occur at the branch or 
division level of management




B-T, B-W, AND T-W GAPS
The table 5 on the following page shows the differences, i.e. the "gaps", between 
the assessments for the "belief, "talk", and "walk" scales for the composite perspectives. 
The score for each scale is calculated by numbering the responses for the assessments of 
the composite perspectives from 1 thru 7 corresponding to the seven Likert scale 
distinctions from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree". For example, a score of 4.0 on a 
scale would indicate there are as many participants who disagree, and by the same 
magnitude, as there are participants who agree. The absolute difference of these scores for 
each of the three possible pairs of scales for each perspective is then calculated. For 
example, a difference of 1.0 for any one of the three possible pairs of scales would indicate 
that the participants' assessments have an average difference of one interval between their 
assessments for the two scales under consideration. (See appendix 4 for a visual 
representation of the scales for each perspective of the composite perspectives). Note that 
there are six intervals on the seven point Likert scale used in this research, so that the 
maximum difference that may occur is six intervals in the case where for a perspective all 
participants together assess the opposite ends of the two scales under consideration.
Columns labeled "#" in table 5 refer to the perspective number, as labeled in 
appendix 4. Columns labeled B-T refer to the assessment difference between the "belief1 
and "talk" scales for the perspective number indicated in the corresponding row. Columns 
labeled B-W refer to the assessment difference between the "belief1 and "walk" scales for 
the perspective number indicated in the corresponding row. Columns labeled T-W refer to 
the assessment difference between the "talk" and "walk" scales for the perspective number 
indicated in the corresponding row.
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# B-T B-W m . # B-T B-W T-W # B£E B-W T-W # B-T B-W T-W
1 1.5 0.6 0.9 49 0.3 0.3 0.1 97 0.3 2.7 2.4 145 1.4 1.6 0.2
2 1.3 0.9 0.4 50 1 0.9 0.1 98 0.8 1.2 0.4 146 0.3 0.1 0.2
3 0.5 0.6 0.1 51 0.9 0.7 0.2 99 0 0.1 0.1 147 0.1 0.1 0
4 0.1 0.7 0.9 52 1.3 1.1 0.1 100 0.6 1.9 1.3 148 0.2 0.1 0.1
5 0.1 1.7 1.5 53 0.3 0.7 0.5 101 0.3 0.1 0.2 149 0.5 1 0.5
6 0.3 2.1 1.8 54 0.7 0.9 0.2 102 0.4 1.1 0.7 150 0.8 1.5 0.7
7 0.3 3.3 3 55 0.9 1.4 0.5 103 1 1.4 0.4 151 0.5 1.7 1.2
8 1.9 2 0.1 56 0.3 0.7 0.4 104 0.3 0.1 0.2 152 1 0.7 0.3
9 2 3.5 1.5 57 0.1 0.1 0 105 0.1 0.1 0.1 153 0.5 0.2 0.3
10 1.7 2.9 1.1 58 1.6 0.9 0.7 106 0.4 0.4 0 154 1.9 2 0.1
11 0.9 1.9 1 59 1.1 1.4 0.3 107 0.3 0.5 0.1 155 0.7 0.8 0.1
12 1.4 2.9 1.5 60 0.6 0.3 0.3 108 0.6 0.2 0.4 156 1 1.1 0.1
13 0.5 2.2 1.7 61 1 1.9 0.9 109 0.1 0.1 0.1 157 0.2 0.5 0.3
14 0.6 1.5 0.9 62 0.6 1 0.4 110 1.3 0.5 0.8 158 0.3 0.3 0.7
15 0.8 1.6 0.8 63 0.5 0.9 0.4 111 0.5 0.6 0.1 159 0.1 0.7 0.7
16 0.2 0.2 0 64 0.3 0.5 0.1 112 0.9 0.8 0.1 160 0.3 0 0.3
17 1.8 1.2 0.6 65 1.1 0.8 0.3 113 0.3 1.3 1 161 0.3 0.8 0.5
18 0.8 1.5 0.7 66 0.6 0.4 0.2 114 0.3 0.5 0.2 162 0.1 0.7 0.6
19 1.3 1.2 0.1 67 0.6 1.1 0.5 115 0.1 0.1 0.1 163 0.5 0.4 0.1
20 0.7 1.1 0.3 68 0.2 1.5 1.3 116 0.5 1.7 1.2 164 0.2 0.5 0.3
21 1.3 1.1 0.3 69 0 0.5 0.5 117 1.3 1.1 0.2 165 0.5 1.1 0.6
22 1.5 2 0.5 70 0.7 1.3 0.6 118 0.7 0.5 0.2 166 0.3 0.5 0.2
23 1.3 1.2 0.1 71 0.3 2 1.7 119 1.4 0.8 0.6 167 0.2 0.2 0
24 0.9 1.4 0.5 72 0.3 2 1.7 120 1.1 0.8 0.3 168 0.3 0.9 0.6
25 0.3 0.1 0.5 73 0.2 1.1 0.9 121 0.1 0.4 0.3 169 0.2 0.1 0.1
26 0.5 0.2 0.7 74 0.7 1.3 0.5 122 0.5 0.9 0.4 170 0.3 0.5 0.2
27 0.3 1.5 1.3 75 1.1 2.2 l.l 123 1.7 0.9 0.8 171 0.2 0.6 0.8
28 0.5 0.9 0.4 76 0.8 2.6 1.8 124 0.4 0.9 0.5 172 0.5 1.4 0.9
29 0.6 1.4 0.8 77 0.3 1.7 1.3 125 1.4 1.1 0.3 173 0.3 0.3 0.5
30 1.9 1.8 0.1 78 0.8 2 1.2 126 0.2 0.8 0.6 174 0.6 1.7 1.1
31 2.3 1.6 0.7 79 0.9 2.2 1.3 127 0.9 0.5 0.4 175 0.3 1.2 0.9
32 2 1.3 0.7 80 0.6 1.1 0.5 128 0.5 0.8 0.3 176 0.1 0.1 0.1
33 1.5 0.9 0.5 81 0.1 0.5 0.7 129 0.7 0.3 0.3 177 0.6 0.5 0.1
34 2 1.3 0.7 82 0.3 0.6 0.3 130 1.1 2.3 1.2 178 0.3 0.7 0.3
35 1.6 1.1 0.5 83 1 1 0 131 1 1.9 0.9 179 0.3 0.3 0.1
36 1.3 1.5 0.1 84 1.5 2.1 0.5 132 1 1.9 0.9 180 0.7 0.9 0.3
37 0.8 0.5 0.3 85 0.5 0.7 0.2 133 0.9 1.7 0.7 181 1 1.3 0.3
38 1.2 0.9 0.3 86 0.5 0.9 0.5 134 1.2 1.7 0.5
39 0.7 0.6 0.1 87 0.3 0.5 0.1 135 0.4 1.5 1.1
40 1.3 1.1 0.2 88 0.5 1.7 1.2 136 0.7 1.9 1.2 Ave
41 0.9 1.8 0.9 89 0.9 1.5 0.5 137 1.1 2.1 1 Gap 0.6 0.7 1.1
42 0.7 2.7 2 90 1.7 1.3 0.5 138 0.3 1.3 1
43 0.7 2.6 1.9 91 1.2 0 1.2 139 0.2 1.4 1.2
44 0.4 1.7 1.3 92 1.1 1.3 0.2 140 1.8 1.3 0.5
45 1.7 1.2 0.5 93 0.7 0.9 0.1 141 0.9 2.3 1.5
46 1.1 0.7 0.4 94 0.5 1.6 l.l 142 0.2 0.3 0.1
47 0.9 1 0.1 95 0.3 1.5 1.2 143 0.7 1.1 0.5
48 0.3 0.9 0.7 96 0.1 1.1 1.1 144 1.8 1.2 0.6
Table 5. B-T, B-W, and T-W Gaps.
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